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ABSTRACT
Stated simply, this thesis is an attempt to utilize aspects o f the 
philosophical hermeneutics o f Hans-Georg Gadamer in the interpretation 
of some ancient texts, and in the understanding o f how interpreters o f 
those ancient texts have acted hermeneutically toward both the texts and 
other interpreters. On one level, this thesis is relevant to those interested 
primarily in philosophical approaches to interpretation, and not 
necessarily expert in the interpretation o f the New Testament. It can be 
seen as a test-case and development o f Gadamer’s philosophy. On 
another level, this thesis is an example o f technical interpretation o f Paul 
and material relating to Paul in the New Testament. The work’s 
arguments in this vein are meant to stand up to the linguistic and 
historical rigour in which New Testament scholars pride themselves, and 
by which the discipline where it’s author has made his academic start will 
test this thesis. This group o f concerns does not always obviously follow  
Gadamer’s interests and motivation, but it is hoped that the application o f 
Gadamer’s philosophy to a different field will demonstrate its wider 
usefulness. Both aspects will need to be understood in tandem. As 
Gadamer in his philosophy relies on the interpretation o f texts to both 
develop and demonstrate his philosophical hermeneutics, so too does this 
study’s interpretation o f ancient texts form the basis for its 
implementation and development o f—sometimes departure from— 
Gadamenan philosophical hermeneutics. Likewise, it is not possible to 
somehow separate the interpretation o f Paul from the philosophical 
framework o f this thesis.
To Diane, Brendan and Dylan: 
I  love you deeply
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INTRODUCTORY PREFACE
Stated simply, this thesis is an attempt to utilize aspects o f the 
philosophical hermeneutics o f Hans-Georg Gadamer in the 
interpretation of some ancient texts, and in the understanding of how 
interpreters of those ancient texts have acted hermeneutically toward 
both the texts and other interpreters. On one level, I hope this thesis 
will be read by those interested primarily in philosophical approaches 
to hermeneutics, and not necessarily expert in the interpretation of the 
New Testament. It can be seen as a test-case and development of 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. On another level, this thesis is 
an example of technical interpretation of Paul and material relating to 
Paul in the New Testament. My arguments in this vein are meant to 
stand up to the linguistic and historical rigour in which New  
Testament scholars pride themselves, and by which the discipline 
where I have made my academic start will test this thesis. This group 
of concerns does not always obviously follow Gadamer’s interests and 
motivation, but it is hoped that the application of Gadamer’s 
philosophy to a different field will demonstrate its wider usefulness. 
Where possible, in the interests of the reader primarily interested in 
hermeneutics, I have translated all of the ancient Greek and Latin texts 
upon which I base my interpretation, but occasionally it is not possible 
to explain close linguistic analysis to those unable to read and analyze 
Hellenistic Greek. I have also tried, in chapter 1, to outline the way in 
which I understand Gadamer’s hermeneutics, for the benefit largely of 
those readers who do not know of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics, or for those who understand by ‘hermeneutics’ 
primarily a method-based approach to interpretation.
It is important, however, that both sets of readers understand that, to 
understand both aspects of what I have done here, both aspects will 
need to be understood in tandem. As Gadamer in his philosophy relies 
on the interpretation of texts to both develop and demonstrate his 
philosophical hermeneutics, so too does my interpretation of ancient 
texts form the basis for my implementation and development 
of— som etim es departure from— Gadamerian philosophical 
hermeneutics. Likewise, it is not possible to somehow separate my 
interpretation of Paul from the philosophical framework of this thesis.
I have just mentioned that I have occasionally departed from 
Gadamer, or worked to develop his philosophy. My focus on Gadamer
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is not just supplemented, but directed and disturbed by two other foci: 
(1) as mentioned, the New Testament texts examined in this thesis, as 
well as the concerns which surround this literature; and (2) other 
scholarship on the features I have drawn from Gadamer, not only 
those with whom Gadamer interacted, but also some not mentioned by 
him,1 or with whom Gadamer overtly disagrees,2 who provide critical 
variation to Gadamer’s approach. Despite the pre-eminence of 
Gadamer’s work in this thesis, I do not consider m yself to be a 
‘Gadamerian’, as such. Nor is this thesis meant to be a systematic 
implementation of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in all areas 
of its purview. I make no mention, for instance, of much of 
Gadamer’s theories of language and the development of a concept of 
language.3 It is simply an attempt to isolate some of those features in 
Gadamer’s work which appear to be appreciated by some scholars as 
substantive for looking at past literature and providing ways forward 
to investigate it .4
1 E.g. in discussion of the role of consciousness and unconsciousness in 
Gadamer’s concept of a horizon, below, p. 13 n. 37, S. Gardner, Irrationality and 
the Philosophy o f Psychoanalysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996); in tightening Gadamer’s concept of ‘validity’, below, p. 10 n. 28, T.J. 
Smiley, ‘Consequence, Conceptions o f , REP 2.599-603; and even, by way of G. 
Warnke’s appropriation and interaction with him (in Legitimate Differences: 
Interpretation in the Abortion Controversy and Other Public Debates [Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1999]), the ethical philosophy of the analytical 
philosopher Bernard Williams (in his Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy 
[Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985]).
2 Here especially I must mention my use of the work of Jacques Derrida, 
who, though apparently in contradistinction to Gadamer’s focus in his own 
philosophy, occasionally provides necessary supplementation of Gadamer’s 
points. See below, pp. 8, 14, 22, 28, and esp. p. 137; but see also p. 22 and esp. p. 
29, where Gadamer and Derrida’s disagreements are given their proper weight.
3 Cf. H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (trans. J.C. Weinsheimer and D.G. 
Marshall; London: Sheed and Ward, 2nd rev. edn, 1989 [trans. from 5th German 
edn.]) 405-91.
4 Cf., e.g., D. Davidson, ‘Gadamer and Plato’s Philebus\ in Hahn (ed.), 
LLP, 421-32; G. Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, Tradition and Reason 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) 90, on Gadamer’s own reading of classical Greek 
texts; T. Prufer, ‘A Thought or Two on Gadamer’s Plato’, in Hahn (ed.), LLP, 
549-51, and Gadamer’s following response to that essay, pp. 552-54; and C.H. 
Zuckert, Postmodern Platos: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, Strauss, Derrida 
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996) 70-103.
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I have attempted to use Gadamer’s philosophy in two primary ways. 
On the one hand, Gadamer’s meta-critical discourse5 is useful in 
helping to illuminate, and perhaps helping to correct, the role of 
unquestioned assumption in the on-going study of Paul. Chapter 2, 
illuminating the role that a convenient ‘background’ story to the letter 
to Philemon has played in its interpretation; and Chapter 3, 
investigating two key assumptions about the role that Acts has to play 
in the understanding and re-construction of Paul’s career, especially 
relate to this element. On the other hand, Gadamer’s work is , also 
useful in illuminating how Paul himself works as a hermeneutical 
figure in dialectical relationship to his audiences and influences. In 
Chapter 4, two case studies in the text of Romans show the way in 
which Paul uses, alludes to, and interacts with traditional material to 
engage in dialogue with and interrogate his audience. In the first 
place, he uses a satirical caricature of Egyptian religion— present in 
Roman popular culture— to draw his audience into the dialectical 
discourse he carries on throughout the rest of the letter. In the second 
case study, I show how this same religious background, despite 
constant objection to it in the history of interpretation since the demise 
o f the religions-historical school, most likely underlies the 
interpretation of baptism used by Paul in Romans 6. This use of 
traditional material on the part of Paul is ironical, and creative, while 
still being the result of ‘influence’. Chapter 5 focuses on issues 
surrounding the relationship of Paul and James, and, by a novel 
interpretation of the letter of James and aspects of Paul’s career, helps 
to develop a model for ‘dialectical mapping’ of relations between 
individual authors.
The different case studies which make up the bulk of this thesis 
may not in themselves seem, at first glance, to have a unity—this is 
not the case. All of them are areas either where the interpretative 
state-of-play in the study of Paul has never or only rarely been 
questioned, or where critical concern has reacted against a particular 
interpretation in such a way that the discipline no longer considers 
that interpretation to be a valid consideration. The studies take as their
5 Gadamer’s explicit purpose for his philosophical hermeneutics is to 
function on a meta-critical level to describe the process of understanding {Truth 
and Method, Part II: ‘Elements of a Theory of Hermeneutic Experience’). While 
this does not eliminate the usefulness of his hermeneutical description to 
interrogate the meaning of texts, it does form the primary stated purpose of 
Gadamer’s philosophical programme.
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focal point the figure of Paul, although they do not limit themselves to 
his letters alone. As perhaps the most influential figure in the New  
Testament besides Jesus himself, Paul has left his mark in many 
places his pen did not touch. As a result, only two of my four chapters 
on Pauline questions focus on Paul’s letters, and the remaining two 
focus on Acts and James in turn. In a sense, even though these studies 
cluster around Paul, they relate to the notion that a series of different 
examples may exemplify a function of an idea or a concept other than 
itself—in this case, this is the concept of Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics as an aid both to interrogate New Testament authors, 
and in turn to interrogate the interpreters of those authors.
To signal the programmatic difference between this kind of 
approach to ‘hermeneutics’ and that typically understood by biblical 
scholarship, Gadamer’s comments on the beginning— as he sees 
it— of a science of hermeneutics require a brief note. He states, with 
regard to Schleiermacher’s development of ‘the science of  
hermeneutics’, that this ‘is not...just one more stage in the history of 
the art of understanding’.6 He states further,
The history of understanding has been accompanied, since the days of 
classical philology, by theoretical reflection. But these reflections have the 
character of a ‘technique’—i.e., they try to serve the art of understanding, 
just as rhetoric tries to serve the art of speaking, and ‘poetics’ the art and 
appreciation of poetry. In this sense both the theological hermeneutics o f  
the fathers and that o f the Reformation were techniques. But now 
understanding as such becomes a problem. The universality of this 
problem shows that understanding has become a task in a new sense, and 
hence theoretical reflection acquires a new significance. It is no longer a 
set o f techniques guiding the practice o f philologist or theologian J
My approach in this thesis is dedicated to the problem of  
understanding as such in connection with the study of one ancient 
thinker and his interaction with his contemporaries. I am not seeking 
here to develop a technique, nor to denigrate other techniques for the 
study of texts— ancient or otherwise. Although I recognize that the 
use of the term ‘hermeneutics’ in biblical studies as a whole tends to 
denote a technique-orientation, I do not position my use of Gadamer 
in such a vein. In fact, my choice of Gadamer as primary dialogue 
partner in the discission of a hermeneutic approach to New Testament 
texts is partly predicated on the fact that he has not been so used in the
6 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 178.
7 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 178 (emphasis added).
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past, and that he himself gives little attention to biblical texts, and so 
is less obviously pressed into service as a maker of ‘techniques for 
interpretation’ than those philosophers and theoreticians who have so 
turned their attentions. A figure such as Schleiermacher, whose work 
forms the basis of and impetus for much of the modern ‘science’ of 
biblical hermeneutics,8 might seem a more obvious first choice for 
one interested in taking a philosophically-informed approach to 
biblical texts. However, it is precisely because a figure such as 
Schliermacher has dealt so extensively with biblical texts that I have 
chosen to avoid his work for this present study (except where 
Gadamer interacts with him). To bring new life into a discussion, it 
may sometimes be necessary to introduce a new voice. That is my 
goal in this present study.
Here the title ‘philosophical’ hermeneutics, chosen by Gadamer in 
part to set his hermeneutics apart from such technique-orientation, 
comes into its own. My use of Gadamer’s hermeneutics to elucidate 
not only the approach of modern interpreters to the biblical texts, but 
also to map the dialectical relations between Paul himself and others 
of his contemporaries sets my efforts apart from others who have 
attempted to include hermeneutics in biblical studies. Nonetheless, 
this thesis is also an example of close textual analysis and wide-scale 
historical reconstruction redolent of ‘traditional’ biblical studies. In 
this vein, I hope that it stands as an example of Gadamer’s words: 
‘The universality of this problem shows that understanding has 
become a task in a new sense, and hence theoretical reflection 
acquires a new significance’, but also to show in this theoretical 
reflection that it truly ‘is no longer a set of techniques guiding the 
practice of philologist or theologian’.
8 Cf. F. Schleiermacher, Brief Outline on the Study o f Theology (trans. with 
intro. T.N. Tice; Atlanta: John Knox, 1966), and idem. Hermeneutics and 
Criticism and Other Writings (trans. and ed. A. Bowie; Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Philosophy; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). See also 
below, Appendix A, for more thorough analysis of the current state-of-play in 
New Testament ‘ hermeneutics ’.
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CHAPTER 1
A PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTIC: PAUL, HIS 
INTERPRETERS, AND THE LOGIC OF QUESTION AND
ANSWER
Socrates: ...The gods, then, as I said, handed down to us this mode
of investigating, learning, and teaching one another; but 
the wise men of the present day make the one and the 
many too quickly or too slowly, in haphazard fashion, and 
they put infinity immediately after unity; they disregard all 
that lies between them, and this it is which distinguishes 
between the dialectic and the disputatious methods of 
discussion.
Protarchus: I think I understand you in part, Socrates, but I need a 
clearer statement of some things.
(Plato, Philebus 16E-17A, LCL)
INTRODUCTION
The philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer have been 
one of the most influential forces in twentieth-century hermeneutics. 
They have been assimilated, polemicized against, dialogued with, and 
generally discussed in, especially, legal,1 theological,2 and literary3 
circles. Truth and Method, published in German in I9604 and first
1 E.g. R. Dworkin, A Matter o f Principle (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1985); and discussion in G. Warnke, Gadamer: Hermeneutics, 
Tradition and Reason (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987) 54-55. The explicit 
treatment of legal hermeneutics in Truth and Method ( ‘The Exemplary 
Significance of Legal Hermeneutics’, 324-41—see below, nn. 4 and 5 for full 
bibliographic details) perhaps especially paved the way for this discussion
2 See below, ‘Appendix A: An Indicative Survey of Gadamer’s 
Hermeneutics in New Testament Theology, Hermeneutics, and Criticism’, 283- 
294.
3 E.g. R.E. Palmer, Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, 
Dilthey, Heidegger, and Gadamer (Northwestern University Studies in 
Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy; Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1969), among others discussed below.
4 H.-G. Gadamer, Wahrheit undMethode (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1960;
2nd edn, 1965; 5th edn 1986).
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translated into English in 1975,5 quickly became a standard reference 
in any discussion of modern hermeneutics. However, for all of this 
quick reception among varied human sciences, the appropriation of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics has been strikingly varied. Certain 
disciplines have seen a marked resistance to Gadamer,6 while, 
conversely, others have made extensive utilization o f his 
hermeneutical programme for their own work. The latter is true 
especially of literary theory,7 although at least one important literary
5 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method (trans. W. Glen-Doepel [not 
identified]; ed. G. Barden and J. Gumming; London: Sheed and Ward, 1975) = 
2nd German edn. Now trans. J.C. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall; 2nd rev. edn, 
1989 = 5th German edn. Page references in the present work are to the second 
English translation.
6 See below, p. 4 n. 11, for the various attempts to polemicize against 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, from various disciplines and positions.
7 J.C. Weinsheimer, one of the translators of the second English translation 
of Truth and Method, has written two books on Gadamer and philosophical 
hermeneutics in general: Gadamer’s Hermeneutics: A Reading o f Truth and 
Method (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985), and 
Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory (New Haven and London: Yale 
University Press, 1991). G.L. Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), is mostly an attempt to utilize 
the findings of philosophical hermeneutics for literary theory, albeit not 
exclusively Gadamer’s. G.B. Madison’s The Hermeneutics o f Postmodernity: 
Figures and Themes (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana State University 
Press, 1988) is also largely concerned with literary theory, and, of course. 
Palmer’s early Hermeneutics: Interpretation Theory in Schleiermacher, Dilthey, 
Heidegger, and Gadamer is concerned with the then-dominant New Critical 
approach to literary criticism. Cf. D.E. Linge’s ‘Editor’s Introduction’ to H.-G. 
Gadamer, Philosophical Hermeneutics (trans. and ed. D.E. Linge; Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976) xi-lviii; D.G. Marshall, ‘Reading as 
Understanding: Hermeneutics and Reader-Response Criticism’, Christianity and 
Literature 33 (1983) 37-48; idem, ‘Truth, Universality, and Interpretation’, in R. 
Lundin (ed.), Disciplining Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Christian Perspective 
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997) 69-84; and T. Kisiel, ‘The Happening of 
Tradition: The Hermeneutics of Gadamer and Heidegger’, in R. Hollinger (ed.), 
Hermeneutics and Praxis (Revisions; Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1985) 3-31 (originally published in Man and World 2.3 [1969] 358-85), 
who discusses the differences between these two philosophers’ hermeneutics. The 
most cogent discussions of Gadamer in the field of New Testament criticism have 
been those by A. Thiselton: The Two Horizons: New Testament Hermeneutics and 
Philosophical Description with Special Reference to Heidegger, Bultmann, 
Gadamer, and Wittgenstein (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980); idem . New
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theorist— E.D. Hirsch, Jr.— has met Gadamer’s work with outright 
derision.8 As a result, conflicts between Gadamer and other theorists 
have received much attention, and occupied perhaps more than their 
requisite share of the secondary literature devoted to summarizing 
and/or applying Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Although this is 
understandable, given the extensive scope of Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
and the various controversies in which they have become involved, it 
would seem that there is room for application of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics in terms of his own philosophical programme, rather 
than just discussion of the controversies they have inspired. I will, as a 
result, make reference to these criticisms only when they impinge on 
the use of Gadamer in New Testament studies, and dedicate the larger 
part of this chapter to an elucidation of the way in which Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics can provide a corrective for New Testament historical 
criticism of Paul.
One of the chief difficulties with secondary literature on Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics in the area of New Testament studies is that, in many 
cases, it seems that authors often provide citations of an epitome of 
Gadamer. Often, it seems that this epitome or impression of Gadamer 
owes more to the criticisms of such key figures as Betti, Apel or 
Habermas, rather than to reading Gadamer himself.9 As a result, there 
are important aspects of Gadamer’s hermeneutics that have been 
missed, as they are not those aspects which have been drawn out by
Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice o f Transforming Biblical 
Reading (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992).
8 E.D. Hirsch, Jr., ‘Appendix II: Gadamer’s Theory of Interpretation’, in his 
Validity in Interpretation (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967) 
245-64. Cf. Warnke, Gadamer, 42-54, 62, and below, p. 17.
9 For example, consider S. Schneiders’s article, ‘From Exegesis to 
Hermeneutics: The Problem of the Contemporary Meaning of Scripture’, 
Horizons 8 (1981) 23-39, here 34-35: ‘Like the musician playing Mozart or the 
actor playing Hamlet, the interpreter is “performing the text” and the performance 
is satisfying, illuminating, and transforming to the extent that it is both faithful to 
the text and creatively original in execution’. In a footnote she explains, ‘This 
analogy with musical interpretation...occurred to me as I meditated on Gadamer’s 
illuminating analysis of the play as clue to the ontological explanation in Truth 
and Method, pp. [lOlff.]’. This idea had occurred to Gadamer at an earlier date, 
{Truth and Method, 310; cf. also H.-G. Gadamer and P. Ricoeur, ‘The Conflict of 
Interpretations’, in R. Bruzina and B. Wilshire [eds.], Phenomenology: Dialogues 
and Bridges [Selected Studies in Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy 8; 
Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982] 318-19).
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either Gadamer’s epitomizers or his dialogue partners, hostile or 
otherwise.10 It is plausible to suppose that it is these aspects of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics which may prove the more helpful for 
interpretative disciplines.
USING GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS IN PAULINE CRITICISM
Gadamer's Hermeneutical Programme
As suggested above, the use of Gadamer’s philosophy has been, in 
many cases, less than true to Gadamer’s stated aims. As a result, many 
beneficial aspects of his hermeneutical programme have been under­
utilized, and there has been un-due concentration on those areas to 
which Gadamer does not pay attention (or, from the standpoint of his 
critics, adequate attention). As mentioned above, many o f the 
responses to Gadamer in New Testament studies reflect those 
criticisms levelled against Gadamer by Emilio Betti, Karl-Otto Apel, 
and Jürgen Habermas—his most distinguished conversation partners. 
Their objections can be summarized in two points. They assert that 
Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is dangerous in that (1) it 
weakens the basis of scientific objectivity, and (2) it does not provide 
a method for recovering such objectivity.11 As Gadamer has
10 Many of the more conservative reactions to Gadamer in New Testament 
studies have followed the lines of such critics as Betti and Hirsch—so-called 
‘objectivist’ or ‘reconstructive’ critics—and often vilify Gadamer in the process 
as if he has set out to ‘attack’ objectivity. Cf. J. Grunfeld, ‘Gadamer’s 
Hermeneutics’, Science et Esprit 41 (1989) 231-36, here 236: ‘[Gadamer] 
emphasizes the metaphorical character of language use, while this inevitably 
remains parasitic on literal meaning’. Grunfeld’s discussion of Gadamer 
continually assigns prescriptive motives to what are, for Gadamer, primarily 
descriptive elements of his philosophy. E.g. he suggests that ‘[Gadamer] merely 
requires that every text should be appreciated from a perspective that is 
appropriate to it, yet fails to specify which point of view is the appropriate one for 
any given occasion’ (p. 234, emphasis added), which demonstrates an almost total 
lack of engagement with Gadamer’s discussion of the function of horizons in 
interpretation (see my discussion below, p. 12).
11 See E. Betti, ‘L ’Ermeneutica storica e la storicità dell intenderre’, Annali 
della Facolta’ di Giurisprudenza di Bari 16 (1961) 1-28; idem, ‘Hermeneutics as 
the General Methodology of the Geisteswissenschaften’, trans. J. Bleicher in J. 
Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy and 
Critique (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980) 51-94 = Die Hermeneutik 
als allgemeine Methodik der Geisteswissenschaften (Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 
1962). Much of Gadamer’s hermeneutics stands in stark contrast to the earlier
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answered, however, ‘Fundamentally I am not proposing a method’, I 
am describing what is the cased12 And, elsewhere, ‘It is a naive 
misunderstanding (furthered by Betti’s adherents) to fear that the 
hermeneutic reflection I practise will mean a weakening of scientific 
objectivity.’13 As Gadamer characterizes Betti’s debate with him: ‘he 
sees nothing in my work but equivocations and conceptual confusions. 
This generally means that the critic is relating the author to a question 
that he does not intend. And this seems to be the case here.’14 Rather 
than continue this approach to Gadamer and extend it into New
work of Betti, Teoria Generate della Interpretazione (2 vols.; Milan: Istituto di 
Teoria della Interpretazione, 1955 [German trans. 1967]); K.-O. Apel, Towards a 
Transformation o f Philosophy (trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby; London: Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1980 [German 1973]); idem, ‘Szientistik, Hermeneutik, 
Ideologiekritik. Entwurf einer Wissenschaftslehre in erkenntnisanthropologischer 
Sicht’, in J. Habermas et al., (eds.), Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik (Frankfurt: 
Suhrkamp, 1971) 7-44; J. Habermas, ‘The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality’, 
trans. J. Bleicher in Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics, 181-211 = ‘Der 
Universalitatsanspruch der Hermeneutik’, in Habermas et a l. (eds.), Hermeneutik 
und Ideologiekritik, 120-59 (Gadamer’s contribution to Hermeneutik und 
Ideologiekritik is ‘Rhetorik, Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik: Metakritische 
Erorterungen zu “Wahrheit und Methode’” , 57-82, and his response to Apel and 
Haberm as’s essays is ‘R eplik’, 283-317); i d e m ,  Zur Logik der 
Sozialwissenschaften (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2nd edn, 1970 [1967]) esp. 281-89 
(Gadamer’s response to this is ‘The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem’, 
in his Philosophical Hermeneutics, 3-17). Gadamer further deals with these 
criticisms in ‘Supplement 1’, Truth and Method, 512-16; and the ‘Afterword’, 
555-79. Cf. Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics, 122-27 and p. 3 n. 2 (printed 
on p. 260) for discussion of the Gadamer-Betti debate, 147-50 for discussion of 
Apel’s disputes with Gadamer, and 153-58 and p. 4 n. 3 (printed on p. 260) for 
discussion of the Gadamer-Habermas debate. On the Gadamer-Habermas debate, 
cf. also D. Misgeld, ‘Critical Theory and Hermeneutics: The Debate between 
Habermas and Gadamer’, in J. O’Neill (ed.), On Critical Theory (London: 
Heinemann, 1977) 164-83; S.E. Shapiro, ‘Rhetoric as Ideology Critique: The 
Gadamer-Habermas Debate Reinvented’, JAAR 62 (1994) 123-50; and M. Foster, 
Gadamer and Practical Philosophy: The Hermeneutics o f Moral Confidence 
(AARSR 64; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1991).
12 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 512, quoting a personal letter sent by him to
Betti. It would be a mistake to see Gadamer’s statement here as a claim to an
unassailable objectivity. In making a disjunction from Betti’s position regarding 
the importance of method for interpretative validity, Gadamer is instead simply 
asserting the importance of the descriptive purpose of philosophical hermeneutics.
13 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 555.
14 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 512.
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Testament studies, the purpose of this research is to utilize Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics in the ways that I judge he himself has 
outlined.
There are three questions about Gadamer’s hermeneutics which 
deserve attention before we can begin to look directly at Pauline 
studies. (1) What is the scope and identity of Gadamer’s description of 
‘what is the case’ in interpretation? (2) How would an approach to 
criticism that was not bound  by method be possible without a 
‘weakening of scientific objectivity’? And, focusing this point, (3) 
how can such an approach help to elucidate the implications of 
differing methods and orientations in Pauline studies? There are many 
competing theses of the individual terms {and their conjunction) in 
‘scientific objectivity’, from Karl Popper15 to Ian Hacking.16 It may 
be empirically possible to maintain the use of these terms, while not 
prolonging an understanding thereof which itself ignores the 
actualities of the human process of communication and understanding.
The Hermeneutical Process:
Horizon and the Logic o f Question and Answer
The first section of Truth and Method, dedicated to the history of 
hermeneutics, is complex, though the remainder of Truth and Method 
is really a rather simple treatise. It is, perhaps, just this simplicity that 
has caused Gadamer’s hermeneutical programme to be one of the 
most influential forces in the discussion of recent hermeneutics. His 
programme is outlined in the second part of the book, entitled, 
‘Elements of a Theory of Hermeneutic Experience’, beginning with 
the programmatic statement: ‘Our question...is how hermeneutics, 
once freed from the ontological obstructions of the scientific concept 
of objectivity, can do justice to the historicity of understanding.’17 
Many have generalized from this statement, epitomizing the rest of 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical programme, whether on its own, or in 
conflict with those who have been his detractors.18 As those studies
15 K.R. Popper, Objective Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1972).
16 I.M. Hacking, Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy? (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1975).
17 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 265.
18 Among the useful guides to and epitomes of Gadamer’s thought available, 
the two most useful are those mentioned above by Weinsheimer. Gadamer’s 
Hermeneutics limits itself to Gadamer, specifically Truth and Method', 
Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory widens its scope and, largely
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are readily available, the need in this present study is for a more 
specific illumination o f a central facet o f Gadamer’s thought, 
particularly his conception of the process of interpretation.
As those who study Gadamer quickly realize, Gadamer’s 
philosophical hermeneutics are not about facilitating the formulation 
of methods of interpretation. This is specifically why he has chosen 
the title ‘philosophical’ hermeneutics, in contradistinction to the 
‘science of hermeneutics’.19 This specific point, as we saw briefly 
above, is what has led many to criticize Gadamer severely, and to 
wonder what possible use his hermeneutics could have for 
interpreters.
The most important aspect o f Gadamer’s description o f the 
interpretative process, the concept of a hermeneutics of the question, 
will be discussed below. To reach the point where that is possible, 
however, we need to briefly discuss the process of interpretation as 
Gadamer sees it. Gadamer’s often quoted statement, ‘we understand 
in a different way, if we understand at all’, is more instructive in its 
fuller form: ‘Understanding is not...understanding better, either in the 
sense of superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas or 
in the sense of fundamental superiority of conscious over unconscious 
production. It is enough to say that we understand in a different way.
following Gadamer’s lead, charts a course through the field of contemporary 
literary theory, looking as well at several other significant figures in contemporary 
philosophical hermeneutics and literary theory (in contrast to the also helpful 
Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics, which compares and contrasts the various 
major figures of contemporary hermeneutical enquiry, following no specific 
figure). Also very useful is Warnke, Gadamer. A somewhat shorter introduction 
to Gadamer’s thought is the ‘Editor’s Introduction’ to Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, xi-lviii. Palmer’s earlier study, Hermeneutics, though dated, is still 
useful. C.H. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos: Nietzsche, Heidegger, Gadamer, 
Strauss, Derrida (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 70- 
103 specifically on Gadamer, is highly instructive as a comparative study which 
shows sensitivity to each of the philosophers she treats. The use of each of these 
figures’ own use of Plato as a point of comparison is especially instructive for 
Gadamer, who based so much on his appropriation of Plato. See also J. Grondin, 
Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (trans. J.C. Weinsheimer; New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994).
19 See, for instance, the introductory paragraph to ‘On the Scope and 
Function of Hermeneutical Reflection’, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 18. See also 
the discussion of the philosophical nature of Gadamer’s hermeneutics in 
Weinsheimer, ‘What is Philosophical about Philosophical Hermeneutics’, 
Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory, 24-40.
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if  we understand at a ll.’20 That is to say, internal to the process of 
understanding a text, we arrive at something different than the text we 
are interpreting. This statement has been taken in a number of ways, 
both by those who support and use Gadamer’s material, and by those 
who denigrate it. Of course, this particular statement is not the only 
place where Gadamer is open to attack from those who think that he is 
out to destroy all ground of scientific objectivity in the human 
sciences. This statement is part of a section entitled ‘Prejudices as 
Conditions of Understanding’.21 In a sub-section entitled ‘The 
Rehabilitation of Authority and Tradition’, Gadamer states that.
At the beginning of all historical hermeneutics...the abstract antithesis 
between tradition and historical research, between history and the 
knowledge of it, must be discarded. The effect of a living tradition and the 
effect of historical study must constitute a unity of effect, the analysis of 
which would reveal only a texture of reciprocal effects. Hence we would 
do well not to regard historical consciousness as something radically 
new—as it seems at first—but as a new element in what has always 
constituted the human relation to the past. In other words, we have to 
recognize the element of tradition in historical research and inquire into its 
hermeneutic productivity.
That an element of tradition affects the human sciences despite the 
methodological purity of their procedures, an element that constitutes their 
real nature and distinguishing mark, is immediately clear if we examine 
the history of research and note the differences between the human and 
natural sciences with regard to their history.22
This element of tradition takes on a very important role in Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics. This recognition, however, indirectly implies the 
deconstruction of insecure premises assumed in many theories of 
history and interpretation of texts which rely on ‘methodological 
purity’, as Gadamer expresses it.23 This effect interrogates the
20 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 296-97 (emphasis original).
21 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 277-307.
22 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 282-83.
23 Cf. J. Derrida, Monolingualism o f the Other; or. The Prosthesis o f Origin
(trans. P. Mensah; Cultural Memory in the Present; Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1998) 46: ‘...I have never ceased calling into question the motif of “purity” 
in all its forms (the first impulse of what is called “deconstruction” carries it 
toward this “critique” of the phantasm or the axiom of purity, or toward the 
analytical decomposition of a purification that would lead back to the 
indecomposable simplicity of the origin). . . ’.
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assumptions and presuppositions that have accrued to the field of New 
Testament studies as unquestionable facts.24 One of the facets of the 
remaining chapters in this study shows that, even in the area of 
Pauline studies, where grand Synoptic source theories and their like 
do not apply, unquestioned use of assumption has led to a stagnant 
and uncreative approach to many problems. This state-of-play makes 
it difficult not only for new methodological approaches to find 
success, but also for the continued historical study of Paul to advance 
and refine its previous conclusions. As a result o f some central 
implications of this point in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, he has drawn 
fire from those who find themselves uncomfortable with this aspect of 
interpretation, as noted above.25
Gadamer’s concept o f the rehabilitation of prejudice revolves 
around a wish to recover an aspect of the process of interpretation that 
the Enlightenment seems to have taken away:
The recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice 
gives the hermeneutical problem its real thrust. In light of this insight it 
appears that historicism, despite its critique o f rationalism and o f natural 
law philosophy, is based on the modern Enlightenment and unwittingly 
shares its prejudices. And there is one prejudice of the Enlightenment that 
defines its essence: the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the 
prejudice against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power...
[The prejudice which he espouses] certainly does not necessarily mean a 
false judgement, but part of the idea is that it can have either a positive or 
negative value... There are such things as préjugés légitimes.26
This ‘prejudice against prejudice’ and the turn toward method allows 
for judgements to be made, but the ‘only thing that gives a judgement 
dignity is its having a basis, a methodological justification (and not 
the fact that it might actually be correct)... This conclusion follows 
only in the spirit of rationalism. It is the reason for discrediting
24 E.g. the virtual hegemony of the Two-Four Source Synoptic source theory, 
the idea of the existence of the non-extant source ‘Q’, the non-Pauline authorship 
of Ephesians and the Pastorals (and other letters such as Colossians and 2 
Thessalonians, although these are more often disputed).
25 See above, n. 11.
26 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 270 (emphasis original). See also H.-G. 
Gadamer, ‘The Power of Reason’, trans. H.W. Johnstone, Jr., Man and World 3.1 
(1970) 5-15, for further discussion of the changes to the concept of ‘reason’ 
during the Enlightenment, away from the idea of ‘reasonableness’ to ‘empirical 
science’.
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prejudices and the reason scientific knowledge claims to exclude them 
completely.’27
However, the problem with this theoretical exclusion of prejudice 
and bias in the human sciences is that prejudice and bias are 
contingently universal characteristics of human being-in-the-world. 
Human finiteness excludes the empirical universal quantification of a 
field, so as to exclude subjectivity. As I see it, even method itself must 
be seen as a function of prejudice/bias/foreunderstanding. There is, 
after all, no way of conclusively demonstrating, for all contexts, the 
universal validity28 of one method over another, except by the 
usefulness of the results obtained by the application of that method. 
Gibson likewise adverts to the need to reconsider such reasoning:
27 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 271. Cf. C. Page, ‘Historicistic Finitude and 
Philosophical Hermeneutics’, in Hahn (ed.), LLP, 369-84, here pp. 371-72: 
‘...knowers acquire various ontic skills in the manipulation of the contents they 
apprehend (even as these activities presuppose a cognitive, interpretative 
machinery behind the scenes of consciousness’s actual focus and discursive 
activity). This gives rise to the procedural interests that mark all forms of ordinary 
hermeneutics. Their concern is with the typical ways in which one might go about 
the activities of inquiry and articulation in various domains. It will include 
metareflections on how to decide about cognition. It aims at specifying what 
counts as rational—nowadays almost always a methodological term, never a 
metaphysical one—for a given domain of investigation.’
28 The definition assumed for ‘validity’ here and throughout the remainder of 
my study is pragmatic (not unlike I. Levi, A Covenant with Rationality 
[Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997]): a method, approach or 
particular assumption (or set of assumptions) brought to bear as premises on 
interpretation of a text which function pragmatically to depict a given text (or 
particular aspect of a text). On this view, if a method obscures elements of a text, 
or simply does not have as part of its actual function the elucidation of a particular 
facet of a text, then it is not a valid method for studying that facet of the text. If, as 
a result of research, an assumption concerning a text proves unsuitable, then this 
assumption is invalid. ‘Validity’ conveys other senses; but nothing more than this 
pragmatic definition is intended in the present context.
This use of ‘assumption’, premise and inference draws on the general position, 
for example, of T J. Smiley (‘Consequence, Conceptions o f , REP 2.599-603), 
where they are relative to a basis. This basis is a mixture of the use of content 
internal to the analyzed subject and classical uses of inference based on 
Aristotle’s Prior Analytics as read, for example, by Smiley and by W.D. Ross, in 
his edition thereof (Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics: A Revised Text with 
Introduction and Commentary [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949] esp. 23-47).
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A factor in the production, and/or survival, of literary theories may be that 
each one isolates a facet of a narrative. Each theory over-generalizes 
beyond its functional fit with the data. For example, Barthes’ structuralism 
identifies properties of narrative indeterminacy and patterns of perceptual 
mythology, as well as their relations to non-literary eternal semiotic 
functions; but structuralism itself is not a, or the, theory of what it is to be 
narrative. This point obtains generally for theories. So, consider the 
following impious thought: a literary theory is truly positioned when it 
ceases to be believed as a, or the, generalized theory for its target set of 
narratives. With some literary theories, a stronger version may be apt: the 
only good literary theory is a dead one. This is not to consign literary 
theory to the grave. Only when a literary theory has ceased to be 
normative in activity is ‘the theory’ given its proper level of generality and 
its true perspective. The focus here is the view that a literary theory should 
be a subordinate element in other literary analyses. Thus literary theory, 
on this view, maps a strand or point in a narrative, and often has the prior 
role of rendering explicit the reader’s disposition towards narrative. In this 
situation, features other than the one(s) successfully delineated by the 
literary theory are mapped by a plurality of other literary theories or reader 
presuppositions. 29
The subject matter of the human sciences, namely human behaviour 
and communication, cannot be veridically examined in the same way, 
in typical cases, as can subject matter in physical sciences. Nor, 
indeed, can the results obtained by such investigation be demonstrated 
or shown to be ‘useful’ or ‘more useful’ in the same way that the 
results of investigations in the natural sciences can. In the human 
sciences, as Gadamer states, ‘The prejudices and fore-meanings that 
occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not at his free disposal. He 
cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that enable 
understanding from the prejudices that hinder it and lead to 
misunderstanding. Rather, this separation takes place in the process of 
understanding itself, and hence hermeneutics must ask how that 
happens.’30 Gibson’s discussion of ‘theory’ is helpful in this regard:
since there is no final decision-procedure or criterion of application for 
implementing any literary theory, scholars will differ as to what 
constitutes the identity and applicability of a theory in some states of 
affairs. This variance concerns the status of theory itself in this sphere.
The idea of a theory thus warrants some brief attention... A theory, 
roughly, is a universally quantified set of descriptions whose domain is
29 A. Gibson, Text and Tablet: Near Eastern Archaeology, the Old Testament 
and New Possibilities (ed. B.W.R. Pearson; Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2000) 68.
30 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 295-96.
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literature, in a strong sense of ‘theory’. My use here deforms this 
presupposition about theory into a recipe which episodically fits fragments 
of a domain in a narrative. Impressionistically summarized, this amounts 
to the following. The mind has an imaginative faculty which produces 
both creative fiction and literary theories. I propose a mental causal link 
between the two enterprises. This causal link can be termed that of a 
causally anomalous nomist.31
This causal link— ‘that of a causally anomalous nomist’, as Gibson 
characterizes it— is equivalent to the identity o f ‘prejudice’ as 
Gadamer formulates it. As David Linge states:
It is not surprising that Gadamer’s notion of prejudice has been one of the 
most controversial aspects of his philosophy. More than any other element 
of his thought, it indicates his determination to acknowledge the 
unsuspendable finitude and historicity of understanding and to exhibit the 
positive role they actually play in every human transmission of meaning... 
Even the historicism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
with its affirmation of the historicity and relativity of every human 
expression and perspective reaching us from the past, stopped short of 
affirming the interpreter’s own historicity along with that of his objects.32
It is exactly this type of concept of prejudice and the active role of 
tradition in interpretation that leads Gadamer to formulate what has 
become the most borrowed of his concepts: the two horizons.
The two horizons are the historical horizon of the text,33 and the 
horizon of the interpreter. Gadamer defines ‘horizon’ as
the range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a 
particular vantage point. Applying this to the thinking mind, we speak of 
narrowness of horizon, of the possible expansion of horizon, of the 
opening of new horizons, and so forth... In the sphere of historical 
understanding, too, we speak of horizons, especially when referring to the 
claim of historical consciousness to see the past in its own terms, not in 
terms of our own contemporary criteria and prejudices but within its own 
historical horizon.34
31 Gibson, Text and Tablet, 68.
32 Linge, ‘Editor’s Introduction’, xv. Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 299.
33 Note, not the author—Gadamer has no space for a recovery of the 
Romantic theory of hermeneutics which saw the process of understanding as one 
where the interpreter inhabited the mind of the author, a sort of re-production of 
the text. ‘Not just occasionally but always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its 
author’ {Truth and Method, 296). See also pp. 372, 394-95, 489, but especially 
358-59. Cf. Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modem, 159-78.
34 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 302-303.
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Although the idea of horizons in interpretation is not unique to 
Gadamer, the significance which he draws from the claim that there 
are horizons is:
Understanding tradition undoubtedly requires a historical horizon, then.
But it is not the case that we acquire this horizon by transposing ourselves 
into a historical situation. Rather, we must always already have a horizon 
in order to be able to transpose ourselves into a situation...35
But now it is important to avoid the error of thinking that the horizon of 
the present consists of a fixed set of opinions and valuations, and that the 
otherness of the past can be foregrounded from it as a fixed ground.36
Here Gadamer takes ‘horizon’ to be a consciously functioning 
presupposition; it is a refinement of his intimation in the earlier 
quotation that a ‘horizon’ consists o f all aspects o f a person’s 
consciousness37 which may play a role in interpretation. This is where
35 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 304-305.
36 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 306.
37 Gadamer’s use of the idea of consciousness is connected with his use of 
Erlebnis, ‘life experience’, discussion of which can be found in Truth and 
Method, 65-69, here 69: ‘Every experience is taken out of the continuity of life 
and at the same time related to the whole of one’s life. It is not simply that an 
experience remains vital only as long as it has not been fully integrated into the 
context of one’s life consciousness, but the very way it is “preserved and 
dissolved” (aufgehoben) by being worked into the whole of consciousness goes 
far beyond any “significance” it might be thought to have. Because it is itself 
within the whole of life, the whole of life is present in it too.’ Though explicit on 
the role of ‘consciousness’, Gadamer is not likewise explicit in connection with 
the role of the unconscious mind. For his statement above to have pragmatic 
validity, it would perhaps be appropriate to extend Gadamer’s ideas of mimesis to 
map the relation between consciousness and unconsciousness in horizon. If, as 
Gadamer understands mimesis, we can look at the work of art as in mimetic 
relation to reality (although not, as he puts it, as ‘a falling back into the 
vanquished Platonism of a classicistic aesthetics nor [as] an entrapment in 
metaphysics’, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, in Hahn [ed.], LLP, 44), 
we might also understand the relation between consciousness and 
unconsciousness along similar lines (but avoiding the problems with a reflexive 
view of self-consciousness as discussed by A. Bowie, ‘Introduction’ to M. Frank, 
The Subject and the Text: Essays on Literary Theory and Philosophy [ed. with 
intro A. Bowie; trans. H. Atkins; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997 
(1989)]) xxiii). In the Gadamerian understanding of mimesis, the work of art has a 
relationship to reality, but not one which is reproductive. Extending this to 
interpretation, he states, ‘The work, the text we read, is not something we [as
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Gadamer begins to describe the process of interpretation in a way 
which can make those dependent on the objectivity of method and 
scientific rationalism very uncomfortable. His following statements, 
however, make his position eminently clear:
There is no more an isolated horizon of the present in itself than there are 
historical horizons which have to be acquired. Rather, understanding is 
always the fusion o f horizons supposedly existing by themselves.^
interpreters] dream up’ (‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 44). In this 
understanding, then, we could suggest that consciousness has a reflexive 
relationship to unconsciousness. Although Gadamer seems to suggest that the 
presuppositions and fore-understandings an interpreter brings to interpretation are 
consciously functioning presuppositions and fore-understandings, we might be 
better to suggest that they are a mixture of consciously and unconsciously 
functioning presuppositions, but that the horizon of the interpreter (which fuses 
with that of the text and other interpreters in the dialogical interaction with the 
text in interpretation) is itself the result of the preceding fusion of horizons 
between the conscious and unconscious selves of the interpreter (S. Gardner, 
Irrationality and the Philosophy o f Psychoanalysis [Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996], might be profitably used to map such a fusion). We 
might wish to speak here of both the open indeterminacy of the text and that of 
the interpreter, although neither of these are likely to be terms which would meet 
with Gadamer’s approval. Still, this flaw in Gadamer’s argument demands an 
examination of this point. It may be that this flaw could be addressed by an appeal 
to Derrida’s philosophy, especially in his discussion of translation and 
monolanguage in his recent work, Monolingualism o f the Other, 56-57. Cf. also 
my extension of Gadamer’s ideas about mimesis, below, Chapter 4. Although 
relating Derrida to Gadamer’s philosophy in a positive way is not typically 
undertaken, as H. Philipse, Heidegger's Philosophy o f Being: A Critical 
Interpretation (Princeton: Princeton Univrsity Press, 1998) 4 notes: ‘Heidegger 
held specific views on interpretation, and he may be considered as the founder of 
a new school of interpretation theorists, to which belong authors such as Gadamer 
and Derrida.’ While too much should not be freighted on such a characterization, 
it is neverthelesss the orientation to aspects of a common philosophical 
tradition—however different their own philosophies may be—that allows 
Gadamer and Derrida to be brought into dialogue with each other.
38 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 306. The nature of this ‘fusion’ is simply 
that an interpretation of a text is something made up of both the text itself and the 
interpreter’s thoughts about it—if we are speaking of understanding, and not an 
‘interpretation’ which ignores the text which it claims to interpret, or an 
‘interpretation’ which limits itself to simply transcribing the text in question. As 
Gadamer states, ‘why do we speak of the fusion of horizons and not simply of the 
formation of one horizon, whose bounds are set in the depths of tradition? To ask 
the question means that we are recognizing that understanding only becomes a
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Although this statement and others like it have caused consternation 
amongst those who would preserve the primacy of ‘objectivity’, 
Gadamer’s description of this process is compelling.39
What a 'Horizon' Is Not 
The title of this section takes as its impetus elements of the recent 
work of Marian Hobson on the work of Jacques Derrida,40 in which 
she discusses the issue of language in his philosophy. Part of her 
approach is to identify levels or types o f meaning in Derrida’s 
philosophy. She speaks of ‘lexemes’ as ‘something akin to points of 
accumulation of an argument, places where it was possible to bring 
complexity together into a word and hence raise as a theme’;41 but 
also includes other levels or types of meaning: ‘micrologies’, ‘syntax’, 
and ‘philosophemes’. This is a striking and appropriate way to discuss 
the philosophy of a man whose work depends so heavily on the 
understanding and functioning of language. It may be, however, that 
this mode of speaking about philosophy could be extended beyond 
Derrida, and used also to discuss others. In the case of Gadamer, and 
specifically his idea of ‘horizons’ in interpretation, it is Hobson’s 
concept of ‘micrologies’ which is of the most potential use. Speaking 
of the contrast between ‘lexemes’ and ‘micrologies’, she states,
Although [lexemes] are the best known [elements of Derrida’s 
philosophy], there are others, operations of a larger scale, longer strings, 
forming circuits of argument, or what I shall occasionally call 
‘micrologies’. These resist isolation because they have no lexical 
membrane round them separating them from their context, but...they 
recur.42
scholarly task under special circumstances and that it is necessary to work out 
these circumstances as a hermeneutical situation. Every encounter with tradition 
that takes place within historical consciousness involves the experience of a 
tension between the text and the present. The hermeneutic task consists in not 
covering up this tension by attempting a naive assimilation o f the two but in 
consciously bringing it o u f (Truth and Method, 306, emphasis added). This 
‘fusion’ of horizons, then, is much like the fusion of the component parts of an 
atom—constant tension and attraction between opposing electrical charges that 
together make a unity.
39 Cf. Warnke, Gadamer, 169-70; Page, ‘Historicistic Finitude’, 370.
40 M. Hobson, Jacques Derrida: Opening Lines (Critics of the Twentieth
Century; London and New York: Routledge, 1998).
41 Hobson, Jacques Derrida, 3.
42 Hobson, Jacques Derrida, 3.
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One might suggest that, in the interpretation of Gadamer, the 
recurring patterns in his philosophy function much like this level of 
micrology that Hobson has illuminated in her book on Derrida. 
‘Horizon’ as a lexeme is often appropriated by interpreters of  
Gadamer in isolation from the rest of his philosophy. I argue that, 
instead of a lexeme (summarizing in a single word the whole o f an 
argument), ‘horizon’ functions as part of a recurring micrology with 
vital connections, especially to his model of question and answer, to 
be discussed below.
It may be that reactions to Gadamer, such as Hirsch’s vitriolic 
response to Truth and Method,^ which repeatedly misses the point of 
Gadamer’s programme, even to the point of ignoring what it is that 
Gadamer states, misunderstand Gadamer’s use of language— reacting 
to words as though they were concepts. For example, with regard to 
the idea of the fusion of horizons, Hirsch writes,
Once again Gadamer’s attempted solution turns out, on analysis, to 
exemplify the very difficulty it was designed to solve. How can an 
interpreter fuse two perspectives—his own and that of the text—unless he 
has somehow appropriated the original perspective and amalgamated it 
with his own? How can a fusion take place unless the things to be fused 
are made actual, which is to say, unless the original sense of the text has 
been understood?44
There are two distinct difficulties with this reading of Gadamer. First, 
the fusion of horizons for which Gadamer argues is something which 
takes place at the primary appropriation of the text and its horizon by 
the reader. What Hirsch pictures instead is the idea that there is a way 
of stepping outside of the set of all circles. Such a process, for Hirsch, 
actualizes the text which is to be interpreted, thus allowing the 
interpreter to step back into ‘the circle’ and allow his own horizon to 
then come into effect. This is a truly fantastic hermeneutical idea.45 
What Hirsch means by ‘made actual’ is unclear. Does he mean that 
the material would somehow be brought into reality? (This raises the 
further question as to where it existed—if such language could be
43 Validity in Interpretation, 245-64.
44 Hirsch, Validity in Interpretation, 254.
45 The similarity to Wolfhart Pannenberg’s theologically motivated response 
to Gadamer (‘Hermeneutics and Universal History’, in B.R. Wachterhauser [trans. 
and ed.], Hermeneutics and Modern Philosophy [Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1986] 111-46) is startling. See discussion below, in Appendix A, pp. 
277-285.
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used— before being actualized.) Or does he mean that the material 
must ‘somehow’ be appropriated in such a way so as to conform to 
the interpretative process of which it is to be a part? If the latter, this 
would seem to damage Hirsch’s quest for ‘objectivity’ more than it 
does Gadamer’s conception of the process o f understanding. 
Moreover, there is the question as to what form such actualization 
would take. Secondly, Gadamer himself actually addresses this point 
in some detail, material of which Hirsch seems to be ignorant.46
I would argue that anyone who is involved in the interpretation of 
texts must accept the force of Gadamer’s point regarding the 
impossibility of ‘objectivity’ in interpretation. Does not the brute fact 
of the existence of a history of interpretation for a given text entail the 
necessity of a conception such as Gadamer’s? If understanding did not 
contain an element of the interpreter’s horizon, mixed with that of the 
interpreted, then there would be no need for ongoing interpretation; 
further, it would not be obvious, as it is, that a given interpretation 
comes from a specific time/place/viewpoint. Gadamer offers the 
example of nineteenth-century German historical writing, with its 
distinctive universal conception of the historical process,47 but many
46 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 305. Hirsch’s later ‘Three Dimensions of 
Hermeneutics’, New Literary History 3.2 (1972) 245-61 presents no signficant 
improvement. If anything, Hirsch steps backwards in this article, for he no longer 
interacts with any specific theorists, choosing instead to speak of ‘adherents of 
Heidegger’s metaphysics’ (p. 251), of whom he mentions only Roland Barthes. 
That Hirsch is still beating at Gadamer’s shadow is obvious, however, from his 
construal of these ‘adherents of Heidegger’s metaphysics’, and the points at which 
he takes issue with ‘them’. Especially problematic for this article are the 
admissions he makes in his introduction, with regard to the historically-effected 
nature of interpretation (a clearly Gadamerian point, pp. 246-47), while still 
attempting to affirm his ‘earlier definition of meaning’ (p. 250—presumably this 
is a reference to Validity in Interpretation). He argues that the metaphysical 
nature of ‘Heideggerian hermeneutics’ has nothing to do with the interpretation of 
texts (esp. pp. 251-255), the reason being that, since ‘the spiritual universe [his 
translation of Welt\ that actively governs an interpretation is limited and selective, 
no inherent necessity requires this delimited world to be different from any that 
existed in the past’ (p. 254). The lack of any criteria by which this possibility (if it 
is admitted as such) could be determined to be true does not seem to trouble 
Hirsch, perhaps because he has misconstrued the nature of the ‘Heideggerian 
hermeneutics’ against which he is arguing (on p. 255, he suggests that this 
hermeneutical position ‘urge[s us] to adopt present relevance rather than original 
meaning as the “best meaning’” !).
47 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 284.
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examples could be garnered from the field of biblical studies as well. 
The history of the quest for the ‘historical Jesus’ is particularly 
instructive in this regard, as it has gone through several stages that 
each quite obviously displays the critical concerns of its particular 
period. No one can mistake a nineteenth-century life of Jesus for work 
coming from the Bultmannian tradition, or either of these for the work 
of modern Jesus scholars such as Craig Evans, J.D. Crossan or John 
Meier.48 Consequently, this simple description of the historicality of 
the interpretative process strategically lies at the centre of Gadamer’s 
dialogue with those, such as Betti and Hirsch, who dispute with him 
on the grounds that his philosophical hermeneutics undermine method 
and objectivity.49
This aspect of his thought has been misunderstood not only by those 
who would salvage method as determinate and decisive in the 
interpretative process, but also by those who side more with a 
deconstructionist or wider post-structuralist programme o f the 
elevation of the critic and lowering of the status of the text.50 
Gadamer cannot, however, consistently be made to conform to such a 
programme. Even in the immediate context of the above quotation, he 
goes on to clarify his position:
If...there is no such thing as these distinct horizons, why do we speak of 
the fusion of horizons and not simply of the formation of the one horizon, 
whose bounds are set in the depths of tradition? To ask the question means 
that we are recognizing that understanding becomes a scholarly task only 
under special circumstances and that it is necessary to work out these 
circumstances as a hermeneutical situation. Every encounter that takes 
place within historical consciousness involves the experience of a tension 
between the text and the present...
In the process of understanding, a real fusing of horizons occurs—which 
means that as the historical horizon is projected, it is simultaneously 
superseded. To bring about this fusion in a regulated way is the task of 
what we called the historically effected consciousness.51
48 Cf., e.g., J.P. Meier, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus (3
vols.; ABRL; New York: Doubleday, vol. 1 1991, vol. 2 1994, vol. 3
forthcoming).
49 See above, n. 11, and Gadamer, Truth and Method, 512.
50 Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, is a good example of this. His 
reading of Gadamer is to be discussed in more detail below.
51 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 306-307.
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Interpretation here, despite the fusion o f horizons and the 
unavailability of a standpoint from which one can interpret in such a 
way as to be unaffected by prejudice and bias, must take place in a 
‘regulated way’. This is a far cry from the descent into unbridled 
subjectivity which some decry and others find encouraging.
Excursus: Are There 'Poles’ in Interpretation?
Some of the misunderstanding of Gadamer’s conception of the 
hermeneutical process may revolve around a structure used by many 
authors to discuss different approaches or orientations to 
interpretation, namely the idea of ‘poles’ in interpretation. There is 
some opacity in Gadamer’s prose and use of terms in this regard, 
which requires further clarification.
This concept of two opposing poles or orientations that can be taken 
towards the interpretation of texts can be found in many writers, 
taking many different forms. For example, Paul Ricoeur has called the 
two approaches the ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ and the ‘hermeneutics 
of faith’, for which he has substituted the latter alternatively with ‘the 
hermeneutics o f retrieval’, ‘archaeological hermeneutics’,52 and a 
‘hermeneutic of re-enactment’.53 Gadamer himself has identified 
these poles as a ‘polarity o f familiarity and strangeness’.54 
Weinsheimer also comments on these two poles:
The concept of interpretation, then, comprehends two poles. On the one 
hand, it implies the fact that the text is continuous and self-identical over 
time, as well as the corollary fact that interpretations are...o/the text. This 
we might call the pole of correctness, since it explains why there can be 
wrong interpretations. On the other hand, interpretation also includes a 
pole of discontinuity and self-difference, in that the text can sustain 
interpretations that are not just duplicates of it but genuinely other. This
52 See P. Ricoeur, ‘On Interpretation’, trans. K. McLaughlin, in A. 
Montefiore (ed.), Philosophy in France Today (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1983) esp. 192-93; idem , Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on 
Interpretations (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1970) 27. In 
connection with the latter, cf. M. Bowie, Psychoanalysis and the Future o f Theory 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993) esp. 11-54, also including discussion of Lacan; idem, 
Proust among the Stars (London: HarperCollins, 1998) 90-100, 239-40.
53 Ricoeur in Gadamer and Ricoeur, ‘The Conflict of Interpretations’, 305. In 
this discussion, Ricoeur also uses the opposition ‘recapitulation in the Hegelian 
sense and...the archaeology of a deconstruction in a Nietzschian sense’, and ‘the 
conflict between comprehension and explanation’.
54 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 295.
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we might call the pole of creativity, since it bespeaks the text’s capacity to 
sanction an essentially limitless number of novel interpretations.55
Weinsheimer’s conception of polarity in interpretation is not without 
difficulty; terminology such as ‘self-difference’ needs more 
elucidation than he provides, though it helps us see the use of this 
terminology in current discussion.
Another figure of interest in this discussion of polarity and the 
identification of the poles in interpretation is Gerald Bruns. His book, 
Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, and his earlier work, Inventions: 
Writing, Textuality, and Understanding in Literary H i s t o r y ,attempt 
to bring many of the elements of modem philosophical hermeneutics 
home to an audience more concerned with literary theory. His 
Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, is the most complete form of his 
theory; but the concept of polarity is also present in a nascent form in 
Inventions. Initially, he seems to be an exemplary Gadamerian:
My concern...is not with what interpretation is but with the ways in which 
it makes its appearance and.. .with the ways in which it is to be studied.57
This complies well with Gadamer’s meta-critical approach. 
Nevertheless, in contrast to Gadamer’s approach to interpretation, 
Bruns very quickly turns to a discussion of polarity, and bases much 
of his subsequent work on this discussion, both in Inventions and in 
Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern. He identifies the two poles as 
‘allegory’ and ‘satire’, or allegorical and satirical criticisms. Allegory 
would be identified  with the herm eneutics o f  faith , 
retrieval/archaeological hermeneutics (Ricoeur)Zthe pole of creativity 
(Weinsheimer)/familiarity (Gadamer). Satire, equated with the 
hermeneutics o f suspicion (Ricoeur)Zthe pole o f correctness 
(Weinsheimer)Zstrangeness (Gadamer), in Inventions is termed 
‘objectivist’, and later, in Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, 
‘satirical’:
My own view...is that the difference between...objective [what he will 
later call ‘satirical’] and...allegorical [interpretation] is social rather than 
mental: it is a conflict between two traditions of understanding... It is not 
a conflict between the logical and the illogical, or between knowledge and 
edification, but between two customary ways of talking about what is
55 Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory, 87.
56 G.L. Bruns, Inventions: Writing, Textuality, and Understanding in 
Literary History (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982).
57 Bruns, Inventions, xi.
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written, one familiar to us and one strange—but both equally rational, 
because norms of rationality are social: they are rooted in ways of life 
rather than in processes of knowledge. From this point of view, the 
conflict of interpretations does not exist for us to resolve; rather, we 
should adopt a historical attitude toward it and attempt to understand its 
meaning, or its emergence within the history of interpretation.58
This is where Bruns’s identification of the poles seems to go awry, 
mixing terminology in an unsatisfactory manner. There are 
differences between previous theoretical discussions of polarity or 
valency in interpretation or the interpretative process.59 Bruns seems 
unaware of these differences, and so conflates different conceptions of 
polarity (or what can be construed as polarity, as Ricoeur does not use 
the term ‘polarity’). As a result, although citing Gadamer as support, 
he does not see his two poles to be present in all interpretation. 
Rather, he posits that they are opposite ways of approaching the world 
of texts, much like Ricoeur’s different species or kinds o f  
hermeneutics. By citing Gadamer as support for this, he ignores that 
this is exactly what Gadamer has tried to avoid with his concept of the 
fusion of horizons. However, Bruns goes even further in his 
misunderstanding of these categories. In In ven tions, he puts it 
somewhat cryptically:
[The] instability in relation to one another [of allegory and satire] is 
manifest: one can only connect them by means of a third term—for 
example, language, or figurative speech, or the ‘veil of words’. The way I 
wish to begin is by considering allegory and satire as figures for two 
different attitudes toward the veil of words, or for two different ways of 
evaluating it.60
However, his later work somewhat qualifies this understanding, 
asserting that
It might be worth expanding on this opposition of allegory and satire, 
which is a sort of premodern way of facing off the hermeneutical postures 
of faith and suspicion, which Modernism has got backwards. All 
interpretation is certainly allegorical in the sense of being a conversion of
58 Bruns, Inventions, xii.
59 I.e. Gadamer’s terminology suggests that he sees a polarity in terms of his 
fusion of horizons conception, where the two poles represent the two horizons; 
Weinsheimer’s terminology suggests a modal conception in terms of the purpose 
of someone’s interpretative activities; and Ricoeur’s various terminologies seem 
to speak of a polarity in terms of bivalently opposed strategies of reading.
60 Bruns, Inventions, 5.
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the strange into the familiar, or of the different into the same. Allegory is a 
mode of translation that rewrites an alien discourse in order to make it 
come out right—according to the prevailing norms of what is right...it 
would not be too much to say that allegory is philosophy’s (or any 
dominant culture’s) way of overcoming its suspicion of whatever is not 
itself...
Satire is the discourse of the Other against the Same: counterallegory. 
Satire explodes the conceptual schemes or mechanical operations of the 
spirit by which we try to objectify and control things, including all that 
comes down to us from the past. Satire is unconvertible, uncontainable, 
uncontrollable; it rages at the gates for all the world like the voice of a 
madwoman61...the satirist is always a little out of control, more 
subversive than corrective...62 Satire resists the institution of allegory and 
frequently, or say in its very nature, breaks out against it.63
Strangely enough, Bruns cites Gadamer as evidence and support for 
this position. It is more likely that this reading has been construed 
under the attraction of Derrida’s philosophy, rather than Gadamer’s.64
61 Cf. Derrida, Monolingualism o f the Other, 55 n. 8 (78-93), esp. 88-89.
62 However, cf. W. Percy, the well-known satirical American novelist (‘How 
to be an American Novelist in Spite of Being Southern and Catholic’, in his 
Signposts in a Strange Land [ed. with intro. P. Sam way; New York: Farrar, Straus 
& Giroux, 1991] 181-82): ‘Don’t forget that satire is not primarily destructive. It 
attacks one thing in order to affirm another. It assaults the fake and phoney in the 
name of the truth. It ridicules the inhuman in order to affirm the human. Satire is 
always launched in a mode of hope.’
63 Bruns, Hermeneutics, 202-204.
64 Derrida’s so-called ‘undecidables’—see J. Derrida, ‘Différance’, in 
Margins o f Philosophy (trans. A. Bass; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1982) 1-26; idem, Writing and Difference (trans. A. Bass; Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1978) 162; idem. Dissemination (trans. B. Johnson; Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1981) 219; idem, Monolingualism o f the Other, 62. 
A frequent example used is Wittgenstein’s duck/rabbit (L. Wittgenstein, 
Philosophical Investigations [Oxford: Blackwell, 1963] 194). Derrida traces this 
motif in Wittgenstein to the logician Kurt Godel (1906-78), but he develops it in 
a different direction than does Wittgenstein (on Godel, see J.W. Dawson, Jr., 
‘Godel, Kurt’, REP 4.105-107; M. Detlefsen, ‘Godel’s Theorems’, REP 4.107- 
19). Whereas Wittgenstein is happy to allow for the possibility of understanding 
conveyed public meaning in language, even with the ambiguities inherent in rule- 
following, Derrida points to such examples as evidence for the undecidability of 
language, and the constant play of which it consists (cf. Hobson, Jacques Derrida, 
esp. 109-11). Where Bruns departs from Gadamer and follows Derrida is in his 
characterization of the ‘satirical’ pole of interpretation as an out-of-control
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Gadamer’s position on the idea of interpretative polarity is very 
clear: ‘there is a tension[:] It is in the play between the traditionary 
text’s strangeness and familiarity to us, between being a historically 
intended, distanciated object and belonging to a tradition [of which we 
are a part]. The true locus o f hermeneutics is this in-between.'^  
Ricoeur, too, is clear that interpretation cannot be undertaken from 
one standpoint or the other, but that ‘two distinct moments— of doubt,
madwoman, resistant to the force of the ‘allegorical’ pole, with its imposition of 
itself on the texts it is trying to interpret. This is not how Gadamer conceives of 
the poles in interpretation, or in keeping with the model Gadamer has proposed of 
the horizons in interpretation, of which & fusion takes place when one attempts to 
understand. It is, however, in keeping with the anti-realist attacks leveled by 
Derrida and his followers on an understanding of language and interpretation 
which allows for the communication of meaning. For discussion of the interplay 
of Gadamer and Derrida, see Grondin, Introduction to Philosophical 
Hermeneutics, 135-44. The one true exchange between the two philosophers, in a 
symposium at the Goethe Institute in Paris in 1981 (J. Derrida and H.-G. 
Gadamer, Dialogue and Deconstruction: The Gadamer-Derrida Encounter [ed. 
D. Michelfelder and R E. Palmer; SUNY Series in Contemporary Continental 
Philosophy; Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989] = GW  2.330-60), 
was, in the words of Grondin, ‘more of a case of talking past each other’ 
{Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, 136). Cf. also the comments in 
Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 50: ‘In my view it is just 
the opposite of a right procedure if one isolates the elements of speaking, of 
discours, and makes them the object of critique. In this case, yes, the same is no 
longer the same, so one can understand why a person who is fixated on “signs”, 
has to speak of différence or différance.’
65 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 295. Cf. S. Spence, ‘Writing out the Body: 
Abbot Suger, De administratione’, in her Texts and the Self in the Twelfth 
Century (Cambridge Studies in Medieval Literature 30; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996) 53: ‘The very fact that [Abbot] Suger [of Saint-Denis, 
1081-1151] frames his argument and his selfhood [in his De administratione] in 
architectural terms suggests that his model is spatial, not temporal, as it is based 
on a shift in paradigm from one based primarily on deferral to one based on 
aesthetic appreciation. The hermeneutic space— which Gadamer aptly and 
evocatively defines as that area between strangeness and familiarity—Suger 
describes as a three-dimensional space in which the seeing body serves as the 
intersection of the axes of world and word.’ Although this eleventh-century author 
and his work are somewhat outside the purview of the current thesis, Spence’s 
recognition of the similarity between the two thinkers is nevertheless significant. 
Like Gadamer’s appeal to ancient Greek philosophy for the recovery of the 
fundamental problem of hermeneutics, this congruity with Suger suggests a 
similar recovery-exploration in Gadamer’s work of an earlier ‘road untaken’ in 
hermeneutic thought.
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and of faith— can be discerned. The energy of [Ricoeur’s] thought 
derives largely from his resisting the temptation to resign these 
moments to antithesis, to juxtapose them in a facile eclecticism, or, 
worst of all, to let one eclipse the other.’66 This latter would seem to 
be what Bruns encourages, though his discussion of this concept in 
Ricoeur does not seem to be accurate to his later programme of 
‘satire’: ‘Faith and suspicion are sometimes figured as methodological 
options that one can pick and choose as one pleases, but in fact one 
does not so much choose between them as abide within their 
opposition and interplay.’67 
If, as Bruns points out, ‘All interpretation is certainly allegorical’,68 
he has missed the point that, according to his own terminology, all 
interpretation is likewise satirical. The question of orientation towards 
tradition must then be one of degree, rather than of kind. Continuing, 
for the moment, to utilize Bruns’s terminology, if all interpretation is 
allegorical in character, then an interpretation cannot be only satirical, 
and neither can it be only allegorical. Consequently, we ask ourselves: 
How relevant and/or helpful can the shifting concept of polarity in 
interpretation be? We would do best to reject both Bruns’s treatment 
and his terminology: if  both ‘poles’ are active in the process of 
interpretation, then how does further use of the terminology profit our
66 Weinsheimer, Philosophical Hermeneutics and Literary Theory, 19. 
Weinsheimer continues: ‘“the hermeneutics of suspicion” refers to the necessary 
task of unveiling, of doubt. It involves the suspicion, as Horkheimer once brutally 
remarked, that the edifice of culture is built on dogshit... [A]ll forms of 
consciousness and tradition conceal something to which the knowing, speaking 
subject is not privy and which therefore necessitates an objective interpretation 
that the subject has no authority to confirm or deny.
‘Ricoeur suspects, however, that the hermeneutics of suspicion is itself only a 
half-truth. The bloom is no less real than the manure it feeds on’ (pp. 19-20).
67 Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, 196. The exchange between 
Gadamer and Ricoeur would suggest that there is actually à great deal of middle 
ground between them on this matter. Where Ricoeur would suggest that, with 
regard to the ‘gap between two extreme modes of interpretation’, ‘I have no 
answer myself for this situation but at least as a philosopher, I shall try to 
approach it by this procedure of the progressive construction of mediation’ 
(Ricoeur in Gadamer and Ricoeur, ‘The Conflict of Interpretations’, 305), 
Gadamer suggests that, rather than using the language of conflict (as does 
Ricoeur), I would prefer to speak about a competition of interpretations; so that 
in the end there is a possible discrimination in terms of adequacy and inadequacy’ 
(Gadamer in Gadamer and Ricoeur, ‘The Conflict of Interpretations’, 319).
68 Bruns, Hermeneutics Ancient and Modern, 202.
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description of the process of understanding and interpretation, or our 
analysis of the role that assumption69 plays in Pauline studies? It 
seems to me that Gadamer’s move beyond this particular issue, what 
could be called the hermeneutic of the question, is the place to enquire 
and assess.™
DIALECTICAL OPENNESS
Conversation and the Interpretation of Texts
As noted above in several places, Gadamer’s hermeneutics are a 
‘meta-critical’ hermeneutics, in that they are not concerned with 
constructing a general approach to interpretation, nor with the 
formulation of hermeneutical or interpretative methods. In fact, it is 
exactly the move away from the false objectivity of method that 
Gadamer has spearheaded.
Although received with animosity by some (e.g. Betti, Hirsch), this 
aspect of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is compelling, and grows out of his 
presuppositional description of ‘what is’. Essentially, his ideas rest on 
the principle of moving past unanswerable questions. Necessarily, in 
this case, if the question is one (to use Derrida’s terminology) of an 
undecidable issue of polarity, then there is another approach to the 
problem which will allow a way forward. The desirability of a way 
forward revolves around the need for interpreters and theorists to be 
able to speak about the process of understanding which, although 
resistant to explanation along lines explored up until now, goes on 
constantly. For Gadamer, the way forward— the other major 
constituent of his interpretative ‘micrology’— is in the logic of 
question and answer. He is not one to suggest, contra those who claim 
that his theory destroys any possibility of an authoritative text, that 
there is an unduly large number of correct interpretations. Gadamer 
believes that there is an innate element in interpretation that protects 
against this:
what another person tells me, whether in conversation, letter, book, or
whatever, is generally supposed to be his own and not my opinion; and
69 In this perspective, an ‘assumption’ is a positioned, expressed, or 
presupposed notion which is adopted or accepted as a conclusion or premise 
without evidence and proof relative to a basis which is itself demonstrated. This 
partly reflects TJ. Smiley’s view of inference, as mentioned earlier (cf. above, p. 
10 n. 28).
70 Cf. Warnke, Gadamer, 168-69.
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this is what I take note of without necessarily having to share it. Yet this 
presupposition is not something that makes understanding easier, but 
harder, since the fore-meanings that determine my own understanding can 
go entirely unnoticed. If they give rise to misunderstandings, how can our 
misunderstandings of a text be perceived at all if there is nothing to 
contradict them? How can a text be protected against misunderstanding 
from the start?
If we examine the situation more closely, however, we find that meanings 
cannot be understood in an arbitrary way. Just as we cannot continually 
misunderstand the misuse of a word without its affecting the meaning of 
the whole, so we cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meaning about the 
thing if we want to understand the meaning of the other.71
Indeed, this view is conceptually powerful, and seems to correspond 
with what we experience in typical human communication.72 This is a 
logical extension of Gadamer’s conception of horizons, and provides 
the next step in his description of the process we undergo when we 
interpret and attempt to understand. If, in his description of the 
process, the first major step is simply the recognition of the existence 
of horizons, then the next step is to try and understand how the fusion 
of those horizons takes place. This is not a deterministic sort of 
description. Gadamer displays no concern to provide interpreters with 
instructions as to how to understand. Rather, he wishes to describe  
what happens when that person does attempt to understand. He
71 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 268. Cf. also Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my 
Philosophical Journey’, 39-40. Here he discusses the special place of poetic 
language, and the hermeneutical problem raised by its special character: ‘In a 
poem, with whom does the communication take place? Is it with the reader? With 
which reader? Here the dialectic of question and answer which is always the basis 
of the hermeneutical process and which corresponds to the basic structure of 
dialogue undergoes a special modification.’ I would suggest, though, that this 
special nature of poetic language is at the heart of the theory Gadamer proposes 
with regard to the role of the text in interpretation. As the conversation partner in 
the ‘dialectic of question and answer which is always the basis of the 
hermeneutical process’, all communicative texts must necessarily share in this 
special hermeneutical nature, although perhaps at a more diluted level than the 
poem (which Gadamer speaks of as ‘eminent text’— ‘in this kind of text language 
emerges in its full autonomy’).
72 Cf. Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 39, where he 
cites positively the move in the later work of Wittgenstein to lead ‘all speaking 
back to the context of life-praxis’.
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discusses this, however, in the light of the inescapability of our own 
horizon (or the text of its horizon):
Of course this does not mean that when we listen to someone or read a 
book we must forget all our fore-meanings concerning the content and all 
our own ideas. All that is asked is that we remain open to the meaning of 
the other person or text. But this openness always includes our situating 
the other meaning in relation to the whole of our own meanings or 
ourselves in relation to it. Now, the fact is that meanings represent a fluid 
multiplicity of possibilities..., but within this multiplicity of what can be 
thought—i.e., of what a reader can find meaningful and hence expect to 
find—not everything is possible; and if a person fails to hear what the 
other person is really saying, he will not be able to fit what he has 
misunderstood into the range of his own various expectations of meaning. 
Thus there is a criterion here also. The hermeneutical task becomes o f 
itself a questioning o f things and is always in part so defined. This places 
hermeneutics on a firm basis.73
There is, perhaps, a difficulty at this juncture: that of applying the 
model of a conversation to the interpretation of texts. The equation 
that failure ‘to hear what the other person is really saying’ = 
‘misunderstanding’, provokes one of two mirrored possibilities:
(1) the message has failed in transmission (as the fault of the author 
or other non-interpreter’s horizon factor), or
(2) the receptor has allowed his un-examined fore-understandings of 
the text (which form a part of his own horizon) to function at such 
a level of importance in his interpretation that he does not 
perceive what the text is saying.
While the former fits well with the idea of interpretative ‘static’, 
which forms the basis of Derrida’s post-card-gone-awry model of 
interpretation,74 it is the latter which is indicative of the direction in 
which Gadamer is headed. Warnke, in her analysis of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, pursues this point with reference to Gadamer’s idea that 
‘the possibility of distinguishing between arbitrary prejudices that 
distort meaning and those that illuminate it depends on an openness to
73 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 268-69.
74 I.e. the idea that interpretation of texts is like the interception and 
decipherment of a postcard, without knowledge of the context of despatch or 
intended reception. Cf. J. Derrida, ‘Sending: On Representation’, trans. P. Caws 
and M.A. Caws, Social Research 49 (1982) 295-326; idem. The Post Card: From 
Socrates to Freud and Beyond (trans. A. Bass; Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1987). Cf. Bruns, ‘What is Tradition?’ in Hermeneutics Ancient and 
Modem, 195-212.
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the possible truth of the object under study’.75 She looks at this claim 
of Gadamer’s in connection with Derrida’s point that ‘the encounter 
with a text is characterized far more by a “rupture” in understanding 
and far more by insight into the way in which the text subverts its own 
truth-claim than by a harmonious process of coming to see truth in 
what another has said’.76 Warnke’s otherwise helpful analysis of the 
disjunction between these two perspectives is marred by her idea that 
the reading of some works must entail a priori rejections of their 
truth-claims (e.g. Mein Kampj).11 This argument, when put in the 
perspective of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, suggests that the truth-claim 
of some works must be rejected without analysis. If part o f the 
tradition of interpretation of a text (such as Mein Kampj) includes 
such a rejection, does this not still allow for such a prejudice to be 
analyzed and re-analyzed in the on-going history of interpretation of 
that text?78 Far from there being ‘a danger here that, if  we do not 
simply misinterpret works so that they comply with our own beliefs, 
we will end up learning from truth-claims we ought long ago to have 
dismissed’,79 Gadamer’s argument that, to properly interpret a text, 
one must begin  with an openness to the truth-claim of that text 
necessitates an eventual judgem ent of that text, in the light of its 
relation to the Sache, the subject matter, in which both interpreter and 
interpreted participate. To reject outright and without analysis the 
truth-claim of a text is as dogmatic an abuse of a text as is the 
unquestioning acceptance of any given interpretation of a text.80
75 Warnke, Gadamer, 87-91, here 87. Cf. above, p. 24 n. 67.
76 Warnke, Gadamer, 88. Cf. Derrida, Monolingualism o f the Other, 40.
77 Warnke, Gadamer, 90-91.
78 Cf. A. Bowie, Schelling and Modern European Philosophy: An 
Introduction (London: Routledge, 1993) 189: ‘truth is at least potentially present 
in any kind of communicative act in relation to another person’.
79 Warnke, Gadamer, 89-90.
80 Warnke’s later book, Legitimate Differences: Interpretation in the 
Abortion Controversy and Other Public Debates (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1999), provides what may be the key to understanding the 
motivation behind this reproach of Gadamer. In this book, she seeks to develop a 
hermeneutic of ‘public debate’, and (pp. 25-26) tries to introduce a set of criteria 
to distinguish between ‘legitimate and illegitimate interpretations’. As she goes on 
to state, ‘My argument will be that the conditions of interpretive discussion 
already include criteria of openness that exclude those interpretations of our 
principles, history, and practices that serve to supress the interpretations of 
others.’ The instability of Warnke’s position on this point is apparent from her
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This does not, however, unravel the difficulty of speaking about 
what a text ‘is really saying’. Such is really the most basic question 
with regard to interpretation, and Gadamer’s answer, while pragmatic, 
is also elegant in its simplicity: Because understanding (with a caveat 
to the limited and subjective nature of understanding discussed above) 
can only take place when two horizons meet, the goal of interpretation 
must, by definition, be to facilitate this meeting. In this reading, then, 
no matter in which horizon the ‘static’ originates, it may interfere with 
this meeting of horizons, and hence prevent understanding from 
taking place. What a text is ‘really saying’, then, only speaks to the 
meeting of horizons— not the ‘proper’ interpretation of a text’s 
meaning or meanings. Still, although Gadamer is consistent in 
maintaining the ‘endless multiplicity’ of interpretation, he also insists 
that ‘It is a mistake...to try to make this...a denial of the unshakeable 
identity of the work’.81
contradictory subsequent argument that ‘we...have no access to a critical 
perspective on our own understanding or the experiences and history that give rise 
to it except by taking seriously interpretations that differ from our own’. One way 
of shoring up this instability may be to follow Bernard Williams’s approach to the 
distinction between moral relativism and objectivism (cf. his Ethics and the Limits 
o f Philosophy [Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985])—a direction 
followed by Warnke herself (e.g. Gadamer, 30, 168-80). Although this is not the 
place to pursue the issue of ethics in connection with Gadamer’s philosophy, the 
debate between Gadamer and Habermas (and the copious commentary on it) has 
provided such occasion (cf. above, p. 4 n. 11).
81 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 44. He connects this 
explicitly to Derrida; following on from the above quotation, he states: ‘What this 
seems to me to be saying, against the reception-aesthetics of Hans-Robert Jaul3 as 
well as the deconstructionism of Jacques Derrida (both of which come very close 
to doing this), is: To hold fast to the identity of sense [Sinnidentitat] of a text is 
neither a falling back into the vanquished Platonism of a classicistic aesthetics nor 
is it an entrapment in metaphysics. The work, the text we read, is not something 
we dream up.’ Cf. also his ‘Destruktion und Dekonstruktion’, GW 10 (1995) 138- 
47 = 'Destruktion and Deconstruction’, in Derrida and Gadamer, Dialogue and 
Deconstruction, 102-13; and ‘Hermeneutik auf die Spur’, GW  10 (1995) 148-74. 
In ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 62 n. 68 [NB: the notes in the 
version of this philosophical autobiography as it appears in the LLP volume are 
mis-numbered by 1, following n. 14, which does not appear in the text, so n. 68 is 
the content of n. 67 on p. 50], Gadamer also cites Jürgen Habermas’s critique of 
Derrida in The Philosophical Discourse o f Modernity: Twelve Lectures (trans. F. 
Lawrence; Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987 [1985]) (cf. 181-210) with approval, 
along with other sources.
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This seems, as Gadamer so often claims, simply to describe ‘what 
is’. Those who criticize Gadamer for undercutting the possibility of a 
consistent meaning of a text have ignored this. Instead of an infinite 
range of interpretations with no checks or balances, Gadamer suggests 
that the text itself acts as a dialogue partner in the interpretative 
process: ‘in the end there is a possible discrimination in terms of 
adequacy and inadequacy’.82 Further, he states that he has ‘moved a 
step beyond the logic of question and answer as Collingwood83 had 
developed it, in that not only does one’s world orientation, as he held, 
find expression in what develops between the speaking of question 
and answer; it also happens to us from the side o f the things fDingen]  
that are the topic o f conversation' ,84
By identifying the text as the participant in the interpretative 
process, Gadamer has done two important things: he has moved 
beyond the morass of interpretative polarity, and retrojected to an 
earlier age in philosophy, before modern hermeneutical reflection, 
prior to the enthroning of the Enlightenment ideal o f reason in 
empirical science. So his appeal to the philosophies of Plato, Socrates 
and Aristotle is important for his development of his hermeneutic of 
the question. He achieves this in two ways: (1) by appealing to 
Aristotelian ethics to illuminate the importance and inescapability of 
application in the hermeneutic process,85 and (2) by a long discussion
82 Gadamer in Gadamer and Ricoeur, ‘The Conflict of Interpretations’, 319. 
Cf. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos, 87; and D. Klemm, ‘The Autonomous Text, the 
Hermeneutical Self, and Divine Rhetoric’, in A. Loades and M. McLain (eds.), 
Hermeneutics, the Bible and Literary Criticism (Studies in Literature and 
Religion; Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991) 7-8.
83 See below, n. 86.
84 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 43 (emphasis 
original). This final statement by Gadamer goes some way to redressing what A. 
Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory: The Philosophy o f German 
Literary Theory (London and New York: Routledge, 1997) 292 calls Gadamer’s 
‘reification’ of art, and brings out Gadamer’s model in more obvious relief.
85 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 312-24. Cf. also idem , ‘Zwischen 
Phànomenologie und Dialektik: Versuch einer Selbst-kritik’, G W  2.3-23; idem, 
‘Praktisches Wissen’, GW  5.230-48 (an analysis of Nicomachean Ethics book 6); 
idem. The Idea o f the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy (trans. P.C. 
Smith; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); idem. The Beginning o f  
Philosophy (trans. R. Coltman; New York: Continuum, 2000 [1996]). For 
discussion of Gadamer’s use of Plato and Aristotle in the context of a more 
general discussion of the idea of è p |ir |v e u T iK f | (‘hermeneutics’/ ‘interpretation’) in 
ancient philosophy, see J. Grondin, Sources o f Hermeneutics (SUNY Series in
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of the difference between dialectic and argumentative approaches to 
understanding, largely reliant on Plato.86 It is this last discussion that 
is of most interest in the current context.
Contemporary Continental Philosophy; Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1995) ch. 2 (T he Task of Hermeneutics in Ancient Philosophy’); or, 
without this narrowed focus, Zuckert, Postmodern Platos, 70-103. Gadamer 
summarizes his use of the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle as outlined in this 
section of Truth and Method as follows: ‘...if we relate Aristotle’s description of 
the ethical phenomenon and especially the virtue of moral knowledge to our own 
investigation, we find that his analysis in fact offers a kind of model o f the 
problem o f hermeneutics. We too determined that application is neither a 
subsequent nor merely an occasional part of the phenomenon of understanding, 
but codetermines it as a whole from the beginning. Here too application did not 
consist in relating some pregiven universal to the particular situation...’ (p. 324). 
Gadamer goes on from this discussion to show the exemplary nature of legal 
hermeneutics, and how they help to recover the hermeneutical problem (pp. 324- 
41): ‘all reading involves application, so that a person reading a text is himself 
part of the meaning he apprehends. He belongs to the text he is reading. The line 
of meaning that the text manifests to him as he reads it always and necessarily 
breaks off in an open indeterminacy... The historian is concerned with the whole 
of historical tradition, which he has to mediate with his own present existence if 
he wants to understand it and which in this way he keeps open for the future... 
[TJhere is an inner unity [in terms of subject matter] between philology and 
literary criticism on the one hand and historical studies on the other, but we do 
not see it in the universality of the historical method, nor in the objectifying 
replacement of the interpreter by the original reader, nor in historical critique of 
tradition as such but, on the contrary, in the fact that both perform an act of 
application that is different only in degree’ (p. 340, emphasis original).
86 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 362-79. Gadamer’s chief use of Plato is his 
dependence, as he states it in the first sub-title of this section, on ‘The Model of 
Platonic Dialectic’, from which Gadamer develops his ideas regarding the 
'priority o f the question in all knowledge and discourse’ (p. 363). Cf. H.-G. 
Gadamer, ‘Was ist Wahrheit?’, KS 1.46-58 (GW 2.44-56). In this section of Truth 
and Method, Gadamer also interacts fruitfully with Hegel (esp. pp. 369, 370-71), 
and at length (pp. 370-73) with R.G. Collingwood (An Autobiography [Oxford: 
Galaxy, 1970]), in whom Gadamer finds support for his idea of the historicality of 
understanding, but with whom he disagrees over the question of the relation 
between intentionality and meaning in texts (p. 372). Gadamer’s early work (first 
German edition, 1931) is Plato’s Dialectical Ethics: Phenomenological 
Interpretations Relating to the Philebus (trans. with intro. R.M. Wallace; New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1991); cf. also idem. The Idea o f the 
Good', and idem, Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato 
(trans. P.C. Smith; New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1980), two 
collections of Gadamer’s papers in this area. On Gadamer’s reading of the
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It is in Gadamer’s discussion of the question as a phenomenon that 
we find his clearest expression of what the process of interpretation 
entails. It also serves as a final blow to the determinism of method in 
interpretation:
The hermeneutical consciousness culminates not in methodological 
sureness of itself, but in the same readiness for experience that 
distinguishes the experienced man from the man captivated by 
dogma...this readiness is what distinguishes historically effected 
consciousness.87
The section following this statement is entitled ‘The Hermeneutic 
Priority of the Question’, and begins with an examination of ‘the 
logical structure o f openness' %% which he has suggested is the nature 
of all understanding.89 He then goes on to examine the nature of the 
openness of what it is to be a question— the outworking of the logical 
structure of openness:90
Republic, cf. T.A. Szlezak, Reading Plato (trans. G. Zanker; London: Routledge, 
1999 [1993]) 66.
87 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 362. ‘Historically effected consciousness’ 
translates wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein, a technical term used throughout 
Gadamer’s work. J.C. Weinsheimer and D.G. Marshall, his translators, suggest 
that, ‘We have tried to capture Gadamer’s delineation of a consciousness that is 
doubly related to tradition, at once “affected” by history...and also itself brought 
into being—“effected”—by history, and conscious that it is so’ (‘Translators’ 
Preface’, in Gadamer, Truth and Method, xv). On the historically 
effected/affected consciousness, see Gadamer’s important comments on Truth 
and Method in ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 47: ‘Obviously one 
must read my chapter in Truth and Method on historically affected consciousness 
in the right way. One should not see in it merely a modification of self- 
consciousness; say, something like an awareness of the way history is working on 
us; nor even something upon which one could base a new hermeneutical method. 
Rather, through this term one has to recognize the lim itation  placed on 
consciousness by history having its effect—that is Wirkungsgeschichte, the 
history within whose effects we all exist. It is something that we can never 
completely go beyond. The historically affected consciousness is, as I said then, 
really “more being than consciousness”—“mehr Sein als Bewufitseiri'.'
88 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 362 (emphasis original).
89 See above, n. 85.
90 The disjunction of this aspect of Gadamer’s philosophy with Hegel’s logic 
is made clear on p. 369 of Truth and Method (emphasis added): ‘The primacy of 
dialogue, the relation of question and answer, can be seen in even so extreme a 
case as that of Hegel’s dialectic as a philosophical method. To elaborate the 
totality of the determinations of thought, which was the aim of Hegel’s logic, is as
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The openness of a question is not boundless. It is limited by the horizon of 
the question. A question that lacks this horizon is, so to speak, floating. It 
becomes a question only when its fluid indeterminacy is concretized in a 
specific ‘this or that’. In other words, the question has to be posed. Posing 
a question implies openness but also limitation. It implies the explicit 
establishing of presuppositions, in terms of which can be seen what still 
remains open. Hence a question can be asked rightly or wrongly, 
according as it reaches into the sphere of the truly open or fails to do so.
We say that a question has been put wrongly when it does not reach the 
state of openness but precludes reaching it by retaining false 
presuppositions. It pretends to an openness and susceptibility to decision 
that it does not have. But if what is in question is not foregrounded, or not 
correctly foregrounded, from those presuppositions that are really held, 
then it is not brought into the open and nothing can be decided.91
He has two further points with regard to the openness of questions 
which bear mentioning here: (1) ‘There can be no answer to a slanted 
question because it leads us only apparently, and not really, through 
the open state of indeterminacy in which a decision is made. We call it 
slanted rather than wrongly put because there is a question behind it... 
The slant of a question consists of the fact that it does not give any 
real direction, and hence no answer to it is possible.’92 (2) ‘The 
priority of the question in knowledge shows how fundamentally the 
idea of method is limited for knowledge’.93 This last is an especially 
important point, as the idea of method as the key to meaning in texts 
is prevalent in nearly all types of textual interpretation.94 However, 
what Gadamer is suggesting is limited is not the usefulness of using a 
given method or methods to examine texts, but rather that it is only 
the application o f a given method that will elicit ‘proper’ 
interpretations. The limits of this latter model should be obvious— a
it were the attempt to comprehend within the great monologue of modern 
“method” the continuum of meaning that is realized in every particular instance of 
dialogue. When Hegel sets himself the task of making abstract determinations of 
thought fluid and subtle, this means dissolving and remolding logic into concrete 
language, and transforming the concept into the meaningful power of the word 
that questions and answers—a magnificent reminder, even if unsuccessful, of 
what dialectic really was and is. Hegel’s dialectic is a monologue o f thinking that 
tries to carry out in advance what matures little by little in every genuine 
dialogue’
91 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363-64.
92 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 364.
93 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 365.
94 Cf. Page, ‘Historicistic Finitude’, 372, and see above, p. 10.
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method, if it is to be useful, may only look for certain things in a text. 
Some are more broadly applicable than others, and some have broader 
concerns than others. However, each method remains limited. One of 
the obvious problems with such limitation is that a given method may 
not prove ‘appropriate’ for a given text— a charge often levelled, for 
instance, against the use of various forms of literary criticism in the 
study of the New Testament95— but this simply presupposes that what 
is ‘appropriate’ for any text is known before interpretation of that text 
has commenced. Does this mean that a method is not useful for the 
examination of a given text, or that it does not examine the same 
evidence as another method, or simply that it is not another method? 
Any of these may be the explanation behind someone’s idea that a 
given method is or is not appropriate, but each of them highlights the 
difficulties experienced when the application of m ethod  comes to 
determine the meaning that can be ‘drawn’ from a text. What 
Gadamer suggests is not only that such an attitude prevents one from 
seeing the applicability of another’s method to a text upon which one 
has practised a given method, but, more importantly, that it has the 
potential to silence the voice of the text itself. The interpreter using a 
given method must take account of the historically-conditioned nature 
of both the method and the interpreter himself. The method constitutes 
part of the horizon of the interpreter:
In seeking to understand tradition, historical consciousness must not rely 
on the critical method with which it approaches its sources, as if this 
preserved it from mixing in its own judgements and prejudices. It must, in 
fact, think within its own historicity. To be situated within a tradition does 
not limit the freedom of knowledge but makes it possible.96
Dialectical Openness in Pauline Studies 
For New Testament criticism, the dominant role of method in the 
history of scholarship is obvious. In the study of Paul, this has been 
limited, in most cases, to the application of the historical-critical or 
grammatico-historical method and its offspring, such as social- 
scientific criticism, rhetorical criticism and linguistic criticism. In the 
light o f this, Gadamer’s ideas about the role o f method in 
interpretation are helpful. That Gadamer does not deny the usefulness
95 On this, cf. B.W.R. Pearson, ‘New Testament Literary Criticism’, in S.E. 
Porter (ed.), Handbook to Exegesis o f the New Testament (NTTS 25; Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1997) 241-66, esp. 241-42.
96 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 360-61.
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of method in interpretation should be clear from his differentiation 
between presuppositions that are acknowledged (see above, p. 10), 
and those which are un ackn ow ledged , and hence lead to the 
curtailment of the open indeterminacy of questioning. It would seem 
important that, as interpreters, we are open to the idea that method in 
the human sciences can never be anything but a heuristic device— or 
perhaps a collection of such devices.97 Like all tools, a given method 
has its special uses, but, also like all tools, there is a time to lay it 
aside. If method helps in the asking of questions, which ultimately it is 
intended to do, then there should be nothing wrong with its use. 
Where, however, it does the opposite and leads the questioner to ask 
slanted questions, or to put questions wrongly, hence failing to ‘reach 
the sphere of the truly open’, then it is time to set it aside or change its 
focus.98
Gadamer distinguishes dialectic reasoning from argumentative 
reasoning, calling the former the art of thinking, and identifies 
dialectic as ‘the art of asking questions’ :
As the art of asking questions, dialectic proves its value because only the 
person who knows how to ask questions is able to persist in his 
questioning, which involves being able to perceive his orientation toward 
openness. The art of questioning is the art of questioning even
97 This idea coheres with Nancy Cartwright’s (The Dappled World: A Study 
o f the Boundaries o f Science [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999] 
201) idea of a ‘theory-net’. Cf. Gibson, Text and Tablet, 4, 14-15, 68, 203.
98 Cf. Gibson, Text and Tablet, 72-73: ‘Creative fiction is the mental 
landscape. Literary theory is the geography. There are enormous territories of 
different varieties to be mapped; there are proportionately immense literary 
theories to account for these worlds. Clearly, some maps will be bad, wrong, 
good, prejudiced, true, or false; but what tends to happen is that a literary theory 
(or its school) waxes imperialistic and over-generalizes the scope of the theory. 
No doubt some literary theory only succeeds in mirroring its author’s approach to 
literature, rather than imaging literary narrative. A given theory properly only fits 
one slice of literature, or perhaps only one level within one type of narrative or 
sentence: a street map for part of a city, as it were, has been attenuated to mimic 
the globe; it may be that a theory properly maps only one feature within one level 
of a type of sentence. In this way, a restrictive, eclectic use of available literary 
theories is correct. Obviously, this distorts, questions, and reformulates the aims 
often advertised for many theories of literature.’
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further—i.e., the art of thinking. It is called dialectic because it is the art of 
conducting a real dialogue."
Gadamer goes on to elucidate what he means by a ‘real’ dialogue and 
dialectic:
To conduct a dialogue requires first of all that the partners do not talk at 
cross purposes. Hence it necessarily has the structure of question and 
answer. The first condition of the art of conversation is ensuring that the 
other person is with us... The positive side of this monotony is the inner 
logic with which the subject matter is developed in the conversation. To 
conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the 
subject matter to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented... A 
person skilled in the ‘art’ of questioning is a person who can prevent 
questions from being suppressed by the dominant opinion... Dialectic 
consists not in trying to discover the weakness o f what is being said, but in 
bringing out its real strength. It is not the art o f arguing (which can make 
a strong case out o f a weak one) but the art o f thinking (which can 
strengthen objections by referring to the subject m atter)}^
"  Gadamer, Truth and Method, 367. Cf. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos, 76, 95- 
96. Note, however, that Zuckert, p. 96, either misconstrues or badly represents the 
tenor of Gadamer’s later work on dialectic, ‘Plato’s Unwritten Dialectic’ (in 
Dialogue and Dialectic, 124-55) as a detraction from his earlier insistence on the 
importance of dialogue and dialectic. Gadamer in his even later The Beginning o f 
Philosophy, 17-18, posits the analogy of the growth of a human being for 
understanding what it is to be a beginning. One of the implications of this is that it 
‘suggests a movement that is open at first and not yet fixed but which concretizes 
itself into a particular orientation with ever-increasing determinateness’. If it is 
correct to extend this to Gadamer’s wider concern with his dialectical model of 
hermeneutics, it would seem that, fundamentally, he remained unchanged on this 
point.
100 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 367 (emphasis added). Putting it another 
way, ‘the subject-matter [Sache] “raises questions” [“ gibt Fragen au f’]. Likewise, 
question and answer play back and forth [both ways] between the text and its 
interpreter. That the text is written does not, as such, change the basic problem- 
situation at all. It is always the matter [Sache] which is being spoken about: is it 
this way or that?’ (Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 43). 
Bowie (Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, 188-89) discusses the 
dichotomy of ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ philosophies. The former attempt to 
develop a ‘definitive theory of truth via a theory of meaning’, and the latter are 
characterized by the ‘hermeneutic insistence that such a theory must always rely 
on the uncontrollable reality of the fact that we are always already engaged in 
interpretation and understanding, so that circumscribing what understanding is 
becomes impossible, as we need understanding to do so’. In this light, Bowie 
holds Gadamer up as an example of equivocation between the two positions, and
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Although Gadamer’s hermeneutics have a number of possible 
applications to New Testament studies as a whole, the remainder of 
this thesis is concerned with issues to do with Paul. On the one hand, I 
shall seek to map and assess the orientation toward openness in 
various areas of enquiry with regard to Paul. As Gadamer suggests, 
‘The literary form of the dialogue places language and concept back 
within the original movement of conversation. This protects words 
from all dogmatic abuse’.101 On the other hand, there are several areas 
where an understanding of dialectic and the conversational model of 
interpretation (as Gadamer discusses it) can help understand what is 
going on in Pauline texts, or in the relations between Pauline texts and 
other New Testament writings, or even in the relationship between 
Paul and others of his contemporaries.
Gadamer’s discussion of the special character of poetic expression, 
mentioned briefly above,102 provides the impetus for this dual use of 
his philosophical hermeneutics in Pauline studies. On the one hand, as 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics are not designed to be ‘applied to texts’ as if 
they were a method of criticism, the meta-critical nature of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics easily lends itself to the investigation of Pauline 
scholarsh ip , and occasions o f reliance upon un-questioned (or 
unacknowledged) assumption in the interpretation of Paul. In this 
way, Gadamer’s insistence on the fundamental importance to 
interpretation of the logic of question and answer (and hence of 
authentic questioning) is applied to the interpretation of texts. On the
criticizes some of Gadamer’s looser language surrounding the idea of the 
irreducibility of subject matter to merely what is spoken or written in a text. This 
is an area of some debate in Gadamer’s philosophy, and one of the reasons for 
which he has been unpopular with both objectivists like Hirsch and in comparison 
with more thoroughgoing anti-foundationalists like Derrida. Bowie’s analysis of 
Schelling (and his work on Frank) suggests positive ways forward in this debate, 
which may enable Gadamer’s middle-position to find the purchase it requires to 
establish his more fully-realized ideas with regard to interpretation.
101 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 369. The use of ‘all’ in this quotation is 
perhaps an overstatement, given that part of the on-going process of 
hermeneutical inquiry is to uncover and assess the role of such dogmatic abuse, 
among other things. Gadamer’s later comments in his ‘Reflections on my 
Philosophical Journey’, 44, develop this more clearly: ‘The artwork is a challenge 
for our understanding because over and over again it evades all our interpretations 
and puts up an invincible resistance to being transformed into the identity of a 
concept.’
102 P. 26 n. 71.
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other hand, Gadamer’s hermeneutics do allow for the investigation of 
texts themselves. Paul stands as an interpreter of tradition and 
communicator to his communities, just as do his interpreters. With 
this understanding, Gadamer’s hermeneutics are well suited to very 
specific analysis of Pauline texts and texts which interact with Paul 
and with which Paul interacts in the New Testament.
Some difficulty could be imagined in connection with Gadamer’s 
use of the word ‘conversation’ to understand the interpretative process 
of ancient texts such as those in the New Testament. Responding to 
criticisms that his work in Truth and Method, by taking the 
‘“historical” Geisteswissenschaften as a starting point was rather one 
sided’, he first argues that interpretative distance is not merely limited 
to temporal distance, but also states that ‘where temporal distance 
does play a role, it remains true that it still offers a special critical 
help’. He goes on to suggest that ‘Certain changes often only then 
become apparent and certain differences only become accessible to 
observation with temporal distance’.103 This suggests that it will 
indeed be appropriate to use Gadamer’s hermeneutics not merely as a 
tool not only to investigate modern scholarship, but also to understand 
ancient texts.104
103 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 45.
104 The use of the word ‘understanding’ here underscores a tendentious 
element in Gadamer’s later philosophy. In his ‘Reflections on my Philosophical 
Journey’, he develops his argument on the relationship between poetics and 
rhetoric (for more on this, see chapter 3 below), and states that, with the 
development of a reading public, ‘the written...gets combined with the concept of 
“text”. This means that reading moves to the center of hermeneutics and of 
interpretation. Both hermeneutics and interpretation serve reading, for reading is 
at the same time understanding’ (pp. 50-51, emphasis original). What Gadamer 
means by ‘reading’ is broader than simply reading texts— ‘Reading, I believe, is 
really the basic form in which all encounter with art takes place. Reading takes 
place not only in relation to texts, then, but also in relation to pictures, sculpture, 
and buildings’ (p. 51). This idea is worked out more fully in his ‘Das Lesen von 
B au ten und Bilden’, in G. Boehm et a l  (eds.), Modernitat und Tradition: 
Festschrift fiir Max Imdahl (Munich: Fink, 1985) 97-103 = GW  8 (1993) 331-38, 
but brief comment on it here is important. Gadamer does not mean by this that 
reading and understanding a text in some kind of objective manner are to be 
equated—quite the contrary. He is instead asserting that there is no intermediate 
stage between reading and understanding. This is formulated partially in response 
to the hermeneutics of Betti, who, according to Gadamer, ‘totally separates 
understanding and reproducing’ (‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 51), 
but is also necessitated by Gadamer’s emphasis on the linguisticality of being
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In his reflective comments in his preface to the Library of Living 
Philosophers volume devoted to his philosophy, Gadamer admits that, 
in Truth and Method, he
did not make it clear enough how the two basic projects that were brought 
together in the concept of play [Spiel, also game] harmonized with each 
other and how they contrasted with the subjectivism of modern thinking.
On the one hand, there is the orientation to the game we play with art and 
on the other hand the grounding of language in conversation, the game of 
language.105
This double focus of Gadamer’s concept of ‘play’ reflects the twin 
foci of my implementation of his work in this thesis.
Although we have only, at the outside, thirteen letters of Paul, very 
little archaeological data which can be in any way related directly to 
him, and the problematic data of the book of Acts, it seems that there 
are several areas of inquiry that remain untapped as a result of certain 
key operative assumptions in the study of Paul. As my concerns are 
largely historical, in the following chapters I will investigate several 
historically-based assumptions in the study of Paul, touching on areas 
as specific as the implications of the assumed situation behind the 
letter of Philemon for its translation (and hence reinforcement of the
which can be understood—if 'Being that can be understood is language’ {Truth 
and Method, 474, or, less cryptically, ‘man’s being-in-the-world is primordially 
linguistic...hermeneutic experience is verbal in nature', p. 443, emphasis 
original), then the statement that 'Understanding is to be thought o f less as a 
subjective act than as a participating in an event o f tradition, a process of 
transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated’ {Truth and 
Method, 290) puts the appropriate light on Gadamer’s equation of reading and 
understanding. Cf. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos, 11 for discussion of this in 
connection with Gadamer’s use of Plato. A. Gibson, ‘Philosophy of Psychotic 
Modernism: Wagner and Hitler’, in S.E. Porter and B.W.R. Pearson (eds.), 
Christian-Jewish Relations through the Centuries (JSNTSup 192; RILP 6; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, forthcoming 2000) 356 helps bring precision 
to this point of Gadamer’s: ‘Reading is a type of causal experience. The influence 
of an idea on the mind and emotions is itself causal, even by the indeterminate 
infiltration of dispositions into a reader.’
105 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 41. Gadamer’s 
concept of play, to which I return on several occasions below, is supplemented by 
K.L. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations o f  the 
Representational Arts (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
Although Walton does not interact with Gadamer’s philosophy, his theory of 
mimesis is strikingly in tune with Gadamer’s similar connection between ‘play’ 
and mimetic function.
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assumed situation behind the letter) (Chapter 2) to the very broad 
question of the way in which one’s reconstructed paradigm of earliest 
Christian history impinges on the study of Paul and his letters 
(Chapter 5). During this analysis, I will examine aspects of the role of 
Acts in the study of Paul (Chapter 3), and address issues relating to 
reconstructing Paul’s religious milieux (Chapter 4), and the 
significance such reconstruction has for the interpretation of his 
letters. Because the idea of investigating the role of assumption in the 
study of Paul threatens to lend itself to broad, diffuse, non-specific 
discourse, I have purposely designed the following studies to be as 
focused as possible, while hopefully still showing the implications of 
assumption in the broader subject areas of which each study is a part. I 
have also sought to show how Gadamer’s philosophy can be useful in 
the interpretation of Paul himself, and of his interactions with his 
churches (esp. in Chapters 3, 4 and 5). I have not sought to be 
exhaustive, but have rather selected typical examples. Each of the 
following investigations is an area where unquestioned assumption or 
assumptions play a role in an important area of Pauline studies. This 
study aims to re-pose questions either which have remained only 
occasionally discussed, or in the investigation of which un-examined 
assumption or assumptions continue to play an important role. In the 
following studies, I seek, to use Gadamer’s phrase, ‘to prevent 
questions from being suppressed by the dominant opinion’.
In a sense, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics offer nothing 
specifically new to Pauline studies or to the interpretative disciplines 
as a whole, nor are they the answer to all interpretative ills. As he has 
himself said with regard to hermeneutics:
Heidegger had a good reason for eventually dropping the word, 
‘hermeneutics’. I have learned myself that it is dangerous to use this word, 
because it always invites the expectation that here is a new wonder- 
weapon: that one can learn how to interpret more reliably, more surely, 
and with a deeper meaning than was ever done before.106
Instead, hermeneutics are meant to function as a corrective to certain 
common abuses and excesses, and as an impetus to move forward 
‘conversations’ with the Pauline texts that may be stalled at the 
moment, because the assumptions and biases currently operative in 
Pauline studies do not allow them to continue. In addition, Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics can help as a descriptive model to outline and map the
106 Gadamer in Gadamer and Ricoeur, ‘The Conflict of Interpretations’, 302.
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relations between Paul himself, his writings, and other factors of his 
world. As such, I do not seek here to demonstrate each and every 
aspect of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, or to offer his hermeneutical 
paradigm as an alternative to the historical-critical method. Instead, I 
wish to demonstrate how Gadamer’s correctives can help the 
historical-critical method re-configure itself, and move towards a 
greater understanding of the materials with which it is concerned—in 
this case, Paul and his writings. The ‘success’ or ‘failure’ o f the 
following studies in the opinion of the reader should in no way be 
seen as indicative of the usefulness of Gadamer’s hermeneutics in re­
con figu rin g  the study o f  Paul. C on versation — true 
conversation— never comes to an end, and this is perhaps especially 
true of the on-going interpretative conversation.
CHAPTER 2
ASSUMPTION AND THE INTERPRETATION OF PHILEMON1
Protarchus: ...When those two claims were made and an argument 
arose, we playfully threatened that we would not let you 
go home until the discussion was brought to some 
satisfactory conclusion. You agreed and put yourself at our 
disposal for that purpose. Now, we say that, as children 
put it, you cannot take back a gift once fairly given. So 
cease this way of meeting all that we say.
Socrates: What way do you mean?
Protarchus: I mean puzzling us and asking questions to which we 
cannot at the moment give a satisfactory answer.
(Plato, Philebus 19D-20A, LCL)
A DIALECTICAL APPROACH
The word ‘assumption’ which appears in the title for this chapter is 
not explicitly discussed by Gadamer. Instead, he uses terms such as 
‘prejudice’, ‘presupposition’ and ‘fore-meaning’ to discuss the 
hermeneutical make-up of the interpreter’s horizon when approaching 
texts. These terms are not, for Gadamer, negative, as I have discussed 
above in chapter I.2 And yet, as we have also seen in connection with 
Gadamer’s discussion of the logic of question and answer,
a question can be asked rightly or wrongly, according as it reaches into the 
sphere of the truly open or fails to do so. We say that a question has been 
put wrongly when it does not reach the state of openness but precludes 
reaching it by retaining false presuppositions. It pretends to an openness 
and susceptibility to decision that it does not have. But if what is in 
question is not foregrounded, or not correctly foregrounded, from those 
presuppositions that are really held, then it is not brought into the open and 
nothing can be decided.3
His use here of ‘false presuppositions’ suggests the appropriate use of 
‘assumption’ as a descriptor for an intermediate stage between the
1 An earlier form of this chapter has appeared as B.W.R. Pearson, 
‘Assumptions in the Translation and Criticism of Philemon’, in S.E. Porter and R. 
Hess (eds.). Translating the Bible: Problems and Prospects (JSNTSup 173; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999) 253-80.
2 See above, pp. 8-12.
3 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363-64. See above, pp. 33-36.
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recognition of the unavoidable role of presupposition in interpretation, 
and the judgement that a particular presupposition or fore­
understanding is ‘false’. In this chapter, my goal is to illuminate this 
particular phase in Gadamer’s description of understanding by way of 
an examination o f the critical assumptions surrounding the 
interpretation of the book of Philemon. Carl Page’s discussion of the 
relationship between Gadamer and historicism sharpens the focus on 
this point:
What may strike the experiencing, as yet unreflective mind as immediately 
given obtrudes into the foreground only on condition of there being a tacit 
yet precursorily familiar background. In the act of conscious seeing that is 
stimulated by inquiry, one always knows roughly how to look, what to be 
looking for. The situation is rightly called hermeneutic because an 
interpretative move has already been made in advance of what is given in 
encounter, an interpretative move that sets the stage for the latter’s 
possibility and meaningfulness.4
Gadamer’s separation of a question put wrongly (which is not a 
question at all, as it fails to reach ‘the sphere of the truly open’5) from 
a slanted question (which ‘leads us only apparently, and not really, 
through the open state of indeterminacy in which a decision is made’, 
but does have ‘a question behind it’6) is false— both are, according to 
his own discussion, questions wrongly put. However, the distinction 
he makes may lead us to a more important discovery, namely, a kind 
of taxonomy of wrongly-put questions. In this case, we could suggest 
that questions fail to ‘achieve the sphere of the truly open’ for a 
variety of definable reasons. In the case of what Gadamer calls 
‘slanted questions’, it is the operation o f a particular, false 
presupposition, which leads to the failure of a question put to the text 
to achieve openness. This would be the case where what is asked of a 
text a p p e a rs  to be a question, but allows only one possible 
answer—what in a court of law is known as a ‘leading question’. This 
would be differentiated, still following the contours of Gadamer’s 
distinction, from questions which fail to achieve openness not as the 
result of a false presupposition, but because they are not questions. To 
continue our courtroom metaphor, this could be called ‘badgering the 
witness’. While the nature of these two manners of approaching 
witnesses is the same— they are not questions at all— their identity is
4 Page, ‘Historicistic Finitude’, 372.
5 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363.
6 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 364.
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different, in that the former assumes a situation where the witness and 
barrister are on the same ‘side’, while the latter assumes an adversarial 
relation between attorney and witness. It may be that it is this kind of 
distinction that Gadamer is trying to emphasize by his differentiation 
of ‘questions wrongly put’ and ‘slanted questions’.
It is in this connection that Gadamer’s discussion of dialectic and 
dialogue appear. He states: ‘As the art7 of asking questions, dialectic 
proves its value because only the person who knows how to ask 
questions is able to persist in his questioning, which involves being 
able to preserve his orientation toward openness... It is called 
dialectic because it is the art of conducting a real dialogue.’8 Gadamer 
bases much of this on the role of dialectic in Plato, specifically the 
discussion of understanding in the Seventh Letter 342-45. Here, and 
throughout Plato’s philosophy, dialogue functions as an attempt by 
any one of the protagonists not to ‘win’ the arguments in which they 
are involved, but rather, to conduct conversations with regard to 
particular subject matters. As Gadamer states,
To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the 
subject matter to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented. It 
requires that one does not try to argue the other person down but that one 
really considers the weight of the other’s opinion. Hence it is an art of 
testing... As against the fixity of opinions, questioning makes the object 
and all its possibilities fluid. A person skilled in the ‘art’ of questioning is 
a person who can prevent questions from being suppressed by the 
dominant opinion.9
Understanding of a text, then, is the result of a dialogue not only with 
the text in question, but also with those who hold similar interest in 
this text. The text plays the role both of dialogue partner, and of 
subject matter (although the text alone will not define the boundaries 
of a subject matter for discussion).
APPROACHING PHILEMON
In the case of the interpretation of Philemon, the ‘tacit background’ 
of this text has become the focus of a great deal of attention in recent 
years. This letter is among the shortest in the New Testament, and, of
7 For Gadamer’s sense of ‘art’ in this context, cf. Truth and Method, 366- 
67.
8 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 367.
9 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 367 (quoted partially above, p. 36).
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all the Pauline letters, most like the thousands of papyrus personal 
letters from Egypt.10 Nevertheless, it has still managed to elicit its fair 
share of critical concern. For the most part, this concern has revolved 
not so much around authorship and theology11 (as it has for other 
Pauline and 6deutero’-Pauline letters), but, more fundamentally, 
around the Sitz im Leben of the letter— the actual situation which 
called forth this tiny scrap of communication from the Apostle to the 
Gentiles. In some ways, it is an anomaly within the Pauline 
corpus— unlike other Pauline epistles, the simple fact of its inclusion 
in the New Testament argues convincingly for its authenticity. Its 
contents are not, on the surface, theologically significant, although 
they may be some of the most significant when it comes to the 
discussion of the social reality of the Pauline churches.12 However, it 
is this latter significance which, in the light of current research andj 
debate, becomes very difficult to quantify. It is a special type o f  
dialogical narrative, one which assumes a functioning (suppressed) 
recipient, which agrees with Gadamer’s assumption, as remarked by 
Warnke, that ‘the logic of understanding [can be equated] with the
10 On the relationship between the letters of the New Testament and those 
found in the sands of Egypt, cf. A. Deissmann, Light from the Ancient East: The 
New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts o f the Graeco-Roman 
World (trans. L.R.M. Strachan; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 4th edn, 1927 [4th 
German edn 1923]) 227-44; and J.L. White, Light from Ancient Letters (PENT; 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986) 218-20.
11 E.g. the recent J.M. Bassler (ed.), Pauline Theology. I. Thessalonians, 
Philippians, Galatians, Philemon (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1991), virtually 
ignores the theology of Philemon. Each of the other texts is given an entire 
section of the book, as well as dedicated bibliographies, whereas Philemon seems 
to be treated only by N.T. Wright in his essay, ‘Putting Paul Together Again: 
Toward a Synthesis of Pauline Theology (1 and 2 Thessalonians, Philippians, and 
Philemon)’, 183-211. Philemon figures only in the title of two other essays in the 
volume (R.B. Hays, ‘Crucified with Christ: A Synthesis of the Theology of 1 and 
2 Thessalonians, Philemon, Philippians, and Galatians’, 227-46; and D.J. Lull, 
‘Salvation History: Theology in 1 Thessalonians, Philemon, Philippians, and 
Galatians: A Response to N.T. Wright, R.B. Hays, and R. Scroggs’, 247-66). The 
earlier paper by M.A. Getty, ‘The Theology of Philemon’, in K.H. Richards 
(eds.), Society o f Biblical Literature 1987 Seminar Papers (SBLSP 26; Atlanta: 
Scholars Press, 1988) 503-508, does little to redress the imbalance.
12 A fact noticed by, e.g., N.R. Petersen, Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and 
the Sociology o f Paul’s Narrative Thought World (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1985).
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structure of dialogue’.13 Here, Paul’s assumption of a consensus, 
which can coerce the letter’s recipient, mirrors Gadamer’s notion of 
community.
Much of the discussion surrounding the significance of Philemon 
has typically revolved around the question of the ethics of slavery, and 
of Paul’s position thereon. This is perhaps because the situation 
behind the letter has, since patristic times, been understood thus: 
Onesimus, a slave of the church leader Philemon in Colossae, 
absconded with valuables belonging to his master, and fled. For some 
reason, he decided that the safest place to flee would be to wherever 
the apostle Paul, his master’s spiritual father and friend, was in prison. 
Another way of formulating this part of the story is that, somehow, 
with Paul in prison and Onesimus ‘on the lamb’, they somehow met 
and were able to have enough discourse for Paul to convert Onesimus, 
and for Onesimus to then become a useful co-worker in the spread of 
the gospel— as Lightfoot put it, the apostle ‘spread his net’ for the 
runaway slave.14
13 Warnke, Gadamer, 169.
14 J.B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul’s Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon 
(London: Macmillan, rev. edn, 1879) 312. However, original modern scholarship 
(rather than simple commentary) has turned somewhat away from this paradigm. 
See J.A. Harrill, The Manumission o f Slaves in Early Christianity (HUT 32; 
Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1995), who purposely leaves discussion of Philemon 
out of his investigation, as the evidence surrounding the issue of Onesimus’s 
supposed manumission (and, by extension, the whole background story which 
would go along with this issue) ‘proves too slim to support a positive conclusion’ 
(p. 3). The recent exchange between A.D. Callahan and M.M. Mitchell is also of 
significance in this regard (chronologically: Callahan: ‘Paul’s Epistle to 
Philemon: Toward an Alternative Argumentum’, HTR 86 [1993] 357-76; Mitchell: 
‘John Chrysostom on Philemon: A Second Look’, HTR  88.1 [1995] 135-48; 
Callahan: ‘John Chrysostom on Philemon: A Response to Margaret M. Mitchell’, 
HTR 88.1 [1995] 149-56; and now Callahan, Embassy o f Onesimus: The Letter o f 
Paul to Philemon [The New Testament in Context; Valley Forge, PA: Trinity 
Press International, 1997]). Callahan’s initial article on this topic suggested that 
the interpretation of Philemon according to what has now become the accepted 
‘background story’ was the result of John Chrysostom’s innovative reading of the 
letter, rather than simply a repetition of received tradition. Mitchell’s response, a 
detailed examination of the whole of Chrysostom’s œuvre, suggests that Callahan 
has mis-read Chrysostom, and ignored evidence of even earlier interpreters who 
support the traditional view (including Theodore of Mopsuestia, who, Mitchell 
rightly points out [‘John Chrysostom on Philemon’, 136 n. 4], is mentioned in 
Callahan’s apparent modern source for the idea that Chrysostom is the earliest
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What is the most interesting aspect of this reconstructed story is 
that, for the largest part, it does not derive directly  from the text of 
Philemon itself. This narrative derives from inferences drawn from 
certain of its elements, which are then read back into the text of 
Philemon itself, and used as an assumptive foundation for both 
translation and interpretation. This, like many historical ‘re­
constructions’, has led readers of the letter to think that more is known 
about the situation behind it than is actually the case. This echoes 
Gadamer’s15 agreement with Droysen’s16 research, which argues that 
historians are subject to their own history, and this influences how the 
assumption of this point surfaces or functions in the (ancient) text they 
examine. My primary purpose in this chapter is thus to examine the 
positions on either side of the debate surrounding the background of
interpreter to hold the traditional view, P. Stuhlmacher, Der Brief an Philemon 
[EKKNT; Neukirchener-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag, 1975] 58). Mitchell (‘John 
Chrysostom on Philemon’, 144 n. 33) posits that the common source for both 
Chrysostom and Theodore ‘may well have been their teacher, Diodore of Tarsus 
(died ca. 390)’, and tries to put the origin of this interpretation even further back 
into the third century (p. 147 n. 44, appealing to Origen as the major source of 
Jerome’s Philemon commentary). Callahan’s rejoinder clarifies some points 
raised by Mitchell and challenges others, but pushes the question no further. 
Essentially, even if we are to fully accept Mitchell’s challenge to Callahan’s 
reading of Chrysostom, Mitchell has, at most, succeeded in pushing back the 
point of origin for this problem into the previous century. Her cryptic suggestion 
(p. 144 n. 33) that the source from which ‘Diodore might have learned such an 
exegesis remains an open question’ does not push this date any further back than, 
perhaps (again, if one accepts her other references as legitimate) the mid-third 
century. This remains some 200 years from the origin of Paul’s letter! As Mitchell 
states, ‘The traditional interpretation, like Callahan’s alternative argumentum of 
the Epistle to Philemon, must be evaluated on its own exegetical merits’ (p. 147). 
Mitchell, unfortunately, saves her problems with Callahan’s exegesis to a single 
footnote (pp. 147-48 n. 47). In his later commentary on Philemon {Embassy o f 
Onesimus), Callahan has been assiduous in answering these exegetical criticisms. 
Like the Knox hypothesis (see below), however, it must be noted that Callahan’s 
theory includes more than one element: he not only suggests that Onesimus was 
not a runaway slave, he also suggests that he was not a slave at all (e.g. Embassy 
o f Onesimus, 10-12), something for which I find no support in the letter itself.
15 Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 334.
16 J.G. Droysen, ‘GrundriB der Historik’, in P. Leyh (ed.), H isto rik :  
Rekonstruktion der ersten vollstandigen Fassung der Vorlesungen (1857) 
Grundrifi der Historik in der ersten handschriftlichen (1857/1858) und in der 
letzen gedruckten Fassung (1882) (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1977) 395- 
411 (1857/58 edn), 413-88 (1882 edn).
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Philemon, in the light of the implications this new position has for the 
questioning of assumption.
On the one side of this debate are those who support the main 
traditional story concerning the flight of Onesimus,17 and, on the 
other, those who pose the idea that the situation behind Philemon has 
nothing to do with a runaway slave, and everything to do with the 
complex relationship between an imprisoned apostle and his free, 
wealthy, ‘partner’, Philemon.18 Complete certainty can not be 
achieved concerning this issue— the exact situation addressed in the 
letter is simply too obfuscated to reach a definite solution. This 
position can be attuned to Gadamer’s view as interpreted by 
Warnke,19 that what is understood is a meaning that is determined in 
relationship to issues over which we dialogue. This dialogue is
17 Fairly typical in this regard is the argument of J.M.G. Barclay, ‘Paul, 
Philemon and the Dilemma of Christian Slave-0wnership’, NTS 37 (1991) 163- 
65, who rejects the alternative hypothesis largely because ‘there seem to be good 
reasons for holding to the usual understanding of events’ (p. 164). Both Barclay 
and B.M. Rapske, ‘The Prisoner Paul in the Eyes of Onesimus’, NTS 37 (1991) 
188-89 find difficulty with the idea that Philemon could send someone he 
regarded as useless (Philem. 11) to fulfil Paul’s physical needs in prison (cf. C.S. 
Wansink, Chained in Christ: The Experience and Rhetoric o f  PauTs 
Imprisonments [JSNTSup 130; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1996] 179- 
99, for discussion of the physical conditions in Roman prisons, and the role that 
one’s slaves or family would have had in taking care of those in prison). This is a 
fair point, and one to which I return below, but for the moment, one must surely 
reject Rapske’s characterization of such a duty as ‘an important spiritual 
responsibility’ (p. 188), with which Philemon would surely not have entrusted a 
non-Christian slave. This presupposes an understanding of the role of slaves 
(believing or unbelieving) within the early Christian community, as well as an 
interpretation of Philem. 10 which necessitates his conversion while with Paul. 
On the latter, see below, p. 77.
18 The reader will note that elements of this alternative view, which was first 
voiced by J. Knox (in Philemon among the Letters o f Paul [New York: Abingdon, 
1959; London: Collins, 1960; 1st edn 1935]), are not discussed here, such as his 
theory that Archippus was the actual recipient of the letter, and that the letter to 
Philemon is actually the missing letter to the Laodiceans, mentioned in 
Colossians. These are passed by simply because (a) they have received virtually 
no support, and (b) they rest on a historical reconstruction even more tenuous than 
the traditional view. Much gratitude is due to Knox, however, for illuminating 
several difficulties with the traditional view of Philemon’s situation that have 
spurred later studies, even if this later discussion is more of a by-product of his 
study than its original goal. See further discussion below, n. 93.
19 Warnke, Gadamer, 102.
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operated on an assumption of the lack of complete knowledge of the 
subject matter by the participants, which is the fundamental reason for 
the importance of keeping open the question of the letter’s situation 
open.
The second part of the chapter will consist of an examination of 
some significant factors which surround the translation and 
interpretation of the language of Philemon, in an attempt to see where 
interpreters’ judgements in their treatment of Philemon have been 
clouded by dependence upon the traditional historical reconstruction. 
This may be seen to create some tension with Gadamer’s sense of 
tradition, but, to use Detmer’s terms, ‘prejudices are necessary 
conditions o f all instances of genuine understanding, without, 
however, being ever sufficient fully to determine the outcome of any 
instance of real understanding’ .20 Thus, as Gadamer states: ‘it is a 
grave misunderstanding to assume that emphasis on the essential 
factor of tradition which enters into all understanding implies an 
uncritical acceptance of tradition’.21
TEXTUAL AND GRAMMATICAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE SITUATION 
WHICH ELICITED THE LETTER TO PHILEMON
Those who posit that a particular background of Philemon should 
be seen as the proper reading of the text must take stock of several 
elements in the interpretation of the letter, not the least of which is the 
notion of ‘reading’ that is assumed. Gadamer’s last autobiographical 
remarks on the matter, in attempting to avoid psychologism, suggest 
that reading is a completion-of-meaning function which assumes and 
fulfils a state of understanding,22 as opposed to the idea that the 
process of reading somehow re-creates or reproduces the author’s 
intentions. As he states:
...it seems to me that traditional hermeneutics has still never fully
overcome the consequences of psychologism. In all reading and all
20 D. Detmer, ‘Gadamer’s Critique of the Enlightenment’, in Hahn (ed.), LLP 
279-80, here 279 (emphasis original).
21 ‘The Problem of Historical Consciousness’, trans. J.L. Close, in P. 
Rabinow and W.M. Sullivan (eds.), Interpretive Social Science: A Reader 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979) 108. Cf. also Truth and Method, 
283: ‘we have to recognize the element of tradition in historical research and 
inquire into its hermeneutic productivity’.
22 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 50-53. Cf. Gibson, 
‘Philosophy of Psychotic Modernism’, 356 (quoted above, p. 38 n. 104).
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understanding of writing one is dealing with an event or process through 
which what has been fixed into the text is elevated into a new assertion 
and must be concretized anew. Now the nature of true speaking is such 
that what is meant constantly goes beyond what is said. For this reason it 
seems to me that to hypostatize the intention of the speaker as the measure 
of understanding constitutes an ontological misunderstanding that one 
does not realize. It assumes that one could just somehow reconstruct this 
intention once again through a kind of identification and reproduction, and 
only then turn to the words as a standard of meaning. But...reading is not 
a process of reproduction that permits a comparison with the original 
intention.23
While not explicit in the discussion of the ‘background’ to Paul’s 
writing to Philemon, both of the hitherto suggested alternatives for 
this ‘background’ tacitly assume that the reconstruction of Paul’s 
intention in writing this letter is not only possible, but also necessary 
before examining its ‘words’. I would like to suggest that this is part 
of the ontological problem that lies under the surface of the historical 
and linguistic problems surrounding the interpretation of the letter to 
Philemon, and that, as part of a way out of this dilemma, we ought to 
turn first to the words of Philemon and see if we can move from that 
to a reconstruction of the subject matter— the Sache— which prompted 
Paul to write to Philemon, Tw dyamriTq) kcll auvepym ( ‘the beloved 
and fellow worker’). I will attempt to bring into the discussion of the 
‘background’, then, material not necessarily usually seen as part of the 
relevant data, in an attempt to allow the text to drive the discussion of 
this point more so, perhaps, than it has in the past.
The first nine verses of this twenty-five verse letter do not typically 
figure in the tendentious aspects of the discussion, usually being 
brought in to bolster a case built on the entreaty, beginning in v. 10. 
This entreaty, or at least the part seemingly concerned with Onesimus 
in some direct way, extends for ten verses, to v. 19. The most 
significant issues with regard to these verses are:
(a) the sense of the verb TrapamXm (parakalo, ‘entreat/ask’)24 in v. 
10 with the preposition Trepi (peri, ‘concerning/about’) with a 
genitive object—tou ep.ou tekvou ( ‘of my child’),
(b) the sense of bv àveite i^ â  œol ( ‘whom I send to you’) in v. 12,
23 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 52-53 (emphasis 
original).
24 Although I have typically simply translated the Greek throughout this 
thesis, on occasion, I have also offered the lexeme and a transliteration, so as to 
keep the discussion of specific linguistic points open.
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(c) the sense of rdxa yàp ôià touto éxwpLoGri npos* œpav ( ‘for 
perhaps on account of this he was spared for a while’) in v. 15,
(d) what Paul means by ouketi wg 8ou\ov à XX’ urrèp 8oüXov, 
d8eX(f)ôv dyairpTov ( ‘no longer as a slave, but more than a 
slave, a beloved brother’) in v. 16,
(e) the nature and sense of the conditionals el ovv fie exe iç  
Koivtovôv, TTpoCTXa(3ou aÙTÔv cos1 ëfië (if, then, you have any 
partnership/fellowship with me, receive him as me’) in v. 17 and 
el 8e t l  ffSiKrfCjév ae f\ ô^elXei, toüto éfiol ëXXoya ( ‘but 
if  he has harmed you in any way, or is obligated [to you], reckon 
this to me’) in v. 18,
(f) the reason why Paul should entreat Philemon to receive 
Onesimus as himself in v. 17, and finally,
(g) for what exactly Paul expects to possibly be held bond in v. 19. 
Some have, of course, brought up different aspects of the letter as
significant (some of which will be discussed in the course of this 
chapter), but it seems that these seven issues are the basis of all other 
inquiry, and the starting point for any interpretation of the situation 
underlying the letter. All other outside information brought to bear on 
the issue of background must first establish a base among these verses 
and their problematic nature, before sallying forth into various 
cognate writings and historical reconstructions. Translation, too, is 
unable to be completed without some sort of decision regarding the 
nature of these verses and their background— even such an ideal 
translation that would keep the question completely open must make a 
decision not to read one or the other suggested backgrounds into the 
text and its translation. Gadamer’s comments on this are salient, and 
demonstrate the need for attention to precisely this sort of issue:
Having to depend on an interpreter’s translation is an extreme case that 
doubles the hermeneutical process, namely the conversation: there is one 
conversation between the interpreter and the other, and a second between 
the interpreter and oneself.25
This hermeneutic doubling is a precarious state of affairs about which 
the way in which Gadamer frames his statement ( ‘Having to 
depend...’) raises questions concerning the effect of such doubling on
25 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 385.
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the psychology o f reading.26 While this is not the context for 
developing this point, it is a conscious presupposition of this chapter 
that such hermeneutical and psychological difficulties do accompany 
the reading of texts in translation. Part of the motivation to examine 
the presuppositions underlying the interpretation of Philemon is to 
provide a conscious move away from the delimitation o f the open 
sphere of the question through translation.
In discussing the relative merits of the two major options for the 
understanding of the background of Philemon, it seems prudent to 
determine how they establish at least provisional answers to these 
seven issues.
Philemon 10: TrapaKaXû ae ne pi tou ep.ou reicvou
There are two specific issues to take into account concerning the 
meaning of this clause: the sense of TrapaicaXd) (parakalo), and the 
sense of the preposition ne pi (peri) with the genitive. Basic English 
glosses for the verb napoucaXw are ‘entreat, beseech, ask’, although 
the sense of ‘exhort, urge’ is also attested.27 In all of Paul’s usage, 
Philem. 10 is the only occurrence of this verb with an indirect object 
taking the preposition nept. The verb, however, occurs twice in 
Philemon, the first time in v. 9: ô ià  t t \ v  dydur|v p.dXXov 
napamXa), to ioû toç  wv cos* HauXos* upea(3urr|s* vvvi ôe m !  
Séap-ios* Xpiarou ’Iqaou ( ‘on account of love, rather, do I 
ask—inasmuch as, being Paul, an old man, but now also a prisoner 
of/for Christ Jesus...’). Because of the proximity of these two usages 
of the verb in Philemon, and because of the lack of Pauline cognates 
to the usage with Trept, it is probably best to begin with trying to 
understand TraparaXco in its immediate context in Philemon.28
26 Cf. B.W.R. Pearson, 6Remainderless Translations? Implications of the 
Tradition Concerning the Translation of the lxx  for Modern Translational 
Theory’, in Porter and Hess (eds.), Translating the Bible, 63-84, esp. 79-84.
27 See M -M  s.v. TrapaKaXéco, as well as Liddell-Scott-Jones (LSI) s.v. 
TTdpaicaXétt, 1311. See also Louw-Nida (Domains) 33.168, 310, 315 
‘communication’, and 25.150 ‘attitudes, emotions’.
28 This is not the opinion of J.G. Nordling, whose essay, ‘Onesimus 
Fugitivus: A Defense of the Runaway Slave Hypothesis in Philemon’, JSNT 41 
(1991) 97-119, is the most cogent recent defense of the traditional view 
concerning the background of Philemon in modem scholarship. He suggests that 
we should carefully consider ‘the 52 occurrences [this figure, from M-G, seems 
inaccurate, or is perhaps based on an earlier edition of the Greek text, as, using the 
full Pauline corpus of the NA27, including the “deutero-Pauline” material, the
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In v. 9, Paul’s entreaty is rather confusing, since he seems not to 
specify the object of the request. Unlike any other usage in the Pauline 
corpus, this usage of TrapamXa) seems to have no object. TlapamXci), 
used in the first person (singular or plural) and the active voice, is 
generally found in one of two constructions. The first construction is 
with an accusative object (most common in Paul and the rest of the 
New Testament is up.âç (humas— the second person plural pronoun), 
usually translated something like, ‘I/we entreat/exhort/encourage you’ 
[Rom. 12:1; 15:30; 16:17; 1 Cor. 1:10; 4:16; 16:15; 2 Cor. 2:8; 6:1; 
10:1; etc.])— often as part of an accompanying dependent infinitive 
phrase (e.g. 2 Cor. 2:8 8iô TraparaXü) up.âç Kupcoaai e lç  airrôv 
dydmriv ‘thus I entreat you to render unto him love’). The second is 
with an object in either the accusative or dative case, accompanied by 
a iva (hina, a Greek particle marking purpose or content) clause (e.g. 
2 Cor. 12:8 ÙTrèp toutou Tplç tôv  Kupiov TrapEKdXeoa iva  
àTroarfj dir’ è|iou29 with the accusative; or 2 Thess. 3:12 to lç  8è 
to lou to iç  TrapayyeXXop.ev Kai 'TTaparaXoup.EV èv Kupico ’Ipaoû 
XpiaTto, ïva  p.6Tà fjouxLciç epya^op-Evoi tôv  èaurav dpTov 
écrGLcoaiv30 with the dative). There are two places in Pauline usage 
where the first person active is used without being complemented in 
the above manners: one is possibly Philem. 9, under consideration 
here, and the other is 1 Cor. 4:13: 8uo-(f>r|p.ou|j.evoi 'irapaKaXoup.EV
count is 54, or, only using a seven-letter corpus, it is 40] of this verb in Paul will 
reveal that the apostle used the word in two ways: (1) “to exhort/beseech”...; and 
(2) “to comfort/encourage’” (p. 112). Nordling then apparently reads these two 
related meanings back into Philemon, and comes up with the translation for the 
second occurrence of irapaKaXw as ‘I encourage you . . . ’ (extrapolated from p. 
112, as he never actually states how he thinks this clause should be translated, but 
the material he does submit leads one to imagine that this is the translation/sense 
he wishes irapaKaXd) to carry). Unfortunately, Nordling ignores both the initial 
occurrence of TrapaKaXw in Philemon, and the typical meaning of Trept with the 
genitive. Although he discusses the importance of the context of the two 
preceding verses in the paragraph following his discussion of v. 10, he does not 
mention the occurrence of rrapaKaXw in this discussion. He suggests that Trept is a 
‘semantically uncertain preposition’, and thinks that it ‘is difficult to avoid the 
suspicion that the whole argument [that rrept with the genitive should be taken in 
its typical Hellenistic sense of content] has been ingeniously invented to suit an 
alien interpretation of the text’ (p. 112). See further discusson of this issue below.
29 ‘For this three times I asked the Lord that he might take [it] from me’.
30 ‘Now such persons we command and exhort in the Lord Jesus Christ to do 
their work in quietness and to earn their own living’.
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œç TrepiKa0dp|iaTa to û  k6(J|iou eyevfiGriiiey, Trdvrajv TrepiiJ;ri[ia 
ëwç dpri (first two words: ‘being slandered, we apologize...’). In 1 
Cor. 4:13, the exact sense of the verb is difficult to ascertain, but, if 
understood as I have done here, there are parallels in the New  
Testament (Acts 16:39 Kai èX ûôvteç TraperaXeaav aùroùç m l  
eÇayayôvTEÇ i p a n w  dTreX0eiv àno tt\ç iroXecas*31), the Letter o f  
Aristeas (§229 TTapamXéaaç 8è Kai to ü to v  eiruvGdvETO Kai to u  
P-ETéiTELTa Ti KaXXovps* d^iôv ÈcJTiv;32), as well as in Menander, 
F ragm ent, p. 241: o&xi TrapaKXriGévTaç up.âç 8eÎ yàp  p p lv  
eùvoeÎv.33 There are, however, two further examples to note: the lack 
of an object in Heb. 13:19, TTEpiŒŒOTÉpGoç 8e TrapamXa) to û to  
TTOLfjaai, ïv a  T axiov diromTaoTaGa) up.iv,34 and in 1 Pet. 2:11 
’AyairT|TOL, rrapaKaXw œ ç TrapoiKouç m i  TTapETTiSppouç 
dTTEXCCJ0ai TOV OapKLKCOV ÈTTl0Upid)V aiTLVES* OTpaTEUOVTai
KaTà Tfj? i/iuxt!?.35 Although without an explicit object, in both of 
these instances rrapamXa) still syntactically has a following dependent 
infinitive. That it does not do so in Philem. 9 seems to suggest that 
these other verses may not provide legitimate parallels to explain its 
use in this verse.
So, while we have some near parallels to Philem. 9, we do not have 
exactly the same syntax in either Paul or wider New Testament usage. 
If we look more carefully at the text of Philemon, however, we might 
think that vv. 9 and 10 are more intricately linked than is usually 
thought. Verses 9 and 10 read: 8id t t ) v  dydmriv pdXXov rrapamXa), 
t o i o u t o s *  d)v cos* HauXoç TTpEa(3uTT|9 vuvl 8è m i Séapioç
XpicjTOu ’Irjaou* rrapamXa) cte rrEpi t o u  èpoü t é k v o u ,  ô v
ÈyÉWTiaa Èv T0i9 SEapoîç, ’OvfjCTipov k .t .X . The typical reading
of v. 9 supplies the pronoun ‘you’ (or, with the preposition, ‘to you’) 
after rrapamXa) (n k j v , n e b , j b / n j b , c e v , n a s b , n i v , Lattimore,
31 ‘And coming, they entreated them, and leading them out, they asked them 
to depart from the city’.
32 ‘and encouraging that one, he inquired of the following one, “What is like 
beauty?’” ; also in §§235, 238 and 264.
33 ‘not apologizing to you, for it was necessary [for you] to be well-disposed 
to us’, see M-M s.v. rrapaKaXéo).
34 ‘earnestly I urge [you] to do this so that I might be restored to you the 
sooner’.
35 ‘Beloved, I beseech [you] as aliens and exiles to abstain from the passions 
of the flesh that wage war against the soul’.
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rsv/n r s v , etc.).36 However, if  we remove this translational 
emendation, we are left with something which (given the usual pattern 
of TTapaKdXécû being found with some kind of object and/or role to 
play with a dependent infinitive and/or following iva clause) should 
probably be associated with the subsequent usage of TrapaKaXw in v. 
10. The intervening material would then be seen as parenthetical, with 
the repetition of the verb in v. 10 signalling the resumption of the 
request, this time with an object, as expected. Translated, this reads, 
‘on account of love, rather, I ask—being as [I am] Paul, old now,37 
and even in chains for Christ Jesus— I ask you ...’. The sense of this 
request having something to do with Onesimus is also a matter of 
some dispute, revolving mostly around the sense of Trept. It is to this 
which we will now turn.
John Nordling’s article, mentioned above, displays the continued 
uncritical usage of the post-New Testament perceptions of the 
traditional background story of Philemon to interpret the letter. As 
Nordling puts it, T would like to defend the hypothesis that Onesimus 
was a runaway slave. Not only does that hypothesis suit the 
evangelical character of Philemon, but there is important extra- 
biblical evidence which ought to be considered before an informed 
decision can be reached about Onesimus...’.38 He then goes on to lay 
out the plan for his assessment. He will look at: ‘1. extra-biblical texts
36 Cf. Callahan, Embassy o f Onesimus, 34: ‘Paul’s repetition of the word 
“appeal (to)” ...is importunate: he is making a request, not a demand’. 
Unfortunately, on the previous page, in translation, he too supplies a second 
person singular pronoun in v. 9. This sort of supply is also the case in the 
translations listed for Heb. 13:19 and 1 Pet. 2:11, which cases are, perhaps, more 
defensible than in Philem. 9, as they are both parts of catenative constructions, 
which Philem. 9 is not.
37 This translation assumes the reading TTpc(j|3uTr)ç (‘old man’), rather than 
the v./. TTpeCTfBeuTris* (‘ambassador’), favoured by, e.g., P.T. O’Brien, Colossians, 
Philemon (WBC 44; Waco, TX: Word Books, 1982) 290. Consider also the 
suggestions of E. Lohse, Colossians and Philemon (trans. W.R. Poehlmann and 
R.J. Karris; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971) 198-99, who argues 
that TTp6cr(3uTTiç can be taken to mean ‘ambassador’. J.D.G. Dunn, The Epistles to 
the Colossians and to Philemon (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: 
Paternoster, 1996) 322 n. 3 problematizes Lohse’s idea. The use of em-dashes 
(—) in the translation to mark off the parenthetical material is mirrored in the r s v , 
although, as noted, it provides an object for the first occurrence of TrapaKaXw.
38 Nordling, ‘Onesimus Fugitivus’, 99. What Nordling means by ‘evangelical 
character’ is unclear.
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that mention runaway slaves; 2. passages in Philemon that support the 
runaway slave hypothesis; 3. the runaway slave problem in light of 
Roman law; 4. conclusion’.39 However, his conclusions as stated in 
section 4 of his paper are assumed from its beginning. Rather than 
attempt to establish the basis from which a ‘runaway slave hypothesis’ 
could be formed on the basis of the text of Philemon itself (as is the 
approach advocated in the present chapter), he begins by discussing 
texts which may or may not have anything to do with the text of 
Philemon— if Onesimus was not a runaway, then those texts have no 
relevance to the discussion of the background of the letter.
Although the sympathies in the current chapter most definitely lie 
with some form of an alternative hypothesis— that Onesimus had been 
sent by Philemon to help Paul in some capacity during his 
imprisonment— the overarching aim of this thesis is to show how 
unacknowledged and invalid assumption can cloud scholarship. The 
simple substitution of one slanted translation and presentation 
(through translation, sub-titling, commentary, etc.) of this letter for 
another will do nothing but perpetuate a climate where questions are 
closed before they are even asked. This is Sara Winter’s approach. 
Her argumentation engages with the same wish to combat one set of 
presuppositions by substituting her own, despite the fact that she 
appeals to Gadamer’s discussion of prejudices as conditions of 
understanding40 to undergird this aspect of her programme.41 The 
way in which Gadamer formulates this point is not to suggest that 
socially-unacceptable biases (such as ‘Androcentric gender bias, racial 
bias, or social class bias’42) are to be rooted out and replaced with 
socially-acceptable ones,43 but rather that one’s presuppositions are an
39 Nordling, ‘Onesimus Fugitivus’, 99.
40 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 277-306. Cf. my discussion above, pp. 8-12.
41 S.W. Winter, ‘Methodological Observations on a New Interpretation of 
Paul’s Letter to Philemon’, USQR 39 (1984) 211 n. 19.
42 Winter, ‘Methodological Observations’, 207.
43 Presumably, non-androcentric (feminist?) gender bias is acceptable to 
Winter: ‘My own gender bias was responsible for the suspicion that Apphia was 
not the wife of Philemon... Analyzing the possibilities that this suspicion opened 
up was the key step in solving the enigma of the greeting and thanksgiving’ 
(‘Methodological Observations’, 212 n. 20). Winter fails to realize that, with no 
more information available to her, her gender bias can accomplish a no more 
demonstrably valid reading of Philemon than the traditional reading which she 
alleges is the result of an androcentric gender bias.
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inescapable part o f the horizon that one brings to the text.44 
Gadamer’s suggestion is simply that presuppositions must be 
constantly examined and re-examined as part o f the on-going 
interpretative process (as discussed above in Chapter 1). Winter’s 
non-androcentric biases are as open to examination as those she 
rejects.45
Another good example of this process in the interpretation of 
Philemon, enshrined at the level of method, is Petersen’s study, 
Rediscovering Paul, in the chapter entitled ‘From Letter to 
Story— and Back: Toward a Narratology and Sociology of Letters’.46 
The process advocated by Petersen is such that, assuming he knows 
the background story concerning Onesimus and Philem on’s 
relationship, he sets out to ‘discover’ this in the text of Philemon, and, 
unsurprisingly, does indeed find it there.
Despite the fact that aspects of the alternative hypothesis of the 
‘background’ of Philemon were put forward as early as 1935 with the 
first publication of Knox’s Philemon among the Letters o f Paul 
(repeated in the second edition of Knox’s book in 1959/60), in J.L. 
Houlden’s Paul's Letters from Prison, very little attention has been 
paid to it. Houlden’s statement on this— less ambitious than Knox’s 
hypothesis and more measured than Winter’s— is worth noting as one 
of the few additional voices in this debate:
That he was a runaway slave and that this is why Paul is so delicate and 
charming in this letter aimed at assuaging his master’s wrath is a legend 
without foundation. We just do not know how he came to be with 
Paul...probably he had been lent Paul to be of service to him over a 
difficult period. And the reason for Paul’s delicacy is simply that he 
wishes to retain his services longer...47
44 Cf. discussion of this point in Warnke, Gadamer, 29-34.
45 An argument might be made for the validity, in this case, of androcentric 
gender biases with regard to the status of Apphia as a named recipient of the letter 
to Philemon (and Apphia and Archippus), given that the culture in which this 
letter was written, received, and initially read was an androcentric one. On this 
particular gender issue in New Testament criticism, see B.W.R. Pearson, 
‘Method, Metaphor and Mammaries: The Ideology of Feminist New Testament 
Criticism’, in M.A. Hayes, W.J. Porter, and D. Tombs (eds.), Religion and 
Sexuality (RILP 4; STS 2; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998) 226-39.
46 Petersen, Rediscovering Paul, 43-88.
47 J.L. Houlden, Paul’s Letters from Prison (Baltimore: Penguin, 1970) 226.
ASSUMPTION AND THE INTERPRETATION OF PHILEMON 59
When responding to Winter and Knox, however, Nordling 
characterizes their attempts to understand the function of Tie pi in v. 10 
as the result of ‘alien interpretation[s]’.48 He may indeed be correct in 
asserting that the Knox/Winter hypothesis49 brings alien elements into 
the interpretation of the text, but no more so than the traditional 
hypothesis. What is important in the understanding of Trept with a 
genitive object, however, has little to do with historical 
reconstructions, and more to do with Greek grammar and syntax. It is 
the sense of this construction that may help us discern the sense of the 
preceding verb(s) TrapaK aX œ , and may give us the best window on the 
nature of the request being made by Paul— is this a request being 
made on behalf o f  Onesimus, for whatever reason, or is it f o r  
Onesimus, that is, with Onesimus himself as the content o f the 
request? As Nordling’s argument is the most recent, and as it handily 
surveys the previous attempts at solving this issue,50 it forms the basis 
of the following analysis.
Nordling responds to the suggestion on Knox’s part (followed by 
Winter and, for different reasons, F.F. Bruce51) that the phrase 
TrapaKaXci) cte t ie  pi t o u  êp.oü t e k v o u  should be translated ‘I ask 
you for my child’,52 by discussing the semantic overlap of rrEpi with
UTTÉp:
48 Nordling, ‘Onesimus Fugitivus’, 112.
49 So designated because Winter’s hypothesis, while rejecting Knox’s idea 
that Philemon was the letter to the Laodiceans, is essentially built upon his work.
50 Cited without analysis in Dunn, Colossians and Philemon, 328 n. 20.
51 F.F. Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the 
Ephesians (NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984) 212-13. Nordling does not 
acknowledge Bruce.
52 Knox, Philemon, 20. On the same page he explains, ‘Moule [Colossians 
and Philemon (CGTC; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957)] writes 
that I take “the TTapaKaXû oe ire pi... of v. 10 to mean ‘I request you for...’, as 
though Paul were not making a request concerning Onesimus but rather fo r  the 
gift o f him,\  Professor Moule neither accepts nor rejects this proposal, but his 
sentence does not seem to me to state the relationship between the two 
possibilities quite correctly. One does not need to decide that Paul is not making a 
request concerning Onesimus in order to recognise that he is asking fo r  him. It 
may be argued, and agreed, that rrepi with the genitive always means “about”, or 
“with reference to”; what I am saying is that after TraparaXco the “about” can often 
be sharpened. A request fo r  Onesimus would certainly also be a request 
concerning him’ (p. 20 n. 8). It is very possible that Nordling never saw this note, 
as he seems to have been using the original, 1935, edition of the book (see his p. 
98 n. 1), which could not have included this comment upon Moule’s 1957
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The more traditional translation cannot stand, claims Winter, because 
there is a substantial difference in the NT between the TrotpaKaXû ... tie pi 
construction (which she contends occurs only at Phlm 10) and TraparaXw 
... uiTEp. Winter also claims that the irapaKaXo) [...] urrép construction 
occurs three times (2 Cor. 12.8; 5.20; 1 Thess. 3.2) and that these passages 
demonstrate the differing sense ‘request on behalf o f .
It is necessary to point out, however, that in the third passage that Winter 
uses to support her position, Trcpl (nofinrÉp!) occurs: TrapaKGiXéom ttepi 
[sfc—see discussion below] rqs* TTLOTEwg û|iwv... (1 Thess. 3.2). This 
fact alone severely damages Winter’s argument that there must be a 
difference in meaning between the TrapaKaXw [...] nepl andTrapaKaXw 
[...] uiTEp constructions. To be sure, NT grammarians do make a slight 
distinction between ttepi and urrép with the genitive case.53 Yet it is 
widely acknowledged that the two prepositions overlap semantically, at 
least in epistolary and Koine Greek.54
There are several difficulties with this response on the part of 
Nordling. The first is his citation of 1 Thess. 3:2 with Trept on the 
basis of a very weak variant reading, of which he has no discussion. 
The textual apparatus of the NA27 records that the reading Trept does 
indeed exist, but supported only in the Majority text and the hand of 
the second corrector of Codex Bezae. The reading unep Qiuper, 
‘about/for’) is, however, found in the Codices Sinaiticus, 
Alexandrinus, Vaticanus, and the original hand of Codex Bezae, as 
well as many other later codices and minuscules. So, while there may 
be grounds for discussion of this as a textual variant, it in no way 
deserves to simply replace uirep in the text without mention— the 
UBSGNTA committee did not even deem it necessary to include tie pi 
as a discussed variant. It is difficult to discern exactly how it was that 
Nordling arrived at this reading, unless he relied upon a printed 
edition of the Greek New Testament based on the Majority text. 
However one decided to solve the text-critical issue here, Nordling’s 
case for imép and ncpi overlapping semantically when used with this
commentary. (Strangely, given that her work seems to have been part of a 
dissertation largely based on Knox’s investigations, it appears that Winter is also 
unaware of this later edition of Knox’s work.)
53 He cites S.G. Green, Handbook to the Grammar o f the Greek New 
Testament (New York: F.H. Revell, 1904) 250-52, and E. Van Ness Goetchius, 
The Language o f the New Testament (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1965) 
155-56.
54 Nordling, ‘ Onesimus Fugitivus ’, 110-11.
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verb does not find support in Paul’s usage or in that of any other New 
Testament author.
A second problem with Nordling’s argumentation here is that, in the 
sources he cites for the ‘semantic overlap’ of these two prepositions, 
he is very selective. There is indeed good evidence that, at times, lurép 
and ire pi are used in very similar circumstances, and it has even been 
suggested by Moule that they may be ‘synonymous’.55 However, it is 
important that the partial ‘synonymy’ of these two terms is not 
confused with complete synonymy. There is no question that these 
two prepositions are semantically related; however, in differing 
circumstances, this semantic relation may or may not translate into 
semantic overlap—the very fact that the writers of these two passages 
have used two semantically related prepositions, rather than simply 
one of them, argues for a lack of complete synonymy (if such can 
indeed exist in language). Nuances in word variation are, of course, 
difficult to discern when there are no native language users to 
interrrogate, but, by the same token, it is important that we do not 
simply conflate similar terms, and so lose any chance at determining 
the nuances that may exist. In fact, the semantic overlap goes in both 
directions— it is not only the case that Trept appears in the same 
contexts in which we might expect to find uirep, but also that uirep 
appears in contexts in which we might expect to find rrepi. 
Louw-Nida (90.24) list several examples of this reverse linking, 
including John 1:30 outôç écm v urrèp ou eyco elirov ( ‘this is the 
one about whom I spoke’), and 2 Cor. 7:4 iroXXfj p.oi KauxpoLg 
uirep up.o)v (‘[there is] great confidence in me concerning you’). Their 
note to this section is helpful: ‘The general equivalence of meaning of 
ire pi and uirep in contexts introducing content can be readily seen 
from the tendency of scribes to interchange these terms in 
manuscripts. However, there may be certain subtle distinctions in
55 C.F.D. Moule, An Idiom Book o f New Testament Greek (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, 1959) 63, on the basis of Eph. 6:18, 19 
SEfjOEL irepl iràvTwv t&v dyicov m i ûnèp èpoü, ïm  pot ôo0fj Xôyoç èv
dvOL^ EL TOÜ CJTOpaTOS* |10U, £V TTapppCTLO. yVWpLCTCU TO pUCTTfjpiOV TOÜ
EÙayyEXtou, and Heb. 5:1-3 iras* ydp dpxrepEÙg' dvGpwirwv Xap(3avôpEvos* 
uirèp dvGptoTTCov mOicrraTai rà  irpos* tôv  Oeôv, iva irpoo^ÉpT] ôœpd t e  
m i OuCTiaç uirèp àpapTiwv, pETpioiraGEiu ôuvdpEvoç to lç  àyvooucnv m i  
irXavcopèy01?, ettel m i  aÙTÔç TTEpLKEiTaL doGévEiav m i  Ôl’ aÙTijv 
ôc|)elXel, KaGws* îte pi toü Xaoû, oütcoç m i tie pi aÙTOü irpo(j<f>épELv ite pi 
àpapTiwy.
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meaning, but these cannot be determined from existing contexts.’ It 
seems, then, that we are no further ahead in the determination of the 
sense of Paul’s request of Philemon by recourse to the preposition. 
However, if  we read ‘on behalf o f . . .’, we are doing so in a context 
where there is no syntactical reason why we must do so, and are in 
fact doing exactly that of which Nordling accuses Knox and Winter, 
namely importing a reading which, although possible, is by no means 
necessarily the best option.
Given that the grammar here has not moved us one way or the other 
on the issue, it would be worthwhile at this juncture to examine the 
evidence adduced by Winter to support her argument that the 
language here in Philemon reflects that of summons formulae in extra- 
biblical Greek. She adduces four examples (following Knox’s lead), 
to which, despite the potential damage to his own argument, Nordling 
offers three more. These show a pattern, in Greek of the Hellenistic 
period (albeit from widely spread dates within that period), o f a 
formula using TrapaKaXd) and Trept that is very similar to Paul’s usage 
here in Philemon.56 Although this formula is used only once in Paul 
and the New Testament, it seems to have been quite clearly 
established elsewhere, at least enough to militate against the 
construction in Philem. 10 necessarily being understood in the sense 
of ‘on behalf of’, which translation seems to be necessary to establish 
the sense of the request required for the traditional hypothesis. 
Certainly, given the semantic overlap mentioned above, it remains a 
possibility.
56 S.C. Winter, ‘Paul’s Letter to Philemon’, NTS 33 (1987) 14 n. 45: P.Oxy. 
VII 1070.7-10 (3rd century c e )  p .e i£ o v  [v]üv è v  rœ p cyd X w  Zapcnreiq) | 
TrpocjKuvEi, Tou p é y a v  0eô v  'Zapâmv Tra|paKaXd) -rrepL te  T f^  Cwfjs1 u pœ v  
Kal tcor | f)|iw v  rrdvM w v teal twv ^pqo-Twu... (‘exceedingly, now, in the 
great Sarapeion, he worships: I entreat the great god Sarapis concerning your life 
and all of ours, and the kindnesses...’); P.Tebt. I 58.52-55 (111 b c e ; a letter from 
a tax-farm er) ir a X iv  Trpoo-evT É X \o|p .aL  ctol irpocFEÔpeÛCTaç | K al 
irpoaTrapaKoiXÉcTai N iK tova | TTEpl T fjç XoyEaxxs* ( ‘again I enjoin you, 
attending constantly to entreat with Nikonos concerning the accounts’); Aur. 
Sakaon 37:15-17 (although this uses irrrép); and Appian, Punic Wars 136. 
Nordling, ‘Onesimus Fugitivus’, 111 n. 4, printed on 112: P.Sarap. 9 2 TTapamXa) 
cte ypaifjai p o i  TTEpl T fjç u y iE ia ç  o o u  ( ‘I entreat you to write to me 
concerning your health’); P.Sarap. 95 TrapaKaXœ our <je ypd<f)€ TTEpl Tps* 
o a r n ip ia ç  (‘I entreat you, therefore: write concerning [your] safety!’); SB 10.102 
TrapaKaXœ our àR T iypàij;ai p o i TTEpl Tfjç o-WTTjpLag" o o u  ( ‘I entreat [you] 
therefore to write back to me concerning your safety’).
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Philemon 12: bv d v E T ie c t o l  
The sense of ôv dv67Te|ii/;d ctol ( ‘whom I send to you’) in v. 12 is 
also important in the discussion of the sense of Paul’s request. This is 
one of the phrases which Knox and Winter have tried to understand 
firmly on the basis of both New Testament and extra-biblical legal 
settings. In fact, when used in the New Testament, not considering 
Philem. 12, duarréfiTTCo seems to be used by Luke exclusively in legal 
contexts, namely, the referring of either Jesus’ (Luke 23:7, 11, 1557) 
or Paul’s (Acts 25:21) cases to a different or more suitable authority. 
In extra-biblical Greek, the word is indeed used in the sense argued 
for by Knox and Winter (although neither of them cites any examples, 
this work being done, again, by Nordling58), as ‘send up/refer [to a 
higher/more suitable authority]’, but there is also a frequently used 
sense of ‘send back’.59 Just because the word has a clear legal sense 
(among others), however, it is not, as Knox would suggest, clear that 
we should read this sense into the text of Philemon, which, after all, is 
not a clear legal setting.60 In fact, even in the Lukan data brought to 
bear by Knox and Winter, there is some equivocation. Although Knox 
suggests that ‘in the New Testament period it was commonly 
employed to indicate the reference of a case from a lower to a higher 
court’,61 the Lukan ‘legal’ examples are not examples of references of 
Jesus’ case from a lower to a higher court, but simply the reference of 
Jesus’ case back to the court from which it was previously referred. 
Arguably, 23:7 is an instance where the word is used in the sense for
57 dvETTEpt^ EV is the form chosen by the NA21 for the text, though it lists 
ette|ii|;ev as a v.I. supported by T>75 R* L and two minuscules. Winter (‘Paul’s 
Letter’, 7) lists Luke 23:22 as an example of dvaTrÉp.'irœ, which must be a 
misreading for 23:11, although it is difficult to determine exactly how her 
numbers tally, as she mentions a v.l. at Acts 27:1 which the NA21 has not 
included in its list of variants. In addition to this, it must be noted that Acts 25:21 
also has a v.l of rrÉp^w, supported by H L and P, among other manuscripts.
58 Nordling, ‘Onesimus Fugitivus’, 108 n. 1. Winter does cite BAGD, but 
does not list any of the examples it adduces.
59 See M-M s.v. àvcnrép/rTO), and the texts listed there, as well as Plutarch, 
Sol. 4:6, listed in BAGD, and Pindar, I. 1 (6). 10, listed in LSJ, s.v. àvonrép/rTûü, 
115.
60 Knox, Philemon, 21: ‘That the term has the same legal connotation in the 
Philemon passage there is not the slightest reason to doubt’. To pre-determine that 
Philemon is a legal text is, however, to again assume unproven conclusions.
61 Knox, Philemon, 21.
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which Knox and Winter argue.62 However, if one argues for the sense 
of lower to higher in the use of the word in 23:7, by definition, one 
cannot argue for the same sense in 23:11, as Jesus is sent from 
Herod’s court (ostensibly the higher court, or at least the court with 
jurisdiction) back to Pilate. Is Pilate’s court transformed through some 
legal chicanery into a higher court while Jesus is being interrogated by 
Herod? By no means. In fact, what one is forced to do, on either one 
or both of these occasions, is translate the word either simply ‘refer’, 
‘send’, or, in the second instance (as well as in 23:15), ‘send back\ 
The reference in Acts 25:21 is, perhaps, the clearest example of the 
sense for which Knox and Winter argue, but this may simply be 
because, unlike the references in Luke, Caesar is clearly a higher 
authority than Festus, or anyone else in the Empire. This fact may not 
be anything more than coincidence, however, and the verb there may 
simply mean ‘refer’ or ‘send’. Of course, it cannot mean ‘send back \ 
as Paul has not yet been to Rome, let alone to Caesar’s court.
At the end of this discussion, one is left with evidence that the 
Knox/Winter hypothesis, where based on the particular meaning for 
which they argue for this verb, loses support. Of course, the traditional 
hypothesis gains nothing by this investigation, since we are left with a 
verb which can only with certainty be translated as ‘send’ or ‘send 
back\ Since we know that Onesimus did indeed come from Philemon 
at one point, the latter translation seems perfectly acceptable, and this 
fact may also provide the best explanation for Paul’s use of the 
prefixed form of this verb, rather than the simple Tréfimi). The lack of 
legal context and the lack of any clear reason why Onesimus left in the 
first place mean that this cannot, as Nordling puts it, ‘provide solid
62 However, it is somewhat questionable as to whether or not Herod’s court 
was really a higher court, or simply the court with initial jurisdiction, through 
which Jesus’ case, to abide by legal precedent (as well as political expediency), 
should first go. The mention in 23:12 of Pilate and Herod’s previous enmity and 
subsequent friendship as a result of Jesus’ case being first referred to Herod’s 
court (as Herod had legal jurisdiction over Jesus), and then, prudently, sent back 
to Pilate, argues for a political motivation for Jesus’ movements between the two 
rulers, not a merely legal one. Cf. I.H. Marshall, Commentary on Luke (NIGTC; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Exeter: Paternoster, 1978) 855: ‘oLvaTrép/rrco can be used 
in a technical sense (cf. Latin remitto), “to send to a higher authority” (Acts 
25:21). But Herod was not a higher authority, and the same verb is used of Herod 
returning Jesus to Pilate in v. 11; the usage is, therefore, non-technical.’ With 
regard to Herod’s jurisdiction, see J. Holland, Luke 18:35-24:53 (WBC 35c; 
Dallas: Word Books, 1993) 1123.
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support for the runaway slave hypothesis in Philemon’,63 nor, as 
Winter puts it, ‘support the argument that àvcrrrép.Trü) is being used in 
the legal sense in Phlm 12’.64
Philemon 15: Taxa yàp 8ià to u to  éxcopia6r| Trpôç ajpav
The sense of the aorist passive verb exwpLoGr) ( ‘was parted’) in v. 
15 is also seen by both sides as beneficial to their cases. Of all the 
possible textual arguments for either side, this is the least persuasive. 
If Paul had used an alternative verbal form, this may have lent support 
to one side or the other, but he does not. He uses neither the active 
voice, which would satisfy those who see this as a reference to the 
flight of Onesimus,65 nor a different verbal construction altogether, 
which would satisfy those who see this as a reference to God’s role in 
the volitional act on the part of Philemon in sending Onesimus to Paul 
in prison.66 However, Nordling’s argument that the verb, in the 
passive, may have been a technical term for running away does bear 
some further investigation. Although he is certainly correct that LSJ 
does record ‘depart, go away’ as a possible Hellenistic meaning of the 
passive, of their examples,67 only a reference in Diodorus Siculus is 
unambiguously passive. References from Heraclitus, Polybius, and 
Ezekiel the Tragedian are all examples of the present middle/passive, 
and none of the contexts helps us to make definite decisions regarding 
their nature. It hardly seems that one example from Diodorus Siculus 
is a sufficient basis upon which to build a case for the sense of
63 Nordling, ‘Onesimus Fugitivus’, 108.
64 Winter, ‘Paul’s Letter’, 7.
65 Still, Nordling manages to construe this verb as supporting his case: ‘By 
this oblique expression Paul comes as close as he dares to mentioning Onesimus’s 
illegal flight from his master. Paul may even have intended the deliberate 
ambiguity of èxœpiCTÔTj to protect Onesimus yet also give his master a precise hint 
of Onesimus’s crime’ (‘Onesimus Fugitivus’, 109). It is difficult to ascertain 
exactly what Nordling means by this, however. What is it about which Paul must 
be careful not to make mention? Would Philemon not have been aware of the 
exact nature of any alleged crime on the part of Onesimus? How would the use of 
a passive voice verb protect Onesimus? Nordling offers no evidence for his 
position.
66 See Winter, ‘Paul’s Letter’, 10-11.
67 Heraclitus, Incred. 8; Diodorus Siculus 19:65:3 Kal to te  pèv eLs* 
EupaKouocraç EXwpioQq; Polybius 3:94:9 Kal TroXXà xwPLCôp.€voç ÈVETEiXaTO
P-T) TO(JOLVTT\V 'TTOlE'lCTÔai CnTOUÔfjV UTTÈp TOÜ (BXa^ aL TOUS* TToXEgLOUS*; and 
Ezekiel the Tragedian, Exodus 76 paoiXiKÔv 8’ eôgûké pot ôiàôqpa kœl aÜTÔç 
ek Gpôvwv x^ptCcTat.
66 BROOK W .R. PEARSON
‘depart/go away’.68 However, the passive voice of this verb does seem 
to have taken on a technical sense to do with the act of divorce, as LSJ 
note, providing examples from Polybius (31:26:6, although this is 
problematic, as there is a variant reading, albeit retaining the same 
verb and voice thereof) and Euripides (F ra g m en t 1063:13). 
Interestingly, the Pauline usage of this verb in the passive (excluding 
Philem. 15) is also limited to his discussion of divorce in 1 Cor. 7:10- 
11, 15.69 It seems within the realm of possibility that this verb was 
particularly suitable for contexts where one party left another (or 
another place), and the language user wished the leaving to focus on 
the person/place being left, rather than toward which the person/place 
the subject is moving. The passive occurrences of this verb in Acts 1:4 
and 18:1-2, which seem best translated into English with an active 
sense, may provide support for this hypothesis, being as there is no 
obvious expression of agency or assumed agency present in either 
context. In the light of this, perhaps the occurrence of this verb here in 
Philemon should be translated ‘Perhaps for this reason he left you for 
a w hile...’. However, this still presupposes how exactly ‘leaving’ can 
be construed as ‘running away’; and this case has not been 
convincingly made.
68 Nordling’s further argument ‘that the stem of could be used in a 
technical sense, meaning “to run away” appears likely in light of the compound 
form of the verb (dmKexwpr|Kev, [P.Paris 10 =] UPZ 121, 11. 3, 21), used to 
denote the flight of...two runaways...’ (‘Onesimus Fugitivus’, 109 n. 2) is hardly 
cogent—the very prefixing of this form argues strongly for the fact that the stem, 
on its own, did not carry the sense for which Nordling argues. This papyrus is 
discussed in the context of general law relating to slaves in Greco-Roman Egypt 
in R. Taubenschlag, The Law o f Greco-Roman Egypt in the Light o f the Papyri 
332 B.C.-640 A.D. (Warsaw: Pantwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 2nd edn, 1955 
[New York: Herald Square, 1944]) 84 n. 83. In addition, Taubenschlag lists 
P.RendHarr. 62 (151 C E ), and P.Cair.Zen. 59.070 (257 B C E ), which is ‘a slip of 
papyrus containing a description, or e’lkwv, perhaps of a runaway slave’.
69 Although the two occurrences of the verb in 1 Cor. 7:15 are also examples 
of present middle/passive forms, the context of the discussion, which includes 
clear examples of the aorist passive of the same verb in very similar 
circumstances, argues for the passive being the correct parsing for the present 
tense-forms.
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Philemon 16: o u k e t l  cas* ôouXov àXX’ uTrèp ôoüXov, à8eX(f>ôv
àyaTTT|TÔv
What Paul means by o u k e t l  œç 8ouXov àXX’ u ir è p  SouXov, 
àSeXÿdv dyaTTT|TÔv ( ‘no longer as a slave, but more than a slave, a 
beloved brother’) in v. 16 is anyone’s guess,70 although the most 
popular solution is that he is making reference to the fact that 
Onesimus is now a Christian (to whom Paul had ‘given birth’ in 
prison, v. 10), and that his status as Philemon’s brother demands some 
kind of change in his status as a slave. It seems that this is one place 
where both sides in this debate are seemingly willing to agree. Winter 
discusses this in some detail,71 while Nordling does not, apparently, 
consider it worth discussion. In actual fact, the implications of the 
level of change in the relationship between Philemon and Onesimus, 
at which Paul hints both here and elsewhere in the letter (especially v. 
21), do not affect either position regarding the actual situation which 
called forth this communiqué. Paul’s attitudes toward and teaching 
about slavery are, of course, important for the discussion of Pauline 
theology, and deserve much more attention than they have received in 
recent debate.72 However, the exact attitude which Paul displays 
towards slavery in this particular letter is quite difficult to establish.
70 It is here, however, where Callahan places the emphasis of his hypothesis 
that Onesimus was, in fact, not a slave. Callahan {Embassy o f Onesimus, 44-54, 
here 44) argues vociferously that, in this context, wg ‘here has the force of “as 
though”, indicating that Onesimus’s servile status is a thought or assertion on 
Philemon’s part, and not a point of fact’. Unfortunately, Callahan offers no 
argument for this understanding of wg, relying instead on the Latin of the diglot 
codex Claromontanus (h 12; 5th century), which has ‘quasi servum’ (‘quasi­
slave’).
71 ‘Paul’s Letter’, 10.
72 One wonders if the widely-held belief in the pseudonymity of the 
Haustafel-bQ&nng letters has not clouded discussion of this issue overmuch. The 
chapter on Paul in P. Garnsey, Ideas o f Slavery from Aristotle to Augustus (The 
W.B. Stanford Memorial Lectures; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996) 173-88, is illustrative of this point. For ‘Paul’ Garnsey would have us read 
‘Paul and some of his followers’ (173 n. 1), after which he asserts that ‘Ephesians, 
I Timothy and Titus are not by Paul’. This is not the place to engage in debate 
over the authorship of these letters, but Garnsey’s rejection of especially 
Ephesians, while accepting Colossians (see pp. 177-78), makes his use of the title 
‘Paul’ to encompass the authors of both of these writings quite strange. Surely an 
outright rejection of Ephesians would necessitate an analysis of the differences 
between the Haustafeln in these two letters, taking the Colossian one as ‘Pauline’, 
and assigning the Ephesian one to a different author altogether? Such conflation
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Philemon 17 and 18: ei ovv \i€ ëx^iç k o lv w v o v , wpooXaPou
aÙTÔv cos* è|ié, ei 8é t l  f)8LKT|(Tév oe f\ ô^eiXei, t o î i t o  éfioi
éXXôya
The nature and sense o f the first-class conditionals el ouv \ie 
ëxELg kolvcûvôv, irpooXalBou œùtôv œç ép.é ( ‘if, then, you have any 
partnership/felowship with me, receive him as me’) in v. 17 and el 8e 
t l  fiSiKTjcjev oe p ô^eCXei, tou to  ëp-oi èXXôya ( ‘but if he has 
harmed you in any way, or is obligated [to you], reckon this to me’) in 
v. 18 are very important to the discussion of any hypothesis regarding 
the background of Philemon. Nordling limits his discussion mostly to 
the lexical level, while Winter attempts a more grammatically based 
analysis. Nordling’s analysis follow s the general pattern of  
commentaries on this passage, but, as he is specifically concerned 
with the background of Philemon, he goes on to suggest that the ‘use 
and mutual proximity of dSiKÉco and o^elXco, however, are at least 
suggestive of Onesimus’s robbery’.73 He appears to be assuming his 
conclusions. It is too much to say this at this point, because it remains 
to be established that such an event has taken place.
Dunn finds the shift o f terminology in these verses to the 
commercial realm somewhat surprising.74 In actual fact, though, both 
hypotheses for the background of the letter require that this area be 
addressed by Paul. On the one hand, we have a runaway thieving 
slave who has deprived his master not only of his services, but also of 
the property, whatever it may have been, which he stole. Paul, in 
wishing some sort of forgiveness to take place, perhaps even to the 
point of manumission, would have no other vocabulary with which to 
address this situation. On the other hand, if what we have here is a 
request concerned not with some kind of wrongdoing on Onesimus’s 
part, but rather with some kind of actual benefit to be received on 
Paul’s part, then we could also expect Paul to discuss this in terms of 
the commercial and financial ramifications that this would have for 
his owner. If the request amounted to manumission, then we should be 
even less surprised that Paul speaks in terms of accounts and debts.
cannot be beneficial in the on-going pursuit of a systematized ‘Pauline’ thought 
on slavery (despite the detailed but deeply flawed arguments in A.T. Lincoln, 
Ephesians [WBC 41; Dallas: Word Books, 1990] lix-lxxxvi, on the validity of 
using Ephesians to reconstruct ‘Pauline’ theology, even though he rejects its 
literal Pauline authorship).
73 ‘Onesimus Fugitivus’, 110.
74 Dunn, Colossians and Philemon, 336.
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We still need, however, to establish the sense of these two 
connected conditional statements. Contrary to Dunn, the first-class 
conditional does not carry the sense of ‘whatever’ rather than ‘i f . 75 In 
fact, of all the classes of conditional statement available to Hellenistic 
Greek-speakers, first-class conditionals carry the least interpretative 
weight. Rather than the sense for which Dunn argues here, the first- 
class conditional simply posits something for the sake of argument. 
As Porter’s discussion indicates,
Use of ‘since’ in translating the protasis of a first class conditional cannot 
be made the rule... [It is] estimated that, of the [300] first class 
conditionals [in the New Testament], 37% are obviously true, 12% are 
obviously false, and 51% are undetermined. If [this] is correct, then well 
over half do not show that the first class conditional is asserted as true 
(‘since’).76
Although Dunn cites Clarice Martin’s essay on the commercial 
language in these verses, he ignores her clear presentation of similar 
argumentation to Porter’s with regard to the first-class conditional, 
based on grammars by Smyth,77 Zerwick,78 and Brooks and 
Winbery,79 as well as Robertson and Davis.80 She is hardly without 
support in her statement that ‘one cannot deduce from the commercial 
terminology in the conditional protasis alone that a crime has 
occurred’.81 Dunn’s response to this is puzzling. Speaking of Martin’s
75 Dunn, Colossians and Philemon, 338, in reference to the conditional in v. 
18 (oddly, he does not make the same argument for the preceding conditional): 
‘The “i f ’ has, indeed, the force of “whatever”, the rhetorical effect being to 
underline the comprehensiveness of Paul’s guarantee’.
76 S.E. Porter, Idioms o f the Greek New Testament (BLG 2; Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 2nd edn, 1994) 257.
77 H.W. Smyth, Greek Grammar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1980).
78 M. Zerwick, Biblical Greek (SPIB 114; trans. J. Smith; Rome: Biblical 
Institute Press, 1963).
79 J.A. Brooks and C.L. Winbery, Syntax o f New Testament Greek 
(Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1979).
80 A.T. Robertson and W.H. Davis, A New Short Grammar o f the Greek 
Testament (Grand Rapids: Baker, 10th edn, 1979).
81 C.L. Martin, ‘The Rhetorical Function of Commercial Language in Paul’s 
Letter to Philemon (Verse 18)’, in D.F. Watson (ed.), Persuasive Artistry: Studies 
in Honor o f George A. Kennedy (JSNTSup 50; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991) 332- 
33. Martin is supported in this by Callahan, ‘Paul’s Epistle to Philemon’, 374; 
idem. Embassy o f Onesimus, 56.
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and Callahan’s questioning of the weight usually placed on this 
conditional, he suggests that ‘the aorist (f|8iKr|crev) hardly indicates 
the possibility of Onesimus’s future  indebtedness (for travel and 
lodging), and the thesis hardly explains the vehemence of Paul’s 
repeated assurance that he would repay whatever Onesimus owed’.82 
Two problems emerge from this statement: (1) the categories Dunn is 
using to understand the function of the Greek tense-forms seem to be 
time-based, and (2) the simple acknowledgement on the part of Martin 
and Callahan (and the present writer) that first-class conditionals do 
not necessarily assert anything except for the sake of argument is not a 
thesis, it is a recognition of a grammatical rule. It is dealing with this 
rule that gives trouble to the thesis that Onesimus was a thieving 
runaway. The antiquity of the runaway slave hypothesis should not 
lead to its being treated as if it were fact! The first problem, however, 
is just as telling as this last—the use of the aorist tense-form does not 
convey anything to do with time. As work on verbal aspect in the 
Greek of the New Testament has shown, the Greek verb can no longer 
simply be understood either in terms of time, or in terms of the first 
rejection of time-based categories in an attempt to make better sense 
of the way in which the Greek verb worked, Aktionsart theory.83 
Contrary to the time-based approach in Dunn’s criticism of Martin 
and Callahan’s position, the aorist is, albeit infrequently, used in 
future-referring contexts— the so-called proleptic or futuristic aorist.84 
It is also used in omnitemporal settings— the so-called ‘gnomic’ 
aorist— 85 and in timeless settings.86 There is nothing to say that this 
particular aorist, f]8iKr)(T6v, is not, indeed, being used like most of its 
compatriots in Greek, as the normal background narrative tense-form, 
conveying perfective verbal aspect. That it is conveying perfective 
aspect, however, does not mean that it must be past-referring, and so
82 Dunn, Colossians and Philemon, 338 n. 34.
83 See K.L. McKay, Greek Grammar for Students: A Concise Grammar o f 
Classical Attic with Special Reference to Aspect in the Verb (Canberra: Australian 
National University, 1974); S.E. Porter, Verbal Aspect in the Greek o f the New 
Testament, with Reference to Tense and Mood (SBG 1; New York: Peter Lang, 
1989); and even B.M. Fanning, Verbal Aspect in New Testament Greek (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990); as well as the handy summary of Porter’s position in 
Idioms, 20-61.
84 Porter, Idioms, 37-38; idem. Verbal Aspect, 230-33.
85 Porter, Idioms, 38-39; idem. Verbal Aspect, 217-25.
86 Porter, Idioms, 39; idem. Verbal Aspect, 233-38.
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we are unable to rest this much weight on one particular verb, no 
matter which tense-form it may take. Context and other deictic 
indicators will have to give us the sense of time, and, as we are 
discovering for many of the instances where a single grammatical 
feature or lexical item is thought to convey much weight for one or 
another hypothesis regarding the background of Philemon, there is 
precious little upon which to go. At this juncture, Gadamer’s approach 
to reasoning, especially as encapsulated in the form of Truth and 
Method which is not published, is salient. He states that, though the 
prepositional character of expressions should be appreciated, ‘what is 
more important is to establish the motivational level as such’.87
As far as verbal aspect in these two verses is concerned, it is worth 
noting the shift in verbal aspect in the protases and apodoses of these 
two conditional statements. In the first protasis, we have a present 
(exelç), followed by an aorist imperative (rTpo<j\a(3ou) in the apodosis 
(which must similarly be an action taking place in the future). In the 
second conditional, we have both an aorist (f|8LKT|(jev) and a present 
(ocpeLXei) in the protasis, and a present imperative (éXXôya) in the 
apodosis (which also must be seen as an action in the future, at least 
from the time of writing). If, following Dunn, we were to view these 
verbs as primarily time-based, a great deal o f confusion is 
unavoidable; looking at the verbs in terms of their verbal aspect 
avoids this confusion. In v. 18, f|8iKr|(jev, as an action viewed as 
complete (or, in the context of the first-class conditional, an allegedly 
complete action), is apparently viewed by the author perfectively, thus 
the use of the aorist tense-form. The use of the present tense-form 
cxJ>€LXei, which conveys imperfective verbal aspect, simply shows that 
this ‘action’ is viewed as a progressing situation— it is difficult to 
view ‘owing’ perfectively, as Paul seems to be speaking of something 
viewed as in progress, or he would not be suggesting the option of 
t o u t o  ê p .o l éXXôya ( ‘reckon this to me’). The continued use of the 
present tense-form with éXXôya suggests that Paul is linking his 
emphasis in this conditional on ‘owing’ to the consequent result which 
he wishes, namely that the onus be shifted to him. This is highlighted 
even more in the previous verse, with the use of the present indicative 
in the protasis, and then a switch to the aorist imperative in the
87 As reported by Grondin, Sources o f Hermeneutics, 95 (from the original 
draft of Wahrheit und Methode, after section 13).
72 BROOK W .R. PEARSON
apodosis. Again, the emphasis is on the relationship that Paul has with 
Philemon, and not on the reception of Onesimus.
This relationship is emphasized elsewhere in the letter as well. The 
entire section leading up to the request in vv. 10-19 focuses on 
Philemon and his role within the community of saints (vv. 5-9). This 
is the basis and content of Paul’s thankfulness in prayer in v. 4: 
euxapicTTco tw 0ec5 |iou TrdvTOTE [iveiav  o o u  TTOioup.Evos* ém  
tcûv TTpooEuxcûv [io n  (T give thanks to my God in every 
remembering of you, made upon my prayers’). In this passage, Paul 
clearly reinforces several characteristics of his recipient: his love and 
faithfulness (both for the Lord and for all the saints), as well as the 
fact that Philemon has refreshed many of the saints by his love. The 
ottcos* ( ‘so that’) subjunctive clause in v. 6 is, however, somewhat 
obscure. Whether it depends on v. 4, or is to be seen as a parenthetical 
comment, is difficult to tell, but the likelihood is that vv. 5 and 6 are 
to be seen as individually dependent on v. 4. Whatever its relationship 
to the surrounding verses, and whatever its exact meaning, v. 6 gives 
evidence of at least one other reinforcement: Philemon’s Koivcovta 
(koinonia) is either commended, or Philemon is commended to 
K oivu )v ia , and, either way, its result (translated rather loosely) is a 
knowledge of ‘every good [thing] which is yours [or ‘ours’]88 in 
Christ Jesus’.89 Verse 7 goes on to give a reason, or perhaps an 
explanation, for Paul’s wish for Philemon: x ^ p d v  y d p  TroXXf)v 
ECTXov kœl TTapdKXr)(Jiv ettl t t )  dyaTTT) oo u , o n  r à  OTîXdyxva
88 There is a variant here which must be taken into consideration: in T>61 and 
R, as well as several later majuscules, minuscules and versions, the reading is èv 
ûpiv. The reading given here, èv f]|iiv, adopted by the NA27, is supported by A, 
C, D, # , as well as a fifth-century minuscule and the Majority text. O’Brien 
{Colossians, Philemon, 275) suggests that the variant should be accepted. See 
B.M. Metzger, A Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament (London: 
United Bible Societies, 2nd edn, 1994) 588, for a discussion— ‘The Committee 
preferred èv f)|±iv, which is perhaps slightly less well supported..., because it is 
more expressive and because, standing among other pronouns of the second 
person singular and plural, fjplv was more likely to be changed by copyists to 
u p .L v  than vice versa.’ By the same token, however, it seems that the first-person 
plural could have been changed to be in keeping with the second-person nature of 
the letter, as there are three individual recipients named, along with the church. 
Certainty based on internal factors seems impossible on this point, and the 
manuscript tradition is rather too evenly divided.
89 For a recent discussion of the various obscurities of this verse, see 
O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 279-81.
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t c û v  àyicov avaTréirauTai 8ià oou, âôeXÿé ( ‘for I have much joy 
and encouragement upon your love, because the hearts of the holy 
ones stand refreshed through you, brother’). Here we meet for the 
second time a word which we will encounter again in the request 
which follows: orrXdyxva (splangchna, ‘heart/inward part/bowel’). 
Paul’s strategy, in Gadamer’s perspective, is to fuse two competing 
horizons for the purpose of an improvement, or existential fulfilment, 
of the community’s functioning, with respect to these two individuals 
in relationship with others.90
No matter which perspective one adopts concerning the exact 
background of this letter, v. 7 must be recognized as a strategic 
device. There is no need to see this as a negative action on the part of 
Paul (although this is not ruled out), but there is no getting around the 
fact that Paul is at least making an attempt at being extremely 
persuasive. What is interesting and notable when it comes to 
discussion of the significance of this dialectical framework is what 
seems to be its emphasis. The picture Paul paints of Philemon here is 
that of a benefactor of the Christian community: T give thanks to my 
God always, remembering you in my prayers, having heard of your 
love and faith which you have toward the Lord Jesus and toward all 
the saints, [and, I give thanks] that the fellowship/sharing of your faith 
might be effective in [the] knowledge of all the good [which is] 
ours/yours in Christ. For I have much joy and comfort at [‘from’?] 
your love, because the hearts of the saints are in a state of refreshment 
through you, brother.’ From here, Paul sets out to establish the basis 
of his request, and the reason for the manner in which he puts it to 
Philemon: ‘Therefore, [though] having much confidence in Christ to 
command you [concerning] what is fit/proper/pertinent, on account of 
love rather I ask ...’.
Two things must be pointed-out with reference to this build-up: (1) 
Philemon’s k o l v c o v l c l  and d y d T T T | ç  ( ‘love’) are commended and/or
90 T.M. Alexander (‘Eros and Understanding Gadamer’s Aesthetic Ontology 
of the Community’, in Hahn [ed.], LLP 323-45) has furthered our understanding 
of this aspect of Gadamer’s use of language to produce an aesthetic ontology of 
the community. This is the acceptance of the other as a requisite for understanding 
(cf. above, p. 24 n. 67 and p. 27 n. 74, for discussion of this aspect of Gadamer’s 
philosophy). This clearly fuses the ethical, the aesthetic, and the existential in 
ways reminiscent of Gadamer’s Heideggerian influence in assessment of Plato’s 
concern with the good and the beautiful (cf. esp. Gadamer, The Idea o f the Good', 
and discussion above, p. 31).
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praised by Paul, as well as their results in the refreshment of the 
saints’ arrXdyxva. Later, Paul appeals to Philemon, rather than 
commands him, because of dydT rpv. What is not clear is whose 
dydTrr)v, exactly, is in view— Philemon’s for the saints, Paul’s for 
Philemon, Philemon’s for Paul, or even a mutual love. What seems 
most natural, given that it has been emphasized in the preceding 
verses, is that it is Philemon’s love which is meant in this particular 
instance. On this reading, then, Paul is not commanding Philemon out 
of some sense of delicacy, but because he is trying to get Philemon to 
see that what Paul asks of him is similar (in both content and results) 
to the previous love he had shown. The circumstances of Paul also 
figure into the request—he refers to himself as an aged prisoner for 
Christ Jesus, and simply ‘Paul’, with whatever connotations that may 
have had for Philemon (or, by extension, for Paul!). Onesimus has not 
yet been mentioned, and, no matter what the background one assumes, 
at this point of the letter it is impossible to deny that Paul is making an 
appeal for something which would fit in with the picture he has drawn 
of Philemon in vv. 4-7. (2) The Koivcovia Paul commends in v. 6 also 
figures later in the letter: the first conditional clause discussing 
conditions which may have affected Philemon’s acceptance of Paul’s 
request puts koivgûvôç in the protasis (v. 17).91 The frequent 
translation of this occurrence with a very different word than that of 
the occurrence in v. 6 (as in the CEV, JB, N A SB , NIV, NKJV, etc.) 
obscures the relation that these two verses and parts of the letter 
derive from Paul’s repetition of the word.92 While the first-class
91 See Louw-Nida 34.5-6, where these two words are treated in the same 
semantic domain ( ‘Association’). Even without the advances of modern semantic 
lexicography, however, surely the fact that these two words are from the same 
root, and are found in such close proximity and in so clearly related contexts (and 
have clearly related meanings), must beg for similarity in their translations.
92 Cf. also H. Binder, Der Brief des Paulus an Philemon (THNKT 11.2; 
Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1990) 46, 49 (Gemeinschaft), 51 
(Gleichgesinnten), although Binder does (p. 61) recognize the connection between 
this usage and that in v. 6: ‘Autor und Adressât Angehorige einer Gemeinschaft 
(v. 6!)’. Cf. also N.T. Wright (Colossians and Philemon [TNTC; Leicester: 
InterVarsity Press; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986] 176, 183, 187), who displays 
sensitivity to kolvwv- language, in contrast, e.g., to such a treatment as that of 
Moule, Colossians and Philemon, 142, who does not even comment on v. 17. 
Similar to Moule are R.P. Martin, Colossians and Philemon (NCB; London: 
Oliphants, 1974) 166; Lightfoot, Colossians and Philemon, 343; and Dunn, 
Colossians and Philemon, 336-37, who recognizes the shared kolvw- root
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conditional, as discussed above, does nothing more than make a 
statement for the sake of argument, the previous discussion of 
Philemon’s k o l v c j v l o l  makes the use of the first-class conditional 
somewhat ironic— Philemon is now asked by Paul, in a very direct 
way, to decide whether he has a similar attitude to Paul as he does to 
others. The result of this decision, if positive, will, as the apodosis of 
the conditional suggests, result in the reception of Onesimus as if  he 
were Paul.
Philemon 17: Why TïpoaXafiov am bv [Onesimus] cos* Paul?
Of course, the simple recognition that Onesimus is supposed to be 
received as Paul is only the beginning of the question. If, as we have 
seen above, the grammatical emphasis in these verses is not on this 
ultimate phrase, we are still left to explain what exactly Paul means, 
and for what reason it is that this request is made.
The usual explanation, of course, is that Paul makes this request, 
based on the 6guilt-trip’ of the protasis in v. 17, because Onesimus 
was in deep trouble with his master as the result of both his running 
away and the act of theft that accompanied it. As we have seen, 
however, neither of these alleged acts is substantiated on the basis of 
the text itself, but is rather read out of what is an unclear text. To read 
these inferences back into this verse, as this interpretation requires, is 
exegetically less than precise. The opposite to this, however, is not to 
simply repeat the process using an alternative hypothesis. The 
opposite action would be to determine what the text does say, and 
then see how that fits with the rest of the letter. Winter’s hypothesis is 
that Onesimus is here being recommended to Philemon and, by 
extension, the church which meets at his house,93 on the basis o f a
between vv. 6 and 17, but confusingly rejects appeal to v. 6 as a means to 
explicate v. 17 because ‘Philemon has already been designated “fellow worker” 
(v .l ) ’.
93 That Winter, following Knox, thinks that this letter is actually addressed to 
Archippus, who was both Onesimus’s master and the owner of the house in which 
the addressed church met, makes little difference to the alternative hypothesis, but 
must be mentioned for the sake of accuracy. That this position is untenable is 
demonstrated in the examination of the evidence adduced by Knox (Philemon, 51- 
61, whose reasoning is repeated without addition in Winter, ‘Paul’s Letter’, 1-2) 
that a letter with more than one recipient was not necessarily addressed to the 
first-named recipient. He cites P.Giss. I 54 as an example where a letter is clearly 
sent to two individuals, to the second of whom the letter is largely addressed (pp. 
53-54). Unfortunately, Knox’s argument breaks down at several points. First and
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societas relationship94 as an equal partner. It is this equality that is in 
view here, not grace for a runaway. Although the parallel to the 
societas relationship is perhaps not as strong as Winter suggests, it is 
not necessary to read this alternative hypothesis into the material at 
hand (as she does) to find support for her argument. Two things about 
this request are telling: (1) It explains the idea of an equal reception 
being given to Paul much better than the runaway slave 
hypothesis— if Onesimus was a runaway, however repentant, why 
would Paul phrase the conditional the way he does? In this case, it 
seems odd that he would not simply appeal to Philemon’s love for the 
saints again, and remind him concerning Onesimus’s status as one of 
these, or, indeed, that he would not have been more explicit about this 
duty of charity, rather than appeal to the K o i v w v i a  between Paul and 
Philemon. If Paul was appealing to Philemon to treat Onesimus 
gently, this is a rather strange way to couch it. As Winter suggests 
concerning the often quoted ‘parallel’ letter from Pliny to Sabinianus 
regarding Sabinianus’s freedman (often mistaken for a slave in the 
literature) who had come to Pliny as an amicus domine ( ‘master’s 
friend’, in the hope that this friend would intercede for him with the 
disgruntled master, as Pliny did indeed do),
comparison of this letter with Paul’s only shows how inadequate Paul’s 
letter is as a request on behalf of a runaway slave. Even a short passage 
from Pliny’s letter shows how he makes an explicit request:
foremost is the very clarity with which the author of P.Giss. I 54 switches from a 
plural pronoun to the singular, but also uses the name of the person to whom he is 
now addressing his comments. The further switch back to the first named 
recipient is also accomplished by the use of that recipient’s name, and the switch, 
right after that brief comment, is, presumably (were it not in actual fact slightly 
confusing to the recipients), an addendum to the list of instructions that were 
being given in the main part of the letter to the second named recipient. In the 
Corinthian correspondence, at least, Paul has a pattern of more than one listed 
recipient, the first of whom must be the primary intended recipients (although it 
must be admitted that these examples are dissimilar to Philemon in terms of the 
way in which they are structured): 1 Cor. 1:2 Tf) 6K K \r |(n q  t o ü  G eoü  r f j  oücrr) 
kv  K o p iv G w , f i Y l a c r g é v o i ç  è v  X p io r q )  ’lq o -o ü ,  KXrjTOLÇ a y l o i s ' ,  a ù v  T rctoiv  
t o l ç  éTTiK aXoup.évoLS' t ô  ô v o p .a  t o ü  K u p io u  f]p.ci)v ’I q o o ü  XplCTTOÜ è v  
t t o l v t l  t ô t t ü ) ;  2 Cor. 1:1 r f j  èK K X q o fq  t o ü  G eoü  t t )  oüctt] è v  K o p iv G w  ctüv  
TOÎÇ â y i o i s -  TTOLCTIV TOÎÇ OLKTLV è v  ÔXl) TT] ’A X O IO .
94 Following J.P. Sampley, Pauline Partnership in Christ (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1981). Winter cites no specific pages.
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‘I know you are angry with him, and I know, too, it is not without reason; 
but clemency can never exert itself more laudably than when there is most 
cause for resentment. You once had an affection for this man, and, I hope, 
will have again; meanwhile, let me only prevail with you to forgive him. If 
he should incur your displeasure hereafter, you will have so much the 
stronger plea in excuse of your anger as you show yourself more merciful 
to him now.’95
Paul’s language, in comparison, does little to address the relationship 
between Onesimus and his master, but rather, perhaps, addresses a 
shift in that relationship on the basis o f Paul's needs. This may have
95 Pliny, Ep. 9:21-24; Winter, ‘Paul’s Letter’, 6-7, following Knox, 
Philemon, 16-18. Cf. also, Harrill’s {The Manumission o f Slaves, 164 n. 22) 
assessment: ‘Note...the servility of Sabinianus’s groveling freedman in Pliny, Ep. 
9:21 (which is often cited, erroneously, as a parallel to Philemon; it deals with a 
freedman and not a slave, and Pliny’s tone is entirely different from Paul’s in 
Philemon)’. Although I will not treat it as such here, the position first defended by 
P. Lampe (‘Keine “Slavenflucht” des Onesimus’, ZNW  76 [1985] 135-37), who 
argued that Onesimus was not a fugitive slave on the basis of Roman law, could 
be seen as a third position in the renewed debate over the background of 
Philemon. Several have followed Lampe in this, either tentatively (e.g. J.-F. 
Collange, L ’Épître de Saint Paul à Philémon [CNT 11c; Geneva: Labor et Fides, 
1987] 18 n. 12: ‘cette thèse, jetant ainsi une lumière assez neuve sur notre lettre’; 
Binder, Philemon, 35) or with full support for his argument. Among his most 
ardent defenders is Rapske, ‘The Prisoner Paul’, who posits six possible stories as 
the background for Philemon, the first of which—the alternative hypothesis being 
examined in this chapter—he rejects with only cursory analysis, and who argues 
against the remaining four (all versions of the fugitive hypothesis) in favour of 
Lampe’s hypothesis. A recent article by Harrill (‘Using the Roman Jurists to 
Interpret Philemon: A Response to Peter Lampe’, ZNW  90 [1999] 135-38), 
however, has produced evidence that puts Lampe’s hypothesis on very unsure 
footing, suggesting that Lampe and his supporters have misunderstood the Roman 
legal material to which they appealed in their re-definition of Onesimus’s status. 
As Harrill states (p. 138): ‘Such mistreatment of the evidence is symptomatic of 
the larger methodological mistake of relying on law exclusively for one’s 
understanding of ancient slavery. In the end, Lampe’s thesis that Onesimus was 
not a runaway slave based on juridical definition of servus fugitivus does not 
hold.’ It is worth noting that this rejection of Lampe’s hypothesis, for Harrill at 
least, does not necessitate an out-of-hand rejection of any alternative hypothesis: 
‘This finding...does not end reassessment of the “runaway slave” hypothesis to 
explain the social situation of the letter, which I support. Rather, we need to 
relocate the issue of slavery in the letter from a predominantly legal question to 
one that stems from social, economic, and familial considerations’, and cites 
Wansink, Chained in Christ, 179-99 as an example.
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had to do with a shift in Onesimus’s role within the Church. Either he 
was to be seen as a new Christian whom Paul hoped would be allowed 
by his master to function directly in service of the Church, or as a 
Christian (perhaps in name only as the result of a household 
conversion?) now vitalized and marked out by Paul for his direct 
apostolic supervision in the service of the gospel.
Winter’s argument that the use of the verb SiaKoveco in v. 13 to 
refer to that for which Paul wanted to retain Onesimus in the first 
place must be a reference to religious service, is worth consideration. 
She points out that S l o l k o v e o )  and its cognate noun form, Ô L a K O V o ç ,  are 
always used in Paul with a sense of religious service.96 It is indeed 
true that, in the 28 Pauline uses of these words (including those in the 
‘deutero’ -Pauline letters) outside Philemon, not one is found outside a 
religious context.97 On this basis, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
Paul, in his request to Philemon to receive Onesimus as if he were 
Paul, wishes Philemon to accept Onesimus’s new role as a minister in 
the gospel under Paul’s command and/or tutelage.
Phlemon 19: eyo) HauXos* cypaifja rfj ê[if] xeLPL> £yw àmmcjü)
The final point of textual contention in this debate is the meaning of 
Paul’s assertion in v. 19, written in his own hand (as opposed to that 
of the amanuensis who had apparently transcribed the rest o f the 
letter), that he will pay whatever Onesimus may owe. Does Paul here 
affirm that Onesimus did indeed owe something to Philemon? Or is 
this instead a way for Paul to segue into the rather pointed comments 
in the rest of the verse and the following verses? Since, contrary to the 
received opinion, the preceding verses do not provide us with a
96 Winter, ‘Paul’s Letter’, 9.
97 Rom. 13:4; 15:8, 25; 16:1; 1 Cor. 3:5; 2 Cor. 3:3, 6; 6:4; 8:19, 20; 11:15, 
23; Gal. 2:17; Eph. 3:7; 6:21; Phil. 1:1; Col. 1:7, 23, 25; 4:7; 1 Tim. 3:8, 10, 12, 
13; 4:6; 2 Tim. 1:18. Dunn’s argument that ‘Winter...ignores the poi’ {Colossians 
and Philemon, 331) is aimed at eliciting a reading where Onesimus must be 
understood as Paul’s personal servant. However, the simple presence of a 
pronoun cannot establish this. While Dunn does support the translation ‘as a 
helper in the work of the mission’ or ‘as servant in the gospel’, there is no reason 
to assume that the content of such service was ‘not having a regular ministry in 
church worship or evangelism apart from Paul’ (p. 331). Working fo r  Paul may 
not mean that he was always working in Paul’s presence. In fact, if we are to 
assume that Paul’s bonds in v. 9 are real and not figurative, then we must likewise 
assume that, were Onesimus’s function one of helping in the mission, that 
ministry must have taken place, in part, away from Paul.
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definite answer to the question of Onesimus’s possible debt, it is 
fallacious to assume that this ‘autograph’ on Paul’s part makes the 
situation any clearer. In fact, the following statement, Iva  p.f| Xéyco 
o o l  o n  Kal aeaurov fioi irpooo^ELXfLS' ( ‘that I should not say to 
you that even your [very] self you owe me’) argues for a sense in 
which this statement of repayment or restitution must be seen as a 
statement of p e rso n a l  debt to Philemon, which is then being 
countered, rather unsubtly, by a reminder of the deep debt owed by 
Philemon himself to Paul. àTrorivo) is a hapax legomenon in the New 
Testament, but its sense is seemingly quite easy to construe on the 
basis of both LXX and extra-biblical usage. Its sense of ‘repay/make 
restitution/compensate’ is well attested in the LXX,98 and in legal 
formulations in the papyri (e.g., P.Oxy. II 275.24-28"). However, it is 
this last usage which may be the most telling regarding how this verb 
is to be understood in Philemon.
P.Oxy. II 275 is a contract for the service of an apprentice, given by 
the apprentice’s father, concerning the conditions of his son’s service. 
Interestingly, this example, used by Lohse to support the argument 
that Onesimus had injured Philemon in some way, seems rather to 
point to exactly the kind of situation for which the alternative 
hypothesis argues Concerning the background of Philemon. In the 
papyrus, for every missed day of service, the father promises either to 
produce an equal amount of days of service for the master (whether on 
the son’s part, or on the father’s is not clear), or, to pay the equivalent 
in a silver drachma per day of missed labour. Surely this situation 
recalls the alternative hypothesis much more clearly than the runaway 
slave hypothesis. The entry in M -M  would seem to confirm this: 
speaking directly about P.Oxy. II 275, they say that the ‘verb 
[dnroTLVco] is much stronger than ctTTo8[8top.i, and carries with it the 
idea of repayment by way of punishment or fine..., a fact which lends 
emphasis to its use in Philem 19’.100 Of course, Moulton and Milligan 
most likely assume the traditional background of Philemon, but their 
comment achieves its full weight only in the light of the alternative 
hypothesis. Paul’s language, which is similar to the father’s in this
98 Cf. l x x  Exodus 21-22, throughout the legal codes of payment, 
compensation, and restitution (e.g. 21:19, 34, 36; 22:11-13).
99 ooas* 8 ’ éàv èv | toutco àraKTfjcrr) f]p.épaç èm r a ç  | lctclç aùrôv 
Trapé^erai [pelrà tôv xpo|^°^ h dhrolreicjdTio èKdoMris1 fjpépaç | àpyupiou 
[ôp]ax|iT]v plav (quoted in Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 204 n. 72).
100 M -M  S.V. dTTOTLVW.
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papyrus, may very well convey a similar meaning, that is, Paul is 
offering Philemon compensation for the loss of his slave, and any 
economic benefit which Onesimus may have brought Philemon, or, 
indeed, any debt which Onesimus may have incurred during his time 
as Philemon’s slave. We simply do not know enough about the 
specific identity of the master-slave relationship between Philemon 
and Onesimus to determine the nature of Onesimus’s indenture to 
him. In fact, it is possible that this vocabulary in Philemon sheds light 
on the relationship between Onesimus and Philemon in a way that no 
other element of the letter does.101 Of course, it is systematically 
problematic to determine anything relevant here from just one 
vocabulary item, but, by the same token, if  we are to appeal to the 
usual use o f this word outside this one occurrence in the New  
Testament, it seems less likely that this word could be used to support 
the traditional hypothesis than the alternative.
QUESTIONING ASSUMPTION IN THE INTERPRETATION OF PHILEMON
In the above discussion, the text of several portions of Philemon has 
been examined in detail. In the end, however, it does no justice either 
to Paul, or to those reading him, to take the scanty evidence that is 
available to us concerning this short letter and exclusively to read 
either major alternative into exegesis or translation. In the 
interpretation and translation of Philemon, critics, translators and 
editors have typically followed the traditional hypothesis regarding 
the background of Philemon. This has contributed to an atmosphere in 
which such a hypothesis has taken on the character of ‘fact’ in New  
Testament studies.
Onesimus in the Dock?
In Truth and Method, as noted above, Gadamer uses the idea of 
translation as a case in point for his hermeneutical theory: ‘Having to 
depend on an interpreter’s translation is an extreme case that doubles 
the hermeneutical process, namely the conversation: there is one 
conversation between the interpreter and the other, and a second
101 The potential pun on Onesimus’s name (which means ‘useful’) in v. 11 
(‘formerly he was useless to you...’; cf. Dunn, Colossians and Philemon, 328-29) 
does not stand as evidence that Onesimus was somehow a ‘bad’ slave in previous 
relationship to Philemon. More likely, this is a pun intended to speak to 
Onesimus’s new status as a minister of the gospel for Paul, and plays a role in 
Paul’s ‘more than a slave’ comment.
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between the interpreter and oneself.’102 In the case of Philemon as 
examined in this chapter, its brevity and lack of context have 
motivated the acceptance and use of the traditional background story 
with regard to O nesim us’s flight. This functions as a 
presupposition— external to the text, and, until recently, hardly ever 
questioned— which has acted as interference in the doubled 
conversation that is the history o f interpreting and, especially, 
translating Philemon.
Although not formally an aspect of translation, the modern practice 
of inserting sub-titles and headings to chapters and sections has led to 
many users of translated Bibles ascribing what often appears to be an 
almost canonical status to them. Some are outrightly interpretative 
(e.g., n e b / r e b  ‘A Runaway Slave’, CEV ‘Paul Asks Philemon to 
Forgive Onesimus’ [before v. 8; the introduction to the letter, part of 
the officially published volume, calls Onesimus a ‘runaway slave’]). 
Others, given the wide dissemination of the usual understanding of the 
background of the letter, are less overt (NRSV [breaking with the RSV 
in including headings at all] ‘Paul’s Plea for Onesimus’ [although the 
introduction to the Pauline letters tells us that the letter ‘is a plea for 
Philemon to forgive the runaway slave Onesimus...’], NKJV ‘The Plea 
for Onesimus’, NIV ‘Paul’s Plea for Onesimus’). There are, however, a 
couple of exceptions to this trend towards interpretative headings, 
most notably, the j b / n jb  ‘The Request about Onesimus’, and, with a 
smaller audience, Phillips’s ‘A Personal Appeal’. Of course, the trend 
toward more interpretative headings is not helped by the UBSGNT, a 
Greek text designed in large part for the use of translators, including 
‘Paul Pleads for Onesimus’ as a heading in their text. With these 
headings, the translators/editors/publishers of the Greek text and 
standard translations have already foreclosed for their readers the 
question as to the background of this letter, and have made the manner 
in which translations deal with the several points raised above a moot 
point. Commentators are often no better, however. Whether by a title 
in an introductory section (as in Binder’s ‘Die Flucht des 
Onesimus’103), an entry in an overview outline (as in O’Brien’s 
‘Paul’s Pleas for Onesimus’104), or even in more extended discussion, 
very few admit that this particular aspect o f the ‘background’ of 
Philemon is questionable.
102 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 385 (cf. above, p. 52).
103 Binder, Philemon, 32-36.
104 O’Brien, Colossians and Philemon, 270.
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How Then Do We Interpret Philemon?
The simple answer to the question of this heading is ‘very 
carefully’.105 A letter such as Romans, any one of the Gospels, the 
book of Acts, even a shorter Pauline letter such as Philippians, are all 
much larger bodies of text to interpret than Philemon is. If critics face 
difficulties with these writings, how much more will this almost 
context-less letter with an obscure subject matter give us difficulty! In 
the face of this difficulty, it seems reasonable to suggest that we have 
two choices with regard to the background of Philemon: (1) we can 
continue to depend on unproven and unsubstantiated tradition 
concerning the background of this letter, or (2) we can try to make our 
work on this letter as open as possible, as transparent as possible, and 
allow the debate concerning the background of this letter to continue. 
Of course, there seems to be a need on the part of both critics and 
translational theorists and, by extension, translators, to close the text 
(or their reading of the text) for their readers. In this way, the text 
suffers from the unwillingness of interpreters to remain open, in this 
case, to its ambiguity (and the potential resolution of that ambiguity in 
further interaction with the text).
It is appropriate here to return to our discussion of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic of the question. Determination to remain open with 
regard to the background of this letter should consciously provoke one 
to avoid putting questions wrongly to the text. As he states:
We say that a question has been put wrongly when it does not reach the 
state of openness but precludes reaching it by retaining false 
presuppositions. It pretends to an openness and susceptibility to decision 
that it does not have. But if what is in question is not foregrounded, or not 
correctly foregrounded, from those presuppositions that are really held, 
then it is not brought into the open and nothing can be decided.106
The interpretation of Philemon presents an interesting test-case for 
Gadamerian hermeneutics: on the one hand, Gadamer argues for the 
necessity o f tradition in interpretation, and the inescapable
105 By way of comparison, see Pearson, ‘Remainderless Translations’, where 
I investigate the similarity between the role of the tradition concerning the 
translation of the l x x  in antiquity, and the role of modern functional equivalence 
translational theory, arguing that the two function at the level of assumption, to 
avoid the difficult problems engendered by the necessity of dépendance on a 
translation. These large-scale assumptions function in a very similar way to the 
traditional assumptions regarding the background of Philemon.
106 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 364. Cf. discussion above, p. 44.
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participation of the interpreter in tradition as the result of his 
historically-effected consciousness. On the other hand, as the above 
quotation shows, and as was discussed in Chapter 1, Gadamer does 
not support the idea that tradition is necessarily to be determinative of 
interpretation (see above, p. 50), any more than the application of an 
interpretative m ethod  should be determinative of interpretation. 
Rather, the model o f the conversation problematizes the role of 
tradition, and elevates the role of the text above that of the tradition of 
interpretation.
This kind o f a hermeneutical strategy, when applied to the 
interpretation of Philemon, allows the current debate with regard to 
the background story of Paul’s letter to Philemon to progress with the 
lines more evenly drawn between the different sides. The antiquity of 
a traditional interpretation of any work does not guarantee its validity, 
or provide it with pride of place. Gadamer’s discussion of the 
prehistory of Romantic hermeneutics is germane to this.107 Following 
Dilthey,108 Gadamer sees a unity between the theological 
hermeneutics of the Reformers, and the development of philological 
hermeneutics:
Theological hermeneutics.. .developed from the reformers’ defense of 
their own understanding of Scripture against the attack of the Tridentine 
theologians and their appeal to the indispensability of tradition; 
philological hermeneutics developed as instrumental to the humanist claim 
to revive classical literature. Both involve a rediscovery: a rediscovery of 
something that was not absolutely unknown, but whose meaning had 
become alien and inaccessible.109
As a result, ‘Insofar as Reformation theology relies on [the] principle 
[of sola scriptural in interpreting Scripture, it remains bound to a 
postulate that is itself based on a dogma, namely that the Bible is a 
unity’.110 Still following Dilthey’s argument, Gadamer shows that, as 
the Enlightenment took hold, and interpreters began to question this 
principle,
Understanding them in terms of their total context now necessarily also 
required the historical restitution of the living context to which the 
documents belong. The old interpretive principle of understanding the
107 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 173-84.
108 W. Dilthey, ‘Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik’, Gesammelte Schriften (20 
vols.; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1914-82) 5.317-38.
109 GdiddLmtx, Truth and Method, \1 A.
110 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 176.
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parts in terms of the whole was no longer bound and limited to the 
dogmatic unity of the canon; it was concerned with the totality of the 
historical reality to which each individual historical document 
belonged.111
Gadamer shows from this that, ‘In Dilthey’s eyes...hermeneutics 
comes into its own only when it ceases serving a dogmatic 
purpose...and begins functioning as a historical organon’,112 and we 
would not be amiss to think of this as similarly descriptive of the 
state-of-play in much contemporary historical-critical theory.113 
Gadamer suggests that ‘both the theological [i.e. allegorical] 
hermeneutics of the [Church] fathers and that of the Reformation were 
techniques’,114 but that the final disconnection of the dogma that had 
underscored all hermeneutical reflection up until the Enlightenment 
now led hermeneutical inquiry in a completely different direction. As 
he states, ‘now understanding as such becomes a problem’.115
This is applicable to the interpretation of Philemon, and the current 
debate with regard to the situation of its subject, the slave Onesimus, 
and its addressee, Philemon. This has been a story of the elevation of 
an extra-textual background story to the status where it denies the 
open indeterminacy of the interpretative process. It has done this by 
pre-determining how the letter is to be understood, and then further 
closed off the possibility of genuine interpretation by encoding this 
extra-textual interpretation into the translation of this letter— acting as 
a counterfeit of a dialogue (cf. discussion of counterfeit dialogues, 
below. Chapter 5). It would be a mistake, though, to replace this 
story— this dogma that is the traditional story behind Philemon— with 
an alternative that was equally open to criticism on the basis of a lack 
of conclusive evidence. The debate that has now been engendered as a 
result of the alternative interpretation is useful not in simply replacing 
one dogma with another, but more by offering interpreters the chance 
to see Philemon afresh— to continue a conversation that had perhaps 
become stagnant, to replace the counterfeit dialogue of text and 
assumed ‘background’ with a genuine dialogue which does not curtail 
the openness of this letter with a prescriptive appeal to tradition.
111 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 111.
112 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 111.
113 Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 178.
114 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 178.
115 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 178.
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Perhaps, also, this could lead to a more consciously detailed 
dialectical relation between Philemon and Paul’s other letters.116
116 One avenue of research to be pursued in this regard is the complex 
relations betweeen Philemon and Colossians. Although examined in a preliminary 
fashion above, I have not examined the hermeneutical implications of a possibly 
conscious decision by Paul to separate the contents of Philemon out from 
Colossians. Why would Paul—who is quite happy to address individuals in other 
church letters (e.g. Phil. 4:2-3; Romans 16)—choose to separate his personal 
requests in this letter (but one which addresses not only Philemon as an 
individual) from the larger letter to the entire church? Perhaps aspects of my 
model above, discussing the status of Epaphras as a beleaguered local minister, 
could be utilized to determine the hermeneutical ramifications of dividing Paul’s 
obviously authoritative request (made in Paul’s own inimical style) from a letter 
where he did not want to focus on his own status.
CHAPTER 3
‘r h e t o r ic ’ a n d  ‘r e a l i t y ’ :
ACTS AS A DIALOGUE PARTNER IN THE STUDY OF PAUL
Socrates: Well, is your view about what takes place in such cases the
same as mine?
Protarchus: What is yours?
Socrates: I think the soul at such a time is like a book.
Protarchus: How is that?
Socrates: Memory unites with the senses, and they and the feelings
which are connected with them seem to me almost to write 
words in our souls; and when the feeling in question writes 
the truth, true opinions and true statements are produced in 
us; but when the writer within us writes falsehoods, the 
resulting opinions and statements are the opposite of true.
(Plato, Philebus 38E-39A, LCL)
RHETORIC AND GAD AMER
‘Rhetoric’ and ‘rhetorical criticism’ have become terms of 
importance in modern New Testament studies. Much has been written 
on the relationship between, for instance, Paul’s letter-writing and the 
rhetorical manuals of the Greco-Roman period. Much has also been 
written disputing this relationship, and positing various other options, 
from more modem definitions of ‘rhetoric’ to a more linguistically- 
based approach.1 However, this discussion need not detain us here, as
1 The bibliography here is too extensive to mention (and somewhat beside 
my use of ‘rhetoric’ in this chapter), but perhaps the most famous examples of the 
first mentioned approach are the works of George Kennedy (e.g. New Testament 
Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism [Chapel Hill: University of North 
Carolina Press, 1984]) and Hans-Dieter Betz (e.g. Galatians: A Commentary on 
PauTs Letter to the Churches in Galatia [Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1979]); A.C. Wire, The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction 
through PauVs Rhetoric (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990) is a good example of 
the way in which New Rhetorical principles have been implemented in Pauline 
studies; and the works of those such as Stanley E. Porter, Dennis L. Stamps and 
Jeffrey T. Reed (cf. the many essays by these and others in the various 
proceedings of the annual rhetoric conferences sponsored by Pepperdine 
University, published by Sheffield Academic Press, e.g. S.E. Porter and T.H. 
Olbricht [eds.], Rhetoric and the New Testament: Essays from  the 1992
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uses of the term ‘rhetoric’ in this thesis are drawn instead from 
Gadamer’s own use of the term. This is distanced from the typical 
usage in New Testament studies— not in dispute, but by virtue of its 
relationship to a different area of inquiry.
In Gadamer’s work on hermeneutics, his interaction with both the 
classical philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and the modern work of 
the philosopher Giambattista Vico, provides the occasion for his 
discussion of rhetoric. For Gadamer, rhetoric is important as the 
‘bearer of aesthetic concepts’, which, in connection with his critique 
of the importing of the reasoning and methodology of the natural 
sciences into the human sciences, leads him to emphasize the point 
that ‘The rationality of the rhetorical way of arguing, which 
admittedly seeks to bring emotions into play but works with 
arguments and probabilities, is and remains far more a determining 
factor in society than the excellence of science.’2 This has important 
links with the philosophical method of dialectic which functions in 
Plato and Aristotle. Dialectic is a fundamentally different type of 
reasoning from that of the natural sciences.3 Instead of relying on 
experimentation and repeatability, dialectical reasoning depends on 
the use of reasoned arguments in the interplay and development of a 
shared consensus. The use of dialogue in ancient philosophy is not 
merely accidental or fashionable, but rather integral to the way in 
which Plato and Aristotle arrive at a consensus both within their own 
work, and in on-going interaction with their readers.
This is the point at which Gadamer’s utilization of Vico is most 
important. Right at the beginning of Truth and Method, he discusses 
Vico as an important example of the humanist tradition to which he 
suggests we must turn for a reification of the human sciences in 
contra-distinction to the natural sciences.4 In this connection, he 
appeals to Vico’s emphasis on the ‘sensus communis, common sense, 
and to the humanistic ideal of eloquentia— elements already present in 
the classical concept of wisdom’, and states with regard to eloquentia 
that
Heidelberg Conference [JSNTSup 90; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1993]) typify the latter approach.
2 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 30.
3 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 30. Cf. idem. Truth
and Method, 18.
4 G.B. Vico, On the Study Methods o f our Time (trans. E. Gianturco; Library 
of Liberal Arts; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merril, 1965).
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‘Talking well’ ([eu Xéyeiv]) has always had two meanings; it is not 
merely a rhetorical ideal. It also means saying the right thing—i.e., the 
truth—and is not just the art of speaking—of saying something well.5
Still, ‘the most important thing in education is something else— the 
training in the sensus communis, which’, critically for both Vico and 
Gadamer, ‘is not nourished on the true but on the probable, the 
verisimilar’.6
For my purpose in this chapter (and for Chapter 5 below), it is this 
last point especially that needs emphasis. Rhetoric forms a part of the 
process by which the sensus communis is achieved. But,
sensus communis obviously does not mean only that general faculty in all 
men but the sense that founds community. According to Vico, what gives 
the human will its direction is not the abstract universality of reason, but 
the concrete universality represented by the community of a group, a 
people, a nation, or the whole human race. Hence developing this 
communal sense is of decisive importance for living.7
It is on this that ‘Vico bases the significance and the independent 
rights o f rhetoric’,8 and it is on this double formulation that the 
importance of determining not only the rhetorical patterns in Luke’s 
portraits of Paul, but also the ways in which those portraits of Paul 
have been utilized in the subsequent tradition of scholarship and 
interpretation of Paul and his writings, is founded in the present work.
Gadamer’s discussion of the concept of ‘problem’ is relevant here: 
‘Problems are not real questions that arise of themselves and hence 
acquire the pattern of their answer from the genesis of their meaning, 
but are alternatives that can only be accepted as themselves, and thus 
can be treated only in a dialectical way.’9 This, in Gadamer’s view, 
stands in contrast to the neo-Kantian treatment of problems as if they 
‘exist like stars in the sky’10—having an independent ‘existence’ apart 
from the matters which originally gave rise to them as ‘problems’. In 
Gadamer’s thought, ‘Critiquing the concept of the problem by
5 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 19. Cf. M. Mooney, ‘The Primacy of 
Language in Vico’, in G. Tagliacozzo, M. Mooney and D.P. Verene (eds.), Vico 
and Contemporary Thought (London: Macmillan, 1980) 191-210, esp. 197-99.
6 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 20-21. Cf. Alexander, ‘Eros and 
Understanding’, 336.
7 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 21.
8 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 21.
9 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 376.
10 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 377.
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appealing to the logic of question and answer must destroy [this] 
illusion’, as ‘Reflection on the hermeneutical experience transforms 
problems back to questions that arise and that derive their sense from 
their motivation’.11 Gadamer’s starting point for this return to the 
logic of question and answer in relation to the ‘problem’ is that this 
‘dialectical sense of the “problem” has its proper place in rhetoric, not 
in philosophy’.12
In this connection, we may now turn to Acts as a very special area 
of research in ‘Pauline studies’. Many of the ‘problems’ of Pauline 
biography stem from ‘problems’ in the narrative of Acts. Many others 
arise when readers of the Pauline letters problematize readings of Paul 
on the basis of their use of material derived from Acts. At issue, then, 
are not simply the rhetorical strategies of the author of Acts (which 
are intimately connected with questions of community— both ancient 
and modern), but also the way in which a reading of Acts which 
ignores the rhetorical nature of the dialectic between Luke and his 
community (much like I have examined this relationship in chapter 2 
between Paul and the individual Philemon13) creates a climate in 
which ‘problems’ are treated in the manner of an abstraction separated 
from the text, rather than dialectically in conversation with the text, 
and with the wider subject matter—Sache— of that text.
ACTS AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF PAUL’S LIFE AND MINISTRY
The ministry and life of Paul are— despite efforts to ignore it— only 
hazily reflected in the letters we have from his own pen, whether one 
takes a 4, 7, 10, or 13 (or even 14!) letter corpus as authentically 
Pauline. When it comes to reconstructing the life and ministry of Paul 
(as opposed to his theology), the interpretative ambiguity I have
11 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 377.
12 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 376. See also idem. The Beginning o f 
Philosophy, 25-28. Cf. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos, 76.
13 Although perhaps here we should really be speaking about a double sense 
of rhetorical interaction: on the one hand, between Paul and Philemon, but on the 
other (and no less significantly), between Paul and Philemon’s community. The 
pattern of using second-person singular and plural pronouns in Philemon would 
suggest that, in this letter, although it is the relationship between Paul and 
Philemon that is of primary importance, it is the situating of that relationship in 
the context of both Philemon’s local community (Archippus, Apphia, and the 
church which meets in Philemon’s house), and the wider community of faith (all 
the saints).
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highlighted in the previous chapter is, in many cases, simply writ 
large. As Hengel expresses it, ‘we should never forget how difficult, 
indeed virtually impossible, it would be to give Paul a historical 
setting if we did not have Acts’.14 Yet, the character of the book of 
Acts as a literary work is rarely taken into account when using it as 
evidence to reconstruct Paul’s life. Despite the long history (since 
Baur) of speaking of Acts as Tendenzliteratur, the evidence of Acts 
continues to be used in Pauline studies to make both n eg a tive  
statements, that is, to say what Paul did not or could not have done, 
etc.; and positive statements, regarding what Paul did do, or could 
have done.15 It seems that this is one of the cases where unquestioned
14 M. Hengel with R. Deines, The Pre-Christian Paul (trans. J. Bowden; 
London: SCM; Philadelphia: Trinity Press International, 1991) xiv. Hengel’s 
comments here are directed against the primarily sceptical approach of Acts 
scholars such as E. Haenchen (The Acts o f the Apostles: A Commentary [trans. B. 
Noble, G. Shinn, H. Anderson and R.M. Wilson; Philadelphia: Westminster; 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1971]), H. Conzelmann (Acts o f the Apostles: A Commentary 
on the Acts o f the Apostles [trans. J. Limburg, A.T. Kraabel, and D.H. fuel; ed. 
E J . Epp and C.R. Matthews; Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987 
(1972)]); and G. Schille (Die Apostelgeschichte des Lukas [THKNT 5; Berlin: 
Evangelische, 1983]), who do not see much (if any) historical value in Luke’s 
work (see Hengel with Deines, Pre-Christian Paul, 88-89 n. 6, see also M. 
Hengel and A.M. Schwemmer, Paul between Damascus and Antioch: The 
Unknown Years [trans. J. Bowden; London: SCM Press, 1997] 6-11, here 11: 
‘Basically, we do not know what we owe to Luke’). Cf. also R. Riesner, Paul’s 
Early Period: Chronology, Mission Strategy, Theology (trans. D. Stott; Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1998) 31, who, after surveying virtually every available 
chronology of the life of Paul (see pp. 3-28), concludes that ‘none of the 
chronological outlines worked out until now has been able to emancipate itself 
completely from Luke’.
15 The literature divides into three basic categories. The first category 
consists of those who actively try to use Acts to reconstruct Paul’s life (e.g. 
Hengel, Riesner, listed above in n. 14). The second includes those who respond 
negatively to attempts to deny the historicity of Acts (e.g. P.P. Bruce, Paul: 
Apostle o f the Free Spirit/Heart Set Free [Exeter: Paternoster; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1977] 17: ‘The Paul of Acts is the historical Paul as he was seen and 
depicted by a sympathetic and accurate but independent observer, whose narrative 
provides a convincing framework for the major epistles at least and may be used 
with confidence to supplement Paul’s own evidence’; idem, ‘Is the Paul of Acts 
the Real Paul?’, BJRL 58 [1975-76] 282-305; W.M. Ramsay, St. Paul the 
Traveller and the Roman Citizen [London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1895] 1-28, here 
20: ‘It is rare to find a narrative so simple and so little forced as that of Acts. It is a 
mere uncoloured recital of the important facts in the briefest possible terms. The
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assumptions can have far-reaching effects for the study of Paul. A 
reason for this is the growing trend in Luke-Acts scholarship to treat 
Luke-Acts as a literary work in its own right. Pauline scholarship is 
often out-of-step with these developments in Acts scholarship when 
dealing with the material in Acts.
This chapter consists in the main of two cases: (1) an examination 
of the way in which the possibility of a Pauline foundation of the 
Colossian church is dismissed on the basis of silence on the matter 
within the book of Acts and vestiges of support for the North Galatian 
hypothesis, and (2) a study of the way in which Paul’s early 
missionary strategy, as presented by the author of Acts in chs. 13-15, 
relates to ‘the Jews’ and the Jerusalem Council. These two examples 
will be examined with focuses on two specific elements: (1) the way 
in which the acceptance of the literary-historical programme of the 
author of Acts has potentially distorted the manner in which we 
reconstruct Paul’s life and ministry, and (2) how an awareness of the 
author of Acts’ Tendenzen in these cases can help us use his evidence 
in a more objective manner in re-drawing the life of Paul.16
narrator’s individuality and his personal feelings and preferences are almost 
wholly suppressed’ ; A. Deissmann, Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History 
[trans. W.E. Wilson; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1926]). The best recent 
treatment which takes this position, however, is C.J. Hemer, The Book o f Acts in 
the Setting o f Hellenistic History (WUNT 49; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1989; 
Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1990). The third category includes those who do 
not address the issue at all, but still use Acts in their reconstruction of Paul’s life 
(e.g. C.J. Roetzel, The Letters o f Paul: Conversations in Context [Louisville: 
Westminster/John Knox Press, 3rd edn, 1991]; H. Ridderbos, Paul: An Outline o f 
his Theology [trans. J.R. de Witt; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975 (1966)]). 
Despite these differing viewpoints, I know of very few attempts to write on the 
life of Paul which do not make use of Acts (or material derived from Acts). An 
exception to this is J.M. Gilchrist, ‘Paul and the Corinthians—The Sequence of 
Letters and Visits’, JSN T34 (1988) 47-69. Gilchrist (p. 49 n. 28) rightly criticizes 
Lüdemann, whose work is perhaps the most famous attempt to do this (G. 
Lüdemann, ‘A Chronology of Paul’, in B.C. Corley [ed.], Colloquy on New 
Testament Studies [Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1983] 309-37; now 
superseded by idem, Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology [trans. 
F.S. Jones; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984 [1980]), on the basis that he 
continually uses language relating to a ‘Council’ of Jerusalem, which cannot be 
derived from Gal. 2:2, with its private meeting with the ‘pillars’.
16 Whereas the study of Luke’s Tendenzen began with Baur’s attempt to 
prove that Luke minimizes the split in early Christianity (as Baur saw it), it has 
subsequently moved more in the direction of simply assuming or trying to prove
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Concerning this latter form of expression, Gadamer questions the 
way ‘objectivity’ has, he claims, been wrongly reserved for 
sciences.17 His view  is that science is as communal and 
hermeneutically based as are other endeavours. So the present use of 
objectivity is informed by this perspective in which there is a 
pragmatic basis to objectivity. This is true of the authorial voice of 
biography, such as that of Luke’s in his portraits of Paul. However, 
the ingredients o f these elements are distributed problematically in 
some works on Paul. I do not intend to fault these by merely 
contrasting them with Gadamer. Rather, linguistic and hermeneutical 
analysis will facilitate the need for an improved internal portrait of the 
relevant material and reasoning.
Before turning our attention to these cases, however, it is important 
that some brief comments are made with regard to the way in which 
decisions regarding date and authorship of Acts will affect my 
discussion. Previous discussions concerning the authorship of Acts 
have revolved around several different factors, including especially 
the presence or absence of medical terminology in Acts (based on the 
mention in Col. 4:14 of Aoumç 6 larpos* 6 dya'nTiTÔç, ‘Luke, the 
beloved physician’) and the presence of the so-called ‘we’ passages.18 
The first, defended most famously by Harnack earlier this century,19 
lacks the conclusivity that Harnack and others had thought it
Luke’s non-historicity. Responses, as in the second category in n. 15 above, often 
simply mirror these intentions. It is not the aim of this chapter to address this 
question. Instead, it is assumed that Acts, as an ancient historical document, will 
have various rhetorical purposes and strategies by which to accomplish those 
purposes, and that an understanding of both Luke’s purposes and his strategies 
can help us to assess the character of the material which he presents to us. It 
seems only reasonable that Luke should be treated in the same way as any ancient 
historian (e.g. Josephus, cited without comment or question by most New 
Testament scholars). On the genre of Acts, see B.W.R. Pearson and S.E. Porter, 
‘The Genres of the New Testament’, in Porter (ed.), Handbook to Exegesis o f the 
New Testament, 131-66.
17 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 476-91.
18 Generally seen to be Acts 16:10-17; 20:4-14; 21:1-17; 27:1-28:15.
19 A. Harnack, Luke the Physician: The Author o f the Third Gospel and the 
Acts o f the Apostles (trans. J.R. Wilkinson; Crown Theological Library 28; 
London: Williams and Norgate, 2nd edn, 1909) esp. 175-98 ‘Appendix 1: The 
Author of the Third Gospel and the Acts of the Apostles a Physician’. For 
bibliography on further supporters, see W.G. Kiimmel, Introduction to the New 
Testament (trans. H.C. Kee; Nashville: Abingdon, rev. edn, 1975) 148 and n. 86.
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possessed for determining that ‘Luke, the beloved physician’ of Col. 
4:14 was the author.20 The second has most recently been brought into 
question by Stanley Porter in his work on the so-called ‘we’ passages 
in Acts, where he shows how the ‘we’ passages can be considered to 
come from a single source, split up by the author of Acts to form the 
basis of those sections of his narrative to which it was relevant. 
Although Luke (i.e. the travelling companion of Paul) could possibly 
have produced such a document and written Acts too, Porter expresses 
scepticism on this point, judging it to be a written source from the 
hand of another author.21
20 This was accomplished as early as 1927, with H J. Cadbury’s The Making 
o f Luke-Acts (New York: Macmillan, 1927 [2nd edn, 1958]), although some 
studies still submit the so-called ‘medical language’ of Luke-Acts as evidence in 
the discussion of the authorship of these two volumes. This is usually done in the 
light of the backlash to the ‘medical theory’ of Harnack and others, for example, 
R.H. Gundry, A Survey o f the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan; 
Carlisle: Paternoster, 3rd edn, 1994) 206: ‘In Colossians 4:14, Paul calls Luke 
“the beloved physician”, a description supported by Luke’s more than usual 
interest in sickness and by his frequent use of medical terms—though these 
features of his writings should not be over-stressed’, or B. Witherington, The Acts 
o f the Apostles: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; 
Carlisle: Paternoster, 1998) 54: ‘Nevertheless, this evidence would support and be 
consistent with the view that the author was a doctor...’. More typical is the 
treatment such as that of C.K. Barrett, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on 
the Acts o f the Apostles (2 vols.; ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1994, 1998) 
2.xiv, or J.B. Polhill, Acts (NAC 26; Nashville: Broadman Press, 1992) 24-27, 
who discuss the evidence because of its importance in the history of scholarship 
on Acts, but make virtually nothing of it. For a recent assessment of ‘medical 
language’ in Luke-Acts in the context of medical language throughout the Greek­
speaking world, see L. Wells, The Greek Language o f Healing from Homer to 
New Testament Times (BZNW 83; Berlin: De Gruyter, \99%)passim, esp. 123-25, 
and discussion of Luke-Acts, 159-72.
21 Porter sees five ‘we’ passages instead of the traditional four: Acts 16:10- 
17; 20:4-14; 21:1-17; 27:1-29; 28:1-16. Published originally as S.E. Porter, ‘The 
“We” Passages’, in D.W.J. Gill and C. Gempf (eds.), The Book o f Acts in Its First 
Century Setting. II. The Book o f Acts in Its Graeco-Roman Setting (Carlisle: 
Paternoster; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994) 545-74, this material has been 
revised and supplemented in his The Paul o f Acts: Essays in Literary Criticism, 
Rhetoric, and Theology (WUNT 115; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1999) 10-46. 
For further assessment of the ‘we’ source, see Porter, ‘The Theology of the “We” 
Passages’, Paul o f Acts, 47-66.
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Despite the problems that have been noted above with regard to the 
arguments fo r  Lukan?2 (as a close associate of Paul) authorship of 
Acts, however, the arguments adduced against it are not particularly 
convincing.23 Although it is not the purpose of this chapter to take a 
position on the dating of Luke, it does seem that many o f the 
arguments that are rehearsed against a reasonably early authorship of 
Acts (whether or not by Luke himself) are self-defeating. For 
example, the argument that Luke could not have known Paul, because 
he does not mention Paul’s letter-writing ministry, encounters 
problems on two fronts: (1) If we are to posit a late, second-century 
author of Luke-Acts, then we must imagine that the author, contrary 
to the pattern in the text of Acts as we have it, would have attempted 
as much as possible to place all of the popular elements of Pauline 
history (as available to him) into the framework of his story. That 
Paul’s letters were known in at least some kind of rudimentary 
collection by the end of the first century or beginning of the second is, 
by now, a scholarly consensus. The evidence in 2 Pet. 3:15, even if  
mid-to-late second century, shows that Paul’s writings were known by 
at least one author somewhere around the time when Acts would have 
been written, if 2 Peter and Acts are both to be dated late. In the light 
of this, it becomes extremely difficult to explain why the author of 
Acts would have left this information out of his account. Of course, 
one could object that the writer of Acts did not know the Pauline letter
22 For ease of use, I will generally continue to use ‘Luke’ to refer to the 
author of Acts, although this does not necessarily presuppose Luke as a travelling 
companion of Paul. For discussion of the authorship of Luke-Acts, see C.-J. 
Thornton, Der Zeuge des Zeugen: Lukas als Historiker der Paulusreisen (WUNT 
56; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1991) 8-68.
23 The principal essay in this regard is P. Vielhauer, ‘On the “Paulinism” of 
Acts’, in L.E. Keck and J.L. Martyn (eds.), Studies in Luke-Acts (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1975) 33-50, who suggests that Luke’s presentation of Paul was, 
on several fronts, in contradiction to Paul’s own letters (e.g. attitudes on natural 
theology, Jewish Law, christology, eschatology). This has become the standard 
position in German scholarship, e.g., Conzelmann, Acts\ J. Roloff, D ie  
Apostelgeschichte (NTD; Berlin: Evangelische, 1981) 2-5; Schille, 
Apostelgeschichte des Lukas, 48-52. This position has been challenged most 
recently by Porter, ‘The Paul of Acts and the Paul of the Letters: Some Common 
Conceptions and Misconceptions’, in his Paul o f Acts, 187-206. See also I.H. 
Marshall, The Acts o f the Apostles (TNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Leicester: 
InterVarsity Press, 1980) 42-44; E.E. Ellis, The Gospel o f Luke (NCB; Grand 
Rapids: Eerdmans; London: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, 2nd edn, 1974) 45-47.
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collection, that the letter collection was much later than this period, or 
another such objection, but these objections do not accord with the 
best evidence.24 However, even if one does not accept the weight of 
the previous point, the second point is still telling: (2) The book of 
Acts is not simply a history of Paul. It is clear that the author of Acts 
is highly concerned with the career of Paul, and that Paul’s work is by 
far the most important element in the book, but the purpose of the 
book is obviously not simply to record Paul’s career. The fact that it 
ends with Paul still in prison without any clear outcome to his life 
and/or career is the most obvious element in this regard, but by no 
means the only one. If we are to think of Acts as a (Bios* ITauXou {bios 
Paulou, ‘life of Paul’), even an early dating of Acts (i.e. before the 
end of Paul’s life) would seem to demand something by way of a 
statement of the current state-of-play in Paul’s life, instead of the 
cryptic inconclusive ending with which the author leaves us— and a 
late dating of Acts simply further begs the question.
FOCUSING AND TENDENZ: LUKE’S SILENCES AND SPECIAL INTERESTS
The special concern in this chapter relates less to the author and 
dating of the material in Acts, and more to the way in which that 
author— whoever he was and whenever he wrote— arranged the 
material available to him for the audience for which he wrote. In 
Gadamer’s philosophy, several related arguments dealing with the 
relationship between a work and the performance of that work have a 
special relevance to the book of Acts. First, Gadamer argues for a 
primacy of an artistic work over its performance 25 The relevance of 
this for the relationship between literary work and interpretation has 
been discussed above in chapter 1, but the related argument that the 
game of language is analogous to performance26 suggests that, just as
24 On this, see D. Trobisch, PauVs Letter Collection: Tracing the Origins 
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994), who posits that the initial collection probably 
took place during Paul’s lifetime, possibly even with the involvement of Paul 
himself.
25 Cf. Truth and Method, 310.
26 See the section entitled ‘Play as the Clue to Ontological Explanation’ in 
Truth and Method, 101-34, and Gadamer’s discussion of ‘double mimesis’ in the 
performance of theatrical works on p. 117. Cf. also his discussion of ‘Language as 
the Medium of Hermeneutic Experience’, in Truth and Method, 399: ‘there is no
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the audience is a construct in performance, so too is the readership of 
any given work a construct in the writing of that work.27 This in turn 
suggests the propriety of concern for the structure of arrangement of 
material relating to a given subject matter in a work, and that, as such, 
the idea of narrative as art and performance for a community must be 
brought into the consideration of the hermeneutic circle.28 As with the 
above discussion of rhetoric in Vico in connection with dialectic, this 
allows the interpreter of a given work to take account of the life 
experience and life history (Erlebnis)2^  of the ideal audience as part of 
the process of interpreting the work. This is not to suggest that one 
must accept some sort of ‘canonical production to be simply repeated 
ad nauseam’.30 Rather, this is the essential moment when Gadamer’s 
metaphor of game-playing,31 as Warnke notices,32 takes on its true 
significance for his description of the hermeneutical process: ‘...when 
a game’s presentation to an audience is its raison d'être and when this 
audience is only an audience, the game becomes a performance. The 
game appears to the audience as a self-contained whole; indeed, it 
undergoes what Gadamer terms a “transformation into structure 
(Gebilde)”.’33 The nature of this structure is integral, then, to the 
understanding of the work itself.
Warnke’s reading of Gadamer emphasizes this point: ‘if  works of 
art are true they must be true for specific communities of interpreters
essential difference between the interpretation that a work undergoes in being 
performed and that which the scholar produces’.
27 Reference might be made here to the now famous communications model 
put forward by the formalist linguist R. Jakobson in his ‘Closing Statement: 
Linguistics and Poetics’, in T.A. Sebeok (ed.), Style in Language (New York: 
Wiley; Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1960) 350-77, esp. 353, later modified by S. 
Chatman Story and Discourse: Narrative Structure in Fiction and Film (Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1978) 267. Chatman’s modifications added a level 
of remove to the model, so that an ‘intended audience’ or ‘ideal audience’ could 
be positioned vis-à-vis other participants in the communication process.
28 This is a point which Gadamer takes from Dilthey. Cf. Warnke, Gadamer, 
27-29.
29 Cf. Weinsheimer and Marshall, ‘Translators’ Preface’, in Gadamer, Truth 
and Method, xiii-xiv, on the translation of Erlebnis and its sister term, Erfahrung.
50 Warnke, Gadamer, 52.
31 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 101-69.
32 Warnke, Gadamer, 53.
33 Warnke, Gadamer, 53; cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 110-21.
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and they must speak to their concerns’,34 which has an important 
connection with Gadamer’s discussion of authorial intention. As 
discussed above in Chapter 2 ,35 reading and interpretation are, for 
Gadamer, fundamentally tied to the work of art in question. This does 
not allow for the possibility of ‘a comparison with the original 
intention’,36 but rather requires that an interpreter focuses on the text 
itself. As Warnke puts the point: ‘Even where my concern is an 
agent’s intentions, my understanding of these intentions is itself a 
situated one.’37 Hence, where our concern is the elucidation of the 
way in which the author of Acts presents certain episodes or themes in 
his work—perhaps even his intentions in so doing— our concern must 
be primarily with the text before us. We are not able to determine, on 
this interpretation, the actual intentions of Luke, but we may be able 
to present a case which uses our understanding of the text to help 
reconstruct the purposes of Luke’s internal arrangement of Acts.
In this regard, if Acts is not a (Bios* ITauXou, it certainly contains a 
sizeable amount of material about Paul, and may even have been 
written primarily to undergird the Pauline mission (at an early or a late 
stage— it does not matter).38 Yet, it is not simply a ‘Life of Paul’. As a 
result, those who are interested in examining and reconstructing 
Paul’s life and work must exercise caution in the use of this book. In 
theory, most scholars would assign a secondary role to the book of 
Acts in reconstructing Paul’s life, privileging the letters when there is 
question and/or contradiction between the two. That this principle is 
not always operative in Pauline studies, however, should be obvious 
from the frequency with which apparent evidence or silence in Acts 
concerning Paul’s career is accepted as read by Pauline scholars. The 
evidence in Acts regarding Paul’s life and ministry is not, however, all 
of a kind. There are, to be sure, several elements of Acts’ account of
34 Warnke, Gadamer, 74.
35 P. 50.
36 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 53.
37 Warnke, Gadamer, 74.
38 Cf. M.D. Goulder’s work on the revival and modification of the Baur 
hypothesis with regard to conflict within the early Church, seen esp. in his A Tale 
o f Two Missions (London: SCM Press, 1994), but also in numerous articles which 
either seek to prove aspects of this hypothesis, or assume it as their basis (e.g. 
‘The Visionaries of Laodicea’, JSNT  43 [1991] 15-39; idem, ‘A Pauline in a 
Jacobite Church’, in F. van Segbroeck et a l. [eds.], The Four Gospels 1992: 
Essays in Honour o f Frans Neirynck [BETL 100.1, 2, 3; Leuven: Peeters, 1992] 
2.859-76).
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Paul’s life which are hard to dispute without rejecting them altogether: 
dates, itineraries, routes, and actual episodes recorded as having taken 
place in certain places and at certain times all fall under this category. 
However, Acts is not simply an arrangement of such basic 
information. As two generations of redaction criticism have shown us, 
the Gospel writers (of which Luke himself may have been one, if one 
accepts the co-authorship of Luke-Acts) were quite deliberate with 
their materials, editing and arranging everything from purported direct 
quotation to the order in which events took place in their sources.
In the case of Acts, of course, it is impossible to compare it to 
anything else in quite the same way, as there is only the one version of 
events. However, we do also have the letters of Paul himself with 
which to work, and by which, although we are unable to compare 
things on a pericope-by-pericope basis, we can assess the account in 
Acts. Assuredly, this is a less certain approach than even in Synoptic 
source theory. Comparison of Acts and Paul’s own letters does not 
include an element of ‘priority’ in the same way that Synoptic source 
theory does, in that it is extremely unlikely that Luke actually used 
these letters in constructing his account (although it seems impossible 
that he would not have known about Paul as a letter-writer).39 In 
addition, we must guard against the tendency to hold Paul’s own 
personal testimony to his life as if  it were not likewise presented in a 
manner calculated to affect his audiences. It is edited and arranged by 
Paul to serve his goals as surely as Luke has edited and arranged his 
material to serve his. Despite these difficulties, we are able to at least 
compare the two, and to exercise reason in our subsequent 
reconstruction of the events to which they refer. Acts as a narrative is 
the result of a contractual relationship40 between Luke and his
39 However, cf. W.O. Walker, Jr., ‘Acts and the Pauline Corpus 
Reconsidered’, JSNT  24 (1985) 3-23, repr. in S.E. Porter and C.A. Evans (eds.), 
The Pauline Writings: A Sheffield Reader (BibSem; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1995) 55-74; idem, ‘Acts and the Pauline Corpus Revisited: 
Peter’s Speech at the Jerusalem Conference’, in R.P. Thompson and T.E. Phillips 
(eds.), Literary Studies in Luke-Acts: Essays in Honor o f Joseph B. Tyson 
(Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1998) 77-86.
40 Cf. C. Prendergast, The Order o f Mimesis: Balzac, Stendahl, Nerval, 
Flaubert (Cambridge Studies in French; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986) 36-41, discussing the idea of ‘contract’ in meaning, which concludes (p. 
41) as follows: ‘To stress the negotiated character of the social knowledge 
informing the agreements on which the mimetic text is mapped out does not entail 
returning uncritically to the assumption of the unconstrained “free” subject; nor
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hermeneutical community. It engages what it is to be its identity as 
narrative, mediated in Paul’s engagement with language, as a facet of 
the community’s experience.
Of primary interest in the present perspective is the way in which 
Luke selects and arranges his material, and the picture of Paul which 
emerges as a result. Ramsay’s statement in this regard is out of 
keeping with contemporary Acts scholarship. Discussing the (then) 
current state-of-affairs in the study of Acts, Ramsay suggests that, in 
this climate,
no historical absurdity is too gross to be imputed to Luke. But our 
hypothesis is that Luke’s silences about an incident or a person should 
always be investigated as a piece of evidence, on the principle that he had 
some reason for his silence.. .41
Luke is not constructing a simple catalogue of facts and figures 
about Paul, even in those sections of his book which deal exclusively 
with him. One of the topics historically of much concern for the study 
of Acts has been the purpose(s) Luke had in his writing of the book,42 
and this is indeed something which impinges on the study of the 
portrait of Paul as seen in the book. My purpose here is not to discuss 
the overarching purpose of the book of Acts, but rather to examine the 
way in which Luke has selected and arranged the events of Paul’s life 
and ministry in such a way so as to accomplish specific purposes. 
These investigations may, in turn, illuminate Luke’s overall purpose, 
but my primary concern is to demonstrate the way in which Luke 
configures the data and their arrangement concerning Paul. In
(by definition) does it rule out the possibility that, as negotiated knowledge, it is, 
under different circumstances and requirements, re-negotiable... there is more to 
the social contract of mimesis than a construction of reality built to the 
specifications of the “police”.’ This theme is introduced here to signal potential 
implications for Luke and his community, but will be taken up in detail below, in 
Chapter 5, in a discussion of Gadamer’s idea of good-will in the interpretative 
process.
41 Ramsay, St. Paul the Traveller, 19. That Ramsay could follow this 
insightful methodological suggestion with his statement (quoted above, n. 15) on 
the ‘uncoloured’ nature of Acts suggests that his reaction to the assertions of the 
Tübingen School with regard to the non-historical nature of Acts was too strong 
to fully work out the implications of Luke’s ‘silences’.
42 This is often bound up with discussion of the historicity of Acts, but note 
L.T. Johnson, The Acts o f the Apostles (SP 5; Collegville, MN: Liturgical, 1992) 
10-12, whose excellent discussion of the literary structure of Acts is (like the rest 
of his commentary) somewhat ambivalent about the issue of historicity.
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Gadamer’s discussion of ‘play’ as a clue to ontological explanation of 
the work of art, he suggests that
Play is structure—this means that despite its dependence on being played 
it is a meaningful whole which can be repeatedly presented as such and 
the significance of which can be understood. But structure is also play, 
because—despite this theoretical unity—it achieves its full being only 
each time it is played.43
If we are to take seriously Gadamer’s idea that interpretation is akin to 
performance, discussed above, then the idea of structure becomes no 
less important to the interpreter than to the performer. Perhaps this 
point seems obvious to regular interpreters of texts, but the 
implications of this artistic model for the matter currently at 
hand— how Acts is used to inform and deform the understanding of 
Paul— reach deeper than the idea that structure is important to 
understand what an author means. For I am interested not merely in 
what Luke is saying and what he leaves out (as is my primary interest 
in the first investigation in this chapter), but also how he has 
understood what he has included. This leads to the realization that the 
structure of Luke’s narrative may itself deform our understanding of 
Paul (as the second investigation in this chapter shows).
The implications of the investigations in this chapter are not meant 
to move in the direction of some kind of castigation of Luke, or to 
suggest that his material is somehow ‘less reliable’ as a result of being 
part of an effective literary creation. Instead, this discussion is simply
43 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 117. Zuckert’s {Postmodern Platos, 87) 
comments on this micrology in Gadamer’s thought are insightful, and stress the 
apparent distance of this Gadamerian conception from both Heidegger and Plato, 
but also recognize that ‘there is still something fundamentally Platonic (and, 
therfore, not purely Heideggerian) about [Gadamer’s] understanding of art. If a 
play exists as a play only in being presented, it continues to exist only in re­
presentation. Although each and every re-production is different, there is an 
enduring core that remains recognizably the same.’ Returning to the idea of ‘play’ 
as the playing of a game, Walton {Mimesis as Make-Believe, 12) utilizes a 
perceived genetic relation between childhood and adult ‘play’ to lay bare basic 
structures in representational art: ‘it would be surprising if make-believe 
disappeared without a trace at the onset of adulthood.
‘It doesn’t. It continues, I claim, in our interaction with representational works 
of art... The forms make-believe activities take do change significantly as we 
mature. They become more subtle, more sophisticated, less overt. The games 
children play with dolls and toy trucks are in some ways more transparent and 
easier to understand than their more sophisticated successors.’
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meant to help point up some of the ways in which Luke has used his 
material, and the way in which some subsequent scholars have been 
trapped in the same rhetorical web into which Luke intended his 
initial audience to be entangled. Luke is, as we are, a child of his 
times. Gadamer’s notion of the historically-effected consciousness 
makes the relevance of this point clear to our interpretation of Luke as 
historian44 of Paul:
The dialectic of question and answer disclosed in the structure of 
hermeneutical experience now permits us to state more exactly what kind 
of consciousness historically effected consciousness is. For the dialectic of 
question and answer that we demonstrated makes understanding appear to 
be a reciprocal relationship of the same kind as conversation.45
To fully engage with Luke’s text— and to fully outline the way in 
which his narrative is the arbiter of our reconstructions of Paul’s 
life— one must take into account not merely the bare informational 
content of his narrative, but also the way in which his narrative has 
been shaped to communicate a specific set of messages.
One of the techniques Luke uses in Acts to structure and arrange his 
material is fairly obvious: selection. He selects stories and information 
which he sees as relevant to the purpose he is trying to accomplish. 
Hence we do not end up with a textbook or timeline, consisting of a 
mere presentation of uninterpreted ‘facts’ (if it would ever be possible 
to write such an account). Instead, we have a highly readable and 
riveting account of the spread of the gospel from Jerusalem to Rome, 
with various sub-plots along the way.46
44 The use of this term is made in full cognizance of the continuing debate 
over the genre of Acts. As can be seen in Pearson and Porter, ‘The Genres of the 
New Testament’, I side with those who see Acts falling within the broad genre of 
‘history’, though caveats must be made concerning the nature of all historical 
writing, in a Gadamerian sense, as the product of historically-effected 
consciousness.
45 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 377.
46 Although I do not support the theory that Acts is essentially to be equated 
with a novel or romance (see Pearson and Porter, ‘The Genres of the New 
Testament’, 131-66), the compelling nature of the narrative in Acts may perhaps 
explain why many have sought to explain the genre of Acts as a novel. See R.I. 
Pervo, Profit with Delight: The Literary Genre o f the Acts o f the Apostles 
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987); also R. Hock, ‘The Greek Novel’, in D.E. 
Aune (éd.), Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament: Selected Forms and 
Genres (SBLSBS 21; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1987) esp. 138-44. However, much 
work on ancient historical narrative also points up the entertainment value of such
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It is interesting to see how often Luke skips over long periods of 
time in Paul’s life, or, conversely, focuses on a single event in such a 
way so as to serve the purposes of his narrative. For example: details 
about Paul’s early life are almost completely missing (except from his 
own speeches);47 it may even be that his ministry is presented in such 
a way so as to appear as concentric circles, emanating away from 
Jerusalem, until he finally reaches Rome with the gospel;48 the author 
spends little more than two verses describing the two-year ministry of 
Paul in the province of Asia, choosing instead to highlight the 
disastrous events at the end of those two years and the coming on the 
scene of Apollos; the author describes in detail many aspects of Paul’s 
later ministry, while leaving discussion of the (according to Galatians) 
16-17 year gap between Paul’s conversion and first ‘missionary 
journey’ completely out of his narrative. In short, the author of Acts, 
no matter in what century he wrote, must have been consciously  
selective with his material.49 This, hermeneutically speaking, leaves 
us with several levels to consider at once, but this
hermeneutical situation is not a regrettable distortion that affects the 
possibility of understanding, but the condition of its possibility. Only 
because between the text and its interpreter there is no automatic accord 
can a hermeneutical experience make us share in the text. Only because 
the text calls for it does interpretation take place, and only in the way
work. See, e.g., B.L. Ullman, ‘History and Tragedy’, TAPA 73 (1942) 250-53; 
F.W. Walbank, ‘History and Tragedy’, Historia 9 (1960) 216-34. For recent 
discussion of the genre of Acts, cf. Hemer, Book o f Acts in Hellenistic History, 
chs. 2-3; D.W. Palmer, ‘Acts and the Ancient Historical Monograph’, in B.W. 
Winter and A.D. Clarke (eds.), The Book o f Acts in Its First Century Setting. I. 
Ancient Literary Setting (Carlisle: Paternoster; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993) 1- 
29; and C.K. Barrett, ‘The Historicity of Acts’, JTS 50.2 (1999) 515-34.
47 Cf. the recent article by M.R. Fairchild, ‘Paul’s Pre-Christian Zealot 
Associations: A Re-Examination of Gal 1.14 and Acts 22.3’, NTS 45 (1999) 514- 
32, in which he makes much of the lack of this material in Paul’s own writings to 
suggest that Paul may not have been from Tarsus at all. His untenable conclusion, 
that Paul was really part of the Zealot movement in his pre-Christian days, partly 
rests on this point, for he wishes to place Paul’s family in a context where they 
could be involved in the ‘oppression and deportations of Galilee’ (p. 532).
48 Cf. Johnson, Acts, 10-12.
49 We should also probably be conscious of the fact that Luke could not have 
had all details about Paul’s career available to him, even i f  he was Paul’s 
travelling companion. Determining between those elements of Paul’s story which 
Luke consciously left out, and those of which he was unaware, would seem to be 
inconclusive, at best.
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called for. The apparently thetic beginning of interpretation is, in fact, a 
response; and the sense of an interpretation is determined, like every 
response, by the question asked. Thus the dialectic o f question and answer 
always precedes the dialectic o f interpretation. It is what determines 
understanding as an event.^
My argument is simply that, when approaching Paul, we must be 
aware of the way in which we allow Luke (whatever his relationship 
or lack thereof to the ‘historical’ Paul) to guide our steps— when we 
‘share in the text’, when we respond to the questioning structures that 
make up Acts, this, as Gadamer states, ‘always precedes the dialectic 
of interpretation’. When we use Acts as simply a source of 
information about Paul (moving from Acts as an ‘apparently thetic 
beginning of interpretation’), we miss both its potential value in 
playing that very role, and the dangers implicit in such a programme.
ORIENTATION TOWARD A SUBJECT: ‘THE WITNESS IS DIRECTED TO 
ANSWER THE QUESTION’
Luke’s twin structuring tendencies of focusing and strategic silence 
are operative in his narrative in such a way so as to draw the eyes of 
his readers along a specific path. In the case of Pauline scholars’ 
interest in the foundation of the Colossian church, this path leads 
away from the events in which we are interested. As a result, the 
silence of Acts on the matter is seen to provide evidence against the 
possibility of a Pauline foundation of the Colossian church, and also 
has implications for the discussion of Pauline authorship of that letter, 
and even for how the tone of that letter is characterized. In connection 
with Gadamer’s conception of the hermeneutical process, I would 
suggest that the key problem in this interpretative process has been the 
assumption that both Luke and Pauline scholarship are concerned with 
the same things— that we are oriented toward the same subject matter. 
This picks up Gadamer’s discussion of dialectic and dialogue at a key 
point:
To conduct a dialogue requires first of all that the partners do not talk at 
cross purposes. Hence it necessarily has the structure of question and 
answer. The first condition of the art of conversation is ensuring that the 
other person is with us. We know this only too well from the reiterated 
yesses of the Platonic dialogues. The positive side of this monotony is the
50 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 472 (emphasis original).
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inner logic with which the subject matter is developed in the 
conversation.51
My suggestion is that, in including Acts as one of the partners in 
our discussion of the Pauline literature, we Pauline scholars rarely 
check to see that Luke is answering our questions, and we even more 
rarely notice that he is putting questions to us. This latter point is 
brought out above in connection with the structural, rhetorical nature 
of the material drawn from Acts, but is salient here especially in terms 
of the former point, that Luke does not always answer us when we ask 
him questions, and occasionally answers our questions with questions 
of his own. The way in which the silence of Acts is used to determine 
Paul’s role (or lack thereof) in the foundation of the Colossian church 
is a case in point: this foundation is almost universally held to be 
secondary.52 In fact, it is often posited that, if  Paul actually wrote 
Colossians, he had not even visited the church there before he wrote 
to them. This convoluted network of inter-related arguments and 
dialectics needs untangling, and re-assessment. Prendergast’s 
discussion of the theme of motive in literature is relevant:
The example of legal argument is...instructive... The inferences and 
judgements...that it makes are not just appeals to pre-given stocks of 
knowledge; they are also practical interventions: in the form of publicly 
declared and recognized ‘cases’ and ‘precedents’, they become themselves 
interpretative paradigms which feed back into, reinforce (and sometimes 
modify) these stocks, thus providing a perfect image of the recursiveness 
of the social world.
A similarly recursive dialectic informs many levels of mimetic narrative.
The techniques of ‘motivation’ it uses for the construction of plots and 
characters often produce versions of events and behaviour whose 
assumptions closely resemble those of the argumentative forms deployed 
in the law courts around the issue of ‘motive’.53
The ‘motivation’ Prendergast discusses is similar to the ‘structuring’ 
in Gadamer’s theory. It complements Gadamer’s comments on
51 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 367.
52 E.g. Lohse, Colossians and Philemon, 79: ‘Paul has never personally met 
the community’; M J. Harris, Colossians and Philemon (EGGNT; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1991) 79; O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, 92: ‘for the sake of those 
who had not heard the gospel from his lips, viz. those at Colossae...’; Moule, 
Colossians and Philemon, 85.
53 Prendergast, The order o f Mimesis, 48.
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intcntionality in a way that helps us to consider the author of Acts as a 
dialogue partner in a way that simply discussing Acts as a ‘dialogue 
partner’ does not flow so easily from Gadamer’s conception of 
intentionality.
Hence, in this section we will examine: (1) the geographical 
evidence drawn from Acts concerning the possibility or impossibility 
of Paul’s founding the Colossian church, (2) the nature of the 
evidence concerning the relationship between the letters to Philemon 
and the Colossians, and (3) the way(s) in which Paul makes use of 
references to persons in the Colossian correspondence in contrast and 
comparison with the rest o f the Pauline corpus, with an eye to 
evaluating the use of arguments concerning a perceived lack of 
personal reference in the letter.
The Relationship between Colossians and Philemon
To begin, it is important that we determine the implications that this 
study may have for the discussion of Pauline authorship of the letter, 
as well as the implications that Pauline or non-Pauline authorship may 
have for this study. If it can be shown on the basis of this study that 
the traditional arguments against a Pauline foundation for this church 
are deficient, then it may be worthwhile to consider this as useful 
evidence in the discussion of Pauline authorship. This is the case even 
though, since Mayerhoff’s initial scepticism about the authorship of 
the letter in 1838,54 arguments have not generally revolved around the 
impossibility of a Pauline foundation for this church. If it can be 
shown that the writer of this letter uses the rhetoric of personal 
reference in a similar way as in the rest of the undisputed Pauline 
corpus, it would provide difficulty for arguments against Pauline 
authorship.55
54 E.T. Mayerhoff, Der Brief an die Colosser, mit vornehmlicher 
Beriicksichtigung der drei Pastoralbriefe (Berlin: H. Schultze, 1838).
55 Mark Kiley’s discussion, Colossians as Pseudepigraphy (BibSem; 
Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1986), suggests that the pseudepigrapher of Colossians had 
only a two letter (i.e. Philemon and Philippians) corpus of Paul’s ‘genuine’ prison 
epistles from which to copy in his creation of Colossians, and that any element in 
the text that sounds like it comes from a letter other than those two is simply the 
result of knowledge of ‘Pauline language beyond his exemplars’ (p. 75). 
However, this begs the question of how such language would have been 
transmitted to the Colossian pseudepigrapher. Of course, it also begs the question 
as to how the two letters happened to be collected together into, seemingly, an 
independent collection (at least for the Colossian pseudepigrapher). Kiley’s
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Another element worthy of consideration in this regard is the 
concept of community (and the role it plays in both initial 
hermeneutical reception of this letter), and of the re-construction of 
the situation that allowed for its retention within the Church as a 
Pauline letter. As scholars of the New Testament, and specifically of 
Paul, we rarely consider the issue of ‘community’ beyond very 
rudimentary attempts to re-construct how ‘communities’ may have 
played a role in various aspects of New Testament history, in writing 
certain New Testament documents, or in the collection of the writings 
we call the New Testament. Assertions that a ‘community’ or a 
‘school’ would have felt one way or another, or acted one way or 
another, are not uncommon. What is lacking in such discussions is 
any idea of the relationship between our model of understanding and 
our conception of ‘community’. In arguments concerned with the 
reception and retention of letters by Paul (or the counterfeit of such a 
process in the creation, reception and retention of pseudonymous 
letters), such notions of community become extremely important. 
These considerations are central to the issue of the relationship 
between Philemon and Colossians— if these two letters are indeed 
written to the same community,56 the differences between their 
content and themes are as important as their similarities. While this is 
not the specific question being addressed in this chapter, we would do 
well to consider the hermeneutical implications of the communal
argument that ‘Within the canon itself we have three letters attributed to John, two 
to Peter, and one to James’ (p. 33) proves nothing—we have no other extant 
letters of these three figures, so the ‘evidence’ of these smaller collections (i.e. 
maybe people had smaller collections of Paul’s letters, too...) is not salient. The 
fact that we have thirteen letters ascribed to Paul in the New Testament and no 
extant two-letter collections must surely beg for more proof to be offered. Similar 
problems are raised with Kiley’s subsequent argument, where he posits that small 
letter collections on the part of Solon, Thales, Chilon and Pittacus (as collected by 
Diogenes Laertius, Lives o f the Eminent Philosophers) argue for the viability of 
his alleged two-letter collection of Philippians and Philemon (p. 33). See below, 
with regard to the relationship between Philemon and Colossians.
56 That the two letters were written at the same time, to the same place, is 
assumed by Moule, Colossians and Philemon, 19 n. 2, in response to the theory 
espoused by Knox {Philemon among the Letters o f Paul) and E J. Goodspeed 
{The Meaning o f Ephesians [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1933]; idem. 
The Key to Ephesians [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956]) that these 
two letters went to different places (i.e. Philemon as the Letter to the Laodiceans 
mentioned in Col. 4:16).
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nature of the recipients of both of these letters. Colossians is quite 
obviously written to a community, and Philemon, despite the apparent 
address to the individual Philemon, is also addressed to two other 
individuals, and indeed to the church which meets in Philemon’s 
house.57 The variation between the second person singular and plural 
in Philemon is no mistake on Paul’s part, and must not be ignored in 
our interpretation of both the purpose of the letter, and the nature of 
Paul’s request, as I have argued above (Chapter 2). Thomas Alexander 
particularly emphasizes the role of the second person in Gadamer:
For Gadamer, the human community arises more from the ability to listen 
than the ability to speak. We not only need to hear what the other says, but 
to hear the questions implicit behind any statement and to sense the 
direction such questioning might take. Thus the possibility of speech as a 
joint activity or a process opens up to us in which the other is a partner. 
Such cooperative partnership is the very nature of a community. The other 
is ‘with us’ as we proceed. A community is a history of such intertwined 
projects of cooperative understanding.58
I will return to this idea of community below, when discussing Paul’s 
formulation in Col. 2:1. Its importance here in connection with the 
idea that Colossians is a species of pseudepigraph or forgery, revolves 
around the relationship between Philemon and Colossians. However 
one construes the authorship of Colossians, this relationship between 
the two letters is a tight one. Whether one posits, as does Kiley, that 
the Colossian pseudepigrapher made use of Philemon, or that the two 
letters were written at the same time and sent together to Colossae, the 
relationship needs to be explained, and done so in connection with the 
idea of community. It is important that attention be paid to this point, 
as, with only a handful even questioning the Pauline authorship of 
Philemon, the close connection between, especially, the list of greeters 
at the end of each letter needs to be taken seriously. It seems highly 
improbable to suggest, as does K iley, that the Colossian  
pseudepigrapher only had access to a very small number of Paul’s 
letters. Following this theory, the pseudepigrapher would have had to 
be very  early, before a larger collection of Paul’s letters was 
available.59 Of course, this in itself holds major difficulties for a
57 Issues to do with the addressees of Philemon are discussed above, in 
chapter 2, p. 49 n. 18 and p. 75 n. 93.
58 Alexander, ‘Eros and Understanding’, 330.
59 A solution which E. Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians: A 
Commentary (trans. A. Chester; Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1982 [1976]) 21,
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‘Pauline school’ theory of authorship.60 It is possible (if improbable) 
to posit that the Colossian pseudepigrapher knew that Philemon was a 
Colossian, and so decided to write his fictional letter to the Colossians 
reflecting the Pauline letter to Philemon. The other possibility, if  one 
posits a Pauline authorship for both letters, is that they were simply 
sent to the same place. It is this last point that will form the basis of 
the following discussion, but we would do well to give appropriate 
weight to the idea that, if  we are to follow the route proposed by those 
who see Colossians as pseudepigraphal forgery, we must contend with 
the role of deception in the initial attempt to infiltrate it into the 
church at Colossae— or elsewhere. Porter’s comments on the 
implications of pseudepigraphy of the Pastoral Epistles for their 
inclusion in the canon, while directed toward a different location in 
the Pauline corpus than my current interest, remain useful:
...I think we must come to terms with the question of deception in the 
New Testament... Is it so hard to believe that the early church was in 
some way fooled into accepting these letters? If the letters are not 
authentic, that must be the answer, since there is no record of objection to 
their acceptance... The [forger] disciple’s motives may have been noble,
considers, but finds ‘inconceivable, especially in a letter that is so very close to 
Paul, and would therefore presumably be the first to be seized on as inauthentic’. 
It is this difficulty, coupled with perceived difficulties in the theology of 
Colossians, that leads Schweizer to his strange view on the authorship of this 
letter (see below).
60 This is the only viable alternative to Pauline authorship, unless one tries to 
suggest, as do Dunn and Schweizer, in attempting to preserve the Pauline status 
of Colossians while denying Pauline authorship, that one of Paul’s inner circle 
wrote this letter, with the full acknowledgement of Paul, and, indeed, a Pauline 
signature at the end to give his seal of approval. In this case, of course, it is 
difficult to see why Paul would allow such a person (whom both Dunn and 
Schweizer identify as Timothy) to write a letter in the apostle’s name—which, 
according to both of them, contains non-Pauline elements—and then still sign it 
with his own name. Of course, it is also difficult to see how the insightful 
theological writer who constructed Colossians could or would have only ever 
written the one letter, especially if, with Dunn and Schweizer, we posit that this 
writer was Timothy. Nowhere is there any suggestion, of which I am aware, from 
the early Church or in modern scholarship, that Timothy carried on a letter- 
writing ministry (except as co-sender with Paul). Cf. Dunn, Colossians and 
Philemon, 35-39; Schweizer, Colossians, 21-24.
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including finding a way for Paul to speak to [the forger’s] community, but 
deceptive it was, nevertheless.61
Gadamer’s conception of the ‘Other’ as a necessary condition for 
understanding (with dialogue as its basic form), calls for a more 
stringent approach to this issue of pseudepigraphy, such as that which 
Porter encourages.62 Gadamer’s dialogical model for understanding 
human communication necessitates the ‘Other’. As he states, ‘The 
word is what one person speaks and another understands’ 63 While 
Gadamer does not develop the notion of the role of the counterfeit in 
connection with his model, his discussion of the orientation of 
dialogue partners towards a common subject matter allows for the 
development of such a notion. If we are to imagine a situation where 
the recipients of a given letter are deceived about the authorship of 
that letter, the way in which this letter is received by this group— the 
mediated dialectic relation with the author of that letter into which this 
group will enter— will be of a fundamentally different nature than if 
the author is, in this case, Paul. In the case of a forgery, we have to 
contend with the idea of a double mimesis in the production of the 
letter— the production first of a persona to write the letter,64 then of 
the letter itself. The engagement of the recipients with this letter will 
be at a remove from the subject matter of the author, for he includes 
within his subject matter an element of deception. Obviously, this will 
not hold if we posit a willing acceptance of such a forgery, along the 
lines argued by Meade in his Pseudonymity and Canon,65 but the 
problems with such a reconstruction have been noted before, and need
61 S.E. Porter, ‘Pauline Authorship and the Pastoral Epistles: Implications for 
Canon’, BBR 5 (1995) 105-23, here 122.
62 Porter engages with A.T. Lincoln, who, in his Ephesians, Ixxiii, states that, 
to suggest that ‘Ephesians is pseudonymous is somehow to detract from the 
validity or authority of its message as part of the NT canon... [is] committing the 
“authorial fallacy’” .
63 In Derrida and Gadamer, Dialogue and Deconstruction, 95. For 
discussion, cf. Alexander, ‘Eros and Understanding’, 325-27.
64 Cf. Lincoln, Ephesians, Ix: ‘The implied author is a construct evoked by 
the text... It is a further question what the relationship is between this implied 
author and the actual author’.
65 D.G. Meade, Pseudonymity and Canon: An Investigation into the 
Relationship o f Authority and Authorship in Jewish and Earliest Christian 
Tradition (WUNT 2.39; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1986) cf. 116-39.
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not detain us here.66 Nor need this entire point about the hermeneutics 
of pseudepigraphy, which could be further investigated in connection 
with Gadamer’s philosophy, be discussed at length in the present 
context. In the present context, the recognition that pseudonymity 
needs to be placed within a hermeneutical framework, and appreciated 
within this framework, is enough. This discussion could be rounded 
off by returning to Gadamer’s notions o f authorial intention, 
mentioned above (pp. 50-51). In rejecting the psychologism of a 
Hirschean or Romantic approach to hermeneutics, Gadamer returns 
always to the text. Anything of an author’s ‘intentions’ which are 
recoverable are recoverable and able to be explicated only in 
connection with and by reference to the text. In the case of 
pseudonymity, we would be unable to determine what was encoded 
within a text precisely because of the effects of ‘authorial intention’ in 
the Gadamerian model.67
Geographical and Textual Arguments against a Pauline Foundation 
fo r the Colossian Church
As was stated above, the relationship between many Pauline 
scholars’ reading of Colossians as pseudonymous and the wide-spread 
belief that Paul did not found the Colossian church is not obvious. It 
may be that the two have nothing to do with one another. Still, it is 
striking that, while the one (Colossian pseudonymity) is met with 
equivocation by a fair number of Pauline scholars, the other (the non- 
Pauline foundation of the church itself) is virtually unquestioned. 
Coming back to the main theme of this chapter, this latter is because 
of the perceived solidity of the evidence in Acts against this 
possibility. But, as we shall see below, the usual arguments, that, if  
Colossians is a Pauline letter, Paul (1) could not have founded the
66 Cf. G.W. Knight, III, Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles (NIGTC; 
Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1992) 46-54; Porter, ‘Pauline 
Authorship’, 116-17. Cf. also the evidence marshalled by B.M. Metzger, ‘Literary 
Forgeries and Canonical Pseudepigrapha’, JBL 91 (1972) 3-24, and, in more 
abbreviated form, by Porter, ‘Pauline Authorship’, 114, that forgery, far from 
being a well-accepted practice within the ancient world, was not.
67 Cf. Warnke, Gadamer, 25. In discussion of Gadamer’s critique of 
Romantic hermeneutics, specifically that of historical interpretation, she states: 
‘Gadamer’s criticism of a historical intentionalism, then, is not that an agent’s 
intentions ought not to be a subject of interest to the historian. His point is rather 
that we remain historically situated even where we are concerned with an agent’s 
intentions.. .’ (emphasis original).
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church and (2) could not even have visited it before writing the letter, 
bear re-examination. The arguments are usually made, following the 
nineteenth-century work of Lightfoot, on a geographical and a textual 
basis.68
Geographically speaking, Lightfoot would have us believe, it is 
impossible that Paul, on any missionary journey listed in Acts, could 
have founded the churches in the Lycus valley, including that of 
Colossae. Although Lightfoot’s position has enjoyed a great deal of 
support in the history of scholarship, it is by no means conclusive. It 
depends on the North Galatian hypothesis to explain the route of 
Paul’s so-called third missionary journey, which posits that both Paul 
and Luke mean by the term ‘Galatia’ (Gal 1:1; Acts 16:6 ‘Phrygia and 
Galatia’; 18:23 ‘Galatia and Phrygia’) the ancient territory of the
68 See Lightfoot, Colossians and Philemon, 24-31, esp. his four-page 
footnote, 24-28 n. 2. From a hermeneutical perspective, we might wish to 
consider the issue of our orientation, as scholars, and perhaps even scholars who 
are also part of a Christian faith community, towards the tradition of scholarship 
on this passage and the traditional belief of the Church about the authorship of 
this letter—in Gadamer’s dialogical model of understanding, as Alexander (‘Eros 
and Understanding’, 327-32, here 327) neatly divides it, the ‘Other’ in 
understanding can ‘be as radically concrete as the immediate “you” of any 
conversation; it may be a collective “you” of the community; it may rise to the 
generality of the speaking voice of a cultural tradition. It may even rise to the 
grandeur and indefiniteness of Levinas’s other, as the eternal other in the structure 
of the process of meaning itself. What Gadamer does not provide is a way of 
mapping these binary oppositions. We might move beyond Gadamer by 
suggesting a network of such binary oppositions, or perhaps even a hierarchy of 
such oppositions, or a network of hierarchies of oppositions. The present thesis, as 
the reader will be aware, is concerned to investigate and map aspects of two levels 
of such a proposed network: that between Paul (or the author of Acts, or, as in 
Chapter 5, James) and his original audiences; and that between modern 
scholarship and the Pauline (or other) text. In Chapter 4, cognate to the 
suggestions made above with regard to the role of Acts as an additional member 
of the dialogue being conducted with the Pauline text by modern scholarship, I 
will investigate the role of the Egyptian tradition (and the Roman reaction to that 
tradition), as part of the dialogue being conducted between Paul and his audience 
in Rome. This will allow for a matrix which contains not just multiple levels of 
dialogical exchange in interpretation (conversation partner, community, tradition, 
etc.), but also the individual stages of such exchange. This is, I suggest, closely 
cognate with the dialogue in Plato’s Philebus—while named for Philebus, it is 
Philebus’s student, Protarchus, who stands as the dialogue partner for Socrates 
throughout the entire dialogue, despite the possibility, on more than one occasion, 
that Philebus could take over for his student.
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Gauls. However, although this theory has had its supporters, it is 
probably best to identify ‘Galatia’ for both Paul and Luke as the 
Roman province of Galatia.69 According to the geographical 
constraint of the North Galatian hypothesis, it would only make sense 
for Paul to have used an old Persian road that took a more northerly 
route to the coast, and hence to Ephesus (see Ramsay’s reluctant 
indication of this route, below in Figure 1).
However, there is no hint in the text of Acts that this was his route. 
Indeed, the only hint we are given is that Paul ‘went from place to 
place through the region of Galatia and Phrygia strengthening all the 
disciples...[and, after a vignette introducing Apollos], Paul passed 
through the upper country and came to Ephesus’ (Acts 18:23; 19:1, 
RSV). This oblique reference to ‘the upper country’, or ‘the upper 
region’ (rà àvcorepim piprj) does not tell us which route Paul used 
to approach Ephesus.70 For Ramsay, this presented a problem to his 
South Galatian theory:
It must be acknowledged that there is in this journey one difficulty from 
which the North-Galatian theory is free. St. Paul’s object was the west 
coast of Asia, and Ephesus was the point at which he arrived. The ordinary
69 For recent discussions of this point, see S. Mitchell, Anatolia (2 vols.; 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) 2.3-6; and C. Breytenbach, Paulus und 
Barnabas in der Provinz Galatien: Studien zur Apostelgeschichte 13f ;  16,6; 
18,23 und den Adressaten des Galaterbriefes (AGJU 38; Leiden: E J. Brill, 1996) 
99-173. These studies are still clearly indebted to the work done on the ‘South 
Galatian Hypothesis’ by W.M. Ramsay. See his Cities and Bishoprics o f Phrygia 
(2 vols.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1895, 1897); idem. Historical 
Geography o f Asia Minor (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1890); and, among 
others, idem . Historical Commentary on Galatians (London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 1899). See also the important early monograph by E.H. Askwith, The 
Epistle to the Galatians: An Essay on its Destination and Date (London: 
Macmillan, 1902), which, while rejecting Ramsay’s theory on the date of 
Galatians, strongly supports the South Galatian hypothesis. Discussion of the 
history of this problem can be found in P.P. Bruce, The Epistle to the Galatians: A 
Commentary on the Greek Text (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Exeter: 
Paternoster, 1982) 5-18 and Hemer, Book o f Acts, ch. 7.
70 àvGùTEpiKÔç simply does not convey any other information. LSJ  s.v. 
cLVtoTepiKos1, 170 suggests that it conveys ‘upper’ or perhaps ‘inland’, and a 
search of the TLG database supports this.
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and frequented route for trade between Antioch and the west coast passed 
through Apameia and Colossae and Laodicea.71
MATERIAL REDACTED AT REQUEST OF UNIVERSITY
The reason Ramsay finds the material in Colossians to be problematic 
is unstable, in the light of my arguments below. He states:
But it would appear from the Epistle to the Colossians [2:1] that Christians 
at Colossae and Laodicea had not seen his face. On the other hand, his 
natural route, according to the North-Galatian theory, would not lead him 
through Colossae and Laodicea, but would pass more to the north through 
Philadelphia.73
His subsequent paragraphs try to resolve this ‘difficulty’ with the 
South Galatian hypothesis; but my present analysis implies that the 
archaeological data, together with the South Galatian hypothesis, 
require that the text of Colossians be re-examined, and perhaps re­
interpreted.
71 W .M . Ram say, The Church in the Roman Empire before A.D. 170 
(London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1893) 93.
72 Ramsay, Church in the Roman Empire, detail from frontispiece pull-out 
map. Ram say’s map is less than accurate in some topgraphical details (e.g. the 
shape of the Limnai, modern Lake Egridir), and it must be recalled that a fair 
amount of the sites listed on this detail (such as Apamea, Tralla, etc.) have not 
been re-discovered by archaeologists.
73 Ramsay, Church in the Roman Empire, 93. Cf. the important article by J. 
Bérard, ‘Recherches sur les itinéraires de Saint Paul en Asie M ineure’, RArch  6.5 
(1935) 57-90, esp. 85-88, who takes the opposite approach, and allows the 
archaeological data regarding the im probability  o f a northerly  route to 
problematize the text of Col. 2:1, rather than the other way around.
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It seems most probable that Paul’s route to Ephesus on the ‘third 
missionary journey’ took him along the major trade-route, through the 
Lycus valley.74 As Bérard states:
If one now recalls the general geographic configuration of Asia Minor, 
with a high central plateu which descends to the sea in an abrupt fashion to 
the North and South, and by a less sudden incline to the West coast, the 
signification to dvwrEpLKa pépr) [‘the upper region’] with the definite 
article does not appear doubtful. This expression designates ‘the high 
plateaux’ of the centre of Anatolia. 75
As a result, we are left with a picture which suggests that Paul either 
spoke to no one about the gospel during this journey,76 or, following 
his usual pattern, he would have had every opportunity to plant the 
seeds of the Colossian church. That Luke makes no specific mention 
of this fact is not necessarily problematic— as discussed above, we
74 D. French, ‘Acts and the Roman Roads of Asia Minor’, in Gill and Gempf 
(eds.), The Book o f Acts in Its Graeco-Roman Setting, 49-58, here 57-58, argues 
that it is ‘a tenable hypothesis that a deliberate rejection of major public roads and 
places in Asia Minor, the extensive travel by ship and at the end of his third 
journey [and] the final avoidance of Ephesus reflect Paul’s conscious awareness 
of hostile public, civic and official attitudes...’. This is a possible hypothesis, but 
it does not apply in reverse. One cannot argue from the evidence in Acts that Paul 
did on some occasions avoid Roman roads and centres (e.g. the avoidance of Asia 
and Bithynia in Acts 16:6-7, but French’s suggestion [p. 57] that being ‘forbidden 
by the Holy Spirit’ is ‘a periphrasis for a different compulsion’ surely needs more 
than just assertion) that when Acts is silent about Paul’s route he must have 
avoided such roads and centres. In fact, part of French’s argument for Paul’s final 
decision to avoid Roman roads and administrative centres relies on the bad 
experiences Paul had at the end of his time in Ephesus, so these experiences could 
not have influenced his decision of a route to Ephesus in the first place. Bérard, 
‘Recherches sur les itinéraires’, 85, responding to Ramsay, suggests that ‘The 
Caÿstre valley [the proposed northern route] is not a way to access the interior: it 
leads to a cul-de-sac, and was never, in consequence, used by the great routes, 
ancient or modern... Finally, in antiquity...we do not have any even passing 
precise reference to a road directly traversing that region’ (translation mine).
75 Bérard, ‘Recherches sur les itinéraires’, 86, translation mine.
76 This is the direction in which Bérard (‘Recherches sur les itinéraires’, 87) 
takes his interpretation of Acts in the light of Col. 2:1: ‘The text of Acts does not 
say, in effect, anything about stopping—prolonged or quickly—on this route, and 
still less of preaching. Paul could not intend other than to go without delay to 
Ephesus—not to found new communities. He would not, therefore, have come to 
know the Laodiceans and the Colossians at the time of his passage through these 
two towns’ (translation mine).
116 BROOK W .R. PEARSON
know of several aspects of both Paul’s public ministry and his private 
life that did not, apparently, merit record in Luke’s work, but that are 
found mentioned in Paul’s own letters. The appearance of Apollos, the 
description of Paul’s missionary activities in Ephesus, and the 
subsequent baptism in the Spirit that Paul brings (in contrast to the 
‘baptism of John’ preached by Apollos), are bases for interpreting this 
as a unit which is concerned more with the build-up to the problems in 
Ephesus in Acts 19 than with other activities on the part of Paul. To 
assume that, in this context, Luke would have mentioned what may 
have been a very mundane (in comparison with the coming events in 
Ephesus) church-planting situation is perhaps presupposing the 
relevance of over-extended presuppositions, or merely putting the 
wrong question to the Lukan text. As discussed above, if we use the 
hermeneutical model o f a conversation or dialogue to map our 
interpretation of Paul via the book of Acts, we must recognize Acts’ 
individuality: ‘The true historical object’, Gadamer writes, ‘is not an 
object at all, but the unity of the one and the other, a relationship that 
constitutes both the reality of history and the reality of historical 
understanding’, to which he adds in a new footnote to his second 
English edition, ‘Here constantly arises the danger of “appropriating” 
the other person in one’s own understanding and thereby failing to 
recognize his or her otherness.’77 Just so, as in a conversation where 
one partner refuses to truly hear what the other is saying, 
interpretative appropriation of Acts without truly understanding what 
it is saying (and not saying) will lead to either an extremely 
unsatisfactory exchange, or one where Acts is actually not present in a 
conversation in which it is meant to be a partner. The Platonic 
dialogues’ ‘yesses’, as Gadamer put it, are absent.
Returning to the matter at hand, another possibility to consider is 
that Paul may have converted Colossian residents while they were in 
Ephesus, or that he may have sent out missionaries from Ephesus 
during his (at least) two year stay there (Acts 19:10). This is, however, 
simply another argument from the resounding silence of the text. Does 
Luke’s t o ü t o  8 è  éyévero è m  err) 8uo, oiare navras* roùç 
KaroiKOuvras* rpv ’Aaiav aKouaai rov Xoyov rou Kupiov, 
’I ouSaious* re  m i "EXXqvaç ( ‘and this happened for two years, so 
that all the inhabitants of Asia heard the word of the Lord, both Jews 
and Greeks’) imply that Paul sent out missionaries? Does it imply that
77 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 299, and n. 230.
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he himself travelled out from Ephesus? Does it imply that his ministry 
was simply passive, expecting the residents of the area to come to him 
to be evangelized? The grammar of this verse does not imply positive 
answers to any of these questions— all we know is what it tells us, 
which is precious little. In keeping with Paul’s missionary strategy 
elsewhere, it seems unlikely that Paul evangelized in a passive 
manner. It also seems unlikely that the same author who recorded 
Jesus’ sending out of the seventy (Luke 10:1) would avoid giving us 
similar information about Paul, if  we are to think that a ‘Pauline 
missionary’ planted the church at Colossae (and, by extension, the 
churches at Hierapolis and Laodicea). Instead, we are forced to 
conclude that, on the basis of Acts, we actually seem to know very 
little about Paul’s time in Ephesus or the Ephesian region, and to 
leave it at that. \
From there, turning to the text of Colossians itself, it is necessary to j 
examine those passages which many read as Paul’s own confession 
that he had not visited Colossae. In order of importance, the first of 
these is Col. 2:1: GéXco ydp up-âç eLSévai fjXiKov àywva cxw 
inrèp hp-GOV Km TÛV 6V AttoSlKELOl Kttl OCJOL 0&X ÉÔpttKaV TO 
TrpÔCTCüTTÔv pou €v oapKi (‘for I wish you to know what great agony ; 
I have for you, and those in Laodicea, and as many as have not seen 
my face in the flesh’). This tripartite list is generally conflated into 
one: those who have not seen Paul’s face in the flesh (including, but 
not necessarily limited to those in Colossae and Laodicea). The m i  
(kai,  ‘and’) before o c t o i  (hosoi ,  ‘as many as’) is interpreted 
emphatically or adverbially to mean that Paul had not seen any of 
them in the flesh.78 Lightfoot’s reasoning on this appears to have 
convinced most. He states that the ‘grammatical form is unfavourable; 
for the preposition inrép [huper] is not repeated, so that all the persons 
included are included under a vinculum’,79 but cf. BDF §479.1: ‘The 
repitition of a preposition with the second of two nouns or pronouns 
connected by m i is a matter of preference’. The three m i ’s can be
78 E.g. M. Barth and H. Blanke, Colossians (trans. A.B. Beck; AB 34B; New 
York: Doubleday; London: Cassell, 1994) 274: ‘The only real possibility...for the 
Greek hosoi... [is that] the Christians in Colossae and Laodicea are included in a 
general sense among those whom Paul did not know personally’; Lohse, 
Colossians and Philemon, 2, 79-80; O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, xxvii, 92; M. 
Dibelius, An Die Kolosser Epheser an Philemon (HNT 12; Tübingen: Mohr 
[Siebeck], 1927) 18: ‘beide Gemeinden.. .nicht von Paulus gegmndet’.
79 Lightfoot, Colossians and Philemon, 28-29 n. 4.
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taken as simply connective, meaning that Paul is addressing the 
Colossians (whom he knows), the Laodiceans (whom he also knows), 
and ‘as many as have not seen my face in the flesh’ (cf. Plato, 
Euthyphro 7D: k g i l  e y c o  kcli a u  K a i  o i  d X X o i  d u G p w ir o L  'rrdvTES* ‘I 
and you and all other people’).80 That the third element in Col. 2:1 is 
the relative pronoun ô œ o ç  does not require the first two elements in 
the list to be entirely limited by it. As a relative pronoun, o a o i  most 
likely needs to be read as modifying something, rather than standing 
on its own, but the suggestion in BDF §304 that ‘ôaoi=n-àvT£ç o ï’,81 
may mean that o o o i  is acting more independently than a typical 
relative pronoun. Paul’s double use of the nominative plural of ô œ o ç  
in Rom. 2:12 seems to treat it in this manner: o o o i  y d p  d v o p .c o s *  
p p . a p T o v ,  d v o p -c o s*  K a i  d T r o X o w r a i ,  K a i  o a o i  èv u d p .w  p p - a p r o v ,  
ô i à  v 6 p .o u  K p i G f j a o v r a i  ( ‘for as many as apart-from-law sinned, 
apart-from-law also they will be destroyed, and as many as in law 
sinned, through the law will be judged’). There is no pronoun or other 
nominal element to act as antecedent, nor one following, as in Rom. 
8:14. In the light of this, I suggest that o a o i  in Col. 2:1 does not 
completely de-limit the Christians in Colossae and Laodicea, but only 
o o o i  Paul has not seen face-to-face.
Lightfoot’s assessment also ignores the use of the third person 
plural in 2:2, 3, which I think is telling for the interpretation of the list 
in 2:1. Paul speaks in these two verses to a group whom the recipients 
of the letter must not read as primarily themselves. To miss this shift 
in person is to miss an important strategic move on the part of Paul: if 
there are problems in Colossae, whether doctrinal, leadership-related, 
or otherwise (which seems to be a consensus view in the interpretation
80 This could be seen as a use of polysyndeton, which, as is defined in BDF 
§460, often lends ‘rhetorical emphasis: polysyndeton produces the impression of 
extensiveness and abundance by means of an exhausting summary’; cf. A.T. 
Robertson, A Grammar o f the Greek New Testament in the Light o f Historical 
Research (Nashville: Broadman, 1934) 427, who offers Rev. 7:16 as an example. 
Cf. also the discussion of ‘Corresponsive K ai... Kai’ by J.D. Denniston, The 
Greek Particles (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934) 323-24. It may be that the 
textual variant in this verse which adds Kai tgov kv  'leparroXei ( ‘and those in 
Hierapolis’) from 4:13 (found in MSS 104, 424, and versions) not only did so out 
of a sense of parallelism, but saw this verse as an example of polysyndeton which 
would naturally admit more elements. Col. 4:13 has a very similar structure to 
2:1, complete with mrép and a tripartite list, this time ending with Kai t& v  ev  
'lepairoXei.
81 Cf. Rom. 8:14.
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of Colossians), Paul’s comments in vv. 2 and 3, made ostensibly to 
those who have not had the benefit o f  meeting Paul and being taught 
face-to-face by him (and who hence could perhaps be excused for 
struggling with Pauline doctrine), could actually be seen to be directed 
not only to this group, but also to the whole communion of those who 
had been taught by Paul (who, if Paul is true to form, he would not 
excuse quite so easily for turning from his gospel).82 The return in v. 
4 to the use of the second person plural, and the emphasis on Paul’s 
absence in the flesh (rrj crapd aTreipi)83 in v. 5 suggest that (1) Paul 
had at one time been present, and (2) Paul is using this third person 
plural group as (at least on one level) a cipher to make some very 
pointed comments to those whom he had both evangelized and taught, 
but who are struggling with maintaining a Pauline doctrine.84
Given the command in 4:16 to exchange letters between the two 
churches, it seems probable that, although there were some (perhaps 
many) who had not had the benefit of meeting Paul face-to-face, the 
others (who, given this reading, had been evangelized and established
82 Cf. Phil. 2:12: "Qote, dyairriTOL pou, kclGgos* Travrore ÙTrqKOUcraTE, 
pf| œ ç  ev rrj irapouaxq pou pôvov dXXà vvv ttoXXw pdXXov èv rrj 
dîTouorq pou, p e rd  (f)ô(3ou Kal rpopou tt|v  éaurwv crwrripLav 
KaTepydCecrÔE (‘So that, my brothers, just as you have always heard, not as in my 
presence only, but now even more in my absence, with fear and trembling work 
out your salvation’). This approach, though softer by far in tone than he utilizes in 
Galatians (3:3: dvorjroi FaXdrai, t l ç  upas* EfBdoxavEV, ols* K ar’
ô^GaXpoùs* ’Iu (Tous* Xpioros* Trpocypd^T) ecrraupcopevos*; [‘O Foolish 
Galatians! who has bewitched you, in whose eyes Jesus Christ was shown 
crucified?’]), is consistent with it—he expects his congregations to maintain their 
single-mindedness on the gospel, and to not be swayed by the arguments of 
others.
83 Cf. Phil. 1:27: iva el te èXGwu Kal ISùv upas* elte dncov àKouco rà  
WE pi upœv ( ‘so that whether coming and seeing you, or being absent I hear the 
things concerning you’)
84 Cf. Dunn, Colossians and Philemon, 129-30, who tentatively allows for a 
visit of Paul to Colossae during his Ephesian stay, or even possibly that he ‘may 
have passed through Colossae earlier’ (p. 130), although he remains vague on this 
point, and does not discuss the grammar. See also T. Lewin, The Life and Epistles 
o f St. Paul (2 vols.; London: Longman, Green, Longman and Roberts, 3rd edn, 
1875 [1851]) 196; and B. Reicke, ‘The Historical Setting of Colossians’, RevExp 
70 (1973) 432-33, both of whom support the idea that Paul travelled through the 
Lycus valley.
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as churches by Paul) had been seen.85 Although Paul records that he 
and his cohorts had heard  of t t ) v  u j j l û v  àyâwr\v èv  T T v e u f i c m  ( ‘your 
love in spirit’) (having been informed by Epaphras), this does not 
suggest that he had not met them in the past— any more than any 
report given to Paul to which he responds is proof that he had not met 
those about whom he had received information (cf., e.g., 1 Thess. 3:1- 
10; 1 Cor. 1:11).
The second most important textual point usually brought up in this 
regard is the discussion of the Colossians’ faith and reception of the 
gospel in 1:3-8. In this connection, it would seem appropriate to 
briefly examine the idea of ‘reception’ of a work of art in Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics, and relate it to the idea of receiving the gospel, and the 
formation, as a result o f that reception, o f a(n interpretative) 
community. First, though, we need to establish some specific bases 
for this discussion in terms of Colossians. The usual interpretation of 
Col. 1:3-8 is that Paul and his companions give thanks because they 
have heard a report from Epaphras— in this reading, the man who 
founded the Colossian church— of the love and faith of his Colossian 
converts. However, a different translation than usual may help us to 
better understand the sense of the Greek:
We give thanks always to God, the father of our lord, Jesus Christ, 
concerning your believing, hearing [of] your faith in Christ Jesus and the 
love which you have towards all the holy ones on account of the hope laid 
up for you in heaven, which you heard before in the word of the truth of 
the gospel which came to you, just as it is also bearing fruit in all the 
world and growing as it also does in you—from that day you heard and 
understood the grace of God in truth—just as you learn86 from Epaphras 
our beloved fellow servant who is a faithful minister of Christ for us [v.Z.
85 The parallel with the list in Col. 4:13 should probably not suggest to us 
that the third elements in the two lists are to be equated, although this could be 
seen as a tempting solution to who boot oùy éopaicav to irpoaxoTTov jiou èv 
oapKi (‘as many as have not seen my face in the flesh’) are.
86 Although I have translated this aorist (èp.d0£T6) with an English present, it 
could as well be translated with an English past-tense. That the verb does not 
grammaticalize time makes this a somewhat moot point, as any particular 
translation of Greek verbal aspect with English tense reflects the interpretation of 
the translator. On the aorist, see Porter, Verbal Aspect, 182-244. See also the 
discussion of the Greek verb in terms of aspect theory, above, pp. 70-72.
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‘you’],87 who is also the one who showed/pointed out/made known to us 
your love in the spirit.
This translation brings out the fact that there is no clear link between 
the dcj)’ r\ç f)|j.épaç tikouctcite kolI ETréyvcûTC tt)V xdptu tou  
06ou èv dXr|06La ( ‘from that day you heard and understood the grace 
of God in truth’) and the (possibly later, possibly concurrent) kgÆcûç 
ép.d0€TE drro ’ETramps ( ‘just as you learn from Epaphras’). These 
data support a move to interpret the mention of Epaphras here as a 
‘faithful servant of Jesus Christ’ as a means to infer that Paul is 
advocating the role that he wishes the Colossians to see Epaphras 
playing with regard to them. Although Kiley has overstated his case 
by suggesting that, while Paul elsewhere sets Timothy up as a 
lieutenant, in Colossians he sets Epaphras up as a general, or a ‘mini- 
Paul’,88 he is on the right track. It is important to note the emphasis 
placed on Epaphras’s ministry also at the end of the letter in 4:12-13. 
Epaphras is with Paul at the time of the writing of the letter, but he is 
not being sent with the letter. Instead, Tychicus (who seems to have 
been unknown to the Colossians) is to carry the letter and inform them 
of Paul’s affairs (one wonders why the Colossians would care about 
Paul’s affairs if they had not had more than a passing acquaintance 
with him; cf. 4:7-8).89 Could it be that Epaphras, left by Paul to teach
87 The textual evidence here (for rjpaiv: $p46 R* A B D* etc.; for upwv: R2 C 
D2 etc.) seems to point away from the decision made by the NA21IUBSGNTA
committee(s) (for utiwv, plural ‘of you’), and does not gain much from the
explanation given in the textual commentary by Metzger (Textual Commentary, 
619-20): ‘Although on the basis of superior Greek evidence...qp-wv might seem to 
be preferable, a majority of the Committee, impressed by the widespread currency 
of ugcov in versional and patristic witnesses, considered it probable that copyists 
introduced the first person pronoun under the influence of the preceding qpwu and 
following f]piv’. One wonders if the committee’s decision was not influenced by 
a pre-understanding of the role of Epaphras vis-à-vis the Pauline mission. It seems 
more reasonable to suggest that this particular variant (upwv) was introduced and 
retained as a result of the ecclesiastical theology of later centuries, which would 
have gained a role model in the form of a minister such as Epaphras, whose role 
was to minister/or the congregation he served. At best, it seems that the internal 
argument for ûpœv is extremely weak, and the external evidence strong against it. 
See also the discussion of this issue in Moule, Colossians and Philemon, 27 n. 1, 
who takes the first person to be the better reading, as do I.
88 Kiley, Colossians as Pseudepigraphy, 95.
89 See also Eph. 6:21-22, which seems to intimate that, if Ephesians is also 
by Paul, the Ephesian, or possibly Laodicean, church did know Tychicus. Goulder
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and strengthen the Colossian church, was not as successful as Paul 
had hoped he would be in the task that Paul had set for him? Does the 
letter Paul wrote to the Colossian church hint that it was not as rooted 
as it could have been, and that part o f the problem might have been 
that it was not accepting Epaphras as an authoritative teacher, as it did 
Paul? Does the sending of Tychicus with the letter hint that the 
situation called for a fresh face, an independent party who could 
establish more clearly what the problems at Colossae revolved 
around? Definite answers to these questions may not be accessible. 
But the idea of the reception of the gospel, whomever we posit as its 
deliverer in the first place, raises some interesting points o f  
comparison with Gadamer’s ‘reception aesthetic’. It does so 
especially in the light of my comments above with regard to the thrust
( ‘Visionaries of Laodicea’, 16 n. 1) argues that ‘Ephesians’ is actually the 
Laodicean letter, but that a copy of it survived only in Ephesus as a result of the 
Laodicean church falling away, about which we hear in Rev. 3:14-22. He follows 
A. Harnack, ‘Die Addresse des Epheserbriefes’, Sitzungsberichte der 
Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Historische-philosophische 
Kleinschriften 37; Berlin: Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1910) 
696-709. The evidence from Marcion (Tertullian, adversus Marcionem 5:17:1), 
however, does suggest that this ascription was current in the ancient world as 
well. This identification could cause some difficulty for my reading of Colossians 
(or my reading may cause Goulder’s attribution some difficulty), as one would 
expect that, were Tychicus known in Laodicea, he would also be known in 
Colossae. A possible solution to this problem could be that Tychicus was known 
to some in Laodicea from their visits to Paul while Paul was in Ephesus, but that a 
similar meeting had not taken place between Tychicus and any Colossians. L. 
Kreitzer {The Epistle to the Ephesians [Epworth Commentaries; Peterborough, 
UK; Epworth, 1997] 31-48; cf. idem, ‘The Plutonium of Hierapolis: A 
Geographical Solution for the Puzzle of Ephesians 4:9-10’, in J. Kerkovsky [ed.], 
ETTITOATTO: Studies in Honour o f Petr Pokorny on his Sixty-Fifth Birthday [2 
vols. (Czech and English); Prague: Mlyn, 1998] English vol. 218-33) has recently 
relied upon much of this same evidence, together with his own code-breaking 
reading of the letter, to suggest that, in fact, Hierapolis was the destination of the 
letter (which he sees as non-Pauline). It would be counter-productive to here 
examine Kreitzer’s arguments in depth. Suffice it to say that this hypothesis 
would obviate the possible difficulty posed by Goulder’s theory, but then any 
theory of non-Pauline authorship would do so, without needing to appeal to any 
alternative location other than Ephesus (or wherever). I do not follow Kreitzer’s 
analysis of the use of pronouns in Ephesians {Ephesians, 41-47), as I consider that 
the variation between first, second and third person singular and plural pronouns 
and personal referents in Ephesians functions in somewhat the same manner as I 
have outlined above for Colossians (see above, p. 119).
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of Paul’s words in 2:1-5. For, if we posit that Paul is responding to a 
situation in Colossae much like he had faced before (e.g. Galatia, 
Corinth, Thessalonica), where his gospel, received once for all by his 
churches, is being questioned, repudiated, abandoned, or modified, the 
problem of what exactly is ‘reception’ becomes particularly poignant. 
Defending his idea that no ‘work of art addresses us always in the 
same way’, meaning that ‘we must answer differently each time we 
encounter it’, Gadamer states that it ‘is a mistake, I think, to try to 
make this endless multiplicity a denial of the unshakeable identity of 
the work’. He goes on to question whether
...my own endeavor to bring together the difference of understanding and 
the oneness of the text or work and in particular whether my holding fast 
to the concept of a ‘work’ in the realm of art do not themselves presuppose 
a metaphysical concept of identity: If reflection by a hermeneutic 
consciousness also leads us to recognize that to understand at all is always 
to understand differently, is one really doing justice thereby to the 
resistance and inscrutability that characterize the work of art? Can the 
example of art really provide a framework within which a universal 
hermeneutics could be developed?
I answer: This was really the starting point of my whole hermeneutical 
theory. The artwork is a challenge for our understanding because over and 
over again it evades all our interpretations and puts up an invincible 
resistance to being transformed into the identity of the concept.90
Transposing this model to the reception of the gospel by first- 
century Christians, one has a useful tool to elucidate the 
hermeneutical web being addressed by Paul in such a situation as we 
find in Colossians. As with the artwork, the gospel— whether we are 
speaking of Paul’s gospel, or, as Paul saw it (cf. Gal. 1:6-10), the 
gospel—is likewise resistant to being transformed into the identity of 
the concept. Paul’s encouragement to congregations about their 
reception of the (his) gospel often plays a role very similar to 
Gadamer’s comments on the work of art; he plays on the idea that 
what they received, they received with joy (e.g. his comments to the 
Thessalonians in 1 Thess. 1:2-10, esp. vv. 4-5 where he reminds them 
of the ratification of their [proper] reception of the gospel by the 
power of the Holy Spirit), and that they should not turn from this 
reception. One could argue that what Paul does in these circumstances 
is to simply argue for a particular interpretation of ‘the gospel’, but I
90 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 44.
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think that Paul himself would see his arguments as attempts to keep 
his converts open to the gospel itself, which, for Paul, contains an 
element of inscrutability, much as Gadamer has argued is the essential 
characteristic of the work of art. One need only refer to the comments 
Paul makes about his own (coming) salvation/resurrection in Phil. 3:4- 
16, and indeed his earlier comments in that letter with regard to the 
Philippians’ own salvation (2:12), to see that, for Paul, there is a 
radical openness to the gospel, inextricably connected with his 
theology of salvation/righteousness by faith alone.91 For Paul, then, to 
be making arguments about reception of the gospel is for him to be 
referring to the content and nature of the gospel itself. In Gadamerian 
terms, such comments by Paul are directed not towards an 
imperialistic interpretation of the gospel, allowing for only one 
interpretation, but towards maintaining the openness and inscrutability 
that Paul sees as the very heart of the gospel itself.92
Regarding the issue of whether of not Paul himself founded the 
church to which he directs these comments, the above series of 
dialectical questions is not in itself the answer, but it does show that
91 Cf. Chapter 5, below, which examines this from a different angle, arguing 
that his involvement in collections for the Jerusalem church underscored this 
radical consistency.
92 As I suggested above (p. 112 n. 68), a possible development of Gadamer’s 
ideas of dialectical interchange could include the idea of a matrix of such 
interchanges, between and among various partners and voices. Such a matrix 
describing the contours of Paul’s dialectical world would include (but not be 
limited to) his interaction with his communities, his understanding of the (his) 
gospel, the communities’ own interaction with the (his) gospel and other 
evangelists’ or detractors’ interactions with Paul, and with his communities, with 
tradition (including, but not limited to the Old Testament). Looking more closely 
at the idea of Paul’s interactions with his communities, it seems that the letter- 
writing he undertakes is only one form of that interaction. We have almost no 
evidence—even in Acts—of the kind of personal interaction in which Paul was 
involved with his communities after their foundation, except through the letters 
themselves. Could we not also construct an idea of Paul and his companions as a 
travelling community undertaking dialectical interaction with more located 
communities, such as that at Ephesus, or Corinth? This would seem to be implicit 
in Paul’s consistent use of his (so-called) ‘apostolic presence’ (e.g. Phil. 1:27; 
Philem. 22; 1 Thess. 2:17-3:10; Rom. 1:13) in his letters, as well as his sending of 
others to undertake information exchange with various locations, and would map 
onto Paul’s missionary activity in a useful manner. Obviously, this is an idea in 
need of expansion, but to do so in the present context would be a detraction. I 
hope to return to this in future work.
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an alternative hypothesis is a possibility, or even a requirement of the 
data. To take a dialectical approach to interpretation, though, the way 
forward will be in the formulation of such questions. Such questions, 
directed at the traditional arguments concerning the foundation of the 
Colossian church, demonstrate both the variety of alternative 
formulations, and the tenuous relationship between the actual text o f  
C olossians and this traditional formulation. If Paul’s purpose in 
writing Colossians had something to do with authority, responsibility 
and orthodoxy/orthopraxy (especially with him in prison), one might 
expect that he would factor himself somewhat out of the equation, and 
pass on the authority he obviously held in the Colossians’ eyes to 
those he knew were going to be responsible for carrying on the 
mission in his absence (cf. discussion of the situation in Philippi, 
below, p. 128). We know that conflict between early Christian 
authorities (at least between those who held different people in 
authority, if not between the different authorities themselves) was an 
issue elsewhere in the world of Pauline churches— especially at 
Corinth. Are we to assume that this problem could not have been 
faced even more by a ‘native’ pastor set up by Paul in Colossae? Of 
course not.
In the end, we are left with a situation that moves conclusively in 
neither direction, but which does seem to suggest that, barring 
evidence and proof to the contrary, we should think of the Colossian 
church as a Pauline foundation— we have no statement in Colossians 
even approaching Rom. 1:13 (T do not wish you to be ignorant, 
brothers, that I have often intended to come to you, but have been 
hindered up to now’) to point in the opposite direction. Reading the 
letter with this assumption, there is much fruit to be gained in terms of 
questions of authority and the role that Pauline authority played in his 
churches at the end of his life.
When faced with silence in response to our questions of Acts, we 
are forced (or tempted) to turn to other sources to illuminate how that 
particular silence may or may not have any meaning. In this case, the 
lack of a description of any Lycus valley travels or missionary work in 
Acts 18 couples well with the preceding cursory description of the 
Galatian and Phrygian portion of this journey.93 Luke’s primary
93 If the argument from silence were to be given its full weight, the complete 
lack of reference to any location on the posited northern route (including not only 
in Acts, but also in the Pauline letter corpus) would need to be taken into full 
account.
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purpose in this narrative is not to describe Paul’s journey, but rather to 
bring us as an audience to Ephesus, where the important events of 
Acts 19 take place. The transformation of this silent response from 
Acts into a privileged voice in the dialogue concerning the 
reconstruction of Paul’s career has led some scholars, in the related 
but not identical conversation with the Colossian text itself, to the 
inappropriate characterization of Colossians as ‘formal’ and ‘non- 
personal’, and to scepticism regarding the Pauline authorship of this 
letter.
Personal References in Colossians and Philemon 
The role that references of a personal nature play in the letter to the 
Colossians is generally overlooked. As Lightfoot objects:
...if [Paul] had actually visited Colossae, it must appear strange that he 
should not once allude to any incident occurring during his sojourn there, 
for this epistle would then be the single exception to his ordinary 
practice.94
This presumed lack of personal references in the text of Colossians is 
often viewed as a counter-example to the possibility that Paul had 
ever even been to Colossae. It is difficult to lodge the basis of this 
argument in the text of Colossians as we have it, however. In this 
regard, the accompanying letter to Philemon (and Apphia and 
Archippus) seems to play a pivotal role that is virtually unrecognized. 
If, as the argument runs, Colossians has an overwhelming lack of the 
kind of personal references we usually see in a Pauline letter, 
presupposing that Paul can never have been to Colossae, how do we 
then construe the very personal literary identity o f Philemon?95 
Philemon’s radically personal tone (assuming both the genuineness of
94 Lightfoot, Colossians and Philemon, 28. This view is assumed by Lohse, 
Colossians and Philemon, 172: ‘The long list of names clearly serves the purpose 
of establishing closer ties with the community’ (i.e. which he did not have, 
because he had not visited them).
95 If the personal relationship between Paul and Philemon assumed and 
expressed throughout the letter is not enough, the inclusion of three different 
recipients’ names, the personal greeting to the church that meets in Philemon’s 
house, the assumption of a ‘fellowship’ between Philemon and Paul in v. 17, and 
the imprecation to make a room ready for him might suggest that Paul had indeed 
been to, and possibly even ministered at, Philemon’s house in Colossae, unless we 
want to assume that, because Acts does not expressly tell us about Paul visiting 
Colossae, Colossae had to come to Paul (something of which Acts also makes no 
mention).
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Colossians, and that the two letters were sent together at the same 
time).
Even so, the assertion that there are no personal references in the 
text of Colossians is somewhat overstated. Paul comments about 
suffering for the Colossians’ sake in 1:24, suggests that he works hard 
for them in 2:1, assumes that they will be personally concerned about 
him and his fellow workers in 4:8, sends greetings to them from 
Onesimus and Epaphras (both Colossians themselves, cf. 4:9, 12-13), 
personally greets Nympha and the church in her house 
(4:15— something which could assume the kind of knowledge gained 
from a sojourn among the Colossians which Lightfoot wishes to see), 
and implores the church to give a personal instruction to Archippus 
concerning his ministry in 4:17.96 How one can argue that a letter that 
contains such personal elements is ‘impersonal’ or overly ‘formal’ is 
difficult to see.
Still, perhaps there is something to be made out of the relative  
paucity of such ‘personal’ elements in Colossians. A comparison 
could be drawn, perhaps, with 1 Thessalonians, which is among the 
most ‘personal’ o f any of Paul’s letters. He is responding, in the 
Thessalonian correspondence, to attacks not only on his gospel, but on 
his person—immediately following the thanksgiving in 1 Thess. 1:2- 
10, he launches into a defence of his and his compatriots’ behaviour 
while among the Thessalonians (ch. 2). In this defence, he utilizes 
such family imagery as ‘a nurse taking care of her children’ (2:7) and 
a ‘father with his children’ (2:11), and constructs a picture that allows 
an unprecedented picture of Paul’s conception of his sojourn among a 
new group of converts. The utilization of this family imagery makes 
sense at this early phase of Paul’s career. His personal authority in his 
churches must have been extremely important— especially where he 
was (or felt he was) under attack.97 From his later correspondence, 
though, one gets the impression that Paul has recognized the need to 
place others in positions of authority, and to undergird such authority 
in his correspondence with his churches. Philippians reads very much 
this way, even if too much can be made of it being the sole Pauline 
letter to include specific greetings to the church’s leadership (1:1).
96 Interestingly, Schweizer {Colossians, 20) thinks that it is the ‘customary 
notes and greetings that make incredible the thesis of post-Pauline origin for the 
letter’, although he does not relate this to the question of the Pauline or non- 
Pauline foundation of the church itself.
97 On threats to Paul’s authority in Thessalonica, see below, p. 136 n. 114.
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Certainly, Paul’s whole argument in Philippians 1 over the 
Philippians’ ability to carry on with or without him implies such a 
move. If my argument concerning part o f Paul’s purpose for 
Colossians is correct— namely, to build up a beleaguered Epaphras as 
leader of the church in Colossae— then one can understand the 
wisdom of Paul not focusing too much on his personal interaction 
with the Colossians in such a letter. If part of what Paul is trying to 
encourage is a weaning of their dependence on him personally (and a 
proper attitude towards and respect for the local leadership which had 
been put in place), it would be disastrous for him to take an approach 
like we see in 1 Thessalonians, or even in Romans, where again Paul’s 
personal status is in question.
Finally, by way o f conclusion to this sub-section on personal 
reference in Colossians, and as a segue to the next major section of 
this chapter, it is perhaps appropriate to offer some suggestion 
concerning the role that evidence concerning the foundation of the 
Colossian church might play in the discussion of the authorship of the 
letter addressed to it. If the text of the letter as we have it now can be 
shown to fit reasonably within normal Pauline missionary strategy, to 
depict parallel problems and tendencies with those in other Pauline 
churches (as well as the way in which he dealt with them), and to 
portray no overt evidence supporting a theological position contrary to 
what we might expect in a letter written by Paul himself,98 then it 
seems only reasonable to posit that the burden of proof has been 
shifted back to those who would posit its pseudepigraphic identity. 
We are faced with a letter to a Pauline church, a church which is not, 
indeed, mentioned in Acts; but it is important enough, nonetheless, to 
elicit an apostolic letter in response to a crisis in leadership, practice 
and possibly faith.
98 I have purposely offered no argument on this point in the current context, 
as I think that decisions on what is or is not ‘Pauline theology’ must be made on 
the basis of the entire Pauline canon, not on a selection arbitrarily made for a 
variety of interlocking reasons which, as with many we have seen here, do not 
stand on their own. For discussion of the theology of the book of Colossians, cf. 
esp. J.M.G. Barclay, Colossians and Philemon (NTG; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1997) 75-96, and A.J.M. Wedderburn, ‘The Theology of 
Colossians’, in A.T. Lincoln and A.J.M. Wedderburn, The Theology o f the Later 
Pauline Letters (NTT; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 3-71.
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THE ILLOGIC OF QUESTION AND ANSWER: ‘OBJECTION, YOUR HONOUR: 
COUNSEL IS LEADING THE WITNESS’
To continue with the picture drawn above with regard to the role of 
Acts in a dialogue about Paul, or a Pauline text," Acts will not only 
resist questions put to it which are not relevant to its subject matter (as 
we saw in the above discussion), it will also sometimes put questions 
to its interlocutors, or respond to our questions with questions of its 
own. The following example is an attempt to show how the 
presentation of evidence concerning Paul in Acts has affected the way 
in which Paul has subsequently been allowed to be studied. That is, 
how Acts has been used to make positive statements about Paul’s life, 
or what he did do (and hence what he could have done).
I am here concerned with Luke’s presentation of Paul’s so-called 
first missionary journey. In the light of this, a few words on the idea 
of Paul as a missionary, and the hermeneutical implications of this 
status are in order. To construe Paul’s missionary strategy as a kind of 
dialectical interaction with the gospel as its subject matter, and Paul’s 
converts and churches as dialogue partners, is an appropriate way to 
consider the hermeneutic contours of the kind of community of which 
Paul is a part and a leader. As Warnke writes,
Gadamer’s model...is that of a Socratic dialogue in which the position to 
which Socrates and his interlocutors come at the end represents a 
significant advance over the position each maintained at the beginning. 
Each begins with certain views and assumptions but in confronting 
opposing views and assumptions has to reconsider and develop his or her 
own...
Gadamer argues that...shared understanding and transformation...marks 
the successful conclusion of the hermeneutic dialogue with aspects of 
one’s own or another tradition... Genuine understanding, on his view, 
derives not from an imposition of one’s own prejudices or needs on the 
object to be understood as the notion of application sometimes seems to 
suggest; neither does it result in the abject acceptance of the views of that 
object; as the idea of anticipating completeness seems to imply.100
For Paul, I think this openness toward the implications of the gospel 
is a fundamental characteristic o f his missionary strategy. 
Unfortunately, the author of the book of Acts does not necessarily 
know or care about this facet of Paul’s work; or perhaps I should say
"  Above, p. 105.
100 Warnke, Gadamer, 101-102.
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that Luke has concerns of his own which neither necessarily equate 
with Paul’s interests, nor necessarily are entirely inconsistent with 
Paul’s concerns. We should, therefore, exercise caution in mapping 
the presentation of Paul’s strategy in Acts onto Paul’s writings, but 
also beware of an initial scepticism which ignores the possibility of 
overlap.
The so-called ‘first missionary journey’, recorded in Acts 13-15, 
begins with the Holy Spirit-induced sending of Paul and Barnabas 
from Antioch to Cyprus, and ends with the ‘Council’ of Jerusalem. 
This sequence of events is cleverly arranged by Luke to establish 
certain things about Paul’s mission, and may very well be part of a 
larger polemic between factions in earliest Christianity.101 Its specific 
role in Acts, however, serves to exonerate Paul (and Barnabas) from 
accusations of wrong-doing which were likely levelled against them at 
the subsequent Council (assuming the Council reflects an actual 
event), and which were probably continually levelled at the Pauline 
mission by his/its critics both during his lifetime and after.
My initial interest in this episode concerns Paul and Barnabas’s 
visit to Antioch-next-to-Pisidia on their first missionary ‘journey’ 
(Acts 13:13-52). It is the culmination of what is really the first act that 
Paul undertakes as Apostle to the Gentiles— at least as this role is 
presented in Acts. Sometime in the late 40’s CE (perhaps 47), Antioch 
was Paul and Barnabas’s first real stop (except for the port of Perga in 
Pamphylia, where they were deserted by John Mark) in Asia Minor. 
Their pattern of missionary activity was a continuation of the pattern 
they had initiated in their evangelization of Cyprus, beginning with 
the synagogue. It would seem that Paul and Barnabas, in the face of 
Jewish resentment, were still unable to establish much of a base in 
Antioch, although Acts 14:21 does record that they returned there on 
the return half o f their journey, ‘strengthening the souls o f the 
disciples, exhorting them to remain in the faith, and that it was 
necessary for [them] to pass through much trouble for the sake of the 
kingdom of God’. Paul’s two further trips through the area (Acts 16:1- 
6; 18:23) may have brought him into Antioch, although this should 
not be assumed, as neither passage records an explicit itinerary for 
Paul’s journeying through the region, and it may very well be that not 
all of the original Pauline foundations continued to exist, even within 
the lifetime of Paul— we know of no explicit reference to Christianity
101 See Goulder, Two Missions, esp. chs. 14-19.
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in Antioch after the New Testament, except for the apocryphal 
second-century work The Acts o f Paul and Theda.102
That Paul’s speech in the synagogue of Antioch is one of the 
longest missionary speeches in the book of Acts is perhaps significant 
in the light of the place it occupies at the outset of Paul’s preaching 
activity in the book of Acts, as well as the place it has in the narrative 
at the beginning of the journey which takes place just before the 
Council of Jerusalem (Acts 15). As Paul’s first speech in Acts, it is 
also worthy of mention from a Gadamerian point-of-view. In fact, the 
use of speeches as the primary records o f Paul’s (and others’) 
messages throughout the book of Acts is particularly interesting. 
Whereas we should probably imagine that the most effective  
‘ministry’ undertaken by Paul was not bound up in the text of such 
speeches as have been included in the book of Acts, we are left with 
the impression in Acts that this is indeed the key context of Paul’s 
evangelization. Adding this to the evidence of his letters, we are left 
with the impression, if we are not careful, that this is the only way in 
which Paul communicates with people— publicly, or remotely. 
Gadamer’s comments on letter-writing could be extended to include 
this idea of the speech; then, perhaps, developed by a re-imagination 
of what must have been the case:
The primacy of conversation can also be seen in derivative forms in which 
the relation between question and answer is obscured. Letters, for 
example, are an interesting intermediate phenomenon: a kind of written 
conversation that, as it were, stretches out the movement of talking at 
cross purposes and seeing each other’s point.103
To see letter-writing as a replacement of conversation is perhaps to 
invite the idea that a speech, especially the form of speeches like 
Paul’s as included in Acts, is the precursor to conversation. And yet, 
we are never privy to Pauline conversation as conversation. This is to 
be expected, given the way in which conversation is 
conducted— verbally, not recorded (at least in the ancient world), and
102 The writer of Acts’s purpose(s) for not recording the Pauline itineraries in 
these two passages, if he knew them, may be linked to this trend we are 
examining of leaving out details and/or focusing on smaller incidents which more 
closely illustrate his purpose. As is explored in Chapter 5, however, it may also be 
that Paul’s initial success in these regions later met with failure, as the result of 
anti-Pauline evangelization on the part of the Jerusalem church. See below, p. 
274.
103 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 369.
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transitory. We have no Pauline dialogues. But the letters of Paul often 
recall conversation (e.g. Gal. 1:8-9), and Paul bases much of his letter- 
writing on the communication that has gone on previously. One might 
even say that there is no Pauline letter that initiates conversation, but 
only continues an on-going conversation. As Gadamer writes, ‘The 
time lapse between sending a letter and receiving an answer is not just 
an external factor, but gives this form of communication its special 
nature as a particular form of writing’— ‘The art of writing letters 
consists in not letting what one says become a treatise on the subject 
but in making it acceptable to the correspondent. But on the other 
hand it also consists in preserving and fulfilling the standard of 
finality that everything stated in writing has.’104 As the only form of 
Pauline communication available to us, apart from the speeches in 
Acts, we may perceive Paul as a communicator to be something 
fundamentally different than what he was. If we read the Acts 
speeches as though they are Pauline (and, perhaps, even if we do not), 
we may further skew our picture of Paul as a communicator,105 for we 
will have, in our reconstruction of Paul’s communication, only the 
bookends, so to speak, of his communication strategy and process. We 
will also, of course, have to contend with the structuring of Luke in 
accessing the Paul of the Acts speeches, even if we are convinced that 
they are literary creations on the part of Luke. It is toward this part of 
the process that the following analysis is directed, but a brief moment 
to simply imagine the role of Paul’s actual sojourning among his 
congregations is also worthwhile. Perhaps it would be well simply to 
remember that Paul (usually) had spent time among the congregations 
to which he sent letters, and, probably, among many to which he did 
not. Either way, the character o f this time, and o f Paul’s 
communication strategy while he was spending this time, is not a 
primary interest of the author of Acts. As is shown in the analysis 
below, there are numerous opportunities where, even if we were
104 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 369.
105 Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 188-89, where he discusses the 
relationship of rhetoric and hermeneutics (cf. above, pp. 85-90), including the 
following statement: ‘...where speaking is an art, so is understanding’ (p. 188). 
This points up again the unity of rhetoric and understanding in Gadamer’s 
philosophy, and the importance of the following analysis of Luke’s structuring 
both of Paul’s speech in Acts 13, and of the events preceding and following this 
speech.
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interested to reconstruct this aspect of Paul’s ministry, the author of 
Acts slips back into his silences, despite our repeated questions.
In the speech to the Antiochenes in Acts 13, Paul’s opening strategy 
seems to play on the tension between Diaspora Jews and their fellows 
in Jerusalem (Acts 13:26-29; and again at 13:40-41), inviting these 
Asian Jews to show themselves superior to the Palestinian Jews who 
had rejected, condemned and killed Jesus. The incredible interest that 
both Gentile and Jewish106 Antiochenes had in Paul and Barnabas’s 
message makes this desired response impossible for the Jewish 
listeners, however, and ‘the Jews’ reject and contradict the message 
(Acts 13:45), while the Gentiles— or at least as many as had been 
destined to do so (Acts 13:48)107— accept the message and become 
believers. Paul and Barnabas’s short follow-up speech of Acts 13:46- 
47 serves as an opportunity for Luke to introduce the quotation from 
Isa. 49:6 (roughly l x x ) which provides the clearest scriptural support 
for the idea of Gentile inclusion in God’s plan: T have made you a 
light for the nations, so that my salvation may reach the ends of the 
earth’. In the light of this, the Jews’ culpability for rejecting this 
salvation is thus even more clearly established on the grounds of 
ancient Jewish tradition— not merely as a rejection o f Jesus, as 
outlined in the previous sabbath’s speech.108 Hermeneutically, we see 
in this use of the Isaiah material a direct appeal to tradition by Paul 
and Barnabas in a manner which closely reflects Gadamer’s 
conception of the difference between dialectic and argument.
106 Presumably, it was not merely the Gentile god-fearers and their friends 
who found this message interesting, even if Luke does leave us with that 
impression in Acts 13:45.
107 This explanation of why some Gentiles believe, while others disbelieve, 
may be part of Luke’s theme of Gentile ignorance and/or lack of responsibility for 
their own actions, made more obvious in Acts 14:8-18 (see below).
108 In tracking the use of Isaiah quotations in speeches in Acts, it is 
particularly interesting to notice the function of two of them in Peter’s speech to 
Cornelius’s household, just prior to the first recorded baptism of the non-Jews. In 
Acts 10:34, Peter suggests that it was to the ‘people of Israel...that the good news 
o f peace was brought by Jesus Christ’ (italicized words from Isa. 52:7), and in 
10:38, when describing Jesus, he quotes Isa. 61:1: ‘God anointed him with the 
Holy Spirit’. Even though it is Peter who undertakes this first outreach to non- 
Jews, and clearly understands Jesus’ activities within the traditions of the Isaianic 
servant, it is only Paul (and Barnabas) who recognizes the full implications of this 
tradition by actively taking the gospel to the Gentiles.
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discussed above.109 He states that ‘Dialectic consists not in trying to 
discover the weakness of what is being said, but in bringing out its 
real strength. It is not the art of arguing (which can make a strong case 
out of a weak one) but the art of thinking (which can strengthen 
objections by referring to the subject matter).’110 One might suggest 
that Paul— or Luke— is indeed being argumentative in this passage, 
but the structure of this argument is dialectical. The appeal to a shared 
tradition, one which forms the basis of all Jewish and Christian (and 
Jewish-Christian) belief, to object to the actions of ‘the Jews’ in 
Antioch is in keeping with Gadamer’s description: ‘The apparently 
thetic beginning of interpretation is, in fact, a response; and the sense 
of an interpretation is determined, like every response, by the question 
asked. Thus the dialectic o f question and answer always precedes the 
dialectic o f interpretation. It is what determines understanding as an 
event.'n i Paul’s use of shared tradition is a clever way of facilitating 
the fusion of horizons and dialectically leading his audience out from 
this ‘apparently thetic beginning’ on the basis of the questions implicit 
within his subject matter.
The same response to Paul and Barnabas’s message is experienced 
in Iconium, but this time the author of Acts differentiates between 
believing and unbelieving Jews (Acts 14:1-2). This makes it even 
more likely that the story of Antioch is meant to function as a 
paradigm, which is then repeated in Iconium, Lystra and Derbe. This 
paradigm of unbelieving Jews causing trouble for the apostles is 
further suggested by the ‘strengthening’ nature of the message of the 
Apostles as they pass back through the region (Acts 14:21). All of this 
paints an extremely convenient picture of the Pauline mission to the 
Gentiles with which to begin the story of the Council of Jerusalem.
Hermeneutically, this is problematic, however, as we are faced with 
a one-sided picture of the interaction of Paul with not only ‘the Jews’, 
but also ‘the Gentiles’. We are privy to no objections to the gospel by 
Gentiles which are not Jewish-inspired, and we have no clear picture 
of the dialectical interaction of any of these groups. On the basis of 
the account in Acts, we have no way of knowing either the actual 
degree of success of the Antiochene church, or whether it managed to 
survive those first few troublesome years prior to and just after the
109 Cf. pp. 35,45,105.
110 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 367.
111 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 472 (emphasis original). Cf. Zuckert, 
Postmodern Platos, 76.
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Jerusalem Council. Luke has used Antioch as a stage upon which to 
display the good intentions of Paul and his companion Barnabas 
against the background of (unreasonable) Jewish opposition to their 
cause, and then moved on once he accomplishes this purpose. Of 
course, the importance of the churches in this region at this stage of 
Paul’s missionary activity is obvious— these are the churches to 
whom Paul’s letter to the Galatians was most likely addressed. 
Regardless of the exact dating of that letter (i.e. pre- or post-Council 
of Jerusalem), its contents would suggest that some, perhaps many, of 
Paul and Barnabas’s converts turned away (or were tempted to turn 
away) from the Pauline gospel (Gal. 1:6-9).
By closely examining Acts 13-15, one can see how Luke’s 
selective labelling of the various groups Paul and Barnabas encounter 
during their Galatian travels changes and develops.112 For instance, in 
Acts 13:5-12, while Paul and Barnabas are on Cyprus, they run into 
two major characters: ‘a Jewish false prophet named Bar Jesus’ (v. 6), 
and ‘Sergius Paulus, a man of intelligence’ (v. 7). The outcome of this 
story is well known, but the display of (Holy Spirit) power on the part 
of Paul does not simply win him a new (and powerful) convert. It also 
begins a theme of, depending on how one wishes to term it, anti- 
Jewishness or anti-Judaism in the following two or three chapters.113
112 A study which has also picked up on the subtle way in which Luke uses 
references to ‘the Jews’ in Luke-Acts is T.E. Phillips, ‘Subtlety as a Literary 
Technique in Luke’s Characterization of Jews and Judaism’, in Thompson and 
Phillips (eds.), Literary Studies in Luke-Acts, 313-26. Unfortunately, Phillips’s 
examples derive only from the Gospel. See also J.T. Sanders, The Jews in 
Luke-Acts (London: SCM Press, 1987) 65: ‘a closer examination of plot 
development in the narrative of Luke-Acts will show...that the apparent 
disharmonious juxtaposition of the good Jewish people in the narrative and the 
bad Jewish people in the speeches is quite deliberate and serves a definite 
purpose, and that our author finally—and quite skilfully, one might add—brings 
the two together in a successful resolution’. That I disagree with Sanders’s 
assessment of Luke’s characterization of the ‘Jewish people’ in the narrative in 
Acts will be obvious from the ensuing discussion.
113 Cf. Sanders, Jews in Luke-Acts, 259. It is interesting to note that, as Bar 
Jesus/Elymas is a magician, and hence apparently culpable as a practitioner of 
magic rather than merely as an opponent of Paul, Paul’s harsh castigation of him 
in Acts 13:10-11 goes without much comment. However, if one examines this 
passage closely, it is clear that Bar Jesus/Elymas’s Jewishness is also under 
attack. Of the five things of which Paul accuses him, only four of them make 
much sense in the light of the magic issue: being a fraud, impostor, son of the 
devil and an enemy of all true religion. ‘[Tjwisting the straightforward ways of
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This is not anti-Semitism, nor is it something to be made cognate with 
later Christian anti-Jewish polemic, which plays on themes long 
current in pagan attacks on Jews.114 Instead, it should be seen as 
evidence of an intra-Christian controversy into which, because it is 
intricately tied up with the question of Jewish ethnicity, Luke 
introduces evidence which will disparage Jews and/or Judaism.115
the Lord’ does not fit particularly well. However, by the same token, Paul’s 
criticism of Judaism (and indeed Judaizing Christianity), as seen in letters such as 
Galatians and Philippians (esp. ch. 3), would fit extremely well with all of these 
characterizations (except, perhaps, ‘son of the devil’, but note the use of such 
language in the Johannine literature: e.g. John 8:44; cf. 1 John 3:10-15; 2 John 7, 
and below, n. 115, with regard to 1 Thessalonians). If this reading is correct, we 
have, at the beginning of Paul’s mission to the Gentiles, a prophetic 
foreshadowing of the exact manner in which Paul and Barnabas will be opposed 
by ‘the Jews’ throughout their first recorded missionary endeavour.
114 For the evidence of this trend, see S. Krauss, The Jewish-Christian  
Controversy from the Earliest Times to 1789.1. History (ed. and rev. W. Horbury; 
TSAJ 56; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1995) 19-26. For discussion of the two- 
stage nature of the split between Christianity and Judaism ([1] intra-Christian split 
brought on by the forcing of ethno-religio-theological questions after the inclusion 
of Gentiles into the Church, and [2] Christian-Jewish split after the [virtual] 
demise of Jewish Christianity), see S.E. Porter and B.W.R. Pearson, ‘Why the 
Split? Christians and Jews by the Fourth Century’, JGRChJ 1 [forthcoming 
2000]).
115 The similarity between the structure and flow of Luke’s ‘argument’ and 
Paul’s in 1 Thess. 2:13-16 is striking. Despite the argument that this passage is an 
interpolation reflecting a post-70 c e  situation (see, e.g., B.A. Pearson, T 
Thessalonians 2:13-16: A Deutero-Pauline Interpolation’, HTR 64 [1971] 79-94), 
there is no convincing reason to see this as an addition to the text of 1 
Thessalonians. In fact, its removal halts the flow of Paul’s argument in 1 
Thessalonians 2: from his defence of the behaviour of himself and his colleagues 
during his initial visit to Thessalonica (2:1-12) through the report of Paul’s 
feelings towards the Thessalonian Christians on account of their acceptance of the 
gospel and perseverance in the face of tribulation (2:13), there is an important 
theme of Paul’s (and his colleagues’) handling of his new converts. Even though 
Paul at no point in the letter acknowledges any wrongdoing or accusation of 
wrongdoing, his description of the initial visit is a thoroughgoing iteration of his 
proper behaviour. There is not space for a detailed analysis in the present context, 
but the contrast between Paul’s denial of wrongdoing and affirmation of his rights 
in 2:5-7 with the family imagery of 2:8-12 may suggest, following Goulder’s 
hypothesis of Silas’s opposition to Paul (‘Silas in Thessalonica’, JSN T48 [1992] 
87-106), that Paul is trying to shift Silas’s (or indeed any opponent’s) criticism of 
him back onto the critic. In this light, the function of 1 Thess. 2:13-16 is 
(according to my reading) a ‘poisoned chalice’ offered to any ‘Christians’ (fully
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Indeed, it seems that the inclusion of Gentiles into the Church seems 
to have been the primary factor which forced the question of Jewish 
religio-ethnicity in a way that it had not previously been forced— at 
least to this degree— so it should not be surprising that the intra- 
Christian conflict in which Paul and Luke were involved should be 
carried out largely along ‘ethnic’ lines. The connection between the 
concept o f ‘ethnicity’ or, in this case, ‘religio-ethnicity’ and 
Gadamer’s philosophy is particularly poignant in the light of 
Derrida’s recent Monolingualism o f the Other. I quoted above, in 
connection with a discussion of methodological purity, the following 
statement of Derrida’s: ‘...I have never ceased calling into question 
the motif of “purity” in all its forms (the first impulse of what is called 
“deconstruction” carries it toward this “critique” of the phantasm or 
the axiom of purity, or toward the analytical decomposition of a 
purification that would lead back to the indecomposable simplicity of 
the origin)...’.116 Earlier, in discussing his own ethnicity (Franco- 
Maghrebian) and the connection between this ethnic origin and 
language, he suggests that ‘One cannot speak of a language except in 
that language. Even if to place it outside itse lf, and continues: ‘Far 
from sealing off anything, this solipsism conditions the address to the 
other, it gives its word, or rather it gives the possibility of giving its 
word, it gives the given word in the ordeal of a threatening and 
threatened promise: monolingualism and tautology, the absolute 
impossibility of metalanguage’.117 This has important implications for 
the hermeneutical discussion of the Jewish-Christian, or, more 
importantly for the present discussion, the Jewish-Christian-Gentile-
recognizing the difficulties in using this term at this stage) who also wish to be 
seen as ‘Jews’. If indeed Paul’s opposition is headquartered in the Jerusalem 
church, then the likening of the Thessalonians’ suffering to that of the Judean 
churches at the hand of the Jews (who also were responsible for the death of Jesus 
and the prophets, not to mention opposition to the gospel) serves as an invitation 
to those who would lift Judaism above the gospel to identify themselves as either 
followers of Christ or Jews. There is no in-between. This argument is continued 
in Paul’s subsequent discussion of hindrance to himself and the gospel in 2:17-20. 
In 2:16, Paul suggests that the Jews ‘are hindering [them] from preaching to the 
Gentiles and trying to save them’, and continues in 2:18 to suggest that the 
hindrance he faces to seeing them again is at the hands of Satan himself, leading 
to the obvious conclusion that the Jews, by hindering Paul and his compatriots, 
are serving the purposes of Satan.
116 Derrida, Monolingualism o f the Other, 46.
117 Derrida, Monolingualism o f the Other, 22.
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Christian divide (even allowing for the different point-of-view  
experienced in Derrida’s philosophy and Gadamer’s philosophical 
hermeneutics); for it is precisely the idea of a monolanguage that 
divides the earliest Christians from one another. Derrida states that 
this threatened promise, and the effects of metalanguage (which 
ultimately lives within monolanguage), ‘introduce into it some 
translation and some objectification in progress. At the horizon, 
visible and miraculous, spectral but indefinitely desirable, they allow 
the mirage of another language to tremble’.118 This seems to describe 
the flow of linguistic and ethnic development within the early Church, 
from a primarily Jewish, likely Aramaic-speaking localized  
phenomenon; to a predominantly non-Jewish, Greek speaking 
scattering of groups, effected by a stranger within his own tradition: 
Paul, the Greek-speaking Hebrew of Hebrews, the Christian who had 
been an extreme Pharisee, the preacher and theologian of salvation by 
grace alone who had been zealous for the traditions of the fathers. 
Paul embodies exactly that kind of alienation for which Derrida offers 
a latter-day counterpart. In terms of the Jewish/Christian tradition of 
which Paul was a tradent and author, Derrida’s comments on 
translation (in keeping with those comments above) seem likewise 
appropriate:
In a sense, nothing is untranslatable; but in another sense, everything is 
untranslatable; translation is another name for the impossible. In another 
sense of the word “translation”, of course, and from one sense to the 
other—it is easy for me always to hold firm between these two hyperboles 
which are fundamentally the same, and always translate each other.119
Moving on from Cyprus, then, Paul and Barnabas arrive in Asia 
Minor, and, in an example of Lukan ‘hurrying’, arrive in the space of 
a single verse at Pisidian Antioch (13:14). At Antioch, we are 
introduced only to the most central characters: the ‘synagogue 
officials’ of v. 15 who are necessary as a means to call Paul and 
Barnabas to give a message to the gathered audience. In my comments 
above with regard to Gadamer’s use of ‘play’ to explain interpretation 
and understanding (p. 101), I argued that the structuring activity of the 
author of Acts, in keeping with Gadamer’s ideas of the relationship 
between rhetoric and interpretation, was an important area of inquiry. 
Its importance is, I argued, even more important as a result of the dual
118 Derrida, Monolingualism o f the Other, 22.
119 Derrida, Monolingualism o f the Other, 56-57, cf. 65.
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role that Acts plays as literary work and as interpreter of Paul. 
Drawing the significance of this aspect of Gadamer’s hermeneutics 
even further, one could suggest that, at this level within Acts itself, the 
dialectical relationship between the literary construct Paul who gives 
speeches to various audiences, and those audiences themselves, is a 
level of dialectic (cf. my comments on a matrix of dialectics, or a 
hierarchy of dialectics, or a hierarchy of matrices of dialectics above, 
p. 112 n. 68, p. 124 n. 92) going on prior to the assessment of the 
dialectics between the author of Acts and his audience(s), or Acts and 
Pauline scholarship. And yet, as a dialectic contained within the text 
itself, one might suggest that this dialectic would always be kept at the 
closest remove to the interpreter in any description of a matrix of 
dialectics, for it exists within the text itself.
We are not made privy to the makeup of this audience until after the 
speech begins, when Paul addresses the assembled audience as ‘Men 
of Israel and those who fear God’ (v. 16).120 Hermeneutically, this 
provides us with a blank sheet where we expect a list of dramatis 
personae— the audience stares at us expressionless until the speech 
itself begins, at which point it takes on definition, but a definition 
provided only within the speech itself. This inverts Gadamer’s idea of 
structure and performance ( ‘structure is also play, because— despite 
this theoretical unity— it achieves its full being only each time it is 
played’121), and allows us to consider this audience— even if only 
audience as literary construct— as achieving its full being only by 
being played to. One wonders if this aspect of Luke’s hermeneutical 
invention of his (literary) audience is not mirrored in his construction 
of his (actual) audience. We are forced back to the idea of rhetoric as 
structuring— drawing author and audience (or interpreter) into a 
community, which, as Alexander states: ‘arises more from the ability 
to listen than the ability to speak’.122 However, lest one assumes (as
120 On the ‘missionary speeches’ of Paul in Acts, see Porter, Paul o f Acts, 
126-50 (on the address ‘Men of Israel’ in specific, pp. 133-34). On the ethnic 
makeup of the audience of this speech, see Roloff, Apostelgeschichte, 202. On the 
relation between ‘those who fear God’ in v. 16 and the ‘God-fearing proselytes’ in 
v. 43, see G. Schneider, Die Apostelgeschichte (HTKNT 51.1-2; Freiburg: 
Herder, 1980, 1982) 2.131, who doubts the connection; and, contra such a 
position, M. Wilcox, ‘The “God-Fearers” in Acts—A Reconsideration’, JSNT 13 
(1981) 102-22 (discussion of both in Porter, Paul o f Acts, 133 n. 22).
121 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 117; cf. above, p. 101.
122 Alexander, ‘Eros and Understanding’, 330.
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does Warnke in her reading of Gadamer’s hermeneutics; see above p. 
28) that this desire for community123 must ultimately lead to the 
subjugation of the audience or interpreter by the author of a text, 
Alexander also points out that ‘We not only need to hear what the 
other says, but to hear the questions implicit behind any statement and 
to sense the direction such questioning might take’. It is this 
subsequent questioning— a stage only accessible to those who are 
willing to take the risk to enter into community with the author of a 
text— which allows us both to attempt to truly understand Acts, and to 
question the validity of its material in our concurrent conversation 
with the Pauline texts.
As was mentioned above (p. 133), this speech forms an opportunity 
for the Antiochene Jews (and, by extension, the rest of the Jews Paul 
and Barnabas encounter on their Galatian travels) to show themselves 
superior to the Jerusalemite Jews who rejected Jesus.124 After this 
speech, Paul and Barnabas are followed, spoken to, and urged to 
continue speaking by ‘many of the Jews and the God-fearing 
proselytes’ (v. 43). ‘The people’ of v. 42, in case there was any 
ambiguity concerning the makeup of the crowd, are thus further 
specified. The story continues until the next sabbath, when there is a 
change of characterization. When ‘the Jews’ (v. 45) see that ‘nearly 
the whole city’ has turned out to hear the new message, they are 
jealous, and, apparently, all of them (there is no indicator that it was a 
smaller group) ‘begin to contradict the things said by Paul’ (v. 45). 
Verse 46, then, with the bold proclamation that Paul and Barnabas 
would now be turning to the Gentiles, comes as no surprise, and the 
Gentiles, predictably, receive this news with joy (v. 48). The mixed
123 Cf. Alexander, ‘Eros and Understanding’, 327-30, a section entitled ‘The 
Thou as Temptation’.
124 But cf. Sanders, Jews in Luke-Acts, 261: ‘the Lucan Jews in Antioch of 
Pisidia, therefore..., [have the choice to] behave like Jews or to show good sense 
and be converted’. This misses the thrust (and purpose) of Luke’s portrayal of ‘the 
Jews’ in Acts 13-15, which must be read in the light of the controversies 
surrounding the Jerusalem Council (see below). Cf. E. Trocmé, ‘The Jews as Seen 
by Paul and Luke’, in J. Neusner and E.S. Frerichs (eds.), ‘To See Ourselves as 
Others See Us’: Christians, Jews, ‘Others’ in Late Antiquity (Scholars Press 
Studies in the Humanities; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1985) 145-61, esp. 160, 
where he pictures Luke’s representation of Diaspora Jews as clearly negative in 
comparison to Palestinian Jews. It would seem that this characterization ignores 
the implications of Paul’s initial speech in Antioch, as outlined here.
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crowd has become two separate groups, Gentiles for Christ (and Paul) 
and ‘blaspheming’ Jews (v. 45).
Subsequent to the spreading of the gospel throughout the whole 
region, which comes as a result of this (v. 49), we are again faced with 
the monolithic ‘the Jews’ (v. 50), who stir up trouble for Paul and 
Barnabas with the ‘women of prominence and the leading men of the 
city’. I am even tempted to write ‘Subsequent to the e x p ec ted  
spreading of the gosp el...’, for this is one of those places where 
Luke’s structuring of his narrative so draws his audience in its wake 
that we are not surprised at all by this brief and blanket statement 
about the spread of the gospel. We are likewise unsurprised by 
unbelieving Jews at this point in the narrative. Paul and Barnabas’s 
response, tellingly, is to shake off the dust of their feet in protest, and 
head for Iconium.125 We are then introduced to a new characterization 
of a group: ‘the disciples’ who are continually filled with joy and the 
Holy Spirit (v. 52). Presumably, these disciples are those left at 
Antioch (and ‘the whole region’) converted as a result o f Paul and 
Barnabas’s mission.
At Iconium, we are again told that ‘both Jews and Greeks’ (14:1) 
believed, but that here, when Paul and Barnabas face opposition from 
the Gentiles, it is the fault of ‘the Jews who disbelieved’ that incite the 
Gentiles (14:2). This introduces a difficulty, in that Luke’s ethnic 
characterizations of converts have thus far, by the structure of his 
narrative, encoded a disposition in us, his audience, which assumes 
that there were no Jewish converts in the first Galatian mission (in 
contrast with other parts of Acts). His monolithic ‘the Jews’ 
seemingly brooks no division in the ranks of the opposition, and the 
benign ‘the disciples’ offers no clue as to their background. Here, 
however, there is the suggestion that (1) some Jews did believe, while 
others did not, and (2) when those Jews who disbelieve tried to win 
back some of Paul’s converts, it was not their Jewish brethren to
125 One can hardly miss the reference (assuming single authorship of 
Luke-Acts) to Luke 9:5 and 10:11, where Jesus commands the disciples (9:5) and 
the seventy (10:11) to shake off the dust of their feet from those who will not 
receive them. Cf. J. Jervell, Die Apostelgeschichte (KEK 3.17; Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998) 365; Johnson, Acts, 244; Haenchen, Acts, 415. 
As R.L. Brawley {Luke-Acts and the Jews: Conflict, Apology, and Conciliation 
[SBLMS 33; Atlanta: Scholars, 1987] 73-74, here 73) suggests, this action 
‘warn[s] the Jews of their responsibility and absolve[s] Paul of his’ (rather than 
some sort of final repudiation).
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whom they turned, but rather the converted Gentiles. This is a bizarre 
state of affairs; but it is one which seems to play into Luke’s strategic 
reconstruction of this first Galatian mission. Luke represents the 
opposition as, if not exclusively Jewish, at least exclusively motivated 
by the Jews (see vv. 2, 4, 5). The Jewish converts are ignored in the 
ensuing battle between ‘the Jews’ and ‘the apostles’, and the 
responsibility for the attempted stoning in v. 5 is placed squarely at 
the feet of ‘the Jews with their rulers’, even if some of the Gentiles 
were also involved.
Following the incident in Lystra (14:8-18) in which Paul and 
Barnabas are ‘mistaken’ for the gods Hermes and Zeus— an incident 
which displays the ignorance and double-mindedness of the Gentiles 
whom we have just seen in Derbe being swayed by disbelieving 
Jews— Paul and Barnabas are again opposed by (this time) simply 
‘Jews’ from Antioch and Iconium (14:19), and Paul is stoned. By 
now, however, fine distinctions mapping gradients between believing 
and disbelieving Jews are very difficult to make. Luke allows for the 
possibility that some Jews have believed (and continued to do so); but 
the overwhelming outcome of his characterizations of the opposition 
to Paul and Barnabas in chs. 13-14 is a picture where the Jews, as the 
result of jealousy, either directly oppose them, or stir up (ignorant, 
changeable) Gentiles against them. Even the return journey leaves us 
with only the characterization ‘disciples’ (14:22) to describe the 
various converts in the three cities. One cannot escape the conclusion 
that Luke wishes to paint all Jews basically with the same brush: that 
of binary opposition to Paul and his co-workers.
In the face of such incredible Jewish opposition, the beginning of 
the next major chapter in the story of Acts functions as an intense 
narrative surprise. Despite the point that the fledgling Church has had 
to face opposition from the Jews throughout the Gentile mission; even 
though Paul was stoned by Jews and the Gentiles they incited against 
him (who had previously been well disposed to the gospel, if Acts 
14:18 is indicative); despite the fact that Paul and Barnabas have had 
to shake the dust off their feet as a result of the Jewish rejection of 
(and hence culpability for?) the gospel in Antioch, ‘some men came 
down from Judea teaching the brethren, “Unless you are circumcised 
according to the custom of Moses, you cannot be saved’” (15:1)! The 
‘great dissension and debate’ on the part of Paul and Barnabas (v. 2) is 
only reasonable, given what they had just gone through in Luke’s 
version of events.
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The involvement of the Jerusalem church in, or authority of the 
Jerusalem church over, the Antiochene church is something that is not 
entirely understood, but it is fairly clear that it was a point o f  
contention between the two early Christian centres. In this case, it 
seems that Luke has specifically reconstructed the events of the first 
Galatian mission in such a manner so as to make the subsequent 
Council seem not to be the result of Antiochene/Pauline innovation 
with regard to the gospel and the Gentile question, but rather an 
attempt at a mollification of those elements within the Jerusalem 
church who cannot move with the times, or perhaps those who fear 
what they do not know. The way in which the Council is conducted in 
Acts 15 seems even more one-sided, however, than the story of the 
Galatian mission. The envisaged picture of a small contingent o f  
former Pharisees126 standing up in an orderly fashion before a council 
has been officially called and saying, Tt is necessary to circumcize 
[the Gentiles who believe], and to direct them to observe the Law of 
M oses’ (15:5), is somewhat humorous. The account of the Council 
itself is taken up with Peter’s moderate chiding of the Pharisaic 
faction (vv. 7-11), the Council’s rapt attention to the report of Paul 
and Barnabas (v. 12), and the admonition from Jacob himself to ‘not 
trouble those who are turning to God from among the Gentiles’ (v. 
19). The letter which issues from the Council is likewise critical o f the 
‘Pharisaic faction’— presumably what modern scholars generally call 
‘Judaizers’— as it suggests that these were ‘some of our number to 
whom we gave no instruction [and] who have disturbed you with their 
words, unsettling your souls’ (v. 24).
Although a typical range of scholarly opinion suggests that Luke 
did not have access to the Pauline letter-collection when composing 
Acts, it would seem that the special attention Luke pays to this
126 It is difficult to know whether or not the Pharisees would be seen by 
Luke’s readers—at this point in Acts—as supporters of or detractors from the new 
Christian movement. As D.B. Gowler {Host, Guest, Enemy, and Friend: Portraits 
o f the Pharisees in Luke and Acts [Emory Studies in Early Christianity 2; New 
York: Peter Lang, 1991] 178) states, ‘The Pharisees serve as instruments of 
legitimation for Jesus and his followers both positively and negatively. In a 
positive sense they advocate toleration of Christianity, and some can even become 
Christians (Acts 5:33-39; 15:5; 23:6-10; 26:4-8). Yet more often they 
serve—because of their flawed nature—as a legitimation device via negativa' As 
Brawley {Luke-Acts and the Jews, 84) puts it, ‘This ambivalent picture of the 
Pharisees [in Luke-Acts] is enough to caution against oversimplification’.
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strategic re-construction of the first Galatian mission betrays a 
sensitivity not only to the events of that time, but also to their 
significance in subsequent controversy within the Church. The 
Jerusalem Council was only perhaps the first of many battles (of 
which we are aware) involving the issues surrounding Gentile 
inclusion in the Church. Even Paul’s latest letters suggest continuing 
controversy regarding ‘Judaizers’ troubling Christian converts (see, 
e.g., Philippians 3). Depending on the date one assigns to Acts, this 
special attention on Luke’s part may be assigned to a number of 
recognizable factors. If controversy continued in the early Church 
around these issues or ones related to them, it would follow that Luke, 
clearly a supporter of the Pauline mission, cast the events of the mid­
century in a perspective which supported the position of the later 
‘Paulinists’, presumably despite his desire to bring together the two 
factions.
The implications of this for the study of Paul are clear. In the first 
place, we must be extremely careful how we allow the portraits of 
Paul which Luke has drawn for us in Acts to colour the ways in which 
we view Paul himself, his letters, or the history about which Luke 
writes. If, as seems obvious, Luke writes as a supporter of Paul and/or 
the continuing Pauline mission, then it would seem reasonable, as the 
second stage of our interpretative interaction with Acts— bringing the 
results of our conversation with Acts into our conversation with the 
Pauline texts—to view his account with critical disinterest. This is not 
an encouragement of presuppositional suspicion, which apprehends 
only issues o f historicity or non-historicity. Rather, it is the 
interrogation of presuppositional polemic which regards any account 
of any event as open to question, and which listens carefully to see if 
Acts is indeed answering our questions (and listening even more 
carefully when it does). A second major implication of this awareness 
is that, when approaching Paul’s letters, we must be careful not to 
read into them the pictures with which Luke presents us— where Luke 
gives us a one-sided picture, as with the chapters examined above, we 
must strive to recognize the possibility that Paul left us a slightly 
different picture, even if  still broadly in line with what we find in 
Luke. Where neither presents us with a picture of some aspect of 
Paul’s life or activities, we should be careful first of all to recognize 
this, but second, even more careful in the ways in which we undertake 
to reconstruct such gaps. To reconstruct the history and personalities 
of earliest Christianity, in so far as this is at all possible, we must
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delve into the kind of mirror-reading with which we are familiar in the 
study of the Pauline epistles, but in this case with regard to the hall of 
mirrors in the narrative of Acts. We need to ask ourselves not just 
'What is Luke trying to say?’, but also, and perhaps more importantly, 
'Why is he trying to say it?’.
CONCLUSION
To use Acts as a source for Paul’s life is not intrinsically a problem 
if  one recognizes that it contains a representation of Paul’s life, and if 
one overtly positions Acts as not simply an objective chronicle. This 
holds some serious implications for Pauline studies. In the first place, 
our ‘lives of Paul’ may have to be somewhat less confidently drawn 
than before, and Pauline scholars may in fact have to be content, and 
even eager, to entertain different approaches to the reconstruction of 
Paul’s life which do not necessarily follow the same chains of  
evidence that have operated in the past. It is vital to articulate the 
notion that evidence regarding Paul and the early Church has no final 
decision-procedure on the identity of the incomplete range of absent 
data.
So how can Acts be used in the reconstruction of Paul’s life? At the 
risk of hubris on my part in attempting to answer this question, I 
believe the answer to this question must be a function of careful 
uncertainty. The uncritical use o f Acts to make both positive and 
negative statements about Paul’s career seems to be counter­
intuitive.127 If we primarily use Acts to reconstruct Paul’s life, this 
would seem to violate the common sense which would place Paul’s 
(first-hand) letters at the centre of any such attempt. As the section on 
the foundation o f the Colossian church in this chapter shows, 
however, Acts continues to be used not simply to make positive 
statements regarding Paul’s career (e.g. ‘Paul spent two years in 
Ephesus’, or ‘Paul had Syrian Antioch as his base for most of his 
ministry’), but also to make negative statements (e.g. ‘Paul never went
127 On counter-intuition, see T. Williamson, Vagueness (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1996) 10-35, C. Lewy, Meaning and Modality (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1976); A. Gibson, Counter-Intuition (London and 
New York: Routledge, forthcoming 2001); and idem, God and the Universe 
(London and New York: Routledge, 2000) chs. 2-7. Gibson’s account of counter­
intuition may be summarized as follows: A mental, epistemological, logical state 
which is at variance with, albeit compatible with, a standardized description of a 
state of affairs.
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to Colossae’, or ‘Paul never founded a church not mentioned in 
Acts’). Even if one is willing to admit the force of the evidence 
adduced by interpretation of Acts to make positive statements 
regarding Paul’s life, the latter category presents extreme difficulty to 
the formation of discrete conclusions from a historical point-of-view. 
In fact, in some cases, evidence and silences in Acts are preferred by 
some scholars over evidence from the Pauline letters themselves. The 
result here is lives of Paul that are largely based on the Acts accounts, 
with the letters inserted where appropriate,128 while our theologies of 
Paul remain based solely on his letters.129 There are other issues 
which might be profitably examined in this regard (e.g. the place of 
the Pastorals in the Pauline corpus and the chronology of Paul’s life 
derived from Acts; the origin of the concept of Paul’s missionary 
activity as ‘missionary journeys’); but hopefully, the two examples 
chosen here have demonstrated that, despite continuing work on both 
Acts and Paul, the tenuous relationship between these two remains in 
need of on-going clarification and elucidation. At the very least, it 
seems incumbent on those who would wish to write on Paul that they 
carefully (and explicitly) examine presuppositional dependence on, or 
suppressed premises behind their assumptions about, Acts.
128 Cf. discussion on this trend above, this chapter, n. 15.
129 Because this is so notable a trend in the writing of Pauline theologies, it 
hardly seems fair to single out any specific one for criticism; yet the recent 
publication of J.D.G. Dunn, The Theology o f Paul the Apostle (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1998) stands as simply one of a long line of ‘theologies’ of Paul which 
epitomize this trend. Dunn includes no explicit statement on the role of Acts in his 
reconstruction of Paul’s theology.
CHAPTER 4
SATIRE AND PERFORMANCE IN ROMANS
Socrates: Whew, Protarchus! Then we have a long discussion before
us, and not an easy one, either, this time. For in going 
ahead to fight mind’s battle for the second place, I think I 
need a new contrivance—other weapons, as it were, than 
those of our previous discussion, though perhaps some of 
the old ones will serve. Must I then go on?
Protarchus: Of course you must.
Socrates: Then let us try to be careful in making our beginning.
(Plato, Philebus 23B-C, LCL)
MAKING OUR BEGINNING
The study of Romans hardly seems an area of Paul to approach in 
just a single chapter of a thesis; yet, this too is an area where an 
application of Gadamer’s ideas concerning hermeneutics can be 
shown to be fruitful. From the standpoint of Gadamerian 
hermeneutics, two instances where Paul’s interaction with the 
Egyptian religious tradition (and the Roman response to that tradition) 
plays a role in his dialogue with the Roman church are of special 
interest, for it is in the letter to the Roman church, to a degree 
unmatched in any of his other extant letters, that Paul utilizes the 
rhetorical technique of diatribe. Diatribe, as the construction of a 
pseudo-dialogue in which an author tests his ideas and objections to 
those ideas in a setting which closely mimics that of actual 
conversation, is perhaps the closest we come to an actual Pauline 
dialogue. From this standpoint, it is worth contrasting the approach 
taken by Paul in Romans with his ‘missionary’ speeches in Acts. For, 
as discussed above (p. 132), Paul’s letters, apart from Romans, are all 
far removed from his initial address to a new group, whereas the 
missionary speeches in Acts present themselves as beginnings of 
dialectical relationships between Paul and new groups of believers 
and potential believers.1 Romans stands apart from both of these
1 The difficulties involved in determining the Pauline character of these 
speeches, or, even if we do think they are authentically Pauline, of understanding 
the relationship between their recorded content in comparison with what were 
likely much longer speeches (cf. Porter, The Paul o f Acts, chs. 5-7), probably
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extremes, in that it is both an initial address, and in the letter form. 
Gadamer’s comment on the letter as a ‘derivative form ...’ or 
conversation ‘in which the relation between question and answer is 
obscured’2 is relevant here. The use of diatribe in this letter might be 
an attempt to overcome what Gadamer in the same context calls the 
‘special nature’ of letter-writing ‘as a particular form of writing’, and 
hence a vital link in helping to reconstruct the character of Pauline 
dialogue, lost to us in all other circumstances because of its transitory 
nature.3
One obvious difference, though, is the identity of the audience of 
the letter to the Romans— they are already Christians.4 But they are 
Christians to whom Paul is communicating the form of his gospel for 
the first time, or at least for the first time directly. It is not surprising, 
then, that the form of the argument in Romans concerning the role of
makes such a comparison impossible. However, it may be worth noting that, on 
different occasions, the author of Acts utilizes SiaXcyopai to describe Paul’s 
interaction with various different groups (Acts 17:2, 17; 18:4, 19; 19:8, 9; 20:7, 
9; 24:12, 25). Although typically translated ‘argue’ when in a disputatious setting, 
and ‘speak’ or ‘talk to/with’ when in a non-hostile setting (e.g. Acts 20:7, 9), it 
may be that we should try to understand this verb in the light of Paul’s dialectical 
relationship with the groups and individuals with whom he is interacting. 
Certainly, this gives some confirmation that Paul was indeed involved in 
dialectical interchange with his audiences, at least from Luke’s perspective.
2 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 369. Cf. longer quotation of this material 
above, p. 131.
3 Bultmann’s early work (Der Stil der paulinischen Predigt und die kynisch- 
stoische Diatribe (FRLANT 13; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1910) on 
this topic noticed precisely this factor in the use of diatribe in Paul, and can be 
supplemented by T. Schmeller, Paulus und die “Diatribe”: Eine vergleichende 
Stilinterpretation (Münster: Aschendorf, 1987); S.K. Stowers, The Diatribe and 
Paul's Letter to the Romans (SBLDS 57; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1981); and 
A.J. Malherbe, ‘Me Genoito in the Diatribe and Paul’, in his Paul and the Popular 
Philosophers (Minneapolis: Fortres Press, 1989), ch. 2. From a rhetorical point of 
view, S.E. Porter, ‘Paul of Tarsus and his Letters’, in S.E. Porter (ed.), Handbook 
o f Classical Rhetoric in the Hellenistic Period 330 B.C.-A.D. 400 (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1997) 575-76, is useful. Cf. discussion below, p. 199 of diatribe in 
connection with the philosophy of the self.
4 As, indeed, is the audience in Troas in Acts 20, with whom Luke records 
Paul dialoguing. While it is often imagined that Paul was preaching or teaching 
throughout the night, it is more likely that we should take this extended period of 
time not as a marathon speech-making session by Paul, but rather, as the verb 
indicates, a dialogue. Paul may be directing it, but this is a community effort.
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the law in the Christian life, and the status of individuals before God 
(whether law-following or not), should follow much the same outline 
as the similar arguments in Galatians. In both situations, it is the 
identity and status of Paul's gospel that is at stake, primarily within an 
intra-Christian setting, as opposed to a ‘missionary’ setting. The 
recognition that Galatians and Romans address similar topics in a 
similar manner is by no means a new observation. It is a significant 
point, though, from the standpoint of Pauline dialogue. For, although 
the issues are somewhat similar— and so too is the intra-Christian 
setting— the argument in Romans both begins and proceeds in a 
different manner. It is these differences which may help us understand 
more clearly the identity of Pauline dialogue.
In this case, I am not so much interested in comparing what Paul 
states in the two letters (although I will note some of these cases 
below), but rather how Paul expresses it. This comparison could form 
the basis o f a study in itself, but here I will limit m yself to the 
following observation. In Galatians, Paul is able to very quickly 
approach the heart of the subject matter in question. Before he has 
finished the address of that letter (Gal. 1:1-5), he has already asserted 
his independence from human agency with regard to the gospel, and 
the significance of the cross and the resurrection. Immediately upon 
beginning the body of the letter (Gal. 1:6-9), his expression of  
astonishment sets the tone for how he will approach the primary issue: 
the role of the law in the Christian life, and the revelatory nature of 
the gospel which Paul himself had preached to them. In Romans, there 
has been debate regarding how Paul starts his letter— the whole 
section of Rom. 1:18-2:29 has again recently been assessed to be a 
non-Pauline interpolation by William Walker. Walker’s primary 
reason for this assessment is that this section does not f i t  into the 
argument o f Romans as Walker understands it.5 It seems that such a 
view expects Paul’s argument in Romans to be simply an extended
5 W.O. Walker, Jr., ‘Romans 1.18-2.29: A Non-Pauline Interpolation?’, 
NTS 45 (1999) 533-52. Walker’s extreme case, while not likely to be followed by 
many, has helped to underscore the uncomfortability many scholars have with this 
section of Romans. While few would go so far as to suggest such a large-scale 
interpolation, Walker has indeed garnered implicit support from other scholars, as 
I will show below. Walker is, of course, following in the footsteps of J.C. O’Neill, 
whose commentary on Romans reduces the genuine Pauline material to a much 
reduced pastiche of various Pauline letters, and several interpolations {Paul’s 
Letter to the Romans [Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1975]).
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form of his argument in Galatians, because it is about the ‘same 
thing’. This ignores the difficulty Paul faces in establishing 
communication with a hitherto unknown group of Christians, and it 
does not consider the necessity of Paul’s attempt to textually encode a 
shaping and moulding of his audience in such a way so as to ensure 
their receptivity to his main arguments. It is precisely this situation 
that an understanding of the role of dialogue in Pauline thought and 
communication can illuminate.
The two examples discussed in this chapter demonstrate that, 
parallel to the way in which we saw that Acts functions as a partner in 
the dialogue concerning Pauline texts, so too are other traditions 
involved in dialectical relation to Paul and his audiences. On a more 
superficial level, it is hoped that the recovery of this lost voice in the 
Pauline dialogue will help to re-open interpretative questions, and 
hence help us to re-examine fore-understandings of various passages. 
This, as I mentioned in the introduction to this thesis, is one part of 
my goal: to question firmly-held assumptions which often resist the 
search for certain types of evidence.6
On a deeper level, this chapter aims to sketch part of a contour map 
of Paul’s interaction with tradition. New Testament scholars are very 
familiar with attempts to demonstrate the use of Jewish tradition in 
Paul,7 or, to a more limited extent, to try and outline the relationships
6 In this perspective, an ‘assumption’ is a positioned, expressed, or 
presupposed notion which is adopted or accepted as a conclusion or premise 
without evidence and proof relative to a basis which is itself demonstrated. This 
partly reflects T.J. Smiley’s view of inference, as mentioned earlier (cf. above, p. 
10 n. 28).
7 E.g. E.J. Christiansen, The Covenant in Judaism and Paul: A Study o f 
Ritual Boundaries as Identity Markers (AGJU 27; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995); W.D. 
Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline 
Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 4th edn, 1980); H. Raisanen, Paul and the 
Law (WUNT 29; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 2nd edn, 1987); idem, Jesus, Paul 
and Torah (trans. D.E. Orton; JSNTSup 43; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 
1992); E.P. Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1983); idem, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison o f Patterns o f  
Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977); H.J. Schoeps, Paul: The Theology 
o f the Apostle in the Light o f Jewish Religious History (trans. H. Knight; 
Philadelphia: Westminster, 1961); J.M. Scott, Adoption as Sons o f  God: An 
Exegetical Investigation into the Background o f YIO&EZIA in the Pauline 
Corpus (WUNT 2.48; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1992); A.F. Segal, Paul the 
Convert: The Apostolate and Apostasy o f Saul the Pharisee (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1990); F. Thielman, Paul and the Law: A
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between Paul and others among the earliest Church in terms of 
theology and tradition about Jesus.8 Yet, it is rare to see discussion of 
the interaction of Paul with any other traditions current in his world. I 
do not think that, by demonstrating the presence of material which 
reflects Egyptian religion, I will have finished that task. Such an 
assumption was the critical flaw in the old history-of-religions school, 
which was severely hindered by its lack of a hermeneutical framework 
to elucidate the meaning or import of so-called ‘parallels’.
The discussion of ‘parallels’ is of great importance in the study of 
any ancient text, including those of the New Testament. However, 
rarely is the concept of what it is to be a ‘parallel’ examined in detail. 
Gibson’s philosophical perspective on the assessment of ‘parallels’ 
between archaeological finds and Old Testament passages provides an 
angle of approach to this issue that may provide fresh insight. His 
discussion of the role of ‘parallel’ in Old Testament studies is 
inversely true for many of the ‘parallels’ examined in the current 
chapter:
The term and notion of ‘parallel’ are multifarious in Old Testament 
studies. ‘Parallel’ partially has a conservative provenance... Conversely, 
just because some earlier employment of the term was associated with 
polemical forcing of alleged matches between biblical text and alien 
tablet, it should not catapult scholars away from the tenability and 
complex rationale of what it is to be a parallel. The heart of the matter of 
parallel is often taken to be either self-evident or resolved; the issues are 
less obvious and more complex than such responses allow, however. The 
concepts which can be associated with ‘parallel’ are often counter­
intuitive and deconstructive, while also possibly realistically 
empirical...[;] we too readily engage in covert negative ideological 
reading according to which we tend not to recognize the complex internal 
evidential force of some parallels because of the understandable aversion
Contextual Approach (Downers Grove, IL; InterVarsity, 1994); P.J. Tomson, 
Paul and the Jewish Law: Halakha in the Letters o f the Apostle to the Gentiles 
(CRINT 3; JTECL 1; Assen: Van Gorcum; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1990); B. 
Witherington, III, Paul's Narrative Thought World: The Tapestry o f Tragedy and 
Triumph (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox, 1994).
8 Reasonably traditional attempts to do this include S. Kim, The Origin o f 
Paul's Gospel (WUNT 2.4; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1981; Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans, 1982); or Hengel and Schwemmer, Paul between Damascus and 
Antioch’, but Goulder’s attempts to revive the perspective of Baur in outlining the 
relationships among the early Christian churches and their leaders addresses the 
same subject matter, if from a different point-of-view (e.g., esp., A Tale o f Two 
Missions’, ‘A Pauline in a Jacobite Church’; ‘John 1.1-2.12 and the Synoptics’).
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to their misuse in some conservative theology... Obviously, in many areas 
we will not find any [parallels]; this should not be a product of a 
reductionist ideology, however.9
While Gibson’s attempt to re-vitalize the notion of ‘parallel’ must 
contend with antagonism toward conservative enthusiasm for 
‘finding’ ‘parallels’ to Old Testament passages, in the study of Paul, 
the opposite prejudice is operative. For New Testament scholars, it is 
largely a reactionary response against the nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century approach to ‘religions-history’ which precludes 
much modern discussion of ‘parallels’. As with Gibson, my 
motivation to revive the concept of parallel is not garnered from a 
theological presuppositional basis, but rather a desire to pursue 
tenable possibilities in what it is to be a parallel between Paul and his 
world. I seek to use Gadamer’s model of conversation and dialectic 
both to sketch the outlines of the involvement of Egyptian religious 
ideas and traditions in Romans, and to help elucidate some of the 
focal points of the significance of that involvement. I will also draw 
on the work of those social-scientists who have extended the 
economic theory of rational choice to the study of religion, and 
suggest that a possible way to explain Paul’s use of Egyptian tradition 
in both negative and apparently positive ways in the same letter has to 
do with ‘brand’ identity and creativity.
Of any figure whose writings have come down to us from the 
Greco-Roman world, Paul is perhaps uniquely positioned as a member 
of (at least) three different cultures: Jewish, Roman, and Greek. To 
those, we could add that he was a primary architect of a new sub­
culture with relations to all of these: Christianity. Or perhaps we 
should say that Paul was the founder of a division within this new 
sub-culture, which both preceded his influence and extended beyond 
it, and which division was involved in dialectical relationships not 
only with traditions outside this new sub-culture, but also within the 
sub-culture of Christianity.10 In the investigation o f Paul’s 
Christianity, then, it is incumbent upon its researchers to examine the 
entire dialectical and hermeneutical web of which Paul was a part.
9 Gibson, Text and Tablet, 48.
10 Although I am not practising sociology here, nor undertaking a social- 
scientific reading of Romans, this kind of thinking about religion does reflect the 
kinds of analysis being undertaken in recent Rational Choice Theory approaches 
to religion. Cf. the essays in L.A. Young (ed.), Rational Choice Theory and 
Religion: Summary and Assessment (London: Routledge, 1997).
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This is a large project. Here, I limit myself to only one neglected 
voice in this network of dialectical relationships, and concurrent and 
inter-related conversations: the voice of the Egyptian cults that had 
been spread throughout the Mediterranean world by the first century, 
and would be continually influential in the Roman Empire well into 
Late Antiquity.
The first of the two examples in this chapter, concerning the 
relation between Rom. 1:23 and Roman anti-Egyptian rhetoric, seeks 
to show how Paul makes use of a satirical mode in Roman thought to 
construct a phantom dialogue partner in his (new) dialectical 
relationship with the Roman church. The presence of this phantom 
dialogue partner in his dialogue draws Paul’s audience into his 
rhetorical structure in a very effective manner. In contrast to this, the 
second study, concerning the relationship between Paul’s words about 
baptism in Rom. 6:1-11 and the baptismal practices of the Isis and 
Sarapis cult, re-opens a question with a long history of interpretation. 
The thrust of my argument in this part of the chapter is to show how 
Paul, as performer, takes a belief about baptism and, by including it in 
the description of Christian baptism, textually performs this ritual in a 
new and vitally changed manner. Here the Egyptian voice, present at 
the initial representation by Paul, is silenced in the performance of a 
religious ‘text’ which, in effect, creates an entirely new ‘text’ for 
baptism. Utilizing the language of economic Rational Choice Theory, 
we could also say that Paul is borrowing elements from the Egyptian 
cultic ‘brand identity’, and so re-working them as to creatively 
produce an entirely new ‘brand’. By addressing the role of creativity 
in earliest Christianity, this Gadamerian analysis of Paul’s orientation 
and appropriation of tradition helps to rehabilitate the idea of 
‘influence’ (difficult concepts both for our reconstructions of earliest 
Christianity, and for Gadamerian philosophy, which contains no 
explicit examination of either influence or creativity).
It is hoped that these two threads, of satire and performance, will 
help to show the manner in which Paul, as both tradent and innovator, 
relates dialectically to his new Roman dialogue partners. By doing so, 
it is also hoped that I will have contributed to the on-going discussion 
of the network of cultural, religious and other dialectics which formed
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the creative nexus in which Christianity had its inception as a religion 
in the Greco-Roman world.11
ROMANS 1:23 AND PAUL’S ARGUMENT IN ROMANS 1-3: A 
DIALECTICAL SATIRE
The Anti-Idolatry Statement in Romans 1:23
Ever since the creation of the world his invisible nature, namely, his 
eternal power and deity, has been clearly perceived in the things that have 
been made. So they are without excuse; for although they knew God they 
did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in 
their thinking and their senseless minds were darkened. Claiming to be 
wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for 
images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles (Rom. 1:20- 
23, RSV).
There are two usual solutions to Paul’s meaning in Rom. 1:23; but 
these two are really only alternative versions of the same solution: 
Paul is reflecting traditional Jewish invective against pagan idolatry. It 
is typically suggested either that the argumentative framework here is 
simply anti-pagan (citing such passages as Isaiah 44-46; Jeremiah 10; 
Epistle o f  Jeremiah; W is. 11:15-16; 12:24, 27; 13:10-14; 14:8; 
15:18-16:1; Let.Arist. 138; 1 En. 91:4; 99:6-10; Sib.Or. 3:6-35; 
T.Mos. 1:13; 2 Bar. 54:17-22; and Philo, Decal. 76-8012); or that the 
condemnation of Israel is in picture. These approaches have masked 
the true identity of Paul’s dialogue with the Roman church, and 
ignored vital evidence for the reconstruction of the religious milieu in 
which the earliest Church existed. Anyone versed in the cultic 
imagery of the Roman world will note that the idolatrous images 
listed in this passage exist together only in one group of cults in the 
Roman world: those originating in Egypt, and typically centred 
around the worship of the chief god and goddess, Sarapis and Isis.
11 It would be useful to extend the results of this analysis hermeneutically to 
map the relationship between Paul and the Jewish tradition, but this will have to 
await another context.
12 E.g. C.E.B. Cranfield, Romans (2 vols.; ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 
1975, 1979) 1.120; H. Boers, The Justification o f the Gentiles: Paul’s Letters to 
the Galatians and Romans (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994) 147; A.T. Lincoln, 
‘From Wrath to Justification: Tradition, Gospel, and Audience in the Theology of 
Romans 1:18-4:25’, in D.M. Hay and E.E. Johnson (eds.), Pauline Theology. ITT 
Romans (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995) 138.
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Nevertheless, this is not a typical position in the scholarship of this 
passage.
Part of the reason for this may be the influence of especially the 
latter of the two approaches mentioned above. The most important 
texts for this approach are Genesis 1 and l x x  Ps. 105:20. The Genesis 
1 reference follows HyldahVs identification of the animals in Rom. 
1:23 with animals mentioned in the Genesis 1 creation account,13 and 
Hyldahl sees the creation of man in Gen. 1:26, 27 as the reason for the 
inclusion of the (pOaprov ayGpcorrou (phthartou anthropou, ‘mortal 
manYTransitory human’) in the list o f images of Rom. 1:23. 
Ironically, given my arguments about an Egyptian cultic identity of 
the idols mentioned in Romans 1, Hyldahl14 is certain that rà  èpTrerà 
(ta herpeta , ‘reptiles’) would have indicated, for Paul, 
‘crocodiles’— one of the animals which, as is shown below, non­
adherents to the Egyptian cults found the most confusing as an object 
of worship.15
Hyldahl offers his argument in contradistinction to the usual 
identification of LXX Ps. 105:20 as the background for this verse.16
13 N. Hyldahl, ‘A Reminiscence of the Old Testament at Romans i.23\ NTS 
2 (1955-56) 285-88; followed by J. Jervell, Imago dei: Gen l:2 6 f in 
Spatjudentum, in der Gnosis und in der paulinischen Briefen (Gottingen: 
Vandenhoeck &  Ruprecht, 1960) 319-22: m i  e I t t e v  6 ô e ô ç  è ^ a y a y É T w  t c l  
hSara êpTrerà ^uxwv Ctoow m l  nereivà  h e t o j ie v g i  èm  Tfjs* yfjs* K a r a  
t o  OTEpÉwpa t o u  oùpavoû m i  éyévETO outw s*  m l  e t t o l t |( t e v  6 Geos* t o  
k t\t t ) t c l  (lEydXa m l  Trdaav l |;u x 0 v  Cwcûv epTrercov d  è£f|yayEv t o  u S o t q  
KCLTO. yÉVTl aÙTWV m l  Trctv TTeTeLUOU TTTEpWTÔy k c ltq  yÉpog* m l  e I ô e p  6
Geos* o t i  m X à  Kal pùXoynoEP aÙTà 6 Geôs* Xéyœv aù^dvEoGE m l  
ttXtiGlivectGe m l  rrXripwociTE Ta ü8aTa èv tols* GaXdooais* Kal t o  TTETEivd 
TrXr|6wécr6(ji)(jav Èm  Tfjs* yfjs* m l  éyévETO èorrÈpa Kal ÈyévETo rrpwl 
fipÈpa TrÈp.TTTr| m l  eIttep 6 Geôs* È^ayayÈTCo f) yfj ijmxh^ C&aap K arà  
yévos* r e T p d n o d a  m l  ÉpTTETà m l  Grjpia Tfjs* yfjs* m T à  yépos* m l  
ÉyévETO oÜTws* ( lx x  Gen. 1:20-24).
14 Hyldahl, ‘A Reminiscence of the Old Testament’, 287 n. 1.
15 Hyldahl, ‘A Reminiscence of the Old Testament’, 286-87. Hyldahl makes 
an intricate argument showing how the kpuera Paul probably presupposed from 
Genesis 1 were not those of the water from v. 20, but rather those on the land, 
from v. 24. Otherwise, his order is put out of kilter, and the neat parallelism with 
Genesis 1 is no longer maintained, and so, because of this forcing of the evidence, 
Hyldahl misses any possible connection to Egyptian zoomorphic idols (Egyptian 
crocodiles were not land animals).
16 E.g. C.H. Dodd, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (MNTC; 
London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1957) 38; D.J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans
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HyldahVs solution is followed by Hooker,17 who suggests that, 
though it is the Genesis 1 creation account which is being followed, it 
is actually the figure of Adam which comes to the fore, and that it is 
Adam's sin that is being condemned by Paul, thus seeing the Adam 
typology from later in Romans reflected even here in ch. 1. 
Unfortunately, Hooker’s parallels between Adam and the ‘men’ from 
Romans 1 are tenuous, at best. In her first article on the topic,18 she 
attempts to show how Adam could have been evaluated with the same 
motif as Paul uses on the ‘men’ in Romans 1; but it is unclear what 
exactly counts as evidence and proof in her argument. Rather than 
staying with the idea that ‘It would appear that Paul, in describing the 
idolatry into which man has fallen, has deliberately chosen the 
terminology of the Creation story’19 (following Hyldahl), she moves 
into thematic sorts of parallels that make the evidence she adduces 
from Genesis 1-3 unstable, because of the difficulty encountered in 
trying to assess thematic ‘parallels’. She herself seems to concede this 
point: ‘It may perhaps be objected that there is nothing in the narrative 
in Genesis to suggest that Adam ever offered worship to idols. He can, 
however,...be justly accused of serving the creation rather than the 
Creator...’.20 It is difficult to see how this case could be made in a 
conclusive manner, since ‘serving creation’ is not necessarily idolatry. 
There has subsequently been much work on this passage which is 
either derivative of Hyldahl and Hooker,21 or, alternatively, argues for
(NICNT; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996) 108-10, who follows this route, in 
addition to seeing an allusion to 1er. 2:11, but then suggests (p. 310) that ‘Paul is 
not describing either the fall of Israel or the fall of humankind in Adam. Rather, in 
a somewhat idealized, pragmatized fashion, he describes the terrible proclivity of 
all people to corrupt the knowledge of God they possess by making gods of their 
own’. Cf. S.K. Stowers, A Rereading o f Romans: Justice, Jews, and Gentiles 
(New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994) 91-93, who disputes the 
l x x  Ps. 105:20 allusion, in preference to the Wisdom references discussed below, 
but who, like Hyldahl, makes no mention of the specifically anti-Egyptian 
character of the material in Wisdom.
17 M.D. Hooker, ‘Adam in Romans i’, NTS 6 (1959-60) 297-306; idem, ‘A 
Further Note on Romans F, NTS 13 (1966-67) 181-83.
18 Hooker, ‘Adam in Romans i ’, 300-301.
19 Hooker, ‘Adam in Romans i’, 300.
20 Hooker, ‘Adam in Romans i’, 301.
21 E.g. P.P. Bruce, Romans (TNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Leicester: 
England, rev. edn, 1985) 80; A.J.M. Wedderburn, ‘Adam in Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans’, in E.A. Livingstone (ed.), Studia Biblica 1978 III. Papers on Paul and
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the anti-Israel interpretation based on l x x  Ps. 105:20, against which 
Hyldahl originally argued.22
As mentioned, however, there is an alternative solution to the 
‘background’ of this verse, namely, that the ‘mortal man or birds or 
animals or reptiles’ about which Paul speaks are specifically Egyptian 
gods, or that in some way the narrative participates in a semantic field 
which has internalized multilingual or multicultural cultic motifs from 
Egyptian religious culture. As is shown below, this position is by far 
the minority view, and it tends, when discussed at all, to be suggested 
only tentatively. Those who do suggest this as a possibility often see it 
as simply a more specific spin on the ‘Jew vs. Pagan’ solution. I 
propose, however, that, on the one hand, the position advocated by 
these few is an empirically more viable interpretation of the data than 
the other hypotheses discussed above, regarding idolatry and 
idolatrous worship in the Greco-Roman world, and the setting of the 
letter to the Romans within the Roman world itself. On the other hand, 
it is the apparent inclusion of an alien voice in his dialogue with the 
Roman Christians which provides the appropriate direction for Paul to 
direct his condemnatory attack on sinfulness. Throughout the 
narrative’s counterpointed interplay, Paul is drawing his unwitting 
audience into the heart of the dialogue he is initiating in his letter. To 
state it in Gadamer’s terms, he is fulfilling the ‘first condition of the 
art of conversation’—he ‘is ensuring that the other person is with’ 
him.23 Paul is stating a premise for discussion in such a way that his 
audience is convinced of its identity as a thesis. Yet, as Gadamer 
shows,24 the apparent thetic nature of the beginning of a dialogue 
contains within itself the suppressed premise of a question.
I am not arguing that Paul is specifically interested in condemning 
the Egyptian gods and goddesses more so than any other idols.25 In
Other New Testament Authors (JSNTSup 3; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1980) 413-30; 
idem. The Reasons for Romans (SNTW; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1988) 119-20, 
who is also largely dependent on Jervell; and J.D.G. Dunn, Romans 1-8  (WBC, 
38a; Dallas: Word Books, 1988) 60-61, who somehow manages to follow both 
Hooker and the Ps. 105:20 route.
22 As above, n. 16.
23 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 367. Cf. discussion of this passage above, p. 
36. Cf. also Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 43.
24 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 472.
25 A case could be made, in the light of my proceeding analysis of this verse 
and its context, that Paul’s use of language similar to l x x  Ps. 105:20 is an 
ironizing ploy—counting on his Jewish audience’s desire to not identify with such
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fact, I am not arguing that idolatry is the specific focus of his attack 
here at all, but rather that, at the beginning of his dialogue with his 
new Roman audience, he must use whatever shared ground exists 
between himself and his Jewish and Gentile audience. Denied the 
typical face-to-face meeting with his audience to which we imagine 
Paul was accustomed, he must still establish his relation to the Roman 
church in keeping with his gospel. To do this, he must ‘make a 
beginning’.
Rom. 1:23 as Participation in Anti-Egyptian Religious Discourse 
In 1971, R.E. Witt, a specialist in the Isis cult (though not on the 
New Testament), wrote with regard to Rom. 1:23:
In the Pauline Epistle to the Romans [1:23,] a condemnation of pagans in 
general for their alleged folly, impiety and unrighteousness contains the 
remark couched in similar terms that they ‘have changed the glory of 
immortal God by copying him in the image of mortal man and birds, 
quadrupeds, and reptiles. We need only recall to mind the hawk of Horus 
and ibis of Thoth, the jackal of Anubis, his dog and the cat of Bast, or the 
cobra of Edjo and crocodile of Sobek, all notorious as sacred animals in 
the land of the Nile, to infer that the main target of attack at this point in 
the Epistle is Egyptian religion.26
This is not a position generally held by New Testament scholars. In 
fact, this idea first occurred to me independently while preparing to 
give a lecture on Romans after recently visiting the Egyptian Statuary 
Hall at the British Museum. I subsequently found support from Witt, 
and brief mention in several New Testament sources, but soon 
discovered that there are few even among those who do mention 
Egyptian zooalatry who would admit the specifically Egyptian nature 
of Paul’s list here (I survey these below). Exceptionally, almost 
concurrent with Witt’s statement (but with no obvious knowledge of 
it), in 1973 E. Kasemann wrote:
castigation as expressed in that Psalm—to motivate the Jewish portion of his 
audience to search for alternative identifications for those who have ‘exchanged 
the glory of the immortal God.
26 R E. Witt, Isis in the Ancient World (Baltimore and London: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1997 [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1971]) 
255.
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Obviously expressed here, in traditional Jewish polemic..., is abhorrence 
of Gentile idolatry. The list in v. 23b is directed specifically against 
Egyptian religion.. .27
Kasemann was followed in 1995 by A.J. Guerra, who, without much 
comment, suggests that Rom. 1:23 (and similar material in several 
second-century Greek apologists) is a ‘critique of Egyptian religion, 
which had successfully infiltrated the Greco-Roman world’ .28 Guerra 
further suggests that Paul seems
to have elided together a critique of idols elKovôç (fjOaprov àvôpcoTrou 
(the image of mortal human beings) with the traditional critique of animal 
worship. In any case, Paul introduces this with language very close to 
Psalm 105.20..., but the provenance of Psalm 105.19f, which is restricted 
to criticism of the golden calf, is too narrow for Paul’s purposes. We have 
here a dramatic instance of how Paul joins together Old Testament and 
Hellenistic traditions in accord with his attention to wield the sword of 
criticism in all directions.29
This is not tenable in view of the following points. Earlier, R.M. 
Grant, in his Gods and the One God (a survey of religions in the 
Greco-Roman world with regard to the New Testament), deals 
specifically with the Roman anti-Egyptian rhetoric found in several
27 E. Kasemann, Commentary on Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980 
[1973]) 45. Kasemann here goes beyond his predecessor in the series, H. 
Lietzmann {An die Romer [HNT; Tübingen: Mohr (Siebeck), 4th edn, 1933] 32), 
who does not mention Egyptian religion, although Kasemann (p. 45) does follow 
Lietzmann in his suggestion that ‘hier war Ps 105.20 das Vorbild’.
28 A.J. Guerra, Romans and the Apologetic Tradition: The Purpose, Genre 
and Audience o f Paul’s Letter (SNTSMS 81; Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1995) 53. Guerra’s syntax here suggests that it is the Egyptian religion, and 
not the critique thereof, that he sees as having infiltrated the Greco-Roman world, 
although he would have been correct in both assertions, as I show below. Guerra 
lists three second-century apologists who seem to reflect the form of Paul’s 
invective in Rom. 1:23, two of whom specifically address Egyptian religion: 
Athenagoras 1:1-2 ol 8è alyunTioL Oeouç vopi£oucuv Kal alXoupous1 Kal 
kpokoÔelXouç Kal ORELS' Kal d o m ô a ç  Kal Kuvaç; Justin Martyr 1:24:1 dXXœv 
dXXaxoü CTEpopérw Kal ôévôpa Kal TTOTapous1 Kal |iûç Kal alXoupous* Kal 
KpoKoôeiXouç Kal tw v  dXôywv Cwœv rd  rroXXd; Theophilus 1:10 t l  poi 
Xoittov KaraXéyELv t o  irXqOog' wv oép ovra i (wwu alym m oL  épTTETÛy t e  
Kal KTr|vajv Kal o-qpiaiv Kal ttetelvùjv Kal ÈFuôpœv vtiktwv e t l  8e Kal 
TroSovLTTTpa Kal qxouç aiCTxwr|s\
29 Guerra, Romans and the Apologetic Tradition, 54.
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literary sources.30 He later suggests that Paul is following ‘Jewish 
precedents when attacking the human images of the Greek and 
Romans as well as the birds, animals, and reptiles conspicuously 
adored by the Egyptians’,31 but never examines the import of the 
evidence he adduces for Roman anti-Egyptian religious rhetoric 
earlier in the book. Similar is M.-J. Lagrange, who recognizes the 
anti-Egyptian character of Paul’s rhetoric, but then decides against 
this interpretation in favour of the traditional Jewish anti-idolatry 
solution:
The division appears very natural to speak of: anthropomorphism with the 
Greeks, worship of animals with the Egyptians. But Paul speaks of men 
and beasts. One can recall the Egyptian statues which have the bodies of 
humans, and the heads of animals, or the statues of the cow Hathor, of 
Apis, of cats, of hawks, of crocodiles. Paul could have also been 
condemning the idol-symbols of the dove of Aphrodite, the serpents of 
Asklepios, etc. But the most probable is that he judges the very real fact of 
idolatry less according to the changeable form of the representations in 
temples, and more according to the biblical phrases which haunted his 
memory. 32
30 R.M. Grant, Gods and the One God (LEG 1 ; Louisville: Westminster/John 
Knox Press, 1986) 34-35.
31 Grant, Gods and the One God, 47.
32 M.-J. Lagrange, Saint Paul: Épitre aux Romains (EtBib; Paris: Gabalda, 
repr. 1950 [4th edn, 1931; 1st edn 1913]) 27, translation mine. Lagrange goes on 
to quote Dt. 4:17 and Ps. 105:20. To these few may be added those who, while not 
suggesting that the rhetoric in Rom. 1:23 is aimed specifically at Egyptian 
religion, do at least mention Egyptian religion along with other factors, e.g., L. 
Morris, The Epistle to the Romans (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Leicester: 
InterVarsity Press, 1988) 87; J.A. Fitzmyer, Romans (AB 33; New York: 
Doubleday, 1993) 284; Jervell, Imago dei, 319-22, esp. 322 n. 501: ‘Another 
matter is that the mention of the worship of animals itself can only be subscribed 
to Egypt; for the Roman mind this would have only theoretical interest’[!]. B.J. 
Brooten, in her recent ‘Love between Women': Early Christian Responses to 
Female Homoeroticism (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1996) 
232, recognizes that ‘Throughout the Roman world religious people venerated 
statues and images of deities, but animals and animal heads particularly 
characterize Egyptian religious iconography’, but retreats from the import of this 
recognition in a footnote (n. 44): ‘Animals also play a role in Greek and Roman 
religion, of course...’. K.L. Gaca, ‘Paul’s Uncommon Declaration in Romans 
1:18-32 and Its Problematic Legacy for Pagan and Christian Relations’, HTR 92.2 
(1999) 165-98, similarly misconstrues the zoomorphic element of this verse, and
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The remainder of scholarship on Rom. 1:23 and environs falls, I 
believe, along less promising lines regarding this topic. As we have 
seen, many scholars seem to have focused entirely on what is seen as 
a Jewish background for this passage, and try to explain it with regard 
to various parallels from a variety of eras of Jewish literature,33 while 
some make no mention at all concerning the source of the idols 
mentioned here.34 The most important deficiency in scholarship on 
this passage is a lack of mention of the specifically Roman nature of 
the religious polemics which Paul uses here.
Rome and Things Egyptian 1: Xenophobia 
The existence in Rome itself of xenophobia is well attested. While 
Rome enjoyed its status as the centre of the known world, it seems 
relatively clear that the implications of this position were not always 
well-received by the Romans themselves. Rome was full of different 
people groups and all of their accompanying elements: ethnic dress, 
cultural practices, religions, food, work habits, languages, etc. One 
reads of Roman suspicion of especially religious practice on multiple 
occasions, the most obvious for the New Testament being the 
expulsion of all Jews from Rome under Claudius (Priscilla and 
Aquila, who left Italy and came to Corinth in Acts 18:2, were 
probably part of this expulsion).35 Roman xenophobia was not limited
appears unaware of the Egyptian cults (see esp. p. 173), which undermines the 
entire premise of Gaca’s argument about the thrust of Paul’s argument.
33 See above, p. 156.
34 E.g. J. Ziesler, Paul’s Letter to the Romans (TPINTC; Philadelphia: 
Trinity Press International; London: SCM Press, 1989) 78; F.J. Leenhardt, 
UÉpître de Saint Paul aux Romains (CNT 2.6; Genève: Labor et Fides, 3rd edn, 
1995) 39-40; W. Sanday and A.C. Headlam, A Critical and Exegetical 
Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans (ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1902) 
45; P. Stuhlmacher, Paul’s Letter to the Romans: A Commentary (trans. S.J. 
Hafemann; Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1994) 36.
35 For Roman anti-Semitism or -Judaism, see Cicero, Flacc. 28:66-67; 
Horace, Satires 1:4:142-43; 1:5:100; 1:9:67-72. For general discussion of Roman 
anti-Semitism, see I. Levinskaya, The Book o f Acts in Its First Century Setting. V. 
Diaspora Setting (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1996) 27-32; 
Krauss, The Jewish-Christian Controversy; and J.M.G. Barclay, Jews in the 
Mediterranean Diaspora from Alexander to Trajan (323 b c e -117  c e )  (Edinburgh: 
T. & T. Clark, 1996) 407-408. This broader topic is apparently of less intrinsic 
importance in recent discussion than it is in terms of its relationship to the 
missionary activity (or not) of Jews in this period. On one side of the debate (page 
references are to discussion of Roman evidence) are works such as L.H. Feldman,
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to the Jews, however. There are many examples o f alien cults 
receiving stringent criticism (e.g. Livy 39:15:3, regarding alien cults 
in general; and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. Rom. 2:19, regarding 
worship of the Phrygian mother, who was, in an expression of the 
Roman equivocation on these matters, later highly honoured by the 
Claudian Emperors),36 but the Egyptian cults seem to have received 
special attention.37 This was probably due to a variety of factors, 
some religious and cultural, others economic.
On an economic level, the dependence of the Romans on Egyptian 
grain was no inconsiderable factor38— it is unsurprising that Egypt’s 
rich harvest should have been the prize of so many conquerors. From
Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World: Attitudes and Interactions from Alexander 
to Justinian (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993) passim, but esp. chs. 
3-6; D. Georgi, The Opponents o f Paul in Second Corinthians (Philadelphia: 
Fortress Press, 1986 [1964]) 92-104, which argue for extensive Jewish missionary 
activity in the Greco-Roman world. The other side is represented by S. McKnight, 
A Light among the Gentiles: Jewish Missionary Activity in the Second Temple 
Period (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991) 30-77; and M. Goodman, ‘Jewish 
Proselytizing in the First Century’, in J. Lieu, J. North, and T. Rajak (eds.), The 
Jews among Pagans and Christians in the Roman Empire (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1992) 53-78, who does not, unfortunately, discuss much of the 
Roman evidence. Cf. the important corrective review of Feldman’s position by 
L.V. Rutgers, ‘Attitudes to Judaism in the Greco-Roman Period: Reflections on 
Feldman’s Jew and Gentile in the Ancient World’, in his The Hidden Heritage o f  
Diaspora Judaism (CBET 20; Leuven: Peeters, 1998) 199-234.
36 For discussion, see G. La Piana, ‘Foreign Groups in Ancient Rome during 
the First Centuries of the Empire’, HTR 20.4 (1927) 297-302.
37 For discussion, see La Piana, ‘Foreign Groups in Ancient Rome’, 282-320; 
A. Roullet, The Egyptian and Egyptianizing Monuments o f Imperial Rome (EPRO 
20; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1972) 1-12; and J.C. Walters, Ethnic Issues in Paul’s Letter 
to the Romans: Changing Self-Definitions in Earliest Christianity (Valley Forge, 
PA: Trinity Press International, 1993) 13-15.
38 As G. Rickman (The Corn Supply o f Ancient Rome [Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1980, repr. Oxford: Sandpiper Books, 1996] 101-19) points out, 
there were more grain producing areas than solely Egypt. Those included Italy 
itself, Sardinia, Spain, Africa (other than Egypt), Gaul, and the eastern provinces. 
However, the Egyptian grain supply was clearly the most important of all of these 
sources, and the possibility of fluctuation in the supply, as a result of a bad Nile 
flood (such as happened in, e.g., 99 c e ) ,  eventually motivated the Romans to 
equip an alternative grain fleet to ferry grain from its North African territories 
(see Rickman, Grain Supply, 119). On the revealing Roman response to the 99 c e  
famine, see Pliny, Panegyric 31 : ‘Let this be a lesson to Egypt; let her learn by 
experience that her business is not to allow us food but to pay a proper tribute’.
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the Sumerian Ur III period, and perhaps earlier, the wealth of the 
Egyptian people was clearly coveted by their neighbours, but the 
annexation of Egypt by Ptolemy in the days after Alexander’s death 
and the making of Egypt into the first imperial province under 
Augustus, reflect external interest in the importance of its harvests. 
The flooding of the Nile, and the rich soil it produced, were legendary 
throughout the known world; historians from Herodotus (book 2) 
onwards (see esp. Diodorus Siculus 1) record many fantastic things 
about the land itself, as well as the fabulous riches of its cities and 
inhabitants. Dependence on such a country rankled the Roman spirit. 
It could be for this reason that the administration of Roman Egypt 
took such a hard-line with regard to social control in the new imperial 
province, for example, restricting social mobility.39
From a religious and cultural perspective, however, Egyptian 
zooalatry seems to have been particularly repugnant to the Roman 
mind. When visiting Egypt, Augustus is recorded to have refused to 
visit the temple of Anubis, since the worship of a dog was completely 
beneath him (Dio Cassius, Roman History 51:16).40 Juvenal, in his 
Satires 15:1-8, 11-13, presents a particularly scathing attack, and 
mockery, of the Egyptian predilection for animal worship:
Who knows to what monstrous gods, my friend,
The mad inhabitants of Egypt bend?—
The snake-devouring ibis these inshrine,
Those think the crocodile alone divine;
Others, where Thebes’ vast ruins strew the ground,
And shattered Memnon yields a magic sound,
Set up a glittering brute of uncouth shape.
And bow before the image of an ape!
Thousands regard the hound with holy fear...
They spare the fleecy kind, and think it ill,
The blood of lambs, or of kids, to spill;
But, human flesh—O! that is lawful fare,
And you may eat it without scandal there (LCL).
39 See especially BGU 1210, the Privy Purse code for the administration of 
Roman Egypt, and discussion in N. Lewis, Life in Egypt under Roman Rule 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983) ch. 2: ‘Classes and Masses’. This 
curtailment of social mobility is similar in scope to that of the early Republic, 
when the Twelve Tables enshrined the principle of no intermarriage between 
patrician and plebian classes (cf. M. Cary, A History o f Rome down to the Reign 
o f Constantine [London: Macmillan, 2nd edn, 1954] 79).
40 See also Lewis, Life in Egypt, 90.
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In addition, in 6:489 and 526-41, Juvenal specifically connects the 
worship of Egyptian gods with illicit sexual license.41 There is also 
evidence that there was both official resistance to the importation to 
Rome of the Egyptian gods, and popular support for them. Tertullian 
reports that the people, after the Senate had torn down the Egyptian 
idols in the Capitol, resorted to the use of violence to set them up 
again.42 In 58 BCE, the consul Gabinus forbade any altars to be erected 
to the Egyptian gods; but the Senate was still forced, eight years later, 
to order the destruction of these altars and the shrines connected with 
them.43
Still, it seems that the Romans could also display a healthy respect 
for the dedication with which the Egyptians (and non-Egyptian 
initiates of the Egyptian religions) viewed their zoomorphic gods. 
Only eight years after the episode just related, the remaining members 
of the first Triumvirate, in need of public support after the death of 
Caesar, built the people of Rome a temple of Isis and Sarapis.44 In
41 He suggests that the temple of Isis serves as a place for illicit assignations 
to take place, and that part of Anubis’s purpose is to obtain pardons from Osiris 
for these (and other) sexual sins. See Grant, Gods and the One God, 35, for 
discussion.
42 Tertullian, ad Natt. 1:10; Apol. 6.
43 Valerius Maximus 1:3:4—and the destruction was accomplished only after 
the consul himself struck the first blow. For the Isis cult in Rome itself, see La 
Piana, ‘Foreign Groups in Rome’, 291-94, 303-10; and Roullet, Egyptian and 
Egyptianizing Monuments, 1-12; and, for the evidence of Egyptian trends in 
Roman architecture, both sacred and profane, see Roullet, Egyptian and 
Egyptianizing Monuments, passim.
44 Dio Cassius 47:15. After his conquest of Egypt, Octavian left off 
destroying Alexandria on account of Sarapis, but then, upon his return to Rome, 
destroyed all of that god’s shrines and altars within Rome itself, presumably 
including the temple built by the Triumvirs in 42 b c e . For discussion, see T.R. 
Glover, The Conflict o f Religions in the Early Roman Empire (London: Methuen, 
1909) 21-22. It is interesting to note the disagreement between scholars of Roman 
religious life concerning the success of foreign cults in Rome. J. Toutain {Les 
cultes paiëns dans Tempire romain [2 vols.; Paris: Leroux, 1907, 1920] 1.1, 2, 34) 
thinks, on the basis of epigraphy, that the foreign cults did not recruit large 
numbers of people; but this is to be contrasted with F. Cumont, The Oriental 
Religions in Roman Paganism (Chicago: Open Court, 1911) 81-83, who suggests 
exactly the opposite. Although Cumont is followed by most, Walters {Ethnic 
Issues in PauTs Letter to the Romans, passim) suggests that Toutain’s view may 
be relevant for the study of early Christianity in Rome. I find it difficult, on the 
basis of the evidence for waxing and waning official support for and antagonism
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addition to this domestic incident, Diodorus Siculus, who was himself 
a witness of the event he relates, while in Alexandria as a member of 
an embassy that negotiated the recognition of Ptolemy XI by the 
Roman Senate,45 records an episode which illustrates this same 
respect on the level of foreign policy. He begins his tale, which forms 
part of a larger discourse on the nature of Egyptian animal worship, 
with a description of the taboos regarding the animals sacred to the 
various gods of Egypt:
When one of these animals [that the Egyptians worship] dies they wrap it 
in fine linen and then, wailing and beating their breasts, carry it off to be 
embalmed; and after it has been treated with cedar oil and such spices as 
have the quality of imparting a pleasant odour and of preserving the body 
for a long time, they lay it away in a consecrated tomb. And whoever 
intentionally kills one of these animals is put to death, unless it be a cat or 
an ibis that he kills; but if he kills one of these, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally, he is certainly put to death, for the common people gather 
in crowds and deal with the perpetrator most cruelly, sometimes doing this 
without waiting for a trial. And because of their fear of such a punishment 
any who have caught sight of one of these animals lying dead withdraw to 
a great distance and shout with lamentations and protestations that they 
found the animal already dead (1:83:5-7, LCL).
In this regard, Diodorus goes on to describe the fate of one of the 
Roman ambassadors. It must be remembered that this embassy was in 
a clear position of power over the last Ptolemaic kings. They were 
‘ambassadors’ and guests in the sense of being visitors to the 
Ptolemaic kingdom, but rulers and patrons in virtually every other 
way:
So deeply implanted also in the hearts of the common people is their 
superstitious regard for these animals and so unalterable are the emotions
against the various Egyptian (and other) cults, to clearly assess the evidence. 
There is epigraphic support for the existence in Rome of the Isis/Sarapis cult (see 
L. Vidman, Sylloge inscriptionum religionis Isiacae et Sarapiacae [RelVV 28; 
Berlin: De Gruyter, 1969] passim', and La Piana, ‘Foreign Groups in Ancient 
Rome’, 305-307), but not, as is noticed by Toutain, enough in itself to support the 
kind of popularity that Cumont and La Piana (‘Foreign Groups in Ancient Rome’, 
302-10) would like to posit. However, we are by no means certain that the 
possibility of persecution would not have prompted initiates and devotees to keep 
their devotion out of inscriptions—a phenomenon we may find equally reflected 
with regard to early Christianity.
45 In 59 b c e , under the influence of Caesar and Pompey—see Suetonius, 
Julius 54:3.
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cherished by every man regarding the honour due to them that once, at the 
time when Ptolemy their king [XI] had not as yet been given by the 
Romans the appellation of ‘friend’ and the people were exercising all zeal 
in courting the favour of the embassy from Italy which was then visiting 
Egypt and, in their fear, were intent upon giving no cause for complaint or 
war, when one of the Romans killed a cat and the multitude rushed in a 
crowd to his house, neither the officials sent by the king to beg the man off 
nor the fear of Rome which all the people felt were enough to save the 
man from punishment, even though his act had been an accident. And this 
incident we relate, not from hearsay, but we saw it with our own eyes on 
the occasion of the visit we made to Egypt (1:83:8-9, LCL).
Diodorus Siculus goes on (1:84-85) to relate many of the additional 
strange things that the Egyptians were wont to do with regard to the 
worship of their animals, all of which seem to have looked ridiculous 
in the eyes of Romans.
Rome and Things Egyptian 2: Jews and Egyptians 
One of the most interesting passages in Diodorus’s discussion of 
Egyptian zooalatry (of which the above passages form a part) is a 
section discussing the reasons for worshipping each of the individual 
animals. Diodorus apparently reflects a typical Roman confusion 
regarding the reasons for worshipping the various animals. In 
1:86-87, Diodorus records three explanations. The first two are 
mythical, but the third is quite practical (if euhemeristic): ‘The third 
cause which they adduce in connection with the dispute in question is 
the service which each of these animals renders for the benefit of 
community life and of mankind’ (1:87:1, LCL). He proceeds to 
explain how the following animals are useful to humankind and hence 
worthy of honour:46
• cow (bears oxen to work the fields, works the lighter soil),
• sheep (lambs twice a year, produces milk and wool),
• dog (useful in hunting and protection— also mythically related to 
the role of Anubis during the wandering of Isis),
• cat ( ‘useful against asps...and other reptiles that sting’ 1:87:4),
• ichneumon ( ‘keeps a look-out for the newly-laid seed of the 
crocodile and crushes the eggs left by the female’ 1:87:4, and kills 
the crocodiles themselves),
• ibis (protector against snakes, locusts, [poisonous] caterpillars),
46 For the various animals and their god/goddess identification, see Witt, Isis 
in the Ancient World, 27-35.
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• hawk (protector against scorpions, horned serpents, ‘and the small 
animals o f noxious bite which cause the greatest destruction of 
men’ 1:87:6; or, according to another version, because of its use by 
Egyptian soothsayers in the prediction of the future, 1:87:7; or, in a 
more mythical form, seen as the primeval bringer of a book of 
wisdom ‘wrapped about with a purple band, which contained 
written directions concerning the worship of the gods and the 
honours due to them’ 1:87:8),
•  goat (because of its prodigious generative member),
• bulls (especially the Apis and Mnevis bulls; because of their use in 
farming), and
• wolves (because of their similarity to dogs, or, in a mythical 
version, because ‘Osiris came from Hades to help his son [Horus] 
and his wife [Isis]’ against Typhon ‘having taken the guise o f a 
wolf’ 1:88:6; or in another mythical version, because of the near- 
miraculous intervention of a band of wolves against an Ethiopian 
attack on Egypt, 1:88:7).
Clearly this rationalistic, euhemeristic approach is the most acceptable 
form of explanation of Egyptian animal worship for Diodorus.47 
However, these animals are not the only animals worshipped by the 
Egyptians. In addition to these ‘useful’ animals, the crocodile and 
lion, among other less savoury characters, were also accorded 
worship. Diodorus deals with only one of these— the crocodile. He 
suggests that, as ‘these beasts eat the flesh of men’, the worship of the 
crocodile is ‘a subject regarding which most men are entirely at a loss 
to explain how ...it ever became the law to honour like the gods 
creatures of the most revolting habits’ (1:89:1). He presents two 
explanations, one mythical (with the primeval king, Menas, being 
carried on the back of a crocodile to escape an angry pack of dogs, 
1:89:3), and one practical— the Nile, infested with crocodiles, formed 
a naturally uncrossable frontier for most of Egypt’s eastern border 
(1:89:2). The mythical explanation is given by Diodorus to explain 
certain monuments which have obviously been attached to the legend 
of the crocodile ferry-ride by Menas; yet it is clear by his ‘strange 
though it may seem [this is what they say]’ (1:89:3) style of language 
that he is clearly in favour of the first explanation. Regardless of the 
rationality of Diodorus’s first explanation, however, the fact that he
47 On euhemerism in the Roman world, cf. B. Bosworth, ‘Augustus, the Res 
Gestae and Hellenistic Theories of Apotheosis’, JRS 89 (1999) 1-18.
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tries to unravel this problem ‘which most men are entirely at a loss to 
explain’ shows that there must exist in both his sources and his 
contemporaries’ minds some question concerning the worship of these 
animals. In Diodorus’s writing on Egypt, there is a schooled 
detachment underlain by a superior disdain. He makes no decisive 
judgement concerning the beliefs of the Egyptians, but the character 
of his detachment, and the way in which he distinguishes that from 
previous attempts at explanation, suggest that these very things about 
which he attempts to think rationally have been treated irrationally by 
those who preceded him.
In contrast to Diodorus’s detachment, another author of importance 
to discussion in this regard is Plutarch, who, in his Isis and Osiris 
(377D-378A; 379B-D), has an extended discussion of idols, atheism, 
and superstition, and then, in 379D-382D, of animals and idols (esp. 
382B-C, regarding the equality o f animate and inanimate 
representation of the gods). Although Plutarch does not try and 
explain the reasons for the worship of each of the animals as do 
Diodorus and Philo (see below), opting instead for mythical 
explanations, his reasoned discussion regarding the nature of idolatry 
stands in contrast to the kind of vitriol found in Jewish literature of the 
period, and highlights the need that many Jewish authors must have 
felt in trying to make their point with regard to idolatry, and perhaps 
one of the reasons for overstating their case. Such vitriol is visible in 
several of the Second Temple Jewish passages that are adduced in 
connection with Romans 1 (see above, p. 157).
But, like the Roman literature, these texts are not all o f a single 
kind. Some of them (e.g. 1 En. 91:4; T.Mos. 1:1348) are irrelevant, not 
speaking directly about idolatry. Others seem to be directly related to 
Old Testament prophetic anti-idolatry texts such as Isaiah 44-46 and
48 Although the OTP translator, J. Priest, has chosen to render T.Mos. 1:12- 
13 as ‘He created the world on behalf of his people, but he did not make this 
purpose of creation openly known from the beginning of the world so that the 
nations might be found guilty, indeed that they might abjectly declare themselves 
guilty by their own [mistaken] discussions [of creation’s purpose]’, the earlier 
Pseudepigrapha scholar R.H. Charles does not supply the material in Priest’s 
brackets, and renders the last part instead as ‘...that the Gentiles might thereby be 
convicted, yea to their own humiliation might by [their] arguments convict one 
another’ (R.H. Charles, The Assumption o f Moses [London: A. & C. Black, 1897] 
6). It would seem that this passage has more to do with a discussion of the 
inferiority of the philosophical beliefs of the Gentiles to the Mosaic law than with 
idolatry.
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Jeremiah 10 (e.g. Epistle o f Jeremiah; 1 En. 99:6-10. Wisdom 13:10- 
14; 14:8-29 also have strong parallels with Isaiah 44^16; but there is 
reason to judge that there are additional elements accrued to this 
tradition which merit further investigation, as argued below). There 
are, however, several of these texts which do seem to relate more 
specifically to the Rom. 1:23 list of animals, namely Wis. 11:15-16; 
12:24, 27; 13:10-14; 15:18-16:1; Let.Arist. 138; Sib.Or. 3:6-35; and 
Philo, Decal. 76-80. With these, it would seem reasonable to include 
Bel and the Dragon, as it deals not only with idolatry, but also with 
the worship of animals.49
W isdom  11:15-16 reflects a similar reasoning to Diodorus’s 
concerning the reasons for the worship of various animals: Tn return 
for their foolish and wicked thoughts, which led them astray to 
worship irrational serpents and worthless animals, you sent upon them 
a multitude of irrational creatures to punish them, that they might 
learn that one is punished by the very things by which he sins’ (see 
also Wis. 12:24, 27). Philo’s discussion in Decal. 76-80, specifically 
anti-Egyptian, is also relevant in this regard. Like Diodorus, he is 
(grudgingly) able to understand the deification of domestic animals, 
but not of the vicious beasts like the crocodile or lion:
the Egyptians are rightly charged not only on the count to which every 
country is liable [i.e. idolatry], but also on another peculiar to themselves.
For in addition to wooden and other images, they have advanced to divine 
honours irrational animals, bulls and rams and goats, and invented for
49 Opinion is strongly divided with regard to the origin of this last mentioned 
work (split between Babylon, Palestine and Alexandria). As W.O.E. Oesterley 
{An Introduction to the Books o f the Apocrypha [London: SPCK; New York: 
Macmillan, 1935] 291) states: ‘If the stories were written for renegade Jews 
Palestine is highly improbable; there was but little danger of idolatry among the 
Jews there; it was in the lands of the Dispersion that Jews were subject to this 
temptation. Babylon is more likely, especially if, as some authorities maintain, the 
stories were originally written in Hebrew; in their Greek form, on the other hand, 
their home was probably Alexandria.’ However, the original setting of this story 
may be irrelevant in this regard, as we do know that it existed in Greek (in fact, 
we have it in no other language), and that this Greek version (be it translation of a 
Semitic original or not) existed in Alexandria. This would make it part of the 
complex of literature available not only to Alexandrian Jewry, but also, of course, 
to the later Paul, or his teachers. It does, however, in the light of the following 
discussion, seem that the specifically anti-Egyptian nature of much Jewish anti­
idolatry invective of the Second Temple period suggests an Alexandrian 
provenance, rather than a Babylonian one.
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each some famous legend of wonder. And with these perhaps there might 
be some reason, for they are thoroughly domesticated and useful for our 
livelihood (Decal 76-77, LCL).
Philo goes on to describe the various uses of these animals, then re­
sumes his discussion of the various Egyptian animal-divinities:
But actually the Egyptians have gone to a further excess and chosen the 
fiercest and most savage of wild animals, lions and crocodiles and among 
reptiles the venomous asp, all of which they dignify with temples, sacred 
precincts, sacrifices, assemblies, processions and the like (Decal. 78, 
LCL).
He continues his polemic against zooalatry with those animals he can 
neither understand nor ridicule as vicious, and records the reaction of 
foreigners to the Egyptian predilection for animal worship:
Many other animals too they have deified, dogs, cats, wolves and among 
the birds, ibises and hawks; fishes too, either their whole bodies or 
particular parts. What could be more ridiculous than this? Indeed strangers 
on their first arrival in Egypt before the vanity of the land has gained a 
lodgement in their minds are like to die with laughing at it, while anyone 
who knows the flavour of right instruction, horrified at this veneration of 
things so much the reverse of venerable, pities those who render it and 
regards them with good reason as more miserable than the creatures they 
honour, as men with souls transformed into the nature of those creatures, 
so that as they pass before him, they seem beasts in human shape (Decal. 
79-80, LCL).
Philo here reflects one of the classical ways to conquer something 
which threatens or is perceived to threaten: make it ridiculous in an 
effort to render it worthless or harmless. The reference to ‘strangers 
on their first arrival in Egypt before the vanity of the land has gained a 
lodgement in their minds’ (80) reflects the probability that Philo is 
trying to suggest that the initial reaction of these people is the proper 
one (so far as Philo is concerned), but does not always characterize 
their continuing attitude. Of course, the extensive success of Egyptian 
cults both in Hellenized Egypt itself and throughout the rest o f the 
Greco-Roman world makes this kind of argument on Philo’s part 
unsurprising. That many of the visitors to Alexandria in Philo’s time 
would be Romans goes without saying; and the existence in a Roman 
author such as Diodorus of similar argumentation (although 
dispassionate in comparison to Philo) suggests that this kind of  
argumentation was more widespread than simply these two authors. It 
seems that neither of them is actually furnishing new arguments, but,
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rather, makes use of a generally accepted way of speaking about 
Egyptian religion.
Of the other texts mentioned above, Wis. 13:13-14 bears special 
attention:
But a cast-off piece from among them, useful for nothing, a stick crooked 
and full of knots, he takes and carves with care in his leisure, and shapes it 
with skill gained in idleness; he forms it like the image o f a man, or makes 
it like some worthless animal... (R SV , emphasis added).
The concatenation of a ‘man’ and the various animals mentioned in 
Rom. 1:23 has caused some difficulty for commentators. As we saw 
above, most see it as a mixture of two different kinds of worship, 
perhaps Greek-Roman and Egyptian, and leave it at that.50 However, 
this ignores an important feature of Egyptian iconography, regarding 
the representation of Osiris:
In the view of a well-informed Greek writer there was a determined 
hellenization of Egyptian gods and heroes, which was generally 
recognized, and which enabled Osiris to be called Dionysus by some, 
Pluto by others, Zeus by some, and Pan by others. We must remember also 
that in his own country Osiris underwent identification with Ptah, Sokar 
and Re. Another significant fact is that Osiris was always portrayed with 
human features. From these circumstances we can see how in the post- 
Alexandrian period a new idea of the consort of Isis could be 
involved—the oecumenical Sarapis.51
Although Hyldahl has suggested that the singular form àvGptoTTOu 
(anthropou) in Rom. 1:23 indicates the use of Gen. 1:26, 27,52 his 
arguments for this identification do not explain why these verses from 
Genesis would be relevant to the created dvOpanros* now being 
criticized for worshipping creation, and indeed himself. I argue 
instead that positioning this verse more explicitly as a function of the 
context of the rest of the passage has a greater claim to validity.
Should one not consider how Paul’s argument in the first part of 
Romans hangs together in the light of the audience, religious setting,
50 E.g. Kasemann, Romans, 45-46; Hyldahl, ‘A Reminiscence of the Old 
Testament’, 287-88; Hooker, ‘Adam in Romans i’; idem, ‘A Further Note on 
Romans F.
51 Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, 41 (emphasis added).
52 Hyldahl, ‘A Reminiscence of the Old Testament’, 287-88, followed by 
Hooker in both of her articles on the subject (‘Adam in Romans i’ and ‘A Further 
Note on Romans I ’), and many subsequent authors who themselves follow 
Hooker.
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and culture to which this letter was sent? Although it is clear that the 
anti-Egyptian levels of discourse in, for instance, Wisdom, are partly 
structured on the story of the plagues visited on the Egyptians in 
Exodus, it should be noticed that Wisdom's, new application of this 
Old Testament discourse also emerged in the situation I have 
characterized above— one where the dominant political and military 
power in the Mediterranean world had a tradition of anti-Egyptian 
sentiment. In this cultural-semantic context, we may very well have 
precedents in the Old Testament which lend themselves to re­
interpretation in the light of the current cultural situation, but as 
components in other thematics of fresh origin. It is unlikely that the 
Old Testament/Jewish critique of Egyptian religion spurred the 
Romans into their anti-Egyptian polemic. We must not forget that the 
Jews themselves came under the same Roman prejudicial judgement 
as did the Egyptians. They were even ridiculed by Juvenal in the same 
context as the Egyptians {Satires 6:542-47, directly after the passage 
mentioned above with regard to the Egyptians). Moreover, this 
conflation of Jews and followers of the Egyptian cults is reflected in a 
series of expulsions which took place in the late republic and early 
imperial period. As Tacitus, Ann. 2:85 records, relating the ‘expulsion 
of Egyptian and Jewish rites’ under Tiberius in 19 C E :53 The senate 
declared that four thousand adult ex-slaves tainted with those 
superstitions should be transported to Sardinia... The rest, unless they 
repudiated their unholy practices by a given date, must leave Italy.’54
53 The dating of this event to 19 c e  is made problematic by the reference to 
(apparently) the same event in Josephus, Ant. 18:65, 81-84, who seems to place it 
somewhere between 26-36 c e , thus possibly identifying it with the anti-Jewish 
measures described by Philo {Leg. 159-61) in conjunction with the death of 
Sejanus, the praetorian prefect, in 31. However, the consensus in scholarship is 
clearly for the date in Tacitus, and not to identify the two events (the reasons for 
which, with pertinent bibliography, can be found in H.D. Slingerland, Claudian 
Policymaking and the Early Imperial Repression o f Judaism at Rome [SFSHJ 
160; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997] 50-51 n. 42).
54 The most recent and thorough treatment of this is by Slingerland, 
Claudian Policymaking, but I believe his otherwise fine treatment is hampered by 
his almost exclusive interest in the status of Judaism during this period, rather 
than in the status of foreign cults as a whole, of which Judaism was one. He is 
influenced by the rhetorical strategy of Josephus, who, in his discussion of this 
expulsion {Ant. 18:65, 66-80, 81-84), divides the Jews and the Egyptians into two 
clearly identifiable groups, and discusses the expulsion of each group from a 
different perspective (essentially, the Egyptians deserved to be expelled, while the
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We must also keep in mind the trend towards inter-cultural quarrels 
between the conquered people-groups of the East. First under the 
Greeks, then under the Romans, the various groups were forced to vie 
for respect in the eyes of their overlords (both of which were 
notoriously ‘young’ culturally, at least in comparison with their 
Eastern subjects).55 It follows from this presuppositional perspective
Jews did not). This is especially noticeable on pp. 67-69, but is operative 
throughout the book, in that a thorough-going analysis of Roman attitudes 
towards foreign religions as a whole is absent. This absence is addressed in the 
still influential La Piana, ‘Foreign Groups in Ancient Rome’, esp. 291, here 
discussing an earlier phase of repression: ‘It is no wonder that the cult of Isis [in 
addition to the Dionysiac orgies in 186 b c e ] ,  which seems to have gained a 
foothold in Rome in the time of Sulla (80 B .C .) , met with persecution as soon as it 
became conspicuous in the city and dared to consecrate its altars on the sacred 
grounds of the Capitol. The successive attempts to eradicate this cult during the 
agitated period which followed the senatusconsultum of the year 58 b .c ., and the 
repeated destruction of altars and shrines of Isis in Rome, are well known, but it is 
interesting to remark that these measures of repression coincide with the laws 
against all kinds of associations [which were] enacted after bloody tumults had 
been provoked by the mobs which Clodius recruited from the Roman slums and 
organized into collegia for the terrorizing of the government’ (on the destructions 
of Isea in Rome, see Roullet, Egyptian and Egyptianizing Monuments, 37). La 
Piana’s assessment is further nuanced by his reading of Claudius’s legalization of 
the Phrygian cult (p. 297, cf. pp. 335-37): ‘this grant, which was a departure from 
tradition, could not fail to create a precedent and to mark a turning-point in the 
religious policies of the government. There were sound motives behind it...the 
oriental cults had gained a firm foothold in Rome and were a real power in the life 
of the masses. To ignore them officially was to let them develop and spread 
without public control, a bad policy for a government so suspicious of all 
associations...it seemed better and safer to bring them entirely within the law, 
rather th[a]n let them live by toleration or privilege’.
55 See E.J. Bickerman, The Jews in the Greek Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988) 218-36 for a full discussion of the various phenomena 
related to this. In Jewish literature, e.g., consider the tradition preserved in 
[pseudo]Eupolemus (fr. 1 [Eusebius, Praep.Ev. 9:17:8-9]) that Abraham had been 
the one to pass on his astrological wisdom to the Egyptians (which he himself got 
from Enoch, who is equated with Atlas), thus clearly ‘establishing’ the superiority 
of Hebrew wisdom and tradition over that of Egypt (which was typically seen to 
be the oldest extant wisdom, with upwards of a ten thousand year history) (on 
this, cf. also G. Mussies, ‘Some Astrological Presuppositions of Matthew 2: 
Oriental, Classical and Rabbinical Parallels’, in P.W. van der Horst [ed.]. Aspects 
o f Religious Contact and Conflict in the Ancient World [UTR 31; Utrecht: 
Faculteit der Godgeleerheid, Utrecht University, 1995] 25-44, esp. 41-43; cf. 
P.W. van der Horst, ‘Jewish Self-Definition by Way of Contrast in Oracula
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that one people group would make use of the overlord’s own 
denigration of another threatening people-group both to obtain favour 
in the eyes of the overlord, and to position themselves above the other 
group. This is an effective—if sycophantic— strategy.
Romans 1 and PauVs World: A Satirical Portrait 
Bringing the focus back to Romans 1, it is interesting to see how 
many of the elements we have seen in the above discussion are 
operative in Paul’s argument, and how he ironizes,56 satirizes, 
deconstructs and parodies these popular (mis-)conceptions of 
Egyptian religion to make a startling point to his Roman audience. 
Above, in Chapter 1, I excursed on the topic o f ‘poles in 
interpretation’, and interacted there with Gerald Bruns’s attempt to 
utilize the (as he sees them) binary opposites of allegory and satire to 
describe these putative poles. In an effort to problematize his 
characterization of ‘satire’, I briefly quoted Walker Percy, whose own 
experience as a satirical novelist forms the basis for his comments on 
the subject of ‘satire’. These comments may be counter-intuitively
Sibyllina III 218-247’, in his Hellenism-Judaism-Christianity: Essays on Their 
Interaction [CBET 8; Leuven: Peeters, 2nd enlrg. edn, 1998] 94-99). Or consider 
Aristobulus, who argues for the dependence of early Greek philosophers 
(Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato) on a translation of the Pentateuch earlier than the 
Septuagint (firs. 3 and 4). In fr. 4, he goes on to combine the arguments from frs. 2 
(on anthropomorphic discussions of God) and 3, adding several quotations of 
pagan authors (Orpheus, Aratus—some verses of which are known from 
independent sources) to prove his point that, on the one hand, Greek authors have 
been dependent on the Mosaic law, and, on the other hand, if Greek philosophy 
undergirds Greek culture and is very similar to Moses’ ‘philosophy’, then the 
Mosaic law, on account of its anteriority, should be seen as superior, or at least 
accepted as a viable alternative. An additional note must be made to Artapanus, 
who, in fr. 3 (Eusebius, Praep.Ev. 9:27:1-37), suggests that Moses was the 
founder of the Egyptian animal cults! See Josephus, Ant. 2:10:2; and Ag.Ap. 
1:237-46, which records material from Manetho, the Egyptian writer. Cf. J.J. 
Collins, ‘Artapanus’, OTP 2.893 nn. 32, 34 and 892, where he discusses the 
relationship of Artapanus’s writing to Manetho’s anti-Jewish work; C.R. 
Holladay, Fragments from Hellenistic Jewish Authors. I. Historians (SBLTT 20, 
PS 10; Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1983) 189-201, 232 n. 46; and Barclay, Jews in 
the Mediterranean Diaspora, 127-38.
56 Gadamer offers no definition of ‘irony’ in his work. Utilizing some of his 
terms, such a definition might be ‘the intentional statement of an apparently thetic 
premise whose dialogical questioning direction is counter-intuitively opposite to 
its surface meaning’.
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able to facilitate a mapping relation between the idea of satire and my 
subsequent discussion of mimesis under the direction of Gadamer’s 
philosophy, in the perspective of Percy’s view: ‘Don’t forget that 
satire is not primarily destructive. It attacks one thing in order to 
affirm another. It assaults the fake and phoney in the name of the 
truth. It ridicules the inhuman in order to affirm the human. Satire is 
always launched in a mode of hope.’57 And yet, the plausible 
comments Bruns made about satire also bear repeating: ‘Satire is 
unconvertible, uncontainable, uncontrollable; it rages at the gates for 
all the world like the voice of a mad woman... the satirist is always a 
little out of control, more subversive than corrective...’58 It would 
seem that these stand in contrast and contradiction, but neither, it 
would appear, stands as a definition of satire, but rather stands as a 
description of the intention behind some satirical work. Percy’s 
reconstructive apocalypticism is undertaken in precisely the mode of 
being Percy describes.59 Bruns’s definition, as argued in the above 
analysis, rests on a false dichotomy between ‘allegory’ and ‘satire’ 
(insofar as these terms, in the senses Bruns construes them, can be 
used to describe modes of interpretation). So what is it to be ‘satire’? 
A pragmatic definition, utilizing some of Gadamer’s terminology, and 
which attempts to avoid an intentionalist fallacy (or which allows for 
the recovery of authorial intention only insofar as it is apprehendible, 
through interpretation, in a text itself) could be: ‘Satire is a dialogical 
mode in which the subject matter is mimetically related to by a
57 Percy, ‘How to be an American Novelist in Spite of Being Southern and 
Catholic’, 181-82.
58 Bruns, Hermeneutics, 204.
59 This is true of all of Percy’s fiction, but concentrated especially in his 
Love in the Ruins: The Adventures o f a Bad Catholic at a Time Near the End o f 
the World (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1971), The Thanatos Syndrome 
(New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1987), and most strikingly in Lancelot (New 
York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1977). Percy himself draws inspiration from what 
was, before Percy’s death in 1990, the only novel published by Walter M. Miller, 
Jr., A Canticle for Leibowitz (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1960) (now see 
the posthumously published Saint Leibowitz and the Wild Horse Woman [London: 
Orbit, 1998]). Cf. W. Percy, ‘Rediscovering A Canticle fo r  Leibowitz’ in his 
Signposts in a Strange Land, 227-33. A fruitful comparison could likewise be 
made with the satirical work of Fyodor Dostoevsky, esp. his Crime and 
Punishment (trans. J. Coulson; Oxford World’s Classics; Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1973 [1866]), which satirically utilizes the Nietzschean idea of 
the ‘super man’ in a self-conscious attempt to undermine it.
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process of inversion.’ This is precisely the mode of speaking which 
Paul utilizes in Romans 1 to rhetorically manipulate his audience to 
accept his mediated dialogue as the structuring of an expected 
category,60 but which is actually an inverted representation of the 
audience itself.
Paul starts out in 1:14-15, after having built his audience up through 
praise and an expression of his intense desire to visit them (1:8-13), 
by introducing a distinction which would have been very familiar to 
anyone living in the Greco-Roman world— T am under obligation to 
both Greeks and barbarians, to both the wise and the foolish: so I am 
eager to preach the gospel also to you who are in Rome’. The 
relationship between these two divisions, and what Paul is trying to 
say by means of them, has received much attention in the history of 
Romans scholarship. It seems to me, however, that the weakness of 
much work on this verse stems from an atomistic approach to the 
problem. Rather than trying to understand the overall rhetorical 
purpose of Paul’s discussion in ch. 1, each verse is treated on its own, 
and the possible connections between them (such as the one being 
argued for in this chapter) are missed. There are multiple possible 
permutations when trying to determine the relationships or lack 
thereof between these two antitheses,61 but these can be boiled down 
to two major positions: (1) the two antitheses are not stating the same 
propositions,62 or (2) the two antitheses are to be equated, either in a 
relative or dissolute identity.63 The common distinction between 
Greek (i.e. anyone who is Greek or Greco-Roman in culture, probably 
positioned in this context so as to be identified with the Romans 
themselves64) and barbarian (i.e. anyone else)65 is equated— at least at
60 Cf. above, p. 47, with regard to a similar strategy in Philemon.
61 Most helpfully summarized by Cranheld, Romans, 1.83-84.
62 E.g. Kasemann, Romans, 20; Lagrange, Romains, 16; Morris, Romans, 63- 
65 ; and Fitzmyer, Romans, 250-51.
63 E.g. Cranfield, Romans, 1.83-84; H. Schlier, Der Romerbrief (R T K K I  6; 
Freiburg: Herder, 1977) 41; Dunn, Romans 1-8, 32-33; Leenhardt, Romains, 28; 
and O. Kul3, Der Romerbrief (3 vols.; Regensburg: Pustet, 1963-78) 1.19-20. 
Others, such as Moo, Romans, 62; and F.L. Godet, Commentary on Romans 
(Grand Rapids: Kregel, repr. 1977 [1883]) 89, are more equivocal.
64 With regard to the Roman admiration and assimilation of Greek culture, 
cf. R. Wallace and W. Williams, The Three Worlds o f Paul o f Tarsus (London 
and New York: Routledge, 1998) 85-86, 90-91; and A. Momigliano, Alien  
Wisdom: The Limits o f Hellenization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1975) 12-21.
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this point in Paul’s argument— with the distinction between wise and 
foolish. I would argue that Paul’s audience most likely saw 
themselves as Greeks, and hence ethically and culturally prime 
custodians and beneficiaries of what it is to be wise (or, depending on 
how one solves the question of the ethnicity and culture of Paul’s 
recipients in Rome,66 at least as wise). In other words, Paul states (as 
they would most likely perceive it) that he has spent sufficient time 
among the barbarians in the provinces (out of obligation), and now 
needs to come to Rome to ‘reap some harvest’ (1:13) among the 
‘wise’. There is, however, some ambiguity here, as it is by no means 
clear that Paul is making the identification between the wise and the 
Romans themselves, nor that he allows this understanding to continue 
later in the letter (e.g. 2:9-11; cf. 1 Cor. 2:6-16). As Lagrange 
characterizes it:
Greeks and barbarians, wise and foolish: four words which divide men and 
proclaim the superiority that is attributed to them as they work. All would 
appropriately be summarized under the same judgement! It is a way of 
qualifying men which corresponds to a Greek point-of-view... The 
Romans would like to be counted as Greeks...67
However, Morris’s ‘There could be foolish Greeks and there could 
be wise barbarians’68 does not do justice to the way in which Paul’s 
audience must have taken the double designation, ‘Greek’ and ‘wise’. 
Whether or not Paul maintains this later in the letter is of no account 
here— what matters is how the bifurcations between Greek and 
barbarian, wise and foolish function at this point in the letter. To 
appeal to Paul’s ‘experience of all humanity’ which has ‘taught him
65 The linguistic division between Greek and barbarian can be found as early 
as Herodotus 2:57.
66 See discussion below regarding the ethnic makeup of the Roman church.
67 Lagrange, Romains, 28, translation mine. Dunn {Romans 1-8, 32-33) is 
similar: ‘From its first appearance this was not merely a contrast between Greeks 
and other nations, or Greek-speakers and non-Greek speakers. The very word 
pappdpo? [‘barbarian’] carried a derogatory significance. It referred to a speaker 
of a strange, unintelligible language...; and from its early use in reference to the 
Medes and Persians, the historic foes of Greece, it gained a clear note of 
contempt—hence the Roman unwillingness to be classified as (3ap(3dpoi’.
68 Morris, Romans, 65. Cf. Fitzmyer, Romans, 251: ‘the first pair sums up 
the Gentiles, the second is a description of all humanity’; Cranfield, Romans, 
1.83; J. Huby, Saint Paul: Epître aux Romains: Traduction et commentaire (VS 
10; Paris: Beauchesne, 1940, new edn rev. S. Lyonnet, 1957) 57.
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much’,69 at this point, is to miss the very particular nature of the 
dialectically pitched argument in Romans 1.
Paul moves on in v. 18 to introduce a new group in his discussion: 
‘For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness 
and wickedness o f humans who suppress the truth in unrighteousness’. 
The group a v G p a y n w  tCSv rpv à X f jô e ia v  e v  à Ô iK ia  k o lte x o v tg d v  
( ‘humans [who] suppress the truth in unrighteousness’) is a new 
arrival on the stage here in Romans 1, at least in this full 
identification; but it seems reasonable to think that the Roman 
audience would identify these cMpayrroi (anthropoi, ‘humans’) with 
the only group of which they themselves are not a part (or of which 
they do not see themselves as a part)— the ‘foolish’ of v. 14, who 
would also probably be identified with the ‘barbarians’ in that verse. 
The rest of what follows in vv. 19-32 reads as an invective against 
these dv0po)TTOi, and goes through a litany of sins and foolishness in 
which these dvGpcoTroi have indulged, promising the wrath of God on 
them for their wickedness and their suppression of truth (v. 18).
The question of natural theology with regard to this passage, 
specifically vv. 19-21, has received much attention,70 but it does not 
appear that Paul is here making any significant new argument, or at 
least not the kind out of which a systematic theology can be made. 
Instead, it seems that Paul is appealing to a picture which he knows 
will be present in the minds of his readers— a caricature of some 
group, tentatively (and ambiguously) identified for the reader as both 
barbarian and foolish in v. 14, which Paul seems to assume the reader 
will know about (or think they know about), for he makes no more 
explicit identification. Some may fault this aspect of my analysis, 
suggesting that the lack of specificity here militates against an explicit 
connection with Egyptian cult. While complete certainty in such 
instances is unobtainable, a high degree of probability can be shown 
here. Above, I mentioned an analogy with language drawn from the 
application of economic Rational Choice Theory of religion. Rational 
Choice Theory rests on three key assumptions: (1) ‘Individuals act 
rationally, weighing the costs and benefits of potential actions, and 
choosing those actions that maximize their net benefits’, (2) ‘The 
ultimate preferences (or “needs”) that individuals use to assess costs
69 Fitzmyer, Romans, 251.
70 Cf., e.g., A. Feuillet, ‘La connaissance naturelle de dieu par les hommes’, 
LumVie 14 (1954) 63-80; Fitzmyer, Romans, 128-29. See also J. Barr, Natural 
Theology (Gifford Lectures; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).
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and benefits tend not to vary much from person to person or time to 
time’, and (3) ‘Social outcomes constitute the equilibria that emerge 
from the aggregation and interaction of individual a c t i o n s ’ .71 While 
aspects of this theory and its use in the study of religion continue to be 
debated and questioned,72 the application of economic terminology to 
religious choice suggests an analogy with the way in which Paul 
addresses his (unknown) Roman audience. Most analysis carried out 
in the Rational Choice Theory vein is concerned with explaining and 
predicting religious choices made by individual religious ‘consumers’ 
in the religious ‘marketplace’. Nancy Ammerman, on the basis of her 
involvement in a large-scale study of religious affiliation in North 
American denominations, addresses the issue of pluralism and its 
effects on religious vitality.73 In so doing, she uses the language of 
supply and demand, emphasizing the need to pay more attention to the 
‘demand’ side of the equation than is generally the case in Rational 
Choice Theory. Implicit in her analysis of (Christian) denominations 
is the application of this thought to inter-religious choice. Continuing 
the use of economic language (like religious ‘product’, ‘monopoly’ 
vs. ‘market’ economies), one might further suggest the usefulness of a 
‘brand identity’ concept in discussing not only varieties o f one 
religion, but also in the choice between two different religions 
altogether.
Although the application of such language and thought to the 
actions and language-use of an individual religious figure is outside 
the self-defined purview of Rational Choice Theory, it nevertheless 
provides a useful analogy to explain Paul’s dialectical strategy in 
Romans 1 (and will continue its usefulness in my treatment of 
Romans 6). Paul’s purpose in the initial part of Romans, as discussed 
above, must be to establish the parameters of his new dialectical 
relationship with the Roman church. Scholars have long identified the 
(at least) bivalent nature of the Roman church, though there is little
71 Taken from L.R. lannaccone, ‘Framework for the Scientific Study of 
Religion’, in Young (ed.), Rational Choice Theory and Religion, 26. See 
lannaccone and the remaining essays in section 1 of the same volume for the 
standard bibliography in this area.
72 E.g. the definition and even use of the term ‘rationality’ in connection with 
religious choice. Cf. N T. Ammerman, ‘Religious Choice and Religious Vitality: 
The Market and Beyond’, in Young (ed.), Rational Choice Theory and Religion, 
120.
73 Ammerman, ‘Religious Choice and Religious Vitality’.
180 BROOK W .R. PEARSON
consensus over the specific balance between Jews and Gentiles within 
it.74 No matter what its makeup is, Paul is in a difficult position at the 
beginning of such an important communication. He must somehow set 
both Jew and Gentile on the same footing. As in Gal. 3:28, Paul is 
keen to establish the unity of humankind in the cause of Christ. Paul’s 
strategy in accomplishing this task is a clever one.
This strategy is much like the use of the following description of a 
popular drink: Tt is brown in colour, is served cold, is highly 
caffeinated, is carbonated, is available in diet, regular and classic 
varieties, and is labelled with a red circle and flowing white writing’, 
Paul narrows down in his readers’ minds from general to specific, 
without ever needing to become explicit about his intended subject 
(which would, in the end, damage his argument by himself fully 
admitting a competitor religion to the dialogical table, with whom he 
might be expected to carry on conversation once his brief point had 
been made). While my description of the drink would (by most 
participants in world culture) be taken to be a cola of some kind from 
an early point, it is not until the last two elements of the description 
that brand-specificity is attained (but, given the market-share of that 
particular brand, it may be that some readers would immediately 
assume this identification after establishing that I am speaking of a 
cola). The relation of the arbitrary image coded with intentional yet 
pragmatic sense implements metonymy here. Even those who, in an 
effort to be clever, resist the expected solution and instead proffer 
another brand demonstrate my point. For the brand-image of this 
company and its famous soft-drink is so synonymous with the idea of 
‘cola’, that ‘knock-off’ images (both famous and local) are well- 
known. In our twenty-first-century culture, I do not need ever 
explicitly to state which brand is at issue in my description.
As I have shown above, Egyptian religion had a similar currency in 
the Roman popular mind. And, to continue the analogy, neither the 
Egyptian religious ‘brand’ nor the company responsible for our cola 
drink has an entirely positive image (despite best efforts to the 
contrary). In this instance, Paul is able to capitalize on negative 
aspects of the Egyptian religious brand-image to manipulate his
74 Cf. Wedderburn, The Reasons for Romans, ch. 3 for a survey of various 
positions in this regard. Wedderburn’s conclusions in his chapter (that the church 
at Rome was originally strongly ‘Judaizing’, then was faced with a form of the 
gospel which could be characterized as ‘Pauline’) fit well with my own 
hypotheses over the manner in which Paul then writes to address this community.
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audience into an ‘appropriate’ attitude toward the un-named 
individuals against whom he directs his attack in Romans 1. He 
speaks of them being without excuse (v. 20) as a result of the clear 
revelation of God in ‘the things which have been made’, and then 
describes their behaviour, which contrasts with this freely available 
knowledge: ‘they did not honour [God] as God or give thanks to him’ 
(v. 21). As a result, several things happen: (1) they became futile in 
their thinking, (2) their senseless minds were darkened, and, (3) 
claiming to be wise, they became fools. Up until this point, the brand 
allegiance of these individuals is not clear. It is not until he tells his 
audience that (4) they exchanged the glory of the immortal God for 
images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles (vv. 21- 
23) that they become identified with ‘the real thing’. If there was any 
question in the minds of the Roman audience about whom Paul was 
speaking, that had to have been cleared up for them when they read or 
heard v. 23. As we have seen above, these categories o f  
images— including the <j>6apTou avGpcoTrou ( ‘mortal man7 ‘transitory 
human’), when seen together with these animals— are clearly 
identifiable with Egyptian religion, and the mockery o f these 
zoomorphic idols of the Egyptians was a very serious issue in Roman 
thought, policy and literature. To invoke these categories was to 
invoke a very real and present ‘current affair’ for the Romans— no 
matter what their ethnicity. To argue that this is primarily some kind 
of obscure reference to Old Testament texts75 is to ignore the 
preceding argument with its categories o f Greek/barbarian and 
wise/foolish, as well as what follows with regard to sexual depravity. 
Certainly, the Old Testament and traditional Jewish attitude toward 
idolatry would also be satisfied by some of these categories, but even 
Jews— especially in a Roman context— would react in a specific 
manner to such implicit castigation of Egyptian religion. The 
interaction noted above between Jewish religion and Egyptian in an 
Alexandrian setting would, no doubt, have been supported in a Roman 
setting. Jews and Egyptians were, at least on one important occasion, 
conflated and treated as one, when adherents of both groups were 
deported from Rome.76 In addition, the identification of these 
dvôpcûT T O i as those ‘claiming to be wise’ would naturally reflect the 
superior attitude of the Egyptians when it came to ancient wisdom,
75 Or even, in Fitzmyer, Romans, 284, to a god from ancient Ugarit!
76 See above, p. 162.
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and the way in which this claim, supported by the antiquity of their 
monuments and recorded history, was unconducive to Greeks and 
Romans, including their fellow subject-peoples.77 The ridicule which 
Roman (and Jewish) authors aimed at the Egyptians on account of 
their worship of animals was a way of ironizing ‘claiming to be wise, 
they became fools’.
The sexual license, or at least perceived sexual licence, of the Isiac 
and Osiric/Sarapic religions caused no little problem. I noted above 
(n. 41) Juvenal’s charges in Satires 6:489 and 526-41 of the way in 
which Roman women could carry on their illicit affairs in the Iseum, 
and we have a further anecdote from Josephus, who tells us the story 
of the seduction of a Roman matron by a cocky young knight78 whose 
affections she had spurned. According to the story Josephus relates, 
this young man paid the priests o f Isis to allow him access to the 
temple on a night when the object of his lust had decided (also by the 
connivance of the priest) to sleep in the temple and await a revelation 
from the God. This practice of incubation, by no means limited to the 
Isiac mysteries,79 may have been the cause for accusations of sexual 
illicitness, or even of depravity, among the Isiacs, simply because (as 
with many other aspects of the mysteries) it was done in secret. We 
have no certain way of knowing the extent or frequency of sexual 
intercourse in such rites, but it is likely that the accusations made by 
the non-initiated were highly exaggerated, on the basis of stories such 
as the one related here by Josephus. The story continues with the 
knight seducing the matron in the guise of the god Anubis, and then 
proceeds to brag to her about it. The woman’s indignation eventually 
provoked official action, including the destruction of the Iseum and
77 See above, p. 172 n. 55. Cf. also Diodorus Siculus 1:96:4, where this 
Roman author identifies Orpheus as the bringer of wisdom from ancient Egypt. 
From a different perspective, it is notable that Moses is identified in Artapanus fr. 
3.3 with Mousaeus, ‘a teacher of Orpheus’, which would place the Jews higher up 
the information tree than the Egyptians (or, perhaps, in place of the Egyptians).
78 I.e. a member of the equestrian class.
79 Cf., e.g., M. Delcor, ‘The Selloi of the Oracle of Dodona and the Oracular 
Priests of the Semitic Religions’, in J. Schreiner (ed.), Wort, Lied und 
Gottesspruch. Festschrift fiir Joseph Ziegler. I. Beitrage zur Septuaginta (FzB 1; 
Würzburg: Echter Verlag Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1972) 31-38, esp. 35 where he 
discusses the Hellenistic introduction of incubation into Egyptian religion, as well 
as (he argues) incubation as part of classical Greek religion.
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crucifixion of several of the priests.80 Whatever the extent of the 
sexual activity within the Isis cult, which, with the cult of her consort 
Sarapis/Osiris, was the bringer of Egyptian religion to the Greco- 
Roman world, it is clear that at least some non-initiates had the 
impression that it was extensive. It is this impression to which, I think, 
Paul is adverting in 1:24-27. Dionysius o f Halicarnassus 2:19, 
describing the state-of-play in religion in the city of Rome after the 
Augustan reforms, provides a parallel for the way in which Paul 
proceeds:
Nothing [was then] to be seen among them (though their manners are now 
corrupted) of enthusiastic transports or corbyantic frenzies; no begging 
under the colour of religion, no bacchanals or secret mysteries, no 
promiscuous vigils of men and women in the temples, nor any 
extravagances of this kind. But [rather] all reverence is shown to the gods, 
both in words and actions, beyond what is practised among either Greeks 
or barbarians... (LCL)
The combination of (secret) mysteries and sexual promiscuity in 
this passage is notable, as is the desire to see ecstatic forms of 
religious expression replaced by proper ‘reverence’. While it is 
dangerous to generalize from a single instance, the parallel between 
this passage’s disparagement of ecstatic religion and Paul’s treatment 
of similar topics in Rom. 1:18-31 is suggestive. The vice-list of Rom. 
1:29-31, with its emphasis on actions and behaviours which 
contravene social order, has been seen as non-Pauline, either as the 
result of Paul’s use of a source, or because this passage is part of a 
non-Pauline interpolation. Walker, in his lexico-stylistic study of 
Romans 1-2, states that
One might argue, of course, that the distinctive vocabulary of Rom 1.18- 
31 results from its distinctive subject matter. This argument founders, 
however, on the fact that the vocabulary of the passage is most distinctive 
at precisely the point where the subject matter is least distinctive: the 
‘vice’ list in 1.29-31.81
80 Josephus, Ant. 18:65-80. Regarding the veracity of this story, however, La 
Piana (‘Foreign Groups in Rome’, 293 n. 25) raises doubt. It is not really pertinent 
to our question here, however, whether or not the incident actually  took 
place—what is at issue is public perception of the Isis cult. That it is Josephus 
who relates this story speaks further to the rivalry of this cult and Judaism, and the 
way in which a Jewish-Roman writer could play upon anti-Egyptian prejudice to 
further his own cause.
81 Walker, ‘Romans 1.18-2.29’, 536.
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He goes on to argue that, of the twenty-one items listed in Rom. 1:29- 
31, only six appear in one or more of the ‘authentic’ Pauline vice 
lists,82 while there is generally a more extensive overlap between the 
‘authentic’ lists.83 Accepting these results (which bear more attention 
from a statistical point-of-view), however, is not to accept Walker’s 
interpretation. Simply comparing this vice list to other Pauline 
( ‘authentic’ or not) lists is not adequate. It is by now a watchword in 
Pauline studies that Paul’s letters are sent to particular circumstances 
at particular times, often to accomplish very different purposes. 
Romans, like all o f the Pauline letters, stands out as a unique 
communication to a specific group. We should, hence, look more 
specifically in the Roman context to see if there is an explanation for 
the use of this particular list in this particular manner.84 The vice list 
of 1:29-31 serves to whip the ire of the Roman readers to a higher 
pitch. Already focused on two major elements of the Egyptian cultic 
‘brand identity’, zoomorphic idolatry and (perceived) sexual licence, 
Paul (who by this time is sure he has his audience ‘on-side’) 
constructs a list which has as its purpose to offend the Roman ideal of 
civic responsibility: murder, strife, deceit, malignity, gossip, slander, 
hatred of God, insolence, haughtiness, disobedience to parents, 
ruthlessness. The importance of the idea of civic responsibility in 
Roman culture cannot be over-emphasized— from the early days of
82 Walker, ‘Romans 1.18-2.29’, 536 n. 21 lists and briefly discusses Rom. 
13:13; 1 Cor. 5:10-11; 6:9-10; 2 Cor. 12:20-21; Gal. 5:19-21 as the ‘authentic’ 
lists—and lists (but does not consider) those in Eph. 5:3-5; Col. 3:5-8; 1 Tim. 1:9- 
10; 6:4-5; 2 Tim. 3:2-4; Tit. 1:7; 3:3.
83 Walker, ‘Romans 1.18-2.29’, 537, also notes the omission in the Romans 
1 list of TropvELa/TTÔpvoç and c ’i8w \o\aTpLa/d8toX o\dTpr|s*, suggesting that ‘it is 
difficult to understand why Paul would have omitted them from such a lengthy 
list as that in Rom 1.29-31’. That Paul has just finished speaking at length of both 
of these ‘vices’ militates against this view, however, further problematizing 
Walker’s discussion of 1:29-31.
84 That the vice list was a common topos in moralistic literature of the first 
century does not prevent Paul’s use of it in any particular instance from being 
analyzed according to its setting, rather than simply its form. As A.J. Malherbe 
(Moral Exhortation, A Greco-Roman Sourcebook [LEC 4; Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1986] 138) puts it, ‘Catalogs of virtues and vices were widely used, 
but not indiscriminately. In their content they tended to represent generally held 
views; nevertheless the presence or absence of certain items reflected the values 
of their authors.’ In this case, we might say, the purposes of its author and the 
values of his audience.
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the Republic, the role of the censors was extended, through use, to 
include responsibility for making judgements on the character of 
Romans’ citizenship. Cary states:
In distributing the citizens into their appropriate property classes, the 
censors took it upon themselves to take into consideration other 
qualifications than those of property, and to degrade into a lower class 
persons whom they could convict (after a brief informal trial) of bad 
citizenship in any form... a person rendered infamis by the censors was 
held in as much disgrace as if he had been sentenced in a regular court of 
law.85
Sanders and Walker are entirely correct to note that this list (like 
others of Paul) does ‘not reflect a particularly Christian point of 
view’,86 but the key implication of this observation is that these lists 
are part of the cultural vocabulary Paul is able to use outside  of a 
particularly Christian, or even Jewish, setting. In this case, Paul is not 
trying to make a point which is particularly Christian— he is in the 
position of needing to establish the same attitude in both (or all) parts 
of his audience towards this group of individuals, and to do so, he 
purposely stays away from specifically Christian, or even Jewish, 
attitudes. Although, as we saw above, the castigation of idolatry has 
led many to suppose an exclusively Jewish provenance for 1:24-25, 
the singling-out of the worshippers of zoomorphic idols would, for all 
but a few (if any) who may have converted from the Isis cult, have set 
those apart from his audience.
By concluding with a clear statement of the appropriate punishment 
for such behaviour ( ‘Though they know God’s decree that those who 
do such things deserve to die, they not only do them but approve of 
those who practise them’), Paul likewise concludes the dialectical 
positioning of his ‘conversation’ partners in such a way that, as one, 
he expects them to agree with this judgement on the silent construct 
third-party to their dialogue with Paul. That portions of Paul’s Roman 
audience might agree with him for different reasons and on the basis
85 Cary, History o f Rome, 115-16.
86 Sanders, Paul, the Law, and the Jewish People, 131, cited in Walker, 
‘Romans 1.18-2.29’, 550. By way of comparison, it might be suggested that, like 
Rom. 1:23, a passage such as Wis. 14:12 (‘the idea of making idols was the 
beginning of fornication, and the invention of them was the corruption of life’) 
reflects equally Jewish and Roman ideals. The mere Jewish provenance of a text 
does not necessitate the specifically or exclusively Jewish provenance of the ideas 
it contains.
186 BROOK W .R. PEARSON
of different traditions and attitudes only demonstrates the usefulness 
of Paul’s strategy.
The next passage should probably have read, at least in the mind of 
the Roman reader of this letter, ‘But I commend you (you civic- 
minded Romans, or you righteous Jews), who are wise and not foolish 
like these disgusting barbarian Egyptians with their ridiculous animal 
gods and deplorable sexual depravity’. But this is not what Paul 
wrote. His choice of this moment to disambiguate the identity of the 
dv0pa)TTOi from v. 18 is telling: ‘Therefore you have no excuse, O 
man, whoever you are, when you judge one another; for in passing 
judgement upon him you condemn yourself, because you are doing 
the very same things’ (2:1, RSV). Paul has manufactured a 
vulnerability in his audience by playing on its prejudices and hatreds. 
Of course, in the premises of his presuppositional framing of value, 
the culpability of all people before the righteousness of God is clearly 
an important element of the remaining argument in the first part of 
Romans, and virtually every commentator has noticed this. However, 
what has not been noticed is the way in which the specifically Roman 
anti-Egyptian prejudices were being drawn into the question. This 
does not preclude the existence of a specifically Jewish interpretation 
of that prejudice by either Paul or his assumed audience, but the fact 
that that Jewish interpretation was derivative of the prevailing Roman 
attitude would have been especially apparent in a Roman setting.87
87 One important implication of this study, which bears further consideration, 
relate to Paul’s knowledge of the theological and philosophical controversies of 
his day. Cf. Deissmann, Paul, 174: ‘The whole religious world contemporary with 
St. Paul was...in a state of decided movement even before he began his labours. 
The roads that Paul traversed as a missionary had been trodden before him by the 
emissaries of Isis, of the God of the Jews, and of the great Mother of Phrygia.’ 
Our reconstructions of this ‘decided movement’ are generally opaque and lack 
definition, despite the numerous kinds and prodigious amounts of evidence 
available to us for such purposes. However, cf. Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, 
259 (emphasis original): ‘We would do well to consider that as Paul travelled 
around, he was actually meeting the professors of these other faiths. In the middle 
of the first century a d  Isiacism, far from being dead, was in the ascendant.’ Cp. 
Cary, History o f Rome, 587-90. On the particular appeal of the Egyptian cults in 
the Greco-Roman period, cf. J. Gwyn Griffiths, ‘The Great Egyptian Cults of 
Oecumenical Spiritual Significance’, in A.H. Armstrong (ed.), Classical 
Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman (World Spirituality: An 
Encyclopedic History of the Religious Quest 15; London: Routledge and Kegan 
Paul, 1986) 39-65.
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ROMANS 6:1-11 AND ISIS/SARAPIS BAPTISM: PERFORMANCE AND
CREATIVITY
Socrates: And to my question it has furnished the reply that mind
belongs to that one of our four classes which was called 
the cause of all. Now, you see, you have at last my answer.
Protarchus: Yes, and a very sufficient one and yet you answered 
without my knowing it.
Socrates: Yes, Protarchus, for sometimes a joke is a restful change
from serious talk.
Protarchus: You are right.
(Plato, Philebus 30D-E, LCL)
In a model derived from Gadamer’s philosophy, a dialogue cannot 
take place between partners if they are not oriented toward the same 
subject-matter. Although words may pass between them, this does not 
constitute a true dialogue. Below, in Chapter 5, the idea of a ‘true’ 
dialogue is discussed in detail, but for the present context, it is 
important to understand the importance of this metaphorized 
contractual arrangement in Gadamer’s thought. By subject matter 
{Sache), neither Gadamer nor the present study assumes some vague 
notion o f a connection between the statements all parties are 
making— that, for instance, they are speaking of sin and the law, or 
the status of a Jew or a Greek. Although I have followed Gadamer in 
the use of ‘conversation’ to describe the dialectical process o f a 
dialogue, this is not meant to convey the idea of some vague 
conversation about a non-specific topic, such as that of a group of  
friends at a cocktail party. ‘Subject-matter’ in Gadamer’s perspective 
is a far more tightly defined concept. In the bulk of the material I have 
examined from Gadamer, I have been most interested in his 
understanding of the process of interpreting texts, but I have never lost 
sight of the importance of the dialogue form88 in Platonic philosophy 
for Gadamer’s conception of the hermeneutical process.
88 The sense of ‘form’ here is roughly that of B. Williams’s reading of 
Plato’s cave and line analogies {Republic 514A-516B; 509D-51 IB. respectively; 
Plato [London: Phoenix, 1998] 26-37, here 35): ‘Only what is in the world of 
Forms “really is”; the world of everyday perception is “between being and not 
being”, and is mere appearance or like a dream; only “being” can be the object of 
knowledge, while the world of “becoming” is the object of mere belief or 
conjecture.’ This closely coheres with Gadamer’s use of Plato in this regard, when 
he states {Truth and Method, 474) that ‘Being that can be understood is language’. 
Cf. discussion of this above, p. 38 n. 104, and below, p. 230. Cf. also Gadamer,
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The title for the first section in this chapter reflects the importance 
of the beginning of a dialogue, and of establishing both subject matter 
and orientation to that subject matter. As outlined above, the initial 
point which Paul needs to establish is the unity of his audience, for 
there clearly are differences between members of the church in terms 
of their ethnic and religious background. Rather than read 1:18-32 as 
addressed to Gentiles and 2:1-29 as addressed to Jews, we should read 
1:18-2:1 as an address to both Gentile and  Jewish Christians, 
establishing the sinfulness of all humans, both Jew and Greek, as Paul 
puts it. This is as much as Paul needs to establish with the Gentile 
audience, for that is the extent of the claim that needs to be made on 
Gentiles who would become followers of Christ. Jews, however, have 
another story. It would seem that, perhaps as in other contexts in the 
earliest Church, the status of Jews is in question. Paul must address 
this before getting to his own theology of equality under grace, and 
salvation by faith alone, ju st as he must have in all the rest o f his 
churches where there were Jews present. If indeed I am correct in 
assigning to Romans the unique status of a letter of Paul sent to a 
congregation he had never met, and in suggesting that Romans may 
hence provide a unique glimpse into Paul’s dialectical strategy, we 
should not expect Paul’s arguments here to be in the same form as 
those in other letters, as Walker and Sanders seem to (see above).
From Romans 1 to Romans 6: Tracing PauVs Argument 
Far from an unconnected aside or interpolated introduction, Paul’s 
beginning of his letter to the Roman church, from the beginning of ch. 
1 to 3:21, is a carefully crafted beginning to his dialogue between 
himself and this unknown church. Paul must, in these initial words, 
establish many different elements in this dialogue, but primarily he 
must determine the subject matter. He goes about this task with much 
care and precision, for he must address levels of understanding about 
the gospel (or his gospel?) from the most basic to the more advanced.
I have demonstrated above the initial stage in his establishment of this 
understanding, but he continues, stage-by-stage, throughout the 
introductory section, culminating in 3:26. Although, in the interest of 
space and the desire to analyze in more detail the problem of Rom.
The Beginning o f Philosophy, 20: Tn the end—in absolute knowing—the 
difference between the Idea and its movement is superseded [aufgehoben] and the 
movement is unquestionably the movement of thinking, which we, nevertheless, 
view as something like the projection of the ideas upon a wall.’
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6:1-11,1 cannot fully exegete this first section, I see it progressing as 
follows (from the standpoint of Paul’s purpose for each section): 
1:18-2:11 establishes the culpability of humankind before the creator 
God, and the need to ‘do good’ rather than evil (2:9-11).89 This leaves 
Paul’s audience with the possible expectation that they can do good, 
perhaps on the basis o f the Jewish, or other, law. Paul carefully 
addresses this point at length in 2:12-3:21. First (2:12), he establishes 
that all humankind is under the power of sin. He does this without 
seeming to do so, for his point in 2:12 appears to be directed at the 
role of the law: ‘All who have sinned without the law will also perish 
without the law, and all who have sinned under the law will be judged 
by the law.’ This point will only be taken up again at 3:9, but the 
intervening material shows that, though the Jews have benefits that 
Gentiles do not— and have been of benefit in a way that Gentiles have 
not (see esp. 3:1-2)— there is no salvific usefulness in following the 
law, for ‘no human being will be justified in his sight by works of the 
law, since through the law comes knowledge of sin’ (3:20).
It is not until halfway through ch. 3 that Paul is able to address the 
whole of the subject matter of his anticipated dialogue with the 
Romans:
But now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from law, 
although the law and the prophets bear witness to it, the righteousness of 
God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe. For there is no 
distinction; since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, they 
are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in 
Christ Jesus, whom God has put forward as an expiation by his blood, to 
be received by faith (3:21-25a, r s v ).
The use of diatribe intensifies as Paul nears the end of this section. 
In 3:1, 3, 5, 7, 8 and 9, Paul anticipates the questions, objections and 
thoughts of his audience with a series of rapid-fire questions and 
answers.90 In keeping with my suggestion that the especially frequent 
use of diatribe in Romans may be a result of its special status as an 
initiatory letter, it is unsurprising that this particular juncture 
witnesses an increase in its use. After a long process of laying the 
foundations for their dialogue, Paul is now fielding the questions of 
his partners in such a way as to carefully voice and reject potentially
89 On the controversy surrounding this statement by Paul, cf. Cranfield, 
Romans, 1.151-53, where he outlines ten different possible interpretations.
90 On the use of diatribe in this section, cf. S.K. Stowers, ‘Paul’s Dialogue 
with a Fellow Jew in Romans 3:1-9’, CBQ 46 (1984) 707-22.
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confusing interpretations of his arguments (some, apparently, more 
serious than others, if  3:8 is any indication) before moving on to his 
most controversial stand.
Now that he has fully established the subject matter of their 
dialogue, Paul does not depart from this theme. He continues by 
visiting various topoi of his theological argumentation, familiar to us 
from other contexts: ch. 4 returns to the example of the faith of 
Abraham, discussed at length in Gal. 3:6^1:11; and ch. 5 extends this 
discussion as far back as Adam, using the Adam-Christ typology first 
used in 1 Cor. 15:20-50. Chapter 6 forms a new, but previously 
anticipated development in Paul’s argumentation. In the midst o f his 
argumentation concerning the lack of efficacy of the law and the 
faithfulness of God in ch. 3, Paul includes a double objection: ‘But if 
through my falsehood God’s truthfulness abounds to his glory, why 
am I still being condemned as a sinner? And why not do evil that good 
may come?’ (Rom. 3:7-8a), to which he adds his assessment of those 
‘people [who] slanderously charge us with saying’ such things: ‘their 
condemnation is just’ (Rom. 3:8b). Paul does not actually deal with 
these objections at this point in his argument, though. This waits until 
the beginning of ch. 6, where he re-introduces such objections as a 
response to his arguments in chs. 4 and 5 which culminate in Rom. 
5:20-21 with the following statement: ‘Law came in, to increase the 
trespass; but where sin increased, grace abounded all the more, so 
that, as sin reigned in death, grace also might reign through 
righteousness to eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.’91
Returning to the objection in 6:1-2, Paul asks, ‘What shall we say 
then? Are we to continue in sin that grace may abound?’, and 
responds to this possibility with his famous negated optative ‘p.f) 
yévoiTO ! [“May it never be!”] How can we who died to sin still live in 
it?’ His proof for this argument takes the form of a description of the 
baptism process which, until the 1960s, was often taken by the 
history-of-religions school of thought to stem from mystery religions. 
In the wake of Gunther Wagner’s D as religionsgeschichtliche  
Problem von Romer 6, 1-11,92 however, such appeals to comparative
91 On the continuation of the diatribe into Romans 5, cf. S.E. Porter, ‘The 
Argument of Romans 5: Can a Rhetorical Question Make a Difference?’ JBL 110 
(1991) 655-77.
92 (AThANT 39; Zürich: Zwingli, 1962), English translation, Pauline 
Baptism and the Pagan Mysteries: The Problem o f the Pauline Doctrine o f
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evidence have been largely neglected. The main thrust of Wagner’s 
argument, though, was that baptism did not exist in any of those cults 
which had been appealed to as ‘parallels’ or, perhaps, sources o f this 
interpretation of baptism in Romans 6. From a hermeneutical point-of- 
view, Wagner sought to show that, in any Pauline dialogue about 
baptism, the only possible voices present were those of Judaism and 
Christianity. However, my recent research has shown that, despite 
Wagner’s and others’ assertions to the contrary, the Isis/Sarapis cult 
does indeed seem to have practised some form of baptism, or was at 
least thought to do so by uninitiated outsiders.93
In the light of this, it seems appropriate that the case for ‘mysteries 
influence’ on Paul’s conception of baptism in Romans 6 be re-opened. 
My desire in re-opening this discussion is not identical to that o f an 
earlier generation of religions-historical scholarship, content generally 
to rely on often questionable ‘parallels’ to make assertions about the 
character of the Christian religion practised by Paul. Instead, while 
examining the possibility o f such parallelism between Paul’s 
description of baptism in Romans 6 and baptism in the Isis/Sarapis 
cult, I wish to likewise examine the role that such parallelism might 
play in the dialectical relationship between Paul and the Roman 
church. In so doing, we will have to return to some of the material 
cited above in connection with the Roman attitude toward Egyptian 
religion, and examine the alternate side of that relationship— the 
incredible attraction that Romans seem to have had to the Egyptian 
cults— to consider the role that such attraction might have played in 
their religious sentiments now that they were part of the new Christian 
religious group. If, as I argue below, the ideas about identification 
with Christ in Romans 6 reflect a pagan religious setting, this will also 
allow us to examine the idea of ‘influence’ from a hermeneutical 
point-of-view, and deform past understandings of this concept by 
including an understanding of the role of creativity.
Baptism in Romans VI. 1-11,. in the Light o f its Religio-Historical ‘Parallels’ 
(trans. J.P. Smith; Edinburgh and London: Oliver & Boyd, 1967).
93 This has been published in my ‘Baptism and Initiation in the Cult of Isis 
and Sarapis’, in S.E. Porter and A.C. Cross (eds.), Baptism, the New Testament 
and the Church: Studies in Honour o f R.E.O. White (JSNTSup 171; Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1999) 42-62, reproduced (with some alteration) in this 
thesis as Appendix B.
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The Debate over Mysteries-Influence on Romans 6 
Wagner’s work seems to have sent a clear signal to most of those 
interested in the relationship between Paul and the mystery religions 
(at least as far as his interpretation of baptism in Rom. 6:1-11 is 
concerned) that the phase of Pauline studies where frequent assertions 
of parallels between Paul’s writings and the various Greco-Roman 
mystery cults were made had come to an end. Since that time, 
comparatively few works on the topic have been published.94 
However, both before and after Wagner, scholars have held a variety 
of positions on this matter, ranging from an absolute dependence of 
Paul on the mystery religions,95 through to a complete n i n ­
dependence,96 as well as a variety of mid-way stances.
94 The most important of these have been P. Siber, Mit Christus zu leben: 
Eine Studie zur paulinischen Auferstehungshoffnung (AThANT 61; Zürich: 
Zwingli, 1971) 191-249; A.J.M. Wedderbum, ‘Hellenistic Christian Traditions in 
Romans 6?’, NTS 29 (1983) 337-55; idem, ‘Paul and the Hellenistic Mystery- 
Cults: On Posing the Right Questions’, in U. Bianchi and J. Vermaseren (eds.). La 
soteriologia dei culti orientali nelV Impero Romano (EPRO 92; Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1982) 817-33; idem. Baptism and Resurrection: Studies in Pauline Theology 
against its Graeco-Roman Background (WUNT 44; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 
1987) (see also his ‘Some Observations on Paul’s use of the Phrases “In Christ” 
and “With Christ’” , JSNT  25 [1985] 83-97, which rightly prefers an initially 
grammatical approach to these phrases, rather than a religions-historical one [see 
esp. 91 and 97 n. 51]); H.D. Betz, ‘Transferring a Ritual: Paul’s Interpretation of 
Baptism in Romans 6’, in T. Engberg-Pedersen (ed.), Paul in His Hellenistic 
Context (SNTW; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995) 
84-118; see also R. Schlarb’s study of this passage in early Christian 
interpretation, Wir sind mit Christus begraben: Die Auslegung von Romer 6,1-11 
im Früchristentum bis Origen (BGBE 31; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1990).
95 E.g. P. Wendland, Die hellenistisch-romische Kultur in ihren Beziehungen 
zu Judentum und Christentum (HNT 2; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 4th edn, 1972 
[1912]); C. Schneider, Geistesgeschichte des Antiken Christentums (2 vols.; 
Munich: Beck, 1954); S.G.F. Brandon, ‘The Historical Element in Primitive 
Christianity’, Numen 2 (1955) 156-67; idem, ‘The Ritual Perpetuation of the 
Past’, Numen 6 (1959) 112-29; K. Lake, The Earlier Epistles o f St. Paul (London: 
Rivingtons, 2nd edn, 1919); A.F. Loisy, Les mystères païens et le mystère 
chrétien (Paris: Emile Nourry, 2nd edn, 1930 [1914]); R. Reitzenstein, Hellenistic 
Mystery-Religions: Their Basic Ideas and Significance (PTMS 15; Pittsburgh: 
Pickwick, 1978 [German 3rd edn, 1927]); H. Maccoby, Paul and Hellenism 
(London: S CM Press, 1991); and Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, esp. ch. 19. 
While Witt’s handling of the issue as a classicist is reasoned and based on a 
thorough knowledge of the evidence in question, Maccoby neglects much relevant 
evidence and many important issues (e.g. his handling of the ‘parallel’ of the
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These mid-way stances were the most influential in the last period 
of discussion of the subject in the late fifties to mid sixties, and this 
position is still a popular one, when the issue of mysteries influence is 
not ignored outright or dismissed. For example, as Feldman stated in 
the late seventies, ‘Judaism’s quarrel with Paul is not for adapting the 
law but for repealing it and for combining pagan mystery-cult ideas 
with Judaism’,97 and, more recently, Taylor can casually assert that 
'Christian baptism became a complex ritual that accrued features of 
the initiatory processes of the Hellenistic mystery cults, and it came to 
seem very different indeed from any Jewish practice, despite 
occasional parallels’.98 The question has become a moot point for 
most subsequent scholarship, whose arguments surrounding this issue 
do not reassess the finer nuances of relevant data.
taurobolium of the Mithras and Attis mysteries, p. 128; cf. A. Oepke, ‘(Bd-rmo’, 
TDNT, 1.531-32 for discussion of the anachronism of seeing the taurobolium as a 
parallel of baptism in the New Testament period; and, more generally, R. Duthoy, 
The Taurobolium: Its Evolution and Terminology [EPRO 10; Leiden: E.J. Brill,
1969]).
96 E.g. Wagner, Pauline Baptism, esp. 283-94; M. Goguel, The Birth o f 
Christianity (trans. H.C. Snape; London: Allen & Unwin, 1953 [1946]); O. 
Michel, Der Brief an die Rômer (KEK 4; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 
14th edn, 1978 [1955]); H. Rahner, ‘The Christian Mystery and the Pagan 
Mysteries’, in J. Campbell (ed.), The Mysteries: Papers from the Eranos 
Yearbooks. II. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955) 337-401; H.A.A. 
Kennedy, St. Paul and the Mystery Religions (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1913); O. Cullmann, Baptism in the New Testament (trans. J.K.S. Reid; SET 1; 
London: SCM Press; Chicago: Regnery, 1950); and G. Bornkamm, Paul (trans. 
D.M.G. Stalker; London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1971) 190; idem. Das Ende des 
Gesetzes: Paulusstudien (BEvT 16; Munich: Kaiser, 1952).
97 L.H. Feldman, ‘Hengel’s Judaism and Hellenism in Retrospect’, JBL 96.3 
(1977) 382.
98 J.E. Taylor, The Immerser: John the Baptist within Second Temple 
Judaism (Studying the Historical Jesus; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; London: 
SPCK, 1997) 70. For the background of this way of speaking about Paul and 
mystery religions, cf. R. Bultmann, Theology o f the New Testament (trans. K. 
Grobel; 2 vols.; London; SCM Press, 1952) 1.140-41, 187; W. Bousset, Kyrios 
Christos: A History o f Belief from the Beginnings o f Christianity to Irenaeus 
(trans. J.E. Steely; Nashville: Abingdon, 1970 [German 4th edn, 1935]); M. 
Dibelius, Die Isisweihe bei Apuleius und verwandte Initiations-Riten 
(Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch- 
Historische Klasse 1917.4; Heidelberg: Winter, 1917); idem and W.G. Kiimmel, 
Paul (trans. F. Clarke; London: Longmans, Green, 1953) 93 and 105; and Oepke, 
‘(Bd-nTO)’, 531-32.
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The usual treatment of the idea of mysteries influence on Paul in 
contemporary scholarship seems to be either: (1) to ignore the 
question; or, (2) to conclude (sometimes cautiously) with Wagner in 
rejecting the significance of the Hellenistic mysteries for Paul’s 
conception of baptism in Rom. 6:1-11, while still (to varying degrees) 
recognizing the obvious similarities. Examples of ignoring the 
question where one might reasonably expect discussion in the light of 
the work’s intended purposes include: Tannehill, who discusses the 
esoteric ‘two dominions’ (as he construes them) in Romans 6, but 
does not contribute mention or measurement of any outside material 
which might assist in explaining the origin, meaning or thrust of 
Paul’s language here;99 Fee, whose G od’s Empowering Presence, 
though concerned primarily with the Holy Spirit in Paul’s letters, pays 
no attention to the wider Greco-Roman setting of either Paul or his 
letter to the Roman church in his discussion of Rom. 6:4.100 Soards, 
who, in a chapter entitled ‘The World of Paul and his Readers’, does 
indeed mention the mystery religions, then makes no reference to any 
of them at any point in his book with regard to the role they may have 
played in this world.101 Likewise, Grayston in his Dying, We Live: A 
New Enquiry into the Death o f Christ in the New Testament, in a 
section entitled ‘Dying and Rising in Baptism’, surprisingly makes no 
mention of the mysteries whatsoever.102 A particularly disappointing 
lack of interest in this topic, however, has been the work of the 
Pauline Theology Group of the Society of Biblical Literature, whose 
meetings from 1986-96 appear in the Pauline Theology Series.103 
None of these volumes contains any significant discussion of the
99 R.C. Tannehill, Dying and Rising with Christ: A Study in Pauline 
Theology (BZNW 32; Berlin: Alfred Topelmann, 1967) esp. 7-42.
100 G.D. Fee, God's Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters o f 
Paul (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994) 501-502, reflected also in his appendix 
discussion of ‘The Pauline Antecedents’, 904-15, all of which are, according to 
Fee, either from the Old Testament or Second Temple Jewish literature.
101 M.L. Soards, The Apostle Paul: An Introduction to his Writings and 
Teachings (New York: Paulist, 1987) 15-16.
102 K. Grayston, Dying, We Live: A New Enquiry into the Death o f Christ in 
the New Testament (London: Barton, Longman and Todd, 1990) 101-103.
103 The publication of this series is split between Fortress Press (vols. 1-3) 
and Scholars Press (vol. 4).
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broader issues surrounding Paul’s relationship to his Greco-Roman 
context, nor the more specific issue of Rom. 6:1-11.104
There are also several among the second group— those who side 
(sometimes cautiously) with Wagner in rejecting the significance of 
the Hellenistic mysteries for Paul’s conception of baptism in Rom. 
6:1-11, while still recognizing the obvious similarities.105 By far the 
best treatment within this camp, however, is in Dunn’s first volume of 
his commentary on Romans. While still denying the influence of 
mystery religions on Paul— ‘On the basis of the evidence it can be
104 This lack is particularly felt in D.M. Hay and E.E. Johnson (eds.), Pauline 
Theology. III. Romans (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1995) and E.E. Johnson and 
D.M. Hay (eds.), Pauline Theology. IV. Looking back, Pressing on (SBLSS; 
Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1997). See also Moo, Romans, 353-71; Stowers, A 
Rereading o f Romans, even though the book aims to place Romans within its 
socio-cultural, historical and rhetorical contexts; Stuhlmacher, Paul’s Letter to the 
Romans, 89-93; T.L. Donaldson, Paul and the Gentiles: Remapping the Apostle’s 
Convictional World (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1997); Bruce, Paul: Apostle o f 
the Free Spirit, 280-83, in his discussion of ‘Baptism and the Lord’s Supper in 
Pauline Thought’; C.K. Barrett, Paul: An Introduction to his Thought 
(Outstanding Christian Thinkers; London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994) 128-31, 
although he does, grudgingly, examine the issue in his earlier A Commentary on 
the Epistle to the Romans (BNTC; London: A. & C. Black, 1957), 122, opting for 
a ‘Paul might reflect mystery-vocabulary, but nothing else’ option; J.C. Beker, 
Paul the Apostle: The Triumph o f God in Life and Thought (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1980), who, although he mentions the passage on occasion (e.g. 174-75, 
211, 224-26), seems to be completely caught up in the meaning that it had for  
Paul (as Becker construes him), and is not concerned with the world into which 
this Pauline theology was being injected; M.J. Harris, Raised Immortal: 
Resurrection and Immortality in the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1983) 12; Kim, The Origin o f Paul’s Gospel’, and G.B. Caird, New Testament 
Theology (completed and ed. L.D. Hurst; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994) 222-25.
105 E.g. Cranfield, Romans, 1.301-303; Fitzmyer, Romans, 431; Ziesler, 
Paul’s Letter to the Romans, 154-55; G.R. Beasley-Murray, Baptism in the New 
Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1962) 126-46; N.A. Dahl, Studies in Paul: 
Theology for the Early Christian Mission (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977) 83-84; 
Dunn, Theology o f Paul, 445, 447-48, 450-52; Morris, Romans, 246 n. 10, who 
does make a brief mention of the issue, but gives only a few lines of a footnote 
and a single citation of Wedderbum (‘Hellenistic Christian Traditions’) to the 
topic; Ridderbos, Paul, 406-407; Schoeps, Paul, 61; D. Seeley, ‘Paul’s Doctrine 
of Salvation and the Mystery Religions (Attis, Adonis, Isis, Osiris, Eleusis)’, in 
his The Noble Death: Graeco-Roman Martyrology and Paul’s Concept o f  
Salvation (JSNTSup 28; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990) ch. 4; and Segal, Paul the 
Convert, 135-37.
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firmly concluded that a direct influence from any mystery cult or from 
the Isis cult in particular, on Paul or on the theology of Rom 6:3-4, is 
most unlikely’—he is still willing to admit that, ‘Nevertheless, a broad 
similarity remains’.106
Despite such apparent openness, few have attempted to continue the 
argument, possibly because Wagner’s volume appears to have brought 
an era to a c lose.107 Indeed, it seemed questionable that, after 
Wagner’s publication, there was much left to consider. He managed to 
sum up the state of play to a degree that made new positions simply 
shades of the views of one previous scholar mixed with those of 
another—not really anything new at all. In the light of this situation, it 
may be surprising to find that this discussion is re-opened here. My 
aim, however, is not to open up old wounds; rather, to inject the old 
discussions with some new life, and consider the role of this passage 
within the Pauline dialogue with the Roman church, and the dialectic 
function of the potential Egyptian cultic ‘influence’ on Paul in this 
passage. In the light of new evidence that there likely existed within 
the Isis cult a well-defined and important baptismal ritual, and the 
suggestive parallel between this ritual and the way in which Paul 
explains the significance of baptism in Rom. 6:1-11, it also seems 
appropriate to extend the discussion of Egyptian cultic ‘brand’ 
identity from above, considering the way in which Paul utilizes this 
material in an entirely different way in a new context. It is incumbent 
upon me here to address the issues of creativity and influence in a 
manner that, while I think it is in keeping with Gadamer’s philosophy, 
goes beyond him, for, as I mentioned above, he does not formally 
address either of these topics.
106 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 308-13, here 310.
107 Wagner’s response was simply one of a number of death-knells for the 
ailing over-confidence of the religions-historical school, whose demise has also 
meant the end of much discussion of Rom. 6:1-11. As far as Wagner’s own work, 
he has not been without detractors. As Dunn (Romans 1-8, 309) notes, Wagner 
has been criticized for his ‘underplaying of the closeness of the parallel between 
6:3-4 and initiation into the Isis cult as described by Apuleius in Metamorphoses 
11’. These critics include N. Gaumann, Taufe und Ethik: Studien zur Rômer 6 
(Munich: Kaiser, 1967) 41-46; K. Wengst, Christologische Formeln und Lieder 
des Urchristentums (Giitersloh: Giitersloher, 1972) 39-40; J.G. Griffiths, Apuleius 
o f Madauros: The Isis-Book (Metamorphoses, Book XI) (EPRO 39; Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1975) 52, 258, 298; U. Schnelle, Gerechtigkeit und Christusgegenwart: 
Vorpaulinische und paulinische Tauftheologie (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & 
Ruprecht, 1983) 77-78.
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Before proceeding with these aspects of this study, however, special 
mention should be made of Wedderbum’s work on the topic. 
Although he is one of the current authorities on the topic, he has been 
largely supportive of Wagner’s conclusions, but has not, in my 
opinion, significantly advanced the discussion of Rom. 6:1-11. 
Despite the following programmatic principles for discussion of  
Paul’s potential relationships to the mystery cults devised by 
Wedderbum, his solutions along the same lines are unsatisfying, and 
are tantamount to a counsel of despair:
...any discussion of the relation between Paul and the mystery cults 
should not: (1) treat these cults in isolation from the whole culture of 
which they were a part, but allow for their influence on, and being 
influenced by, that culture; (2) treat Paul’s theology in isolation from that 
Christian heritage which he used and adapted, but reckon with various 
substrata of tradition used by him which may have differed from him in 
certain respects [NB Wedderbum sees Rom. 6:13 as evidence of this]; (3) 
ignore the possibility that to react against something is to be influenced no 
less than if one adopts it as one’s own; or (4) ignore the possibility that, 
even if the whole of Paul’s thought in a passage like Rom. 6 is not 
influenced by the mysteries, parts of it, individual motifs or ideas, may 
well be, directly or indirectly. Yet at the same time this discussion will 
have to be realistic as to how much Paul or any early Christian was likely 
to be in a position to know about the mystery-cults and as to how he was 
likely to view anything which he knew to belong to such rites.108
Nevertheless, it is possible to adopt and adapt this scheme of 
Wedderbum’s as a way to advance my dialectical analysis of aspects 
of Paul’s letter to the Romans. His points (1) and (2) seem self- 
evident, and are hence in need of no further comment; and his final 
(un-numbered) point, regarding the possible knowledge of mystery- 
cults and their theology by Paul and other early Christians, is handled 
in enough detail in the first part of the present chapter (where I take 
the opposite view). Wedderbum’s points (3) and (4) are, however, in 
need of further analysis. Although he admits in point (4) that, ‘directly 
or indirectly’, ‘individual motifs or ideas’ in Romans 6 might be
108 Wedderbum, ‘Paul and the Hellenistic Mystery-Cults’, 829. Wagner 
argued a similar case in 1962, and it does not seem to have been surpassed by 
Wedderbum either here in one of his preliminary articles, or in the monograph 
which followed {Baptism and Resurrection). See below, n. 130, for Betz’s 
criticism of Wedderbum’s position in this regard (although Betz is speaking with 
reference to the later monograph, W edderbum’s position seems to have 
undergone no significant development between the articles and the monograph).
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‘influenced by the mysteries’, Wedderbum is clearly unwilling to 
admit the possibility that Paul’s explanation of baptism in Romans 6 
is taken as a whole from a non-Christian (or, by extension, Jewish) 
setting. His final point, that we ‘will have to be realistic as to how 
much Paul or any early Christian was likely to be in a position to 
know about the mystery-cults and as to how he was likely to view  
anything which he knew to belong to such rites’, underlines this 
unwillingness, and the presuppositional bias he has towards an 
inadequate understanding of ‘influence’.109 However, his point (3), 
that we should not ‘ignore the possibility that to react against 
something is to be influenced no less than if one adopts it as one’s 
own’ revives hope for the concept of influence by a counter-intuitive 
negative assessment.
Parallels between Isiac and Orphic Initiatory Rites and PauVs 
Interpretation o f Baptism in Rom. 6:3-4 
Are Hellenistic mystery religion initiatory rites parallel to Paul’s 
interpretation of baptism in Rom. 6:1-11? And, assuming for the 
moment the positive answer to this question (see below), how and why 
are they parallel? Following some of Wagner’s critics, my assessment 
is that the evidence does indeed suggest that Paul’s interpretation of 
baptism in Rom. 6:1-11 is parallel to elements in the mystery 
religions, especially the Isis cult, which was located in many different 
Hellenistic centres throughout the Greco-Roman world.110 In my 
opinion, the most important element of this similarity is the language 
of identification utilized by Paul o f the individual Christian’s 
‘sharing’ (Rom. 6:5) in the activities of Jesus by participation in a 
ritual re-enactment of Christ’s death. As we shall see, the language 
used in Romans 6 of this participation, in addition to the similarities 
of Paul’s equation of baptism and death with the similar equation in 
the Osiris myth, clearly evokes a connection with Rom. 1:23, and 
stands in developed contrast to typical Jewish use of similar language.
109 As only a representative example adverting to the deep penetration of the 
Isis cult into areas of importance to earliest Christianity, cf. J.C. Walters, 
‘Egyptian Religions in Ephesos’, in H. Koester (ed.), Ephesos: Metropolis o f 
Asia—An Interdisciplinary Approach to its Archaeology, Religion, and Culture 
(Harvard Theological Studies 41; Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 
1995) 281-309.
110 See below, Appendix B, for full assessment of this material. Cf. Witt, Isis 
in the Ancient World, ch. 19.
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Before engaging in this original analysis, informed by Gadamer’s 
understanding of the connection between understanding, performance 
and ritual, it is important that we first understand why it is that Paul’s 
words in Rom. 6:1-11 have, in the past and the present, suggested to 
scholars that there was some kind of overlap between Paul’s 
interpretation of baptism and the understanding of baptism in the Isiac 
religion, as there are foci of this past analysis taken up by me, but also 
elements which, in contrast, are consciously polemicized against in 
my analysis.
In this passage, Paul, continuing the ersatz dialogue with his Roman 
audience through the use of diatribe, responds to his phantom 
dialogue partner who has asked a question regarding the effect of 
continuing in sin for the purpose of multiplying grace. In his answer, 
Paul uses the example of Christ’s death and resurrection, linking the 
presuppositions of this experience through baptism: ‘Do you not know 
that all of us who have been baptized into Christ Jesus were baptized 
into his death? We were buried therefore with him by baptism into 
death, so that as Christ was raised from the dead by the glory of the 
Father, we too might walk in newness of life’ (vv. 3-4).
This context brings together two different aspects of identificatory 
language in a striking manner. On the one hand, Paul’s use of diatribe 
apparently externalizes his own self-consciousness in a way that raises 
questions with regard to the role of self-consciousness in diatribe. In 
the context of Gadamer’s dialogical philosophy, it would be worth 
investigating some of the psychological ramifications of this 
interaction with one’s own self or ego, since the phenomenon of 
diatribe provides a unique window into dialogical characteristics of 
self-consciousness.111 Deleuze and Gauttari, in their discussion of 
‘What is a concept?’, consider the example of a Cartesian concept of 
the ego, and Kant’s creation of a concept of T  by making
time a component of a new cogito, but on condition of providing in turn a 
new concept of time: time becomes form  o f interiority with three 
components—succession, but also simultaneity and permanence. This 
again implies a new concept of space that can no longer be defined by 
simple simultaneity and becomes form of exteriority. Space, time, and ‘I
111 Cf. discussion of the role of the unconscious in Gadamer’s philosophy 
above, p. 13 n. 37.
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think’ are three original concepts linked by bridges that are also 
junctions—a blast of original concepts.112
They see the concept as ‘a multiplicity, an absolute surface or volume, 
self-referents, made up of a certain number of inseparable intensive 
variations according to an order of neighborhood, and traversed by a 
point in a state of survey.’ Gibson considers the ‘Imagination of the 
First Person’, and states:
in certain respects, the identification of what it is to be an individual—to 
be an account of personal identity—is a non-linear function or result of 
wider presuppositions reflected in, and as, facets of society under 
intentional description.. .113
This lays the ground for developing Deleuze and Guattari’s ideas into 
the following concept: ‘the pronoun “I” is a set of possible worlds’.114 
Gathering together these strands, it is plausible to propose from their 
usage in these references that one could conceptualize T  as a spatial 
realm with an expanding surface, which could in turn help one to 
understand the psychological role of the use of diatribe. For Paul, the 
subjunctive conditional possibilities he admits into discussion through 
the use of diatribe suggest a kind of projection of Paul’s inner-play of 
self-consciousness onto the surface of his letter to the Roman church.
112 G. Deleuze and F. Gauttari, What is Philosophy? (trans. H. Tomlinson and 
G. Burchill; London and New York: Verso, 1994 [1991]) 32. Likewise, A. Bowie, 
‘Introduction’ xxiv, in his discussion of the philosophical heritage of Frank’s 
work, adverts to the importance of Fichte’s undermining of ‘the structure of 
reflexive self-presence, which entails a split between two aspects of oneself, by 
showing dependence of that structure on a necessarily prior unity which cannot be 
accounted for in reflexive terms’.
113 A. Gibson, ‘Modern Philosophy and Ancient Consciousness: I Think 
Therefore I Am Gendered?’, in Hayes, Porter, and Tombs (eds.), Religion and 
Sexuality, 35-36. Cf. Bowie, ‘Introduction’, xxiii: ‘The problem Fichte shows 
[with the tautological identity of Cartesian self-consciousness] comes about when 
the whole structure of self-consciousness is to be explained in terms of the “I” 
reflecting upon itself’ In this connection, cf. Bowie’s criticism of the work of R. 
Gasché {The Tain o f the Mirror: Derrida and the Philosophy o f Reflection 
[Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1986]) in Bowie, 
Schelling and Modern European Philosophy, esp. 142 and 166: ‘The problem...is 
simply this: how can something re-cognise itself without already knowing itself 
before ceasing to be itself?’; ‘The question is how this could ever be known. The 
condition of such knowledge would be a prius, a beginning, which is relative to 
what ensues from it, which has a reflexive relationship to it’.
114 Cf. Gibson, ‘Modern Philosophy’, 27, 36.
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In this light, the language of identification which Paul uses in his 
discussion of baptism in this passage is uniquely positioned, for the 
use of diatribe to project the play of Paul’s self-consciousness raises 
his discourse to an advanced level of mental reasoning. His discussion 
is suffused with metaphoric realizations of the deep structure of the 
mind, as confronted with the presuppositions of the Pauline gospel. 
The language of identification and imitation in this passage is not 
reminiscent of Jewish ideas— Jews were not called to participate in 
ritual so as to identify with the actions of Yahweh, nor to imitate their 
God, but rather to follow his Law. Other cults of the Ancient Near 
Eastern and Greco-Roman worlds, however, contain many different 
levels of such identificatory phenomena. As Gibson states.
The concept of what I have termed God-manifestation.. .is a theme in 
which predicable properties are shared between a god and a worshipper in 
whom that god is assumed to be manifested. Accordingly, some of these 
family resemblances are not evidence of ambiguity, nor of a masked 
intention. They are the visual distribution of predicative levels of identity 
(or identification) between god and worshipper. In this way the 
polarization of choices between god and worshipper categories masks the 
point that the correct choice would be the conjunction of properties shared.
If this is true, its denial would arise via confusing visual surface grammar 
with the deep structure of visual sense.115
In contrast, re-enactments in Israelite tradition and Jewish religion 
focused on thé engagement of the Israelite nation with God, and his 
salvific activities in their history. For example, the Passover feast, 
which re-enacts the actions commanded of the Hebrews being brought 
out of Egypt; or even the much later Hannukah, which re-enacts 
elements of the purification of the Temple under the successful 
Maccabean revolutionaries. This latter festival, while convincingly 
argued to reflect a synthesis of Greek/Hellenistic ideas with Jewish
115 Gibson, Text and Tablet, 11-12. A philosophical explanation for this kind 
of phenomenon can be found in what might be termed ‘relative identity’, drawn 
from P.T. Geach, Reference and Generality: An Examination o f Some Medieval 
and Modern Theories (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, emended edn, 1968) 
39-40, 189-90; on ‘relative identity’, cf. A. Gibson, ‘God’s Semantic Logic: Some 
Functions in the Dead Sea Scrolls and the Bible’, in S.E. Porter and C.A. Evans 
(eds.), The Scrolls and the Scriptures: Qumran Fifty Years After (JSPSup 26; 
RILP 3; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997) 84-90.
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religion by Elias Bickerman,116 nonetheless follows the pattern of 
previous Jewish feasts in functioning as re-enactments of the people's 
activities, not the god’s. In contrast to this, there are important 
elements o f Paul’s language in Romans 6 which are reminiscent of 
language from various of the mysteries. And, apparently, this 
interpretation is not novel: if p ayvoeire ( ‘or do you not know?’) in 
6:3 is not an ironizing comment, it would appear that this is common 
ground for Paul and his audience.
And so, Rudolf Bultmann, in his Theology o f the New Testament, 
suggests that this interpretation of baptism was drawn from the 
practice and language of various mystery religions and their baptismal 
rituals:
Baptism imparts participation in the death and resurrection o f Christ.
This interpretation undoubtedly originated in the Hellenistic Church, 
which understood this traditional initiation-sacrament on analogy with the 
initiation-sacraments of the mystery religions. The meaning of the latter is 
to impart to the initiates a share in the fate of the cult-deity who has 
suffered death and reawakened to life—such as Attis, Adonis, or 
Osiris.117
Later, he goes on to suggest that
Such an interpretation is foreign to Old Testament-Jewish thinking, for it 
knows no cultic acts based on the fate of the Deity and intending to bring 
its effect into the present, but only such as have their basis in the history of 
the People. To understand Jesus’ fate as the basis for a cult, and to 
understand the cult as a celebration which sacramentally brings the 
celebrant into such fellowship with the cult-divinity that the latter’s fate 
avails for the former as if it were his own—that is a Hellenistic mystery- 
idea.118
And finally, he intimates that, in using this concept, Paul
was not the first to give baptism this mystery interpretation, but that it was 
already current before him in Hellenistic congregations, as his question (v.
3), ‘or do you not know...’ might indicate by itself... [H]e does not take 
as his point of departure the bestowal of the Spirit...as one would expect
116 E.J. Bickerman, The God o f the Maccabees: Studies on the Meaning and 
Origin o f the Maccabean Revolt (trans. H.R. Moehring; SJLA 32; Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1979 [1937]) 90-92.
117 Bultmann, Theology, 1.140 (emphasis original).
118 Bultmann, Theology, 1.140.
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from Rom. 8.1 Iff. or Gal. 5.25... Instead, he simply makes use of the 
my stery-interpretation.119
I have chosen to quote this material at length, because it is indicative 
of the way in which the broad category of ‘mystery religions’ was and 
is invoked by some to explain Paul’s conception of baptism at Rom. 
6:1-11. There are several apt observations to be made and inferences 
one can draw from these statements.
The first is with regard to the way in which Bultmann characterizes 
the communities in which this interpretation of baptism had its origin: 
he either calls them the ‘Hellenistic Church’, or calls the interpretation 
a ‘Hellenistic mysteries-interpretation’. The reason he gives for using 
this language is that ‘Such an interpretation is foreign to Old 
Testament-Jewish thinking’. This strange characterization of first- 
century Judaism may in part be explained by his major chapter 
divisions in his more popular book, Primitive Christianity in its 
Contemporary Setting.120 In the section on ‘Judaism’, he splits it into 
three parts: ‘Synagogue and Law’, ‘The Hope o f Israel’, and 
‘Hellenistic Judaism’. This division bears striking similarities to the 
somewhat odd conflation of cultural and geographical terms often 
used to speak o f Second Temple Judaism— dividing it into 
‘Hellenistic’ and ‘Palestinian’ Judaisms. Bultmann’s split between the 
‘Hellenistic Church’ and ‘Old Testament Jewish-thinking’ seems to 
suggest that such a division is operative in his thinking here. The third 
item of interest is the lack of explanation Bultmann provides for 
Paul’s easy use of this, to use his words, ‘Hellenistic mystery- 
interpretation’ of baptism. Later in Bultmann’s Theology, when he 
deals explicitly with the theology of Paul, he suggests that
Paul originated in Hellenistic Judaism... There, without doubt, he 
received his first training in the rabbinic scriptural learning to which his 
letters bear witness... [I]n his home city he came into contact with 
Hellenistic culture and became acquainted with popular philosophy and 
the phenomena of religious syncretism. It remains uncertain, however, to 
what extent he had already appropriated in his pre-Christian period 
theological ideas of this syncretism (those of the mystery-religions and of 
Gnosticism) which come out in his Christian theology.121
119 Bultmann, Theology, 1.141.
120 (trans. R.H. Fuller; London: Thames & Hudson, 1956 [German original 
1949]).
121 Bultmann, Theology, 1.187 (emphasis original). Bultmann’s anachronistic 
use of ‘Gnosticism’ is not dealt with in the present context.
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Any such question on Bultmann’s part is perhaps unanswerable in 
the light of his subsequent assertion that Paul was ‘won to the 
Christian faith by the kerygma of the Hellenistic Church’.122 The 
implications of such a paradigm of traditions-borrowing would, I 
believe, require that Bultmann see the Hellenistic Church as the 
source of any ‘syncretism’. Still, he does leave the door open to an 
earlier appropriation of ‘syncretism’ by Paul, in his pre-Christian, that 
is, Jewish, life. Although the present context is not appropriate for a 
full-scale investigation of the possibility of mysteries-influence on 
Second Temple Judaism, this is one area where further research may 
help to explain the way in which a devout Jew, such as Paul 
apparently was, could be open to non-Jewish religious traditions.123 
The framework for the construction of a paradigm of the interaction 
between Judaism and Hellenism (in-so-far as such terms continue to 
hold meaning) has shifted drastically (in fact, if not perception) in the 
wake of such studies as Hengel’s Judaism and Hellenism,124 but the 
implementation of such a paradigm shift has been slow to pervade the 
various areas of the study of early Christianity and Judaism. It seems 
to me that the failure to interact with the implications of much of the 
evidence (old and new) presented with regard to these ‘ascendant 
mysteries’ is indicative of this. If we are to take seriously the model of 
Paul’s religious mileu(x) with which Deissmann and other scholars of 
religion in the Roman Empire present us, and the re-figuring of the 
relationship between Judaism and Hellenism suggested by Hengel, it 
would seem that, whether one was an initiate or not of the Isiac 
religion, it would have made sense that this religion would have been 
known by Paul and his initial converts, and most definitely by those at 
Rome.125
122 Bultmann, Theology, 1.187.
123 This also relates to Wedderbum’s (‘Paul and the Hellenistic Mystery- 
Cults’, 829) point (4), as discussed above.
124 M. Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in their Encounter in 
Palestine during the Early Hellenistic Period (trans. J. Bowden; 2 vols.; London: 
SCM Press, 1974).
125 For the worship of Isis at Rome, besides Lucius’s movement to the Iseum 
at Rome from that in Cenchraea in Apuleius, see Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, 
56-57 for the cluster of Isis-related finds in and around Rome, and 222-42 for a 
discussion of the relationship between the Isis cult and the Roman emperors. See 
also the discussion of Rom. 1:23 above.
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What has not generally been discussed in previous work on Romans 
6 is the source and reason for the striking similarities between Paul’s 
formulation at Rom. 6:1-11 (esp. vv. 3-4), and these mysteries. 
Bultmann’s (and others’) assertion that this comes via the ‘Hellenistic 
Church’, and is something fundamentally impossible in Jewish 
thinking is unsatisfactory, as Wedderbum has rightly noted.126 The 
larger, and more important, question seems to be this: in the light of 
the prevailing religio-cultural web in which Paul was situated while 
writing Romans, how would he have been able to discuss baptism in 
the light of the mystery religions, or indeed, not discuss baptism in the 
perspective of the mystery religions? Depending on the overarching 
paradigm one applies to Paul and his writings, the answers to these 
questions may be mutually exclusive. An obvious analogy here is, of 
course, Philo. The idea that Philo was heavily influenced by the 
mysteries was strongly defended by E.R. Goodenough,127 whose 
reading of Philo (which, as he freely admits,128 follows the earlier 
work of Joseph Pascher129 on Philo) has not been generally accepted, 
and his religions-historical approach to Second Temple Judaism, 
while surely as legitimate as that to Christianity, was quickly and 
resoundingly rejected. However, while many have disputed 
Goodenough’s suggestion that ‘Judaism in the Greek Diaspora did, for 
at least an important minority, become primarily...a mystery’, the 
evidence he adduces for this cannot be dismissed too easily.130
126 Wedderbum, ‘Hellenistic Christian Traditions’.
127 By Light, Light: The Mystic Gospel o f Hellenistic Judaism (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1935). See also the discussion in A.D. Nock, ‘Hellenistic 
Mysteries and Christian Sacraments’, in his Essays on Religion and the Ancient 
World (2 vols.; ed. Z. Stewart; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972) 2.787-820, esp. 
801-803.
128 Goodenough, By Light, 5.
129 J. Pascher, H BAEIAIKH OAOZ: Der Konigsweg zu Wiedergeburt und 
Vergottung bei Philon von Alexandreia (Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des 
Altertums; Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schoningh, 1931).
130 Goodenough, By Light, 5. As he says earlier: ‘Into [the increasingly 
mystery-oriented] atmosphere the Jew brought his faith and his Scriptures with 
their oriental stories and conceptions. He met not Aristotle or Zeno, but the mystic 
philosophy which was transforming every other oriental mythology into a mystery 
religion. In an environment where the folk religions of Isis and Attis, and later of 
Mithra and Christianity, were one after the other being made over into mysteries 
by the Greeks on the model, and with the philosophical foundation, of Orpheus, 
was Judaism alone to escape?’ (pp. 4-5). Wedderbum (‘Paul and the Hellenistic
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Nevertheless, while this remains an avenue for future research, my 
argument here is merely that our picture of the religious milieu of 
earliest Christianity needs to be broadened and deepened by reference 
to a more complicated and nuanced picture of the religion of Paul and 
his contemporaries, both Jewish and Christian. Much of the discussion 
of earliest Christianity, such as that of Bultmann in the above 
quotations,131 has revolved around belief in a sharp distinction 
between Palestinian Christianity and the Hellenistic Church, which 
mirrors similar distinctions made between ‘Hellenistic’ or ‘Diaspora’ 
Judaism and ‘Palestinian’ Judaism. Despite the unsatisfactory nature 
of either of these formulations, much recent work on Paul seems 
virtually to ignore the fact that he existed as part of the wider Greco- 
Roman world in favour of concentration on his narrowly Palestinian 
setting.132
In this context, Wagner’s encyclopaedic response to the religions- 
historical school was appropriate to meet the often vague invocations 
of ‘parallels’. Wagner offers in-depth examination of the actual texts 
upon which these previous assertions were based. His systematic 
study shows that most of these ‘parallels’ are indeed nothing more
Mystery-Cults’, 823) criticizes Goodenough, while still recognizing the 
possibility that Hellenistic Judaism could have been the forerunner of the 
theology in Rom. 6:1-11. He prefers, however, a more diffuse (and difficult to 
demonstrate) solution: ‘the question [is] whether it is primarily to the mystery- 
cults that we should look for influences, direct or indirect, upon Paul and early 
Christianity, or whether we should look rather to something more widely spread 
and more loosely defined than these cults among other religious and philosophical 
movements of the day’ (p. 823). In réponse to this, Betz’s (Transferring a Ritual’, 
99-100 n. 66) criticism of this kind of thinking in Wedderbum’s later monograph 
(which is based largely on these earlier articles) should suffice: he suggests that 
‘the problem with his hypothesis is that it remains entirely negative...[the end] 
leaves in the air entirely...what is to be made of the analysis and material in 
Wedderbum’s book’. In contrast to this, see the important monograph by C. 
Riedweg, Mysterienterminologie bei Platon, Philo und Klemens von Alexandrien 
(UaLG 26; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987) 70-115 for his treatment of Philo, and 94-96 
for interaction with Goodenough. Reidweg adduces several texts in Philo in which 
he finds important mystery-terminology: Cher. 40-50; Somn. 1:164-65; Gig. 54, 
57; Spec. 1:319-23; and All. 3:100, and includes a special critical lexicon of the 
terms pucmpiov and t e X e t t i ,  together with related vocabulary.
131 See also his ‘Introductory Word to the Fifth Edition’ of Bousset, Kyrios 
Christos, 7: ‘'Hellenistic Christianity, within which Paul and John first became 
understandable, is to be distinguished from the primitive Palestinian community.’
132 Cf. list above, p. 150 n. 7.
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than unquantified approximations. As mentioned above (n. 107), 
however, the Isiac parallels, especially those from the text in 
Apuleius, Metamorphoses 11, are difficult to dismiss. Dealing with 
the question of the probable existence of baptism in the Isiac cult is 
not the purpose of this part of the chapter. This is the purpose of my 
previously published arguments reprinted below (with slight 
alteration) in Appendix B, for it was Wagner’s denial of baptism in 
any non-Christian mystery cult that formed the basis of his defence 
against the idea of mystery influence on Paul. Dealing with that point 
is hence essential, before an analysis of the continuing interaction in 
Romans with Egyptian religious material can proceed. I will, for the 
sake of continuity, summarize the argument of Appendix B in the next 
two paragraphs, while referring the reader to my more detailed 
appended exposition throughout.
Essentially, the arguments against the existence of baptism in the 
Isis/Sarapis cult revolve around the fragmentary nature o f the 
evidence available with regard to the cult itself.1^  Of course, the very 
nature of the Isis/Sarapis cult as a mystery religion would suggest that
133 Textually, this evidence is largely limited to Apuleius (cf. Griffiths, 
Apuleius o f Madauros', and H. Miinstermann, Apuleius: Metamorphosen 
literarischer Vorlagen. Untersuchungen dreier Episoden des Roman unter 
Berücksichtigung der Philosophie und Théologie des Apuleius [BAlt 69; Stuttgart 
and Leipzig: Teubner, 1995]); Plutarch, Isis and Osiris; Diodorus Siculus 1 (cf. A. 
Burton, Diodorus Siculus, Book I: A Commentary [EPRO 29; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 
1972]); as well as incidental references in several other classical authors (cf. 
M.W. Meyer [ed.], The Ancient Mysteries, A Sourcebook: Sacred Texts o f  the 
Mystery Religions o f the Ancient Mediterranean World [San Francisco: Harper 
and Row, 1987] 155-96). In addition to these, however, there are papyri (e.g. 
P.Paris 47 = UPZ 1.70, discussed below, pp. 310-314); inscriptions (cf. Vidman, 
Sylloge; idem, Isis und Sarapis bei den Griechen und Romern: Epigraphische 
Studien zur Verbreitung und zu den Tragern des dgyptischen Kultes 
[Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten 29; Berlin: De Gruyter,
1970]); and the more difficult to interpret archaeological evidence of monuments 
and temples dedicated to Isis and Sarapis (cf. R. Salditt-Trappmann, Temp el der 
dgyptischen Gdtter in Griechenland und an der Westküste Kleinasiens [EPRO 15; 
Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1970]; R.A. Wild, Water in the Cultic Worship o f Isis and 
Sarapis [EPRO 87; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981]; Witt, Isis in the Ancient World; F. 
Dunand, Le culte d ls is  dans le bassin oriental de la Méditerranée [3 vols.; EPRO 
26.1-3; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1973], idem, Religion populaire en Égypte romaine: 
Les terres cuites isiaques du Musée Caire [EPRO 76; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1979]; 
and V. Tran tam Tinh, Sérapis debout: Corpus des monuments de Sérapis debout 
et étude iconographique [EPRO 94; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1983]).
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such fragmentary evidence is what we should expect. However, even 
this fragmentary evidence is very suggestive of the existence of 
baptism within the Isis/Sarapis cult. Some of the most important 
evidence is drawn from the second-century134 text by Apuleius, 
M etam orphoses, which recounts how one Lucius became a fully- 
initiated member of the cult. The following points are relevant: (1) 
Lucius’s first initiation, at Cenchraea, is preceded by a ritual bathing, 
before the obligatory ten day period of fasting. 11:23 describes 
Lucius’s preparations for his initiation, then Lucius tells us that T was 
led to the Baths, surrounded by a crowd of devotees. There, after I had 
taken the usual bath, Mithras [the priest leading him through the 
initiatory process] himself washed and sprinkled me with pure water, 
invoking first the pardon of all of the gods.’135 (2) In 11:21, before his 
first initiation, Lucius is eager to be allowed to be initiated, and is 
informed that the date for this ceremony would only be given by the 
goddess herself, and that ‘to undertake the ministries o f the 
goddess...without her consent would be an invocation of destruction. 
For the gates of shadow as well as the bulwarks of life were under the 
goddess’s control; and the act of initiation has been compared to a 
voluntary death with a slight chance of redemption’. (3) Lucius’s 
description of the actual process, while frustratingly incomplete, is 
still somewhat helpful: T approached the confines of death. I trod the 
threshold of Proserpine;136 and borne through the elements I returned. 
At midnight I saw the Sun shining in all his glory. I approached the 
gods below and the gods above, and I stood beside them, and I 
worshipped them. Behold, I have told you my experience, and yet
134 For the relevance of this second-century text to the discussion of first- 
century Isiacism, see below, p. 299 n. 9, and note La Piana, ‘Foreign Groups in 
Ancient Rome’, 303 (cf. 305, 324), who suggests that one ‘important reason for 
[the Isis/Sarapis cult’s] vitality and for the success of its propaganda was its 
organization. Among all the oriental cults which invaded Rome and the West the 
religion of Isis and Serapis was the only one which possessed a highly developed 
hierarchical organization...’ On the situating of Apuleius’s text within the second- 
century world, cf. F. Millar, ‘The World of the Golden Ass', in S J . Harrison (ed.), 
Oxford Readings in the Roman Novel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
247-68.
135 All translations of Metamorphoses are taken from Meyer (ed.), The 
Ancient Mysteries.
136 Persephone, with whom Isis was identified. See Witt, Isis in the Ancient 
World, 159 n. 41. The ‘threshold of Proserpine’, then, would indicate a movement 
either to the brink of the underworld, or one in and out of the underworld.
SATIRE AND PERFORMANCE IN ROMANS 209
what you hear can mean nothing to you’ (11:23). (4) The initiate of 
Isis is twice called renatus, ‘bom again’ (11:16, 21).
Coupled with this and other texts, the archaeological evidence 
would seem to support the idea that one of the central elements of the 
Isis/Sarapis cult was not only the baptism of its initiates, but the 
periodic re-enactment of the central aetiological myth of the Isiac 
religion— the drowning of Osiris in the N ile.137 As discussed below, 
in Appendix B (especially pp. 304-309), there is also strong evidence 
to suggest that the identification of the Isiac worshipper (at both 
initiation and later) with the characters of this central aetiological 
myth was indeed an important part o f Isiac worship and self- 
understanding.138 In short, if  we are to accept the extant textual and 
archaeological evidence as representational to and evocative of a t 
least the popular mind (and in Plutarch’s case, probably the mind of 
an initiate to at least one of the mysteries, if  not those of Isis and 
Osiris/Sarapis), then it would seem that there are several elements 
which, when taken together, would then offer a full parallel with 
Paul’s formulation in Rom. 6:1-11: cultic initiatory baptism that was 
seen as a relative identity with the god,139 and that, in physically 
representing the act of resurrection, pre-figured a future resurrection.
Performance and Creativity in the Utilization of Isiac Tradition in
Romans 6
I argued above that, at the key juncture of his introductory 
monologue in Rom. 1:23, Paul capitalizes on the brand-recognition by 
his Roman audience of key elements of Isiac worship, setting the tone 
for his dialectical interchange with them by turning this identification 
with a brand attitude against his audience by manipulating their 
judgemental response. It might be surprising, then, to argue, as I have 
above, that we should look to that same mode of religious thought for 
elucidation of Paul’s language concerning baptism in Romans 6.
137 This evidence, drawn largely from the discussions of Wild, Water in the 
Worship o f Isis and Sarapis and Salditt-Trappmann, Tempel der dgyptischen 
Gdtter, is discussed below in Appendix B.
138 Cf. also Wengst, Christologische Formeln, 40; Griffiths, Apuleius o f  
Madauros, 52, 298-99, 301, 304, 307. This aetiological myth is likely a mediated 
influence of the ancient Egyptian ritual drama, The Triumph ofHorus, connected 
with the Pharaoh and his identification as Horus. Cf. Witt, Isis in the Ancient 
World, ch. 1 for discussion of this ancient Egyptian ‘mystery’ and its connection 
with the later Hellenistic and Greco-Roman Isis/Sarapis cult.
139 See above, n. 115.
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Surely, what is negative in import in ch. 1 would remain negative 
throughout the letter. But the above analysis of the Roman attitude 
toward Egyptian religion demonstrates the ‘love/hate’ identity of this 
relationship. While on the one hand castigating some aspects of 
Egyptian worship, satirizing it, and even selectively destroying its 
cultic centres, Roman culture as a whole apparently welcomed 
Egyptian religious culture at the same time. It is, in fact, the very 
vehemence of the Roman reaction to Egyptian religion (especially in 
Rome itself) which demonstrates the degree to which it was pervasive 
in the culture. Of course, the Roman actions against Egyptian religion 
are tied to other factors, including, as mentioned, the psychological 
and economic struggle with the corn-supply for Rome, the Roman 
fear of secrecy, including religious secrecy, and the desire for social 
control. But, the bi-valent identity o f the Roman attitude towards 
‘things Egyptian’ forms a ground for expecting a similar bi-valency in 
Paul’s use of ‘things Egyptian’ in his letter to the church of this city.
Gadamer, in his use of the model of ‘play’ to discuss the language 
game, includes reference to and use of the concepts of mimesis and 
performance. He argues that ‘the being of art cannot be defined as an 
object of an aesthetic consciousness because, on the contrary, the 
aesthetic attitude is more than it knows of itself. It is part of the event 
of being that occurs in presentation, and belongs essentially to play as 
play’.140 He goes on to state that
Play is structure—this means that despite its dependence on being played 
it is a meaningful whole which can be repeatedly presented as such and 
the significance of which can be understood. But structure is also play, 
because,—despite this theoretical unity—it achieves its full being only 
each time it is played.141
This forms the basis of Gadamer’s introduction of the concept of 
mimesis into his hermeneutics. He argues that ‘What the actor plays 
and the spectator recognizes are the forms of the action itself, as they 
are formed by the poet. Thus we have here a double mimesis: the 
writer represents and the actor represents. But even this double 
mimesis is one:142 it is the same thing that comes into existence in 
each case.’143 Later, he suggests that
140 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 116 (emphasis original).
141 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 117.
142 ‘One’ is used here with the sense of ‘relative identity’, as in Geach, 
Reference and Generality, 39-40, 189-90; idem, ‘Names and Identity’, in S.
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A work of art belongs so closely to what it is related to that it enriches the 
being of that as if through a new event of being. To be fixed in a picture, 
addressed in a poem, to be the object of an allusion from the stage, are not 
incidental and remote from what the thing essentially is; they are 
presentations of the essence itself.144
The implications of this discussion for religious ritual are 
obvious—the foregoing could even form the basis of a sacramental 
theology. Gadamer gives attention to this in a preliminary and cursory 
manner in Truth and M ethod,145 but returns to the theme in more 
depth in his essay, ‘Zur Phanomenologie von Ritual und Sprache’, 
first published in his Gesammelte Werke vol. 8, and discussed in some 
detail by Richard Palmer in an essay in the Library o f  Living 
Philosophers volume dedicated to Gadamer.146 In this essay, Gadamer 
examines, as Palmer states, ‘a previously unexplored relationship 
between ritual and language’.147 His analysis in this essay extends and 
focuses the role of this relationship between ritual and language for 
his conversational model of understanding, suggesting that ritual 
action exposes a pre-linguistic consideration: our mode of being with 
each other. Contrasting the way in which animal ‘society’ functions 
with the way of being in human society, he concludes that all 
understanding is rooted in this ‘interwoven’ manner of human 
society.148
Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language (Wolfson College Lectures 1974; Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1975) 156-58; cf. A. Gallois, Occasions o f Identity: A Study in 
the Metaphysics o f Persistence, Change, and Sameness (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1998)63-64.
143 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 117.
144 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 147.
145 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 109: ‘a religious act is a genuine 
representation for the community; and likewise, a drama is a kind of playing that, 
by its nature, calls for an audience. The presentation of a god in a religious rite, 
the presentation of a myth in a drama, are play not only in the sense that the 
participating players are wholly absorbed in the presentational play and find in it 
their heightened self-presentation, but also in that the players represent a 
meaningful whole for an audience.’
146 ‘Zur Phanomenologie von Ritual und Sprache’, GW  8.400-40; R. Palmer, 
‘Ritual, Rightness, and Truth in Two Late Works of Hans-Georg Gadamer’, in 
Hahn (ed.), LLP, 529-47.
147 Palmer, ‘Ritual, Rightness, and Truth’, 530.
148 Gadamer, ‘Zur Phanomenologie von Ritual und Sprache’, 412.
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Gadamer’s concerns in this essay, though underlining the relevance 
of a concept of ‘ritual’ in connection with his philosophical 
hermeneutics, focus on an area different from that relevant for my 
case here. Developing this in a different direction, I suggest that, as 
with the double149 m im esis o f the work o f art, religious 
ritual— especially identificatory ritual such as that described by Paul 
in Romans 6, or as practised by the initiates of the Isis/Sarapis 
cult— likewise functions mimetically, ‘not incidental and remote from 
what the thing essentially is; they are presentations of the essence 
itself’.150 In addition, we need to consider that, if Paul is utilizing both 
a mode of religious understanding from the mysteries— identification 
with the divinity— as well as the specific form of the Isis/Sarapis 
aetiological myth, there is also a mimetic relationship between Paul 
and Egyptian tradition in the representation of this material. Utilizing 
the image of a matrix or net of dialectical relationships, developed 
above (p. 112 n. 68), we might suggest that Paul, in seeking to express 
the Christian’s identification with Christ, and hence sharing in both 
Christ’s death and resurrection—in seeking to explain the dialectical 
relationship between the believer and his Lord— is engaging in a 
distorted and unstable mimesis151 of pre-existing Egyptian tradition, 
which already linked death, drowning, burial, and resurrection, and 
did so in a context clearly au fa it  with the idea of identification 
between a divinity and the worshipper. Other inter-connected parts of 
this structure are the (mediated) dialectical relationship between the 
Roman audience and the Egyptian tradition to which Paul (I allege) 
makes reference, and Paul’s relationship to this tradition, triangulated 
with his relationship to his Roman audience. Prendergast’s description 
of mimesis and ‘mirroring’ is salient to this: ‘The language of the 
mimetic text does not “mirror” reality, is not “transparent” to reality; 
it “hooks” on to reality by virtue of a relation that holds between 
linguistic expressions and what they stand for in the world... By
149 Anticipating again my discussion of ambiguity below in Chapter 5, and 
taking up the strand of thought above concerning the hierarchalized networked 
multiplicity of dialectics which might be a development on Gadamer’s 
conceptions, it would be worth considering the detailed analysis of the theme of 
‘doubles’ in K. Miller, Doubles: Studies in Literary History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1985) esp. vii-x.
150 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 141.
151 Cf. Prendergast, The Order o f Mimesis, 214, describing the character of 
mimesis as ‘inherently ambiguous and unstable’.
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exploiting the referring properties of language, the mimetic text knits 
the order of “fiction” into the order of “fact”.’152 
The language Paul uses in Romans 6 helps to outline this multi­
layered dialectic: In the first place, Paul continues his use of diatribe 
to introduce another possible site of objection to his argument (v. 1: t l  
ovv epoujjiev; Emp.evcop.EV' r f j  a p .a p T ia , iv a  f| x^PLS* ttXeovcictt);, 
‘What then shall we say? Should we remain in sin, so that grace might 
increase?’), to which he replies with his famous pf] yévoiTO  ( ‘may it 
never be!’), expanded with a question: o ltlv eç  dTTEÔdvopEV r f j  
d p a p T iq ,  ttcos* ETi C h ^op E v  e v  auTT]; ( ‘we who have died to 
sin— how yet can we live in it?’), which forms a proof for his 
subsequent argument from baptism in vv. 3-10. As mentioned above, 
the role of f\ dyvoELTE o n . . .  ( ‘or do you not know that...’) in this 
argument is unclear. It could be that (1) Paul is ironizing his 
audience’s lack of understanding, introducing them to a new 
conception of which they are unaware, but in which Paul implicates 
them; or (2) Paul may be referring to an existent tradition, of which 
both Paul and his Roman audience are aware. A third possibility could 
be that (3) Paul is aware of this tradition, and a supporter thereof, but 
is unsure of the Romans’ knowledge of it. Of these possibilities, it 
would seem that (1) and (3) are unlikely, given the way in which Paul 
phrases the question, which seems to assume a negative answer ( ‘No, 
of course we are not ignorant of that!’). A still fourth possibility is that 
the remainder of the question in v. 3, ôctol êpaiTTiaôqpEV e ’lç  
XpiOTOV ’IrjCTOUV, ELÇ TÔV ÔdvOLTOV dÙTOU é(3aTTTiCT0qpEy ( ‘as 
many [of us] as were baptized into Christ Jesus, into his death we 
were baptized’), is not a surprise to his audience, but that what follows 
in vv. 4-5 is an expansion on this pre-existing interpretation of the 
significance of baptism, making the bridge to Paul’s familiar 
discussion of the old and new man.
Regardless of how one solves the foregoing, it is the content of vv. 
4-5 which provides the basis for seeing an Egyptian parallel. While 
being baptized ‘into his death’ (v. 3) could be interpreted in a variety 
of manners, the following two verses draw out the exact sequence and 
significance of this for Paul:
(ju veT d .4)r |p ev  o w  c lü tw  8 i à  t o û  (BaiTTLCTpaToç e l ç  t ô v  G a v a r o v ,  
ï v a  wcTTrep qyépÔr) X p L aros’ è k  VEKpœv 8 i à  r f j ç  8 6 ^ ?  t o ü  T raTpôç, 
o ü tg û ç  K al fjpeLÇ  è v  KaLVÔTT]TL (w fjs ' TTEpLTraTqcrcopEv. EL y à p
152 Prendergast, The Order o f Mimesis, 61.
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(ju|i(f)UTOL y eyova iiE V  t û  ôp-oicoiiari t o ü  G avdrou a ù ro ü , àXXà Kal 
Tfj? dvaCTTdCTECO? ECT0|J.60a.
Therefore we have been buried with him through the baptism into death, 
so that just as Christ was raised from the dead through the glory of the 
father, so also we should walk in newness153 of life. For, if we have 
become154 participants155 in the likeness of his death, surely156 we will 
also be of the resurrection.
153 In Louw-Nida domain 58.70, KaivÔTriç is defined as ‘the state of being 
new and different, with the implication of superiority—“newness”’. A footnote to 
this discussion (n. 8) suggests, however, that ‘though in Ro 6:4 the focal semantic 
component is upon the distinctive superiority of the “newness”, there are contexts 
in which KotuoTr^ is primarily temporal in significance’, referring the reader to 
domain 67.101, where mivorriç is defined as ‘the state of being relatively recent, 
with the implication of being appropriately contemporary—“newness”, wore 
SouXeveiv fjpdç èv k cuvottiti irvEUfiaros* K al où TraXaioTriTL yp d p .p .a T o g  
“so that we may serve in the newness of the Spirit and not in the old way of the 
written document” Ro 7:6’. This discussion is problematic, and misses the binary 
temporal opposition of old-new in Rom. 6:6-11, and again, with a slightly 
different focus, in vv. 12-14. As is often the case in L-N, we are given no reason 
why one would choose the former of the latter definition, or vice versa. The foot- 
notation to domain 58.70 even appears to be utilizing theological categories to 
determine the meaning of KaivÔTT|S‘, rather than contextual, semantic categories. 
KaivÔTriç is only used twice in the New Testament—separated by only a 
chapter—but is given two different definitions by L-N. The word is used only 
twice in the l x x ,  both clearly temporal in meaning, rather than value-based: 1 
Kgdms 8:53, where it forms part of an addition to the verse, referring to the Odes 
of Solomon, and Ezek. 47:12, where it partially translates “Dn, ‘bear new fruit’.
154 Although I have translated yeyovapev with an English perfect past, a 
translation which would bring out the stative aspect of this verb would be better. 
Perhaps ‘stand in a state of being’ would communicate this more readily (if more 
cumbersomely). Cf. Porter, Verbal Aspect, ch. 5 with regard to the translation of 
the stative aspect.
155 The sense of this word is difficult to translate, and must be understood in 
relation to the following ôpoicûp.aTi, for they are parts of the same semantic 
domain. I will draw out below the sense of opoiwpa in Romans, but for now, I 
have chosen to give CTÜ|i<f>UTOi the translation ‘participants’ to draw out the sense 
of being of like nature as the ‘likeness’ of Christ’s death.
156 The use of dXXd in the apodosis of a conditional is unusual. Cranfield, 
Romans, 1.306, discusses this, making reference to BDF §448(5) (though NB, a 
typographical error in Cranfield has it as ‘488’], suggesting that dXXd here has the 
‘force of certainty’. While I am not convinced that this analysis does not rely 
more on a deterministic approach to the ‘meaning’ of conditional statements 
(where first-class conditionals, such as this one, are understood to be definitely
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The suggestion that ‘we have been buried with him through the 
baptism into death’ (o w erà ^ rw iev  ovv  aurco ô ià  t o u  
PaTTTi(7p.aToç eiç t ô v  0dvaTov) clearly rests on an understanding of 
baptism in which the initiate re-enacts the aetiological myth, or 
foundational event of the cult. The identification language is thick in 
these two verses: ‘we have been buried with  him’ (a prefixed 
preposition as part of the verb); ‘so that, just as C h rist...sow e...'\ ‘for 
if  we are in the state of being sam e-natured  (oup.(J)vtoi) with the 
likeness of his death’.
Thinking creatively, this passage could be re-stated as follows, 
substituting Isis/Sarapis mythology for Christian: ‘Therefore we have 
been buried in the sacred Nile with Osiris through our initiatory 
baptism into his death, so that, just as Osiris is raised anew as Horus 
through the glory of the sun (cf. Apuleius, Met. 11:23), so we should 
walk in newness of life. For, if we have re-enacted the ritual likeness 
of the death of the god, surely we will also be raised as initiates of the 
mysteries.’ Note, however, the differences from Paul’s discussion. 
Obviously, I have constructed this Tsiac’ passage. It is not ancient, 
nor does it exactly parallel any known Isiac text. Yet, extrapolating 
from our knowledge of Isiac ritual, as outlined above (and examined 
in detail below, Appendix B), it seems legitimate to make such a 
construct for purposes of comparison. This comparison highlights (at 
least) the following differences: (1) Even if Paul is directly  utilizing 
the paradigm of Egyptian cultic baptism to explain the significance of 
Christian baptism, he does so by making use of baptism as a live 
metaphor157 for the death of Christ. This ritual, o f importance to 
Christian practice from a primitive period, and even an activity 
undertaken by Christ himself, had a live metaphoric relationship to a 
pattern in another religion. This is no importation of a purely Egyptian 
cultic practice, nor does Paul understand it in a way which would 
entirely square with an Egyptian cultic settting. Neither, of course, 
does Christian baptism display a purely mimetic relationship with 
Jewish traditions of baptismal-type activity, though suggestions of this 
linkage might trouble commentators less.158 (2) The death of
true, cf. Porter, Idioms, 257, and above, p. 69 for discussion), I am in agreement 
that the use of dXXd here is likely emphatic, hence the translation ‘surely’.
157 For a discussion of live metaphor, cf. Gibson, ‘God’s Semantic Logic’, 92.
158 Even this is an area of some contention, however, given our incomplete 
understanding of the relationships between different Jewish baptismal practices, 
Christian baptism, and the baptism of John the Baptist. On these issues, cf.
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Osiris/Sarapis was not like that of Christ. Paul utilizes a metaphoric 
resemblance between baptism—part of the activity associated with a 
believer’s initiation into ‘Christianity’— and the death/re-birth of 
Osiris— a myth of great antiquity— to knit together the significance of 
Christian baptism  with that of the death  of Christ. Christ did not 
drown. Osiris was not crucified. The nexus of death and baptism is, so 
far as we know, located for Christianity in this passage in Romans, not 
in the re-enactment of the mode of the death of Christ (i.e. re­
enactment of the crucifixion). As a live metaphor to demonstrate to 
the believer the identity o f the action he was undertaking (and hence 
the heavily identificatory language in vv. 4-5), the way in which Isiac 
baptism was understood as mimesis of the death of Osiris, leading to 
initiation into the cult provided a (culturally shared?) basis for Paul’s 
discussion of the identity of Christian baptism, and the identification 
of the believer with Christ. (3) The agency of Christ’s resurrection is 
different from that of Osiris’ ‘resurrection’. While Osiris is 
dismembered, drowned, collected together, and eventually raised 
again in the person of Horus, the agency in this drama is that o f Isis, 
his sister-consort-mother. Paul very clearly states that it was 
‘through/by the glory of the father’ that Christ’s resurrection (and, by 
extrapolation, the believer’s) was effected.
Paul’s use of ôfioiœfia to describe that with which the initiate is 
(tu|1(/)utos‘ is, I argue, similar to his use of ôp.o'iQ)|ia in Rom. 5:14: ‘but 
death reigned from Adam until Moses, even upon those not sinning 
upon the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is a type of the 
one about to be’ (dXXd épaoiXeuaev 6 ÔdvaToç duo ’Aôàp. 
P-éxpL McoDcrécos* Kal êm  to ù ç  [l t\ dp.apTfjaavTas* êm  tco 
6p.OLwp.aTL Tfjs* TTapaJBaCTEws* ’Aôàp. ôç ècttlv  tuttos* tou  
p.éXXovToç). Part of the identification with Adam of all humanity, and 
the further type-comparison of Adam and Christ in ch. 5 is contained 
in this difficult verse, which raises the question of what exactly was 
the sin of Adam, or what would it be to be— or not to be— a ôp.olwp.a 
of that sin? Cranfield is typical in his suggestion that ‘they had indeed 
sinned and were punished for their sin, [but] had not sinned after the 
likeness of Adam’s transgression, that is, by disobeying a clear and
Taylor, The Immerser; B.D. Chilton, ‘John the Purifier’, in B.D. Chilton and C.A. 
Evans, Jesus in Context: Temple, Purity and Restoration (AGJU 39; Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1997) 203-20; R.L. Webb, John the Baptizer and Prophet: A Socio- 
Historical Study (JSNTSup 65; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991).
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definite divine commandment such as Adam had’,159 while Morris 
allows for the further possibility that Paul means that ‘they were not 
law-breakers, for there was no law to break; they died because of 
Adam’s sin’.
Commentators seem uninterested in the question of the sense of 
ô|iOL(jûp.a in Romans as a whole, specifically in connection with the 
later use in ch. 6, or earlier in 1:23. In non-Christian or Jewish 
literature, this word is used in similar cultic contexts— idols or cult 
statues are described as 6p.OLwp.aTa, much as they are in a multiplicity 
of Septuagint uses. This is clearly the sense of Paul’s use in Rom. 
1:23, which closely mirrors Septuagint uses (leading to much of the 
confusion over the origin of Paul’s ideas in that verse, and indeed the 
entire section, as discussed above). The use in Rom. 5:14, and that in 
6:5, do not conform to this pattern. They are not meant to suggest the 
worship or construction of a likeness of a god, but rather speak of 
likeness to a particular action. In the case of 5:14, it is the Trapà|3a(jiç 
( ‘transgression’) of Adam. The transgression of Adam was unlike 
others until the coming of Moses, because the law had not yet come to 
show what sin was. Paul has already made this clear in vv. 12-13:
8ià t o ü t o  wcnrep 8 i’ èvbç  àvGpwTrou f) apapria  els* t ô v  tcocrpov 
eiofj\6ev koi 8ià r f j ç  àpapriaç 6  ôdvaToç, m i o ü tù jç  eiç  Tràvraç 
àvÔpwTTOuç ô GdvaToç SifjXGev, êcf>’ w Travreç qpapTOV* d%pL yàp  
vôpou àp ap ria  fjv èv KÔcjpco, àp ap ria  8è où k  éXXoyeÎTai pf) 
ô v t o ç  vôpou.
On account of this, just as through one man sin entered the world, and 
through sin, death, so also unto all men death spread, unto every human 
who sinned; for until [the giving of] the law, sin was in the world, but sin 
was not counted while the law was not existing.
Those who were ‘not sinning upon the likeness of Adam’s sin’ (pf) 
àpapTf)(javTas‘ èm  tco opoicopaTi rf\g napa^docwç ’A8àp) were 
those who did not know they were transgressing against God, for they 
had not had the direct communication with God in the garden, nor 
were they in possession of the law. This still leaves a need to 
determine the exact sense of opoicopa in this verse. Another possible 
translation o f this word could, instead o f ‘lik en ess’, be 
‘pattern’— which would bring out the idea of being a likeness to an 
action, rather than, as with the use to describe cult statues, to the
159 Cranfield, Romans, 1.283. Similar to this is Fitzmyer, Romans, 418.
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appearance of a person or a god. In this vein, Gadamer’s description 
of the role of a double mimesis in dramatic or musical performance is 
entirely salient. Paul is engaged in just such a double mimesis, which 
itself is freighted upon the idea of what it is to be a mimesis, being as 
it explicitly considers the idea of representation. It could be 
represented as a photograph of a man and two mirrors, at slightly 
oblique angles to one another, in a room full of steam. While the man 
(representing the Egyptian cultic tradition of baptism) and the images 
in each mirror (representing the idea of identificatory ritual, and the 
story of the death of Christ) have mimetic relations, the angling of 
each mirror includes elements not in the ‘sight’ of the previous mirror, 
further problematized by the steam in the room condensing160 on the 
mirror, perhaps unevenly, and distorting the ‘transmission’ of the 
image. The fact that we are looking at a photograph suggests a further 
mimetic relationship, representing the live metaphoric conception of 
baptism as found in Rom. 6:3-4 that takes account of all the foregoing 
elements. This is not an image in the apparently eternal reflection 
between two mirrors in parallel arrangement, but is a crafted, 
intentional representation of the relationships between the man and his 
image in these two mirrors. (To take account of the creativity of Paul 
in using this ‘influence’, we might further notice another individual in 
the picture, at first difficult to see in the steam, but whose hand can be 
seen polishing the second mirror, and whose form slightly obscures 
the view between the first and second mirror.)161
160 The use of this term in Freudian psychoanalysis is instructive, and may 
help tighten my analogy. ‘Condensation’ is used as an analogy to speak of the 
transmission of ideas. Through the process of condensing, as with steam, there is 
both an intensification and a displacement of ideas. Cf. Bowie, Psychoanalysis 
and the Future o f Theory, ch. 1, esp. his discussion of the futurity of analysis and 
the temporality of speech in Lacan and Freud, pp. 18-27; and A. Petocz, Freud, 
Psychoanalysis, and Symbolism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 
171-73. Gadamer’s use of aufgehoben (a simultaneous cancellation and 
preservation) in his discussion of the Ideas in The Beginning o f Philosophy, 20, 
suggests a parallel interest.
161 This analogy, built of ‘optical metaphors’ (to use Prendergast’s term, The 
Order o f Mimesis, 61), nonetheless consciously uses the idea of a photograph to 
avoid the potential confusion inherent in the application of optical language to 
linguistic mimesis. As Prendergast states (p. 61), ‘The language of the mimetic 
text does not “mirror” reality, is not “transparent” to reality; it “hooks” on to 
reality by virtue of a relation that holds between linguistic expressions and what 
they stand for in the world... By exploiting the referring properties of language,
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It is this last point which needs some brief attention before drawing 
this chapter to a close: how can we speak of creativity and influence 
in the same breath? Prendergast’s idea of ‘unstable’ mimesis provides 
a key insight into this. He states, ‘Both mimesis and metaphor are thus 
discovery procedures, heuristic mechanisms for representing the 
movements of Nature, the poetic materialism of the “entelechic” 
properties of material life itself.’162 Mimesis then does not function as 
a copying, but as a movement forward on the basis of what has gone 
before— it is the very mimetic (on the above understanding of the 
term) character of creativity which gives it its special character.163
CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion, a return to the ‘brand image’ idea drawn 
from the application of Rational Choice Theory to religion is 
instructive. As discussed, the idea of a brand image is one which 
capitalizes on the way in which the human mind schematizes 
information— the lack of an element of a description need not entail 
its lack of identity with that for which it is meant to stand as 
description. In advertizing, the use of consistent visual imagery (e.g. 
logos, specific fonts, colours, pictures, or personalities) and/or aural 
accompaniment (e.g. the advertizing ‘jingle’, instrumental music, or
the mimetic text knits together the order of “fiction” into the order of “fact”, and 
thus ensures a process of recognition whereby the reader connects the world 
produced by the text with the world of which he himself has direct or indirect 
knowledge.’
162 Prendergast, The Order o f Mimesis, 21.
163 Reference could also be made here to the monumental Recognitions: A 
Study in Poetics by Terence Cave (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988). Such 
reference will telegraph a central concern of my Chapter 5, namely the role of 
ambiguity in communication and its place within a model derived from 
Gadamer’s philosophy. In the conclusion to Part I of his book, Cave states (p. 
270): ‘Those critics who, in appropriating recognition for the reader, have taken it 
as “clarification”, the culmination of a heuristic process enacted by the text, can 
make out a perfectly fair argument, and one that works well at its own level for 
many different kinds of work. They eliminate scandal in the name of a higher 
cause and a higher purpose. But their reassurance is bland, and doesn’t somehow 
square with the shocks and twists that recognition brings with it. It is surely more 
interesting, and more appropriate to the nature of the hidden figure, to accept that 
the twist at the end can’t be untwisted: anagnorisis [“recognition”] may 
retrospectively “explain” earlier enigmatic events, but considered in itself, as a 
leap out of the series, it retains its aura of oddity, unease, disruption.’
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sound effects) works in such a way that only a small portion of any of 
these needs be seen or heard so as to evoke the entire package.164 This 
is a crude representation of a well-developed area of psychology and 
neural research,165 but it serves to underline the function of such a 
stratagem in the world of advertizing. In keeping with this, I have 
argued above that it is precisely this tendency upon which Paul is 
capitalizing in Rom. 1:23, by not having to mention any specifics 
about the Egyptian cults to nevertheless count on the ‘whole package’ 
being present in the consciousness of his audience.166
What if, however, an author like Paul wished to use terms, ideas, or 
concepts which had also been utilized by another ‘brand’ of religion? 
Would not a similar strategy allow him to creatively incorporate 
previously existing material (influence) into something new, and 
possibly to package with those concepts the disposition of his 
audience towards the concepts in their original setting? Extending the 
brand image metaphor, I would suggest that this is like the difference 
between two further attempts to reduce the market-share of the 
world’s leading cola company during the 1970s and 80s: (1) The 
‘Taste Challenges’ undertaken by a particular cola company, where 
participants were to drink two un-labelled cola drinks, one made by 
the company funding the test, the other by their (more successful) 
rival. Of course, the advertizing campaign stressed the larger 
proportion of subjects who preferred the testing company’s cola. This 
was a battle between two different cola companies for adherents, but 
one which maintained the boundaries of the sphere of cola-drinking. 
(2) The advertizing campaign by a rival kind  of soft drink, in the 
1980s, where the makers of this clear carbonated drink advertized
164 Cf. Prendergast, The Order o f Mimesis, 34-35.
165 More specifically, ‘Since the episodes that give rise to memories generally 
involve a variety of perception, it seems likely that the laying down of such 
memories involves nerve cells in the association areas and in secondary or higher 
order cortical areas concerned with the different senses... It is also likely that 
recalling memories involves recreating something like the original pattern of 
activity in those same sets of cells, or at least some of them... a popular 
hypothesis is this. Memory storage occurs as patterns of synaptic strengths (and 
perhaps also of the firing thresholds of nerve cells) distributed across nerve 
networks’ (I. Glynn, An Anatomy o f Thought: The Origin and Machinery o f the 
Mind [London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1999] 329). Cf. also G. Fauconnier, 
Mappings in Thought and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1997) 37.
166 Cf. Zuckert, Postmodern Platos, 93.
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their drink as an ‘unCola’. While the former example is similar to 
what Paul is manipulating in Rom. 1:23 (as he is arguing from a 
gnomic, universal basis meant to include both Gentile and Jewish 
presuppositions about Egyptian cultic tradition), this latter example is 
closer in identity to Paul’s use of Egyptian cultic traditions in Romans 
6. Although the latter example is based on a drink outside of the 
purview of cola brands, its deformed mimetic relationship to the cola 
brand-image (primarily that of the largest cola company, whose name 
is even used in some American States as a substitution for ‘soft drink’, 
much like ‘soda’, ‘fizzy drink’ or ‘pop’ in other English-speaking 
areas) is nonetheless advertizing something fundamentally different 
than ‘cola’. Likewise, Paul is utilizing from Egyptian tradition a 
category of religious concept, and even the live metaphor o f its 
aetiological myth, in such a manner. It is important to state, in 
conclusion, that the above analogy of a corporate abstract concept, 
while instructive, does not stand as proxy for a cultic abstract concept 
concretized by contextualization due to ritual function. The dialectical 
relations between Paul and this Egyptian and Roman tradition are of a 
more complex nature than the corporate marketing of a soft drink.
There is more which could profitably be discussed, extending and 
deepening our understanding of the way in which Paul interacts with 
alternative religious positions. For the present context, however, I 
have established a probable case that Paul both is aware of Egyptian 
religious tradition, and that, though Rom. 1:23 and 6:1-11 both 
participate in mimetic relations to it, these relations are not stable. 
Hopefully, this kind of analysis can be of use not only to deepen 
understanding of Paul and his conception of the Christian religion, but 
also of use to future work investigating the idea of religious overlap 
and/or influence both within the New Testament and elsewhere in the 
Greco-Roman world. The traveller along these re-opened roads 
should, however, do well to heed the following warning, recently 
nailed up on an old signpost:
The danger in such comparative studies is that the actual subjects—what 
people write and edited to manifest their mentality and lives is the subject 
of complex equivocation, to the effect that their writings become 
metaphors for something other than what they contain. They become, as it 
were, corporate products to be packaged by probability distribution, rather
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than the conceptual dynamics of the consciousness which composed 
them.167
167 Gibson, Text and Tablet, 225.
CHAPTER 5
AXIOM, DIALECTIC AND AMBIGUITY:
PAUL, JACOB,i AND THE COLLECTIONS FOR JERUSALEM
Socrates: That question of yours is not to the point, Protarchus.
Protarchus: Why not?
Socrates: Because you do not prevent my asking my own question
again.
(Plato, Philebus 42E, LCL)
‘SUCH A PROCEEDING REQUIRES GREAT CAUTION.. .  ’2
One area of potentially great significance for our understanding of 
the earliest Church is the possibility that there was conflict between 
some of its leaders. Readers will no doubt be aware of the wide- 
reaching influence of this idea, resulting from the efforts o f the 
Tübingen School3 during especially the end of the nineteenth century 
and beginning of the twentieth, but the pendulum-swing of opinion 
against this sort of position in the bulk of twentieth-century New  
Testament scholarship has, perhaps, gone too far. There are clear and 
undisputed indications of disunity in the earliest Church (e.g. Paul’s 
biting defence of the [or his] gospel in Galatians 1-2), but it is the 
contention o f this chapter that a deeper and more nuanced
1 Although it is typical in both English-speaking New Testament 
scholarship and in wider cultural usage to refer to the leader of the Jerusalem 
church and putative author of the letter of James as ‘James’, I have in this study 
chosen to utilize the form of his name as we have it in the New Testament 
itself—Jacob—which has the virtue of reflecting both the Greek of the New 
Testament ( I cikü){3os*), and its Semitic background (’I dKtofBos* is a transliteration 
of rroir). In addition, the slight strangeness of its appearance may have the effect 
of surprising the reader, perhaps allowing him to see ‘James’ with a new 
presence. I have, however, maintained the use of ‘James’ to refer to the letter.
2 Plato, Protagoras 316C-D, LCL: ‘For when one goes as a stranger into 
great cities, and there tries to persuade the best of the young men to drop their 
other connections, either with their own folk or with foreigners, both old and 
young, and to join one’s own circle, with the promise of improving them by this 
connection with oneself, such a proceeding requires great caution; since very 
considerable jealousies are apt to ensue, and numerous enmities and intrigues.’
3 See esp. F.C. Baur, Paul the Apostle o f Jesus Christ (2 vols.; trans. A. 
Menzies; ed. E. Zeller; London: Williams and Norgate, 2nd edn, 1875).
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understanding may be gained of the history of the New Testament 
period, especially that to do with Paul, by displaying sensitivity to the 
potential for, and outworking of, this conflict between earliest Church 
leaders.
From the perspective of Gadamer’s philosophy, this chapter seeks 
to extend the model first introduced in Chapter 3 above, and more 
fully examined with regard to Paul and the Roman church in Chapter 
4, of the role of dialectic in the New Testament. It is the argument of 
this chapter that the letter of James is a textual fragment of the 
dialectical relationship between Paul and Jacob near its 
inception— during the ‘unknown’ years of Paul’s pre-Acts 13/pre- 
epistolary activity.4 The contention is that the axiomatic kernel of 
Paul’s theology— salvation or righteousness through grace by 
faith— is attacked in Jacob’s letter, coupled with an ad hominem  
attack on Paul’s personality, in such a way that Paul is unable to 
respond to it in a dialogical manner, at least verbally. Thus, for Paul, 
the only way to counter Jacob’s attacks and criticisms as stated in the 
letter of James is for Paul to demonstrate his response. Counter­
intuitively, the only way to push forward a dialogue with Jacob is to 
refuse to engage in discussion along the lines laid out in Jacob’s letter. 
Jacob, to look at his letter (as I construe it below) in connection with 
Gadamer’s hermeneutical programme, is putting a slanted question to 
Paul. As was discussed above in a number of different contexts, 
Gadamer states that
There can be no answer to a slanted question because it leads us only 
apparently, and not really, through the open state of indeterminacy in 
which a decision is made. We call it slanted rather than wrongly put 
because there is a question behind it... The slant of a question consists of 
the fact that it does not give any real direction, and hence no answer to it is 
possible.5
4 Although I shall, throughout this chapter, argue for an early date for 
James, the idea of mapping James as part of a dialectical interchange between 
Paul and Jacob does not stand or fall on this interpretation. While I think it 
unlikely that this letter could stem from a period after Paul’s literary activity, or 
when Paul was a clear leader within the Gentile mission, it may be that a case for 
such a date in the mid- to late-50s or 60s c e  (as opposed to the 40s date sugested 
here) can be made. Nonetheless, this particular strand of my argument is not 
fundamental.
5 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 364.
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I suggested above (p. 44) that, although Gadamer’s splitting off of 
‘slanted questions’ from the category of ‘wrongly put questions’ is 
false, we may be able to pursue a ‘taxonomy of wrongly-put 
questions’. In this connection, it would be worthwhile to map the 
‘questions’ which form James in terms of their failure to ‘achieve the 
sphere of the truly open’ with regard to the theology and activities of 
the early Paul. In my previous discussion of the ‘question’ (in Chapter 
2, with regard to the openness of interpreters towards Philemon), I 
utilized a metaphor drawn from a legal context: a slanted question is 
similar to the ‘leading question’, where what is asked o f a text 
appears to be a question, but allows only one possible answer. I also 
suggested that there were questions which, though they appeared to be 
questions, were not. These were questions which fail to achieve 
openness not as the result of a false presupposition, but because they 
are not questions at all. Carrying on the legal metaphor, I suggested 
that this could be seen as ‘badgering the witness’.
In this context, it would be appropriate to offer another division in 
the proposed taxonomy of ‘wrongly-put’ questions: questions which 
fail to achieve openness because they are specifically designed to 
curtail openness. This, like any counterfeit, is closely linked to the 
original. Since to duplicate the identity of one thing, if successful, 
would be  that thing, it is the slight differences which make a 
counterfeit apprehensible. Gadamer states:
The openness of a question is not boundless. It is limited by the horizon of 
the question. A question that lacks this horizon is, so to speak, floating. It 
becomes a question only when its fluid indeterminacy is concretized in a 
specific “this or that”. In other words, the question has to be posed. Posing 
a question implies openness but also limitation. It implies the explicit 
establishing of presuppositions, in terms of which can be seen what still 
remains open.6
Consider by way of comparison the ‘questioning’ of ‘K.’ in Franz 
Kafka’s The Trial— hounded throughout the pages of this tortuous 
novel by the nameless, faceless accusation of...som ething (or 
nothing), K. desperately searches to find some kind of meaning 
behind the charges which have been levelled against him. His 
interchange with the keeper of the gate to the courthouse stands as a 
moment when both K. and the reader expect some kind o f  
resolution— some kind of mythical structure in which to house the
6 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363.
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terrible nothingness of the phantom accusations against K. We are 
left, however, with a chimera, a blind alley of a courthouse in which 
K. is able to find nothing but a back entrance to his own place of 
work. There is a fundamental element of intentionality in the ‘failure’ 
of the ‘questioning’ of K. to reach the sphere of the truly open, and it 
is precisely in the lack of placing limitations— of describing the arc of 
the question’s horizon— that leads to this lack of openness. In a 
similar way, assuming my proceeding analysis, we might say that the 
questions put to Paul in James are likewise blind alleys with no egress 
into openness. Jacob’s unwillingness to engage with the theology of 
Paul (notwithstanding his apparent willingness to talk about it in his 
letter) is indicative of a counterfeit questioning. This perverts the 
natural course of relations between two thinkers and replaces it with a 
dictatorial monologue which fails to allow for Paul’s horizon in 
responding to Jacob’s questions.
Counterfeiting in Dialogue?
This introduces a problem for Gadamer’s philosophy, in that 
Gadamer’s model of understanding seemingly assumes the good faith 
of all participants in a dialogue. J.P. Stem, in an understated criticism 
of Gadamer’s hermeneutical model, states, ‘Every hermeneutic, 
especially that of literary texts, remains inadequate as long as it 
contains no theory of the irrelevant. (Not that a panjandrum like H.-G. 
Gadamer has ever worried about this.)’7 This weakness in Gadamer’s 
model needs to be addressed. As I have previously mentioned, 
Gadamer provides no account either of counterfeit in connection with 
his model, of participation in dialogue, or of a counterfeit dialogue 
itself. My above comments on forgery and pseudonymy (p. 107) 
initiated a development that is here relevant in connection with 
Gadamer’s ideas on mimesis, and I would like to introduce the idea of 
a counterfeit participation in dialogue in such a way as to allow for 
both a discussion of intentional mis-direction of dialogue, as well as a 
subsequent related discussion of ambiguity in interpretation.
In the concluding portion of Chapter 4, above, I introduced a 
photographic analogy to Paul’s use of Egyptian tradition, based upon 
Gadamer’s concept of mimesis and double mimesis in performance. 
This analogy concluded, in a provisional manner, with the idea that 
we could account for the creativity of Paul in the ‘reflection’ of
7 J.P. Stern, The Heart o f Europe: Essays on Literature and Ideology 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992) 15.
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tradition by ‘noticing’ a form partly obscuring, partly clarifying the 
image. Taking this analogy not only as operative for Paul’s use of 
tradition, but as useful to discuss Gadamer’s ideas about mimesis in 
general, we would do well to return to Gadamer’s ideas about play, in 
an effort to draw out the implications of his own ideas to this end. In 
discussing ‘play’, Gadamer discusses its metaphoric senses:
We find talk of the play of light, the play of the waves, the play of gears or 
parts of machinery, the interplay of limbs, the play of forces, the play of 
gnats, even a play on words. In each case, what is intended is to-and-fro 
movement that is not tied to any goal that would bring it to an end. 
Correlatively, the word ‘Spiel’ originally meant ‘dance’, and is still found 
in many word forms (e.g., in Spielmann, jongleur). The movement of 
playing has no goal that brings it to an end; rather it renews itself in 
constant repetition.8
This turn to the metaphoric functions of ‘play’ follows a series of 
statements regarding the mode of being of play, in which Gadamer 
talks of the ‘seriousness’ of play: ‘play itself contains its own, even 
sacred, seriousness... Play fulfills its purpose only if the player loses 
himself in play. Seriousness is not merely something that calls us 
away from play; rather, seriousness in playing is necessary to make 
the play wholly play.’9 What is implicit in this discussion of play is 
the concept of rule-following and the community of rule-followers 
which forms the basis for the ‘seriousness’ of play. But it is at 
precisely this point in his analysis that Gadamer’s model allows for 
the role o f ambiguity— intentional or unintentional— and even 
deception10 to play a role in the process of communication.11 For it is
8 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 103. Cf. Bowie, Psychoanalysis and the 
Future o f Theory, 39, 109 on the idea of ‘free play’.
9 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 102. Cf. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, 
12: ‘It goes without saying that in speaking of “games” of make-believe we must 
disavow any implication that they are a mere frivolity. Children’s games serve 
purposes far more significant than that of keeping them happy and out of 
mischief. It is generally recognized, I believe, that such games—and imaginative 
activities generally—do indeed, as their prevalence suggests, have a profound role 
in our efforts to cope with our environment.’
10 On deception and its relation to self-consciousness, cf. D.F. Pears, 
Motivated Irrationality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) 42. He states that there is 
‘a striking difference between self-deception and the deception of others. It is 
possible to deceive someone else for no ulterior motive purely out of devilry, 
because the desire to impart truth to others is not ineradicable, whereas the 
ineradicability of the desire for the truth of one’s own beliefs makes it impossible
228 BROOK W .R. PEARSON
the model of play which, as we have seen, provides the basis for 
Gadamer’s ontological move to provide dialogue as the fundamental 
basis of his hermeneutical model. If there is a seriousness about 
playing— whether that be the will to win a game or simply to follow  
the rules of a game correctly and with the good-will of team spirit or 
sportsmanship— does this not allow for the possibility that one could 
purposely subvert those rules? Hence the possibility of a ‘fixed’ game, 
or of cheating. In the world of finance, ‘insider trading’ is an excellent 
example of the subversion of communally-accepted rule-following 
conventions for the purpose of personal gain in the game o f stock 
trading. ‘Insider trading’ is, of course, an American phenomenon, for 
it is in the American market that such activity is illegal, while other 
financial markets do not rule out the same activity. As such, this is an 
excellent example also of the localized community nature of rule- 
following.
Although Gadamer follows his above turn to metaphoric ideas 
about ‘play’ with the statement that ‘The movement backward and 
forward is obviously so central to the definition of play that it makes 
no difference who or what performs this movement. The movement of 
play has, as it were, no substrate’,12 it is precisely the ‘substrate’ of 
play which exists outside the response in faith to another individual. 
Walton’s conception of the origin of mimesis as a human activity is
to deceive oneself simply for the sake of deceiving oneself and an ulterior motive 
is always required’ (cp. idem, ‘Motivated Irrationality, Freudian Theory and 
Cognitive Dissonance’, in R. Wollheim and J. Hopkins [eds.], Philosophical 
Essays on Freud [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982] 264-88, esp. 
270-73). Given the above discussion on the role of the unconscious in the 
formation of a horizon (p. 13 n. 37), it would seem reasonable to restate this, in 
Gadamer’s terms, to say that the ineradicability of the desire for the belief of 
one’s own beliefs is a primary motivating factor in the production of a horizon, 
and one of the reasons why interpreters have the horizonally limited identity for 
which Gadamer argues.
11 Also, as signalled above in Chapter 3 (p. 99 n. 40), Prendergast’s {The 
Order o f Mimesis, 81-82) discussion of ‘contract’ lays bare some of Gadamer’s 
preconceptual ambiguity on this matter: ‘once the conventions of trust on which 
the (somewhat cosy) notion of freely negotiated mutualities [are abandoned], and 
are instead linked to the principle of the division of labour, we are back in the 
world of a socially stratified distribution of knowledge and, therefore, of relations 
of power, authority and dependence—that is, precisely those hierarchical forms 
which the more traditional versions of contract [such as Gadamer’s] have so often 
been accused of attempting to mask’.
12 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 103.
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the idea of ‘make-believe’, that is, mimesis as an internal property of 
being human as founded in childhood play, but then metaphorized as 
an adult modelling function.13 Neither Walton nor Gadamer is explicit 
in treating the possibility of breaking the rules of a game, or of 
contravening the conventions of a game of make-believe,14 but if their 
metaphor is a live one, it would seem appropriate to include this 
aspect o f ‘play’ in our metaphoric conception of interpretation and 
communication.
In terms of interpretation, we might say that the substrate of play 
exists in the ineffability, in the ambiguity, in the irreducibility of the 
work of art. For Gadamer, this is ‘the eminent text’ of poetry which 
resists the transformation into the concept of the text. But this ‘play’ 
he describes in the metaphoric uses of the term is no ‘backwards and 
forwards motion’— in each instance he lists, ‘play’ is precisely the 
function of complex interrelations o f what might be, given the 
appropriate observational powers, characterized as a multiplicity of 
binary oppositions of the kind Gadamer envisages.15 This picks up the
13 Cf. Walton, Mimesis as Make-Believe, 69.
14 While it might be thought impossible to ‘break’ rules in an imaginary 
setting (or perhaps even to have rules in such a setting), one has only to recall 
chilhood play or experience it as an observer to see that this is not the case. My 
own childrens’ frustration at my attempts to cut short a game of imagination by 
failing to follow such conventions is indicative of generally observed behaviour in 
children. Likewise, following Walton’s reasoning, in the more subtle and mature 
structuring of adult ‘play’ in representational art, or, as in this case, simply the 
process of dialogue and interpretation thereof, we likewise appreciate rule- 
following as adults. The typical reaction to contravention of what ‘seems to be the 
case’ by a new interpretation of a text or a work of art is illustrative. Likewise, the 
‘faddishness’ of new approaches to interpretation—new sets of rules to 
follow—and the simultaneous resistance by some to a new way of approaching a 
text or work of art also speak to this. Once a new game of make-believe—a new 
set of rules to follow—is in play, it is only those who are ‘let in’ on the secret of 
the new game who will be able to interact with the players in any meaningful way 
(and the other interpreters may continue stolidly to play their original game, or a 
modification thereof).
15 Relating Gadamer’s ideas about the play and structure of language to 
Romantic literary theory, Bowie, From Romanticism to Critical Theory, 73, 
suggests that ‘The linguistic resources employed by the writer pre-exist any 
theoretical attempt on his or her part to understand them, and s/he must also both 
understand and employ them in order to analyse them.’ Bowie’s further 
discussion indicates that (to utilize Gadamer’s language as developed in the 
present context), in the coming together of a multiplicity of binary oppositions in
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strand of my discussion above concerning modelling a network of 
dialectics, or a hierarchy of dialects, or a network of hierarchalized 
dialectics.16
Dialectical Ambiguity: Paul's Non-Verbal Response to Jacob 
The present conversation, however, further problematizes this 
model by yielding weight to the effect o f a counterfeit dialogue. 
Following Gadamer closely in his suggestions about the effect of a 
closed question (whether ‘slanted’ or ‘wrongly put’, or following my 
attempt at more precise terminology outlined above), the interaction 
of Jacob with Paul comprises an example of such a counterfeit. It is 
the contention of this chapter that Paul is presuppositionally impelled 
to carry on a legitimate dialogue with the Jerusalem church, but 
nevertheless responds to this counterfeit beginning of a dialogue with 
Paul in James in a non-verbal manner (so far as we are aware), by 
undertaking to act as a counter-example to Jacob’s presuppositions. 
This stands in an uncertain relation to Gadamer’s philosophy, for 
Gadamer’s statement that ‘Being that can be understood is17 
language’18 could be seen to stand in some tension with the idea that 
an act might carry meaning— understandable and communicable 
meaning— for interpreters. However, Gadamer’s idea of what can be
the play of language, something greater than the sum of the parts is created. 
Hence, interpretation is not a reductionistic activity, aiming at the disassembly of 
these binary oppositions (as an interpretative model formed under the influence of 
Derrida’s philosophy might be positioned), but rather at an attempt to approach 
this larger whole through the analysis of the structure of the text. Cf. also pp. 277- 
78.
16 Although positioned in a way to describe the various levels of mimeses in 
& narrative, Prendergast {The Order o f Mimesis, 29), discussing material from 
Barthes, Foucault and semiology, offers and explores a ‘structure of the mimetic 
text as a stratified or “hierarchical” distribution of discourses: at the apex there is 
the speech of the narrator; below this point there is the speech of the characters, 
whose varying relation to the “truth” is measured by their degree of 
approximation to, or divergence from, the discourse of the narrator’. This closely 
parallels the way in which the ambiguity of Gadamer’s model is here being 
brought to focus, and by which I propose his model of dialogical interpretation be 
reformed. Prendergast’s material could also be applied to the role of diatribe in 
Paul’s writing, as discussed above, Chapter 4.
17 I take ‘is’ in this context to be a function of a qualifying relative, as in 
Geach, Reference and Generality, 39-40, 189-90; idem, ‘Names and Identity’, 
156-58.
18 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 474.
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construed to be ‘language’ is not prescriptive, but rather, as he states, 
the result of the
hermeneutic phenomenon.. .project[ing] its own universality back onto the 
ontological constitution of what is understood, determining it in a 
universal sense as language and determining its own relation to beings as 
interpretation. Thus we speak not only of a language of art but also of a 
language of nature—in short, of any language that things have...19
Gadamer follows this with an analysis of words which may help us 
depict and code the plane of ambiguity more fully in his philosophical 
hermeneutics. Gadamer states:
The speculative mode of being of language has a universal ontological 
significance. To be sure, what comes into language is something different 
from the spoken word itself. But the word is a word only because of what 
comes into language in it. Its own physical being exists only in order to 
disappear into what is said. Likewise that which comes into language is 
not something that is pregiven before language; rather, the word gives its 
own determinateness.20
Gadamer’s mention of the ‘physical being’ of a word evokes the 
work of Jacques Derrida on the significance of the signs connected 
with a word. In his famous discussion of différence!différance,21 
Derrida provides a test-case for the idea of reducibility of meaning 
such as Gadamer here introduces. However, Gadamer is not entirely 
true to his own philosophical programme when he writes, obliquely 
criticizing Derrida: ‘In my view it is just the opposite of a right 
procedure if  one isolates the elements of speaking, of discours, and 
makes them the object of critique. In this case, yes, the same is no 
longer the same, so one can understand why a person who is fixated
19 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 474-75. Gadamer’s statement coheres in 
principle with M. Gatens and G. Lloyd, (Collective Imaginings: Spinoza, Past and 
Present [London and New York: Routledge, 1999] 127): ‘democratic forms of 
polity are preferable to others because they encourage the development of the 
capacities of the minds and bodies of their citizens... ways of knowing oneself 
and one’s context are reflected in embodied ways of being. What we know, 
imagine and believe is constitutive of our identities and these identities are 
processual, rather than fixed, because they are formed and re-formed through our 
participation in larger transindivual wholes.’
20 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 475.
21 Derrida, ‘Différance’; idem. Writing and Difference.
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on “signs”, has to speak of différence  or différance'22 There is 
equivocation on this point in Gadamer’s own work, especially in his 
discussion of translation in the third part of Truth and Method (pp. 
383-89). He states that ‘Translation, like all interpretation, is a 
highlighting...[the translator] must show his colors.’23 In this 
connection, he refers to ‘hermeneutical difficulty’ (made more 
extreme in the case of translating a foreign language) as that ‘of 
alienness and its conquest’.24 If this is a live metaphoric use of 
military language, Gadamer’s subsequent statements on the idea of a 
‘disappearing interpretation’ need modification:
We saw that to understand a text always means to apply it to ourselves and 
to know that, even if it must always be understood in different ways, it is 
still the same text presenting itself to us in these different ways. That this 
does not in the least relativize the claim to truth of every interpretation is 
seen from the fact that all interpretation is essentially verbal. The verbal 
explicitness that understanding achieves through interpretation does not 
create a second sense apart from that which is understood and interpreted.
The interpretive concepts are not, as such, thematic in understanding. 
Rather it is their nature to disappear behind what they bring to speech in 
interpretation. Paradoxically, an interpretation is right when it is capable 
o f disappearing in this way.25
22 Gadamer, ‘Reflections on my Philosophical Journey’, 50. Cf. also his 
‘Plato’s Unwritten Dialectic’, 132-33: ‘Does not the unity of discourse also have a 
certain determinate property not found in any of its component parts (letters, 
syllables, words) and is this not exactly the point?... Here, I suggest, the true 
relationship of the One and the Many, which gives the logos its structure, is made 
evident in the analogy of the meaninglessness of the syllable and the dilemma 
with which it confronts us.’
23 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 386.
24 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 387. Cf. S. Kofman, Socrates, Fictions o f a 
Philosopher (trans. C. Porter; London: The Athlone Press, 1998 [1989]) 138-39, 
discussing Kierkegaard’s critique of Hegel: ‘By comparing Hegel to [a military] 
officer...Kierkegaard displaces the problem from the ground of “truth” to the 
ground of the “will to power”, as one might call it anticipatorily. He reveals the 
will to power that governs the search for truth: Hegel’s will to be the great master 
of world history, its great conqueror, Caesar’s equal, or Alexander’s, at the very 
least, triumphant over Athens and Socrates... Despite its warlike manner, Hegel’s 
will may well lack masculinity and may leave Truth unsatisfied: for woman—and 
Truth is a female figure—is not satisfied with caresses; she wants all of her 
features to be wholly embraced.’
25 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 398 (emphasis added).
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However, the metaphor of conquest utilized by Gadamer in the 
foregoing suggests rather a replacement of the interpreted by the 
interpreter. Or perhaps Gadamer’s picture of conquistadors is 
different from mine. Indeed, his ideas about ‘true conversation’ are 
marked by such idealism:
Conversation is a process of coming to an understanding. Thus it belongs 
to every true conversation that each person opens himself to the other, 
truly accepts his point of view as valid and transposes himself into the 
other to such an extent that he understands not the particular individual but 
what he says.26
Unlike Warnke’s uncomfortability with this aspect of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical model, where she worries about the possibility of 
openness to the truth claims of individuals or texts which should long 
ago have been recognized as false or damaging (e.g. Mein Kampf; The 
Communist Manifesto),21 I suggest that Gadamer’s model packages 
too much with the idea of ‘true’ here. If one were to replace 
‘understanding’ in the first sentence of the above quotation with 
‘misunderstanding’, this becomes clear. What would be the criteria or 
decision-process by which such a judgement of ‘true’ could be made? 
Gadamer’s model itself, as we have seen, does not allow for a 
transposition of the interpreter outside of the set o f hermeneutical 
circles28— ‘Interpretation is not an occasional, post facto supplement 
to understanding; rather, understanding is always interpretation, and 
hence interpretation is the explicit form of understanding.’29 Hence, 
intentional or unintentional ambiguity in a text (or other interpretable 
‘object’) is something coded by the reader at the level o f initial
26 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 385. This is recognized by Zuckert, 
Postmodern Platos, 83: ‘whereas Heidegger suggested that Platonic metaphysics 
was the origin of untrammeled will to power celebrated by Nietzsche and 
embodied in the Nazi regime, Gadamer presented the same philosophy as a 
necessary antidote to the temptations of power politics’.
27 Cf. above, p. 28.
28 On Gadamer’s use of this term from Heidegger, cf. Truth and Method, 
266-71, and, for his definition of it in terms of his conversational model of 
interpretation, 389. Cf. also Philipse, Heidegger's Philosophy o f Being, 378-79, 
discussing Heidegger’s conception of the hermeneutical circle or spiral. Philipse, 
however, misconstrues Gadamer’s development of Heidegger with the idea of 
‘horizons’, and understands Gadamer to be speaking of an annihilation of 
‘cultural distance’. Cf. also his p. 408 n. 191, where Philipse apparently supports 
Hirsch’s attack on Gadamer.
29 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 307.
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encounter with the text. There is no way for a reader to make an a 
priori assessment of the truth-claim of any text he might read. 
Therefore, there can be no ipso facto  decision-making process for 
what it is to be a ‘true’ conversation. Instead, the possibility of 
ambiguity— intentional or unintentional— and deception is coded at 
the level of interpretation, as is all understanding in Gadamer’s model. 
However, such a process may be a disposition or an aspect of the 
subsequent dialogue (or set of dialogues). This framing of the problem 
allows for a concept of a counterfeit dialogue.30
But how, then, does the suggested model of a hierarchalized 
network of dialogues proceed with the knowledge that such 
counterfeiting is intricately woven into the very structure of human 
communication? Cave’s comments on ‘recognitions’, quoted above 
(p. 219 n. 163) in connection with the analysis of creativity in 
mimesis, are likewise useful here. He comments on theorists (perhaps 
like Gadamer) who, ‘in appropriating recognition for the reader, have 
taken it as “clarification”, the culmination of a heuristic process 
enacted by the text... They eliminate scandal in the name of a higher 
cause and a higher purpose.’ This, for Cave, is not descriptive of the 
role of ‘recognition’ in understanding:
their reassurance is bland, and doesn’t somehow square with the shocks
and twists that recognition brings with it. It is surely more interesting, and
30 This is not, however, to be equated with Gadamer’s idea of an inauthentic 
dialogue: ‘If one transposes oneself into the position of the another with the intent 
of understanding not the truth of what he is saying, but him, the questions asked 
in such a conversation are marked by...inauthenticity’ {Truth and Method, 385 n. 
1, cf. also 385-86 in general). This brief comment is inconsistent with the idea of 
psychoanalysis, for this is precisely the reason for a psychoanalytic dialogue. In 
addition, what about the dialogue where one partner is intent on understanding the 
falsehood of what another,is saying? Although Gadamer’s statement must be read 
in connection with his idea about the truth-claims of a text, it is precisely this 
weakness in his model which provides room for the present discussion of 
ambiguity. Geach’s comments {Mental Acts: Their Content and Their Objects 
[Studies in Philosophical Psychology; London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New 
York: Humanities Press, 1957] 110-11) on Freud could be used to rescue 
Gadamer’s intent here: ‘Freud...transfers a naïve “representative” theory of 
perception from its usual application (to the bodily senses, that is), and holds it to 
be no less valid of “inner sense”. Presumably on his view “inner sense” would not 
be inerrant; but I find in him no clear account of what an error of “inner sense” 
would be like.’ Cf. Gibson, ‘Modern Philosophy’, 25-27, discussing ‘Knowledge 
of Other Minds’.
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more appropriate to the nature of the hidden figure, to accept that the twist 
at the end can’t be untwisted: anagnorisis [‘recognition’] may 
retrospectively ‘explain’ earlier enigmatic events, but considered in itself, 
as a leap out of the series, it retains its aura of oddity, unease, 
disruption.31
Although Cave is not addressing the role of counterfeiting in dialogue 
and the communicative process, the role o f ambiguity in 
communication is formulated by Cave, as with the model I advocate, 
at the level of interpretation. But it may not be that this is basic to 
Gadamer’s philosophy. My development of him in this regard, to 
attempt a description or a mapping of the dialectical relations between 
a multiplicity of people, texts, and traditions in determining the 
hermeneutical character of a text, has an organic relationship with his 
philosophy. Inherent in Gadamer’s descriptions of the communication 
and interpretation process is a potential for such development. In this 
regard, Karl Miller’s comments on ‘duality’, in his study of ‘doubles’, 
can be displayed as a corrective for Gadamer’s apparently tidy 
dialectical relations:
Duality is depart and return. It is theft and restitution. It is megalomania 
and magnanimity. It is weakness, illness, and illusion, and it is the 
advantages they confer. It is divided and diffusive, hostile and hospitable. 
Duality is suicide, and masturbation. It is bisexuality, and dual nationality.
It courts and contemplates uncertainty, vacancy, doubt, dizziness, and 
arrest.32
‘Duality’ is not reducible to being a binary. It codes a networked 
relation of various non-binary possibilities and, as a result, 
ambiguities. ‘Binary’ presupposes determined or determinable 
concepts of ‘opposite’ and their mappable counterparts, whereas 
‘duality’ only requires alignments to be posed. Apparently binary 
relations are often not reducible to a simple opposition.
In the case of dialectical relations between Paul and Jacob, or 
perhaps the Jerusalem church (insofar as this is recoverable through 
the textual evidence of the New Testament),33 it is relevant to be 
aware that the apparently thetic beginning of the dialogue— the letter
31 Cave, Recognitions, 270.
32 Miller, Doubles, 350.
33 Cf. Gibson, Text and Tablet, 56 on the implications of incomplete 
evidence. Although his discussion there is in connection with archaeological 
evidence, the same holds true for a New Testament which, by its own admission, 
does not contain all of the writings of even just Paul.
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of James— between Paul and Jacob is not actually of this identity (as I 
show below). In Gadamer’s model, this apparently thetic beginning is 
not really so, or is of this function within the identity of a thesis posed 
as a question. In this case, we are engaged in the counterfeit of a 
dialogue, for the beginning of this dialogue is intended (in so far as 
intention is textually encoded) to be self-delimiting. There is no 
proportionate manner in which Paul can respond along the lines set 
down by his ‘dialogue’ partner.
To outline my positioning of James in this regard, there are three 
areas in need of preliminary attention from a historical-critical point- 
of-view: (1) the chronological and ideological placement of the book 
of James vis-à-vis Paul and his writings, (2) the paradigmatic 
reconstruction of the relationships between Paul and the Jerusalem 
church, and (3) Paul’s purpose(s) for undertaking the (second)34 
collection for Jerusalem. Although all of these foci have received a 
certain amount of attention in the modern study of the New  
Testament, they are rarely, if ever, treated in relation to each other.35
34 On the two collections of Paul, cf. below, n. 57.
35 Especially disappointing in recent research is the area of the collections for 
Jerusalem. Treatments since J. Munck’s knee-jerk reaction to Baur {Paul and the 
Salvation o f Mankind [trans. F. Clarke; London: SCM Press; Richmond: John 
Knox, 1959 (1954)] passim, but esp. 282-85; followed by W. Schmithals, Paul 
and James [SBT 46; London: SCM Press, 1965] see esp. 7-9) seem to vary, but 
without really interacting on the aspect of the ‘meaning’ of the collections. Some 
are without reference to the larger picture of the role that the collections must 
have played in the interrelationships of the early Church (no matter how one 
construes those relationships), e.g., G. Smiga, ‘Romans 12:1-2 and 15:30-32 and 
the Occasion of the Letter to the Romans’, CBQ 53 (1991) 257-73; P. Bowers, 
‘Fulfilling the Gospel: The Scope of the Pauline Mission’, JETS 30.2 (1987) 185- 
98; D.R. Hall, ‘St. Paul and Famine Relief: A Study in Galatians 210’, ExpTim 82 
(1971) 309-11. D.-A. Koch, ‘Kollektenbericht, “Wir”-Bericht und Itinerar Neue 
(?) uberlegungen zu einem alten Problem’, NTS 45 (1999) 367-90, while 
interested to show the place of the second collection in Pauline chronology, places 
no emphasis on the significance of the collection itself. Others are keen to place 
the collections in the religious setting of the wider Greco-Roman world, e.g., R.S. 
Ascough, ‘The Completion of a Religious Duty: The Background of 2 Cor 8.1- 
15’, NTS 42 (1996) 584-99; and N. Taylor, Paul, Antioch and Jerusalem: A Study 
in Relationships and Authority in Earliest Christianity (JSNTSup 66; Sheffield: 
JSOT Press, 1992) 214-17. Some speak of the role the collections would have 
played in the relationship between Paul (or the Pauline churches) and Jerusalem 
only in the very broadest (and most innocuous) terms, e.g., C.E.B. Cranfield, ‘The 
Grace of our Lord Jesus Christ: 2 Corinthians 6, 1-9’, Communia Viatorum 32
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Perhaps the most discussed of these is the dating of James, but this 
has rarely been examined in the context of a global approach to 
earliest Christian history, and never with the idea that it might be 
directly connected to the work and person of Paul (as opposed to 
merely his writings), and so only the most parochial factors are 
brought to bear in deciding when the letter must have been written.36 
In addition, it seems to have fallen out of fashion to speak of the 
earliest period of Christianity as one which involved conflict and 
division— even though it is generally recognized that this is 
characteristic of every subsequent period of Christian history! This 
over-reaction to the excesses of the Tübingen School of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries has left us with a climate where one can, 
apparently, simply dismiss out-of-hand work which suggests such a
(1989) 105-109; P. Perkins, ‘Taxes in the New Testament’, Journal o f Religious 
Ethics 12 (1984) 182-200. However, only a very few actually address the 
collections in terms of Paul’s motivation for the collection (beyond simple 
charity), or how it might have played into the power relationships within the early 
Church, e.g., Goulder, ‘Silas in Thessalonica’, 90; idem , ‘20<t>IA in 1 
Corinthians’, NTS 37 (1991) 529; L.W. Hurtado, ‘The Jerusalem Collection and 
the Book of Galatians’, JSNT5 (1979) 46-62; G. Strecker, ‘Die sogenannte zweite 
Jerusalem Reise des Paulus’, ZNW  53 (1962) 67-77. Despite Hurtado’s be­
moaning of the relative lack of importance assigned to the (second) collection in 
Pauline studies (in 1979), contemporary study of Paul—even that specifically 
dedicated to the study of economic issues surrounding Paul’s ministry (e.g. J.J. 
Meggitt, Paul, Poverty and Survival [SNTW; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1998])—seems to remain equivocal towards the importance of the collection.
36 E.g. M. Hengel, ‘Der Jakobusbrief als antipaulinische Polemik’, in G.E. 
Hawthorne with O. Betz (eds.), Tradition and Interpretation in the New 
Testament: Essays in Honor o f E. Earle Ellis (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; 
Tubingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1987) 248-78. Hengel does deny the late (second 
century) dating of James, and suggests that it is actually written as a ‘gezielte 
antipaulinische Polemik’ in response to at least the writings of Galatians and 
Romans. (As noted below, however, I think that this assumes too poor of an 
understanding or reading of these two letters by Paul on the part of the author of 
James.) As a result, in Hengel’s most recent work on this period of Paul’s life 
(with Schwemer, Paul between Damascus and Antioch), he mentions this article 
only once (323 n. 12 to p. 3, although conclusions originally drawn in this article 
are repeated on 391-92 nn. 610-11 to his p. 116). Likewise Riesner, Paul’s Early 
Period, does not consider James with regard to the early chronology of Paul (he 
does not actually mention the book at all), and does not even make a single 
reference to it in his book.
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division.37 This dismissal, however, has left much of what goes on in 
current Pauline studies without a unifying or explanatory principle by 
which the purpose and character of Paul’s (or his contemporaries’) 
rhetoric or actions can be discerned. In the light of this current 
vacuum in Pauline studies, the work of Michael Goulder, reviving 
certain aspects of the Baur hypothesis, seems an appropriate initial 
statement to provide such an explanatory principle. That Goulder’s 
work in this regard is largely ignored in contemporary scholarship is 
one of the strongest indications that this particular aspect of Pauline 
studies is yet another area in which we have allowed arguments (in 
this case the reactions against the Baur hypothesis regarding the split 
in earliest Christianity) to become scholarly assumptions, and 
eventually, unquestioned assumptions. To position this in a 
Gadamerian perspective, an aspect o f what it is to be a 
dialogue— apparently the on-going scholarly dialogue in New  
Testament studies concerning New Testament history and 
theology—no longer functions as such. Attempts to question this are 
responded to with either silence or a desire to bring to silence the 
voice of those questioning. This stands also as an example of the 
counterfeit dialogue I have described above, and betrays shades of a 
monolithic Kafka-esque institutionalism.
37 Cf. Hengel and Schwemer, Paul between Damascus and Antioch, e.g., 
204-205, 214, 224 where the authors seem to still be reacting to Baur and the 
Tübingen School, but argue via assertion, rather than interacting with Baur (or 
others) in any meaningful way. Compare L.T. Johnson, The Letter o f James: A 
New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (AB 37A; New York: 
Doubleday, 1995) 108-11, which, while critical of the assumptions of the 
Tübingen School, nevertheless interacts directly with the conclusions of this 
movement. Likewise, M. Bockmuehl, ‘Antioch and James the Just’, in B.D. 
Chilton and C.A. Evans (eds.), James the Just and Christian Origins (NovTSup 
98; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999) 156-57 dismisses the work of ‘the present-day heirs 
of F.C. Baur’ as a developmentalist Hegelian view of early Christian history. 
While I take issue with this characterization of Goulder’s work, or my own 
offerings in the area—whether or not it is fair of Baur’s nineteenth-century 
historical theory—I do appreciate Bockmuehl’s willingness to engage with the 
assumptions underpinning such an approach.
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JACOB AND PAUL: AN AXIOM AND ITS ANTITHESIS
The Dating and Identity o f the Letter o f James 
James is typically assumed to be a late, post-Apostolic letter—even 
a forgery— which interacts with at least Paul’s letters of Galatians and 
Romans,38 and functions as anti-Pauline rhetoric from the post- 
Pauline period. However, this scholarly consensus on James has been 
questioned by several, and the debate continues. Opinion on the date 
(and hence authorship) of James varies, but the divide is between 
early (somewhere in the 40s or early 50s)39 to quite late (late first- to 
late second-century, the typical position of the Tübingen School.)40 A
38 See, e.g., G. Liidemann, Opposition to Paul in Jewish Christianity (trans. 
M.E. Boring; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1989) 140-49. Although, as discussed 
below, I disagree with the view that Jacob is aware of the contents of Paul’s 
letters, it should be noted that the assumption of such interaction does not 
necessarily mean that the letter is late (so Hengel, ‘Der Jakobusbrief als 
antipaulinische Polemik’). Cf. n. 36, above.
39 For an early dating, see J.B. Mayor, The Epistle o f St. James: The Greek 
Text with Introduction, Notes and Comments, and Further Studies in the Epistle o f  
St. James (London: Macmillan, 1913) xci-cii, clxxxiii-clxxxviii; C. Powell, 
‘“Faith” in James and its Bearing on the Problem of the Date of the Epistle’, 
ExpTim  62 (1950-51) 311-14; F. MulBner, Der Jakobusbrief (HTKNT 13.1; 
Freiburg: Herder, 1981) 1-8; W.H. Wuellner, Der Jakobusbrief im Licht der 
Rhetorik und Textpragmatik’, LB  43 (1978) 5-66, esp. 38; G. Kittel, ‘Der 
geschichtliche Ort des Jakobusbriefes’, ZN W  41 (1942) 71-105, esp. 94-102, 
where he argues that Jacob writes against Paul’s letters; and P. Stuhlmacher, Vom 
Verstehen des Neuen Testaments: Eine H erm eneutik  (GNT 6; 
NTDErganzungsreihe 6; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2nd edn, 1986) 
249; Johnson, James, 92-123, esp. 118-21. Of these, only Mayor and Powell, 
however, would suggest that the letter comes before Paul’s writings, as I do here, 
although MulBner, Jakobusbrief, 15-23, does conclude that it should be placed in 
the pre-70 period, and even links it with a response to the preaching of Paul: ‘Der 
Jakobusbrief muB vor dem Jahre 70 geschrieben sein. Er fiihrt deutlich in die Zeit 
jener erregenden Auseinandersetzung, die durch das Auftreten des Paulus und die 
Predigt vom gesetzfreien Evangelium in der j ungen Kirche entstanden waren’ (p. 
21); and T. Zahn, Einleitung in das NT. I. (Leipzig: Deichert, 4th edn, 1924) 95 
suggests that, in Rom. 4:2, ‘die Berücksichtung des Jk seitens des PI spürbar’. Cf. 
also the survey of this issue in T.C. Penner, The Epistle o f James and 
Eschatology: Re-reading an Ancient Christian Letter (JSNTSup 121; Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1996) 61-74.
40 E.g. Baur, Paul the Apostle, 2.297-313. Cf. also K. Aland, ‘Der 
Herrenbruder Jakobus und der Jakobusbrief, TLZ 69 (1944) cols. 97-104, repr. in 
Neutestamentliche Entwürfe (TB 63; Munich: Kaiser, 1979) 233-45; M. Dibelius,
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position such as advocated by Hengel in ‘Der Jakobusbrief als 
antipaulinische Polemik’, (reasonably early— near the end of the 
century— and the authentic authorship of Jacob, the brother of Jesus) 
is unusual. The trouble with dating James is that, if it is not a late, 
second-century document, it should probably be seen as quite an early 
document, very possibly even before the Jerusalem Council in 50, 
and, in my opinion, almost certainly before the letters of Paul have 
been circulated.41 The character of Jacob’s apparent misunderstanding 
of Paul’s theology makes it highly improbable that it is a response to a 
written form of Paul’s theology, such as we find in his extant letters, 
but rather to an oral (and probably second-hand) form of his theology, 
such as may have been reported to the leaders of the Jerusalem church 
during Paul’s early years in the Antioch church, or even while he was 
in Tarsus.42 As Peter Davids puts it: ‘to argue that James directly
A Commentary on the Epistle o f James (rev. H. Greeven; trans. M.A. Williams; 
Hermeneia; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976) 11-12; J.H. Ropes, A Critical and 
Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle o f St. James (ICC; Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1916) 43-52; W.G. Kiimmel, Introduction to the New Testament (trans 
H.C. Kee; Nashville: Abingdon, rev. edn, 1975 [German 17th edn, 1973]) 411-14; 
S. Laws, A Commentary on the Epistle o f James (BNTC; London: A. & C. Black, 
1980) 40; W. Schrage, ‘Der Jakobsbrief, in H. Balz and W. Schrage, Die  
“Katholischen” Briefe: Die Brief e des Jakobus, Petrus, Johannes und Judas 
(NTD 10.13; Gottingen and Zürich: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, new edn, 1985) 
12; Lüdemann, Opposition to Paul, 140 n. 1 (286). Cf. the rather difficult mid­
way position of R.P. Martin {James [WBC 48; Waco, TX: Word Books, 1988] 
Ixxiii-lxxvii), who argues (p. Ixxvii) that, as there was ‘a two-layered stage in the 
production of the letter, the presence of hellenistic idioms and the polishing of the 
material ascribed to James the Jerusalem martyr with stylistic traits and literary 
flourishes such as the diatribe and the repartee would be the work of an 
enterprising editor [of otherwise genuinely Jacobian material]’. For discussion of 
the arguments on both sides, cf. Johnson, James, 108-11.
41 Contra Hengel, ‘Der Jakobusbrief als antipaulinische Polemik’, who 
would like to both assign an early date to James, and posit interaction with at least 
Romans and Galatians. Also contra P.J. Hartin, James and the Q Sayings o f Jesus 
(JSNTSup 47; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991)236, who suggests that the letter’s 
dependence on the so-called ‘Q’ Gospel source material must put the letter 
somewhere in the mid-fifties. He is supported in this by M.J. Townsend, The 
Epistle o f James (Epworth Commentaries; London: Ep worth Press, 1994) xxxiv- 
xxxv.
42 Although unusual, this position is not without support. See D.J. Moo, 
James (TNTC; Leicester: InterVarsity Press; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985) 27- 
28; and J. Painter, Just James: The Brother o f Jesus in History and Tradition
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attacks Paul [i.e. Paul’s letters] is to argue that James is a consummate 
blunderer, for he fails to meet Paul’s arguments at all and instead 
produces a work with which Paul would have agreed!’43 Although 
this misconstrues the degree to which Paul was ready to concede such 
things as the role of the law in the Christian life (among other things), 
Davids is indeed correct that James ‘fails to meet Paul’s arguments’ as 
stated in the extant letters of Paul, as I will show below.
In his recent commentary on James, Johnson desires to 
‘Loosen...[James from] the Pauline Connection’.44 This is admirable, 
albeit mistaken in emphasis. He apparently sees his attempt to ‘loosen 
the Pauline connection’ as a stand against the classic position of the 
Tübingen School and hence the whole idea of investigating division 
within the early Church, or even the more measured attempt of 
Dibelius to speak of the book as simply a repository of wisdom  
traditions and paraenesis, but still in the light of ‘Paul’s formulation of 
the question about the Law’.45 However, it may be too sweeping to 
simply dismiss the idea of division in the early Church (and the role of 
Jacob in that division), as many of the criticisms Johnson brings 
against the Tübingen School in this regard are not reflected in, for 
instance, Goulder’s more recent and more tightly focused work. 
However, Johnson’s final point in this regard is well taken: ‘The most
(Studies on Personalities in the New Testament; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1997) 
268-69.
43 P H. Davids, Commentary on James (NIGTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 
1982) 21. Davids also allows for the position that James is addressed to an early, 
misunderstood Pauline theology, but suggests that this is problematized by the 
lack of ‘such a position ever actually existing] in the shape found in’ James’ 
attacks (p. 21). However, this misses the point that James may very well be 
reacting to Paul himself, not some group which has taken his theology and 
perverted it (which would, indeed, be a problematic position with no compelling 
evidence). Contra this, see P.-A. Bernheim, James, Brother o f Jesus (trans. J. 
Bowden; London: SCM Press, 1997 [1996]) 239: ‘The Letter of James is beyond 
doubt responding to Pauline conceptions. Unquestionably [!], the formula “a man 
is justified by works and not faith alone” (James 2.24) refers to Galatians 2.16 and 
Romans 3.27-28’.
44 Johnson, Tames, 111-14.
45 Dibelius, James, 17-18. Cf. D.J. Verseput, ‘Wisdom, 4Q185, and the 
Epistle of James’, JBL 117.4 (1998) 691-707, here 706, who, on the basis of a 
comparison of 4Q185 and James, concludes that, ‘while James’s epistle is 
certainly a hortatory text and for that reason not dissimilar to the genre of wisdom 
instruction at the micro level, it does not present itself to the reader on the whole 
as a product of wisdom reflection’.
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important gain from breaking the Pauline fixation is that it liberates 
James to be read in terms of 108 verses [i.e. its entire text] rather than 
12 verses [those Johnson identifies as typically seen to relate to Paul], 
in terms of its own voice rather than in terms of its supposed muting 
of Paul’s voice’. It is not the purpose of this chapter to simply take 
those twelve verses (actually, probably more like 16: 1:2-4; 2:10, 14- 
26), and leave the rest of the letter. This in no way enables us to see 
how this letter— if it is indeed early as both Johnson and I think—fits 
within the larger context of either simply Jerusalem Christianity, or 
the conflict between Antioch and Jerusalem and, in some manner, 
Paul and Jerusalem. However, despite Johnson’s assertions to the 
contrary, it is just as legitimate to look at James as evidence for 
discussing Paul as it is to look at it in its own right. Its 
status— according to the dating we both take—makes it probably the 
earliest writing extant from the New Testament period, and likely a 
predecessor of any of Paul’s letters— invaluable evidence for 
reconstructing the climate of the pre-Pauline Church.
The resistance to an early dating of this letter is somewhat odd, 
being that it is based on two widely rejected sets o f arguments. In 
many ways, late dating of James is still apparently dependent on the 
conclusions of the Tübingen School (see n. 39), even in the wake of 
widespread rejection of its broader conclusions. The second major 
argument, heavily influenced by the work of Adolf Deissmann, deals 
with the so-called ‘developed’ literary character of James, something 
Deissmann argued must have taken place at a relatively late date.46 
Despite the rejection of the social model upon which Deissmann
46 For presentation of Deissmann’s letter-epistle divide, see G.A. 
Deissmann, Bible Studies (trans. A. Grieve; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1901) 1- 
59; idem, Light from the Ancient East (trans. L.R.M. Strachan; London: Hodder & 
Stoughton, 4th edn, 1922) 146-251; cf. M. Dibelius, A Fresh Approach to the New 
Testament and Early Christian Literature (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1936) esp. 137-50, 185-89, 226-30. For critique of Deissmann’s position, cf. S.K. 
Stowers, Letter Writing in Greco-Roman Antiquity (LEG; Philadelphia: 
Westminster, 1986) 17-26 for a thorough analysis of Deissmann’s position and an 
overview of recent epistolary theory. For the continued influence of such an 
approach to letters in the New Testament, see M.Y. MacDonald, The Pauline 
Churches: A Socio-Historical Study o f Institutionalization in the Pauline and 
Deutero-Pauline Writings (SNTMS 60; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1988); Dibelius, James, 17; Kiimmel, Introduction, 406; Ropes, James, 50; E. 
Baasland, ‘Literarische Form, Thematik und geschichtliche Einordnung des 
Jakobusbriefes’, AARWII.25.2 (1988) 3676.
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based this argument, the characterization remains of James as a later 
work which reveals a more developed form of Christianity (unlike the 
earliest days of ‘primitive’ Christianity).47
However, this characterization of James is anything but clear—why 
should it be assumed that someone who could rise so quickly to the 
leadership of the Jerusalem church, despite his not (apparently) having 
been a disciple and follower of his brother during his lifetime, was 
uneducated and unable to write in decent Greek? What is it about the 
early Jerusalem church that would prevent its leader writing a 
‘cultured’ document such as the letter of James?48 Such arguments 
betray a misunderstanding of the nature of Palestinian Jewish culture 
in the Greco-Roman era,49 and lead us away from the fact that this is 
most likely a letter written by this early leader of the Jerusalem 
church, as it claims to be.50
47 Note, however, the exception to this in Johnson, James, esp. 116-18, who 
not only challenges the assertion that James could not have written in such 
‘polished’ Greek (a point brought up, e.g., by Kiimmel, Introduction, 412-13), but 
also challenges the idea that the culture in which James was involved would have 
abrogated his ability to make use of the Greco-Roman moralistic traditions which 
seem to pervade his letter.
48 Lüdemann’s (Opposition to Paul, 286 n. 1) brief assertion that ‘In my 
opinion, the most important evidence against the authenticity of James is the 
theological position of the Lord’s brother which becomes visible in Gal. 2:1 Iff’ 
makes little sense, as there is nothing about the issue of Gentile-Jewish table 
fellowship in James. How, anyway, can Paul's brief description of the effect of 
the coming of ‘some from Jacob’ (Gal 2:12) on the actions of Peter/Cephas 
function as an outline of Ja co b ’s theological position, or indeed on the 
authenticity of the letter itself?
49 Responding to the specifically linguistic objections often marshalled in 
this regard, see S.E. Porter, ‘Did Jesus Ever Teach in Greek? A Look at Scholarly 
Opinion and the Evidence’, in his Studies in the Greek New Testament: Theory 
and Practice (SBG 6; New York: Peter Lang, 1996) 139-71 (first published in 
TynBul 44.2 [1993] 199-235); idem, ‘Jesus and the Use of Greek in Galilee’, in 
B.D. Chilton and C.A. Evans (eds.), Studying the Historical Jesus: Evaluations o f  
the State o f Current Research (NTTS 19; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1994) 123-54; idem, 
‘The Greek Language of the New Testament’, in Porter (ed.), Handbook to 
Exegesis o f the New Testament, 99-130; idem, ‘The Greek Papyri of the Judaean 
Desert and the World of the Roman East’, in Porter and Evans (eds.), The Scrolls 
and the Scriptures, 293-316.
50 Other objections to James the brother of Jesus being the author, handily 
summarized by Kiimmel (Introduction, 413-14), are even less telling. To the 
objection that ‘It is scarcely conceivable that the Lord’s brother, who remained 
faithful to the Law, could have spoken of “the perfect law of freedom” (1:25) or
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However, as I will show, other than just the weakness of the typical 
arguments against the early dating and ‘apostolic’ authorship of 
James, the essential characteristics of this Jerusalemite treatise argue 
for such an early dating, and lend support to the veracity of its claim 
to be written by Jacob himself. It is specifically the identity of this 
letter’s interaction with what is typically thought to be Pauline 
theology that argues for such an early date, and it is the argument of 
this chapter that the ‘dialogue’ with Paul found in this letter provides
that he could have given concrete expression to the Law in the ethical commands 
(2:1 If) without mentioning even implicitly any cultic-ritual requirements’ (p. 
413), we might suggest that James in no way felt it necessary to push the cultic 
issues at this early stage, because it seems unlikely that the Church had yet faced 
the issue of Gentile inclusion in any large-scale manner. If a date in the 40s is 
taken for James, and if Jacob is responding to Paul’s theology, rather than to 
Paul’s mission (which had not, according to this reading, started yet), it would be 
natural to emphasize the ethical issues which he thought were threatened by 
Paul’s theology. Indeed, the spiritualization of cultic aspects of Judaism found at, 
e.g., Qumran (see esp. 4Q174) might suggest to us that it would not be strange for 
the early Christians to have held themselves in somewhat of a contra-distinction 
to the Temple establishment, even if Acts does seem to give us the impression 
that the earliest Christians in Jerusalem did indeed continue to worship in the 
Temple itself. These earliest Christians were, after all, followers of a Jesus whose 
main line of argument was contra to the Jerusalem Temple establishment. Cf., 
e.g., C.A. Evans, ‘Jesus’ Action in the Temple: Cleansing or Portent of 
Destruction’, in B.D. Chilton and C.A. Evans, Jesus in Context: Temple, Purity, 
and Restoration (AGJU 39; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1997) 395-439 (first published in 
CBQ 51 [1989] 237-70); B.D. Chilton, A Galilean Rabbi and his Bible: Jesus’ 
Use o f the Interpreted Scripture o f his Time (GNS 8; Wilmington, DE: Glazier, 
1984) 111-14.
The other arguments adduced by Kiimmel are even less convincing: he objects 
that the brother of Jesus would certainly not have omitted reference to Jesus, if he 
wanted to be seen as authoritative, but this assumes that James thought his 
authority was in doubt. The relationship between James and the ‘Q’ material (see 
Hartin, James and the Q Sayings, passim) might suggest that Jacob, if he is indeed 
the brother of Jesus, saw himself as continuing the teaching of Jesus, rather than 
as 2i follower per se. Kiimmel also suggests that the resistance to the inclusion of 
James in the history of the formation of the canon would argue for the late date of 
this letter, but counters himself in his following paragraph, where he argues that 
‘an unknown Christian placed his hortatory under the authority of the former 
leader of the church in Jerusalem’ (p. 413). If Jacob’s authority was seen as 
suitable for a pseudepigrapher to appropriate, then the resistance to its inclusion 
of the letter in the essentially Pauline canon becomes incomprehensible (unless he 
was a particularly bad pseudepigrapher).
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the key to explaining the subsequent ‘collection for the 
poorY‘collection for the saints’ undertaken by Paul. Rather than an 
obscure, late, difficult-to-explain treatise written against an already 
developed, widely disseminated Pauline theology of justification by 
faith, the subject matter of James is specifically related to the early 
activities of Paul, and his theology in its incipient form.
Although it may be thought that James reads more like a papal 
encyclical than a letter to a specific church or situation, this is not a 
particularly damning characterization, unless one accepts 
Deissmann’s romanticized picture of earliest Christianity. This, of 
course, requires the ‘more literary’ o f the writings in the New  
Testament to be later and the ‘less literary’ earlier,51 but it is not by 
any means clear that this was the way in which the writings of the 
New Testament progressed (or, given Deissmann’s feelings on the 
topic: regressed). Leaving aside this paradigm, we have no real 
reason, a priori, to assume that James’s more ‘developed’ literary 
character can not be early. In fact, if we assume that this letter is 
among the earliest writings of the New Testament, we may be able to 
ascertain something of the way in which the Jerusalem church saw 
itself and its role within the growing Church outside of both Jerusalem 
and, possibly, Palestine itself.52
51 ‘The creative, non-literary period is followed by the conservative, literary 
period, but this receives its immediate stamp from the motive forces of the former 
epoch’ (Light from the Ancient East, 247).
52 This analysis could help act as a corrective to Goulder’s re-constructive 
work, which is otherwise followed here. One of chief weaknesses of Goulder’s 
reconstruction (and earlier, Baur’s) of the character of earliest Church history is 
that, by his own admission (‘Silas in Thessalonica’, JSNT  48 [1992] 105), the 
canon we have is essentially Pauline. To unearth the evidence of what he calls 
‘the doctrinal field of battle whose scars are left all over our New Testament’ 
(‘Already?’, in T.E. Schmidt and M. Silva [eds.], To Tell the Mystery: Essays on 
New Testament Eschatology in Honor o f Robert H. Gundry [JSNTSup 100; 
Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1994] 33) is one thing, but (continuing his 
metaphor) to be able to compare battle plans would, of course, be a better way. If 
James is indeed an early letter—written during Paul’s ‘unknown years’ in 
Antioch, sometime in the 40s c e — then we may very well have such a document, 
written before the conflict with Paul’s theology (and extended Gentile mission) 
became the most important issue in the Church. Although I have forefronted my 
use of Goulder’s model in this chapter, this is not by way of a wholesale 
acceptance of all of Goulder’s conclusions or means of arriving at them.
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The Address o f the Letter o f James 
To begin with, we need to consider how this letter, if it is early, 
portrays the Jerusalem church. The letter’s address is perhaps the most 
telling element within the letter that betrays this: ‘To the twelve tribes 
in the Dispersion: Greeting’. This greeting, while making it difficult in 
some respects to identify the recipients, makes the self-identity of the 
sender very clear. This opening phrase, raîs* basera ÿvXalç ra îç  
eu T fj  SiaoTTopa, suggests some things about the recipients, it is 
true— they may very well have been Jewish Christians and/or seen as 
continuing in the tradition of the national institutions of Israel, they 
are dispersed from a centre (which one would expect to be 
Jerusalem53), and are again referred to with language previously used 
to describe the scattered nation of Israel—but the use of this language 
also suggests about its author that he sees himself as part of or present 
in the centre of this new and/or continued Israel. The argument that 
this is something which could reflect a later theology— according to 
the usual dating, sometime after 70 C E —begs the question as to the 
purpose that such language would have played after the destruction of 
Jerusalem. Surely, were this letter post-70 (and were the identification 
o f the recipients as tclls* ÔcaôcKa ÿvX a îç— ‘the twelve  
tribes’— important to the author and/or recipients), the simple tcus* 
ôcûôekœ (jmXais* tglls* €v Tfj SiaoTTopq ( ‘the twelve tribes in the 
dispersion’) would be accompanied by some kind of discussion, 
explanation or justification. That it is not speaks either o f the 
incredible skill and ingenuity of a pseudepigrapher (who, in this 
reading, must not be forging for the purpose of edification— if such 
forgery every truly happened—but rather deception54), or it speaks of
53 Cf. J.M. Scott, Paul and the Nations (WUNT 84; Tübingen: Mohr 
[Siebeck], 1995) 138-39. Also, K.-W. Niebuhr, ‘Der Jakobusbrief im Licht 
frühjüdischer Diasporabriefe’, NTS 44 (1998) 420-43, is useful for positioning 
this kind of communication in relation to other Jewish letters of its kind (e.g. 
Epistle o f Jeremiah, 2 Maccabees 1-2).
54 On the idea of deception and the role it must have played in 
pseudepigraphy in the early Church, see Porter, ‘Pauline Authorship and the 
Pastoral Epistles’; and cf. discussion above, p. 110. Following the above 
discussion of the role of deception in mimesis and ‘play’, it could be said that a 
literary forgery is the creation of a counterfeit mimesis, or is a game under the 
guise of ‘make-believe’, but actually predicated upon the perversion of such 
make-believe—like the ‘games’ played by paedophiles and child abusers to 
deceive their victims into compliance with the twisted, perverted relationships 
between adult and child.
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the simple self-identity of the Jerusalem church in the years following 
the death and resurrection of Jesus.
James and Paul's Early Career 
The connection of this letter to Paul’s early career is not something 
generally discussed in the literature on the topic.55 Although it is often 
difficult to construct a clear picture of the early activities of Paul56 a 
broad outline of his activities may be enough to place James at a time 
when the type of activity in which Paul must have been engaged is 
fairly easy to imagine. The usual attempts at writing a chronology of 
Paul’s life draw the early part of the picture from Gal. 1:15-2:2. What 
is often overlooked in such attempts, however, is the apologetic 
purpose of this chronology in the letter itself. Broadly speaking, this is 
to lay the groundwork for Paul’s attempt to defend the legitimacy of 
his mission to the Galatians, and the gospel which he has preached to 
them. Paul is eager to demonstrate his lack of dependence on the 
leadership of the Jerusalem church, and to show both the implicit and 
explicit acceptance of his gospel by the Jerusalem leadership— long 
before the current difficulties he is having with them in Galatia. The 
two periods, three and fourteen years respectively,57 establish at least 
two different things. The first establishes the churches’ acceptance of 
Paul in the initial period of his ministry (which was not ratified by the 
Jerusalem church). After the initial visit to Jerusalem, the second, 
much longer period shows how long it was before the Jerusalem 
leadership displayed an overt interest in Paul again— and even this 
second visit was not precipitated by the Jerusalem church, but Kcrrd 
à'rroKcxXui/jLV ( ‘according to revelation’. Gal. 2:2). This period of 
thirteen to seventeen years (depending on how one reckons the
55 See above, n. 36.
56 Cf. Riesner, Paul’s Early Period and Hengel and Schwemer, Paul between 
Damascus and Antioch.
57 The discussion of this period of Pauline chronology turns on two issues. 
One is whether or not these are two consecutive periods (hence totalling between 
15 and 17 years), or concurrent ones (13-14 years). See Hemer, The Book o f Acts; 
262-63. The other is whether Galatians 2 and Acts 15 are to be identified, or if the 
identification should rather be between Galatians 2 and Acts 11:28-30. This latter 
position is advocated by Bruce, Paul, 475; and Hemer, The Book o f Acts, 269. See 
discussion in Riesner, Paul’s Early Period, 319-20. Whatever the case, it is 
important not to confuse Paul’s later collection—mentioned in his letters—with 
the earlier collection facilitated by Paul and Barnabas in Acts 11. See discussion 
below.
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relationship between the two periods, see n. 57) is not clearly reflected 
in Acts, but that is inconsequential, for Luke’s concerns were different 
than Paul’s in Galatians. Where Paul is concerned to show  
discontinuity with the authority of the Jerusalem church (although 
maintaining continuity concerning the content of his gospel), Luke is 
more concerned to emphasize the continuity  between the two 
opposing factions.58 Despite Hengel and Schwemer’s desire to ignore 
the differences between the Pauline and Jerusalemite missions,59 even
58 There are, of course, multiple cases where the author of Acts skips over 
protracted periods of time, or protracts short periods to serve his literary purpose. 
Excepting those discussed above, in Chapter 3, the several episodes in Acts 18-19 
are indicative. Acts 18:1-10 tells the story of Paul’s meeting with Aquila, his 
preaching in the synagogue, his decision to leave off preaching to the Jews after 
their resistance, the conversion of Crispus and the revelatory encouragement from 
God. We are uncertain how long this all took, or the exact temporal and causal 
connections between these events—certainly several weeks, as the author has 
Paul arguing ‘in the synagogue every sabbath’ (v. 4). However, even if these 
events were scattered over the first several months of Paul’s stay in Corinth, the 
author seems to suggest that these were the events that shaped Paul’s normal 
activity in Corinth, which it seems we are meant to understand took place for the 
next year and a half, a time period given only a brief mention (v. 11). We then 
skip to the end of that period, with the accusation before Gallic and the beating of 
Sosthenes in vv. 12-17, and then Paul spends ‘many days longer’ with them and 
departs (v. 18). After this, the travelogue in vv. 19-23 barely skims the details of 
what must surely have been a fairly long period. After several verses discussing 
the arrival on the scene of Apollos (18:24-19:1), the narrative spends nine verses 
telling of Paul’s reception in Ephesus and his habitual activities in the hall of 
Tyrannus, which we are told ‘continued for two years, so that all the residents of 
Asia heard the word of the Lord, both Jews and Greeks’ (19:10). The rest of the 
chapter is given over to the description of three events: the controversy over 
healing (vv. 11-17), the description of the magic-book burning (vv. 18-20), and 
the conflict incited by Demetrius the silversmith (vv. 23-41). Are we to believe 
that nothing else of interest took place during the two years of Paul’s stay in 
Ephesus, or that the events the author (or his source) has selected for discussion 
are not directly related to the final problems in Ephesus? Of course not—we are to 
assume that the author of Acts is fulfilling his literary concerns, and we should 
not be surprised at his selectivity. As was argued above, forgetting that Acts 
functions as a dialogue partner in its own right in the discussion of Paul in the 
ancient world is a mistake.
59 E.g. Hengel and Schwemer, Paul between Damascus and Antioch, 204- 
205, 214, 224. As an example of the often reactionary reasons for resisting the 
idea of conflict in the early Church, cf. J.B. Adamson, James: The Man and His 
Message (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989) 41: ‘Personally, I cannot believe that
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they are forced to reflect on the ‘deep hurt’ Paul felt when the 
relationship between Barnabas and him went sour (after the so-called 
‘Antioch incident’ o f Gal. 2:11).60 Schmithals’s reading of the 
relationship between Paul and the Jerusalem community as one of 
Paul’s acceptance of the authority and superiority of Jerusalem61 
simply does not accord with either the evidence of Paul’s own letters, 
or the clear picture of division that even Luke’s mediating pen cannot 
hide.
This still leaves us with some difficulty in establishing the character 
of Paul’s activities during this period, and even, perhaps, the exact 
length of this period—it is certainly not out of the realm of possibility 
that Paul is ‘cooking the books’ when it comes to the exact length of 
this period, especially given his rhetorical and apologetic purpose(s) 
in the letter to the Galatians. We have no way of knowing how Paul’s 
Jerusalemite opponents (or Galatian converts) would have perceived 
his account, and the nature of his independence during this long 
period. However, we are still left with a fairly large period of time 
during which Paul seems to have been active, but not within the direct 
sphere o f the Jerusalem church. Surprisingly, when this gap is 
discussed, it tends to be done largely according to the rhetorical 
strategies of the book of Acts, and even of Paul’s own letters.62 It
James was hostile to Paul. I cannot believe that James designedly put Paul into a 
dilemma (over the Nazarites’ vow): I think it was just a sop to placate the non- 
Christian Jews of Jerusalem... ’
60 Hengel and Schwemer, Paul between Damascus and Antioch, 215.
61 Schmithals, Paul and James, esp. 7-9. Cf. Munck, Paul and the Salvation 
o f Mankind, passim, but esp. 282-85.
62 The former is a striking failure of Hengel and Schwemer, Paul between 
Damascus and Antioch, whose credulity towards, e.g., the Lukan account of the 
Jerusalem Council in Acts 15 severely limits the value of their reconstructions of 
this period (see esp. pp. 200-214). On the other hand, see Taylor, Paul, Antioch 
and Jerusalem, 14, 24, 62-85, for a self-conscious attempt to avoid taking Paul’s 
rhetorical strategy in Galatians 2 at face value. Although I have already discussed 
elements of the book of Acts’ portrayal of the inter-relationships between Paul, 
Barnabas, ‘the Jews’ and the Jerusalem church above, in Chapter 3, the picture of 
Jacob in Acts 15 requires some brief comments here. Acts 15:13-21 presents 
Jacob as apparently reasonable and supportive of Paul and Barnabas’s 
position—even to the point of quoting Amos 9:11-12. In the narrative of ch. 15, 
Luke is very careful to have Jacob distance himself from those who have been 
causing dissension. These have been tentatively identified as ‘some men [who] 
came down from Judea and were teaching the brethren, “Unless you are 
circumcised according to the custom of Moses, you cannot be saved’” (15:1); or,
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seems, however, that the reconstruction of the relations between Paul 
and the Jerusalem church during this period should be carried out in a 
more sceptical manner, and, perhaps, using all of the evidence we 
have to hand, including the oft-suspect book of James. This period 
saw the laying of the foundation for the later difficulties between Paul 
and the Jerusalem church. Hence, should we discover that the material 
in James ‘fits’ with the kind of situation which could reasonably be 
seen as functioning during this period, it seems that such an effort 
should be given first hearing.
We know so little about the early Jerusalem community that 
reconstructions of its self-identity and relationships with other early 
Christian groups are bound to be tentative, and often betray more of 
how a particular scholar wishes to see the structure of the earliest 
church than the evidence will bear.63 However, without making too
more specifically, ‘some believers who belonged to the party of the Pharisees 
[who] rose up, and said, “It is necessary to circumcise them, and to charge them to 
keep the law of Moses’” (15:5). But Jacob writes, ‘Since we have heard that some 
persons from us have troubled you with words, unsettling your minds, although 
we gave them no instructions’ (15:24). How are we to relate this to Paul’s 
accusation in Gal. 2:12, that it was ‘certain ones from Jacob’ who caused Peter to 
turn from praxis which reflected Paul’s inclusive gospel? Whichever chronology 
we accept, whether Acts 15 is to be identified with Galatians 2 or not, it would 
seem that, at least from Paul’s point-of-view, the impression of Jacob given in 
Acts 15 is not entirely accurate. However, it may be that they can be harmonized. 
Consider the tone of Jacob’s speech in Acts 15: he is presented as delivering 
judgement, allowing Gentiles into the Church, and as in the position to decide 
important aspects of the daily life of believers. In Galatians, Jacob stands behind a 
group who insist on circumcision, but it is perhaps significant that, in the Antioch 
incident of Galatians 2, Jacob himself did not come to Antioch. Paul’s contention 
that ‘some’ from Jacob came to Antioch and caused Peter, Barnabas and other 
Jews to stop eating with Gentiles does not actually say that they told these Jewish- 
Christians to so separate themselves. Instead, Paul offers the explanation that the 
Jewish-Christians did so ‘for fear of the circumcision party’. A first reading of 
this would suggest that Jacob himself is indeed part of or even leader of this party, 
but a more nuanced reading, taking into account also how Acts presents Jacob, 
might suggest that there is a degree of seperation between Jacob and this group 
who argued for circumcision to be a Gentile requirement. Nevertheless, this 
degree of seperation did not amount to siding completely with Paul—there is no 
hint of a desire on the part of the Jerusalem leadership, either in Acts 15 or 
elsewhere, to root out this kind of belief, or to combat it, as Paul himself did.
63 A recent exception to this is Bockmuehl, ‘Antioch and James’, whose 
analysis of the relationship between Jerusalem and Antioch is deeply and
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specific judgements, it can reasonably be said that the relationship 
between Jerusalem and its neighbouring churches might have been 
viewed (by the Jerusalem church) along the lines of mother-daughter 
relationships, rather than a sibling relationship. In the case of 
disagreement between the two groups, those on the Jerusalem side 
might have seen themselves as the parent group responding to a 
splinter group (or, perhaps, a wayward child). However other early 
groups might have seen themselves in relation to such a model, the 
activities of the church at Antioch as recorded in Acts and attested in 
the letters of its most famous member, suggest a situation where the 
parent group does not necessarily have a dominant influence over its 
offspring, even if the Jerusalem church was the source of both the 
earliest authority and the ‘genuine’ tradition about Jesus. If this 
description is even partially accurate, it is possible that, given the 
existence of new, potentially disagreeable activity outside the 
immediate influence of the Jerusalem church (such as, say, Antioch), 
the first way to combat this (or perhaps simply the most natural 
reaction) would be to ignore it. Of course, given that we are talking 
about the growing influence of Paul,64 we know that ignoring him did 
not work, nor would it have worked. The second stage in dealing with 
this kind of ‘problem’ would seem to have been the tacit admission of 
a differing opinion, but only casually— something Paul does himself 
on occasion (e.g. 2 Cor. 1:5, 13; 12:11). I think it is this stage that had 
been reached when Jacob penned his letter— Paul was not yet a threat
positively affected by his appropriation of previous historical and archaeological 
research on Antioch.
64 At this point, with Taylor {Paul, Antioch and Jerusalem, esp. 44, 87-95), I 
should point out that I am not entirely sure we should be talking only of ‘Paul’ at 
this point. The character of the theology/teaching/traditions active at the Antioch 
church or within its sphere of influence seems to be almost totally shrouded in 
mystery, and it may very well be that the later teaching of Paul descends from an 
earlier tradition current at Antioch, against which Jerusalem may have reacted 
before Paul appeared on the scene. Given the rhetorical strategy (on rhetoric in 
Gadamer’s perspective, see above, p. 88) in James that I will discuss below, 
however, I think that we are probably talking about a situation that Paul himself 
pushed to its logical limits—a situation that may very well have been active 
within the Jerusalem church as well (thinking here especially about the activities 
of Peter as recorded in Acts—even if these stories are not from eyewitness 
accounts, they must contain some tradition of Peter’s involvement in the Gentile 
mission, a fact backed up by his role within the Antioch incident as Paul records it 
in Gal. 2:11-14).
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of sufficient significance to be addressed directly, perhaps because he 
was still functioning within the authority of the Antioch church, and 
was not seen as an individual threat. However, the growing influence 
of either the Antioch church itself, or of Paul as a leader within the 
Antioch church, was beginning to trouble the Jerusalem leadership.
In the light of the above discussion, it would seem reasonable to 
think that, at a much earlier phase, when the status quo in Jerusalem 
was closer to the way in which the Church began, during a time when 
the inclusion of Gentiles had not been made an issue, and the idea of 
doing away with the law would have seemed like a repudiation of all 
that was Jewish = Christian, Jacob could have penned an avuncular 
letter such as James, and directed it toward the activities of Paul. After 
the period reflected in the beginning stages of Paul’s career recorded 
in Acts, however, an entirely different approach would have been 
necessary. To have not mentioned Paul’s name in a letter directed at 
him in this period would have signalled not dismissal of Paul, but 
rather acknowledgement of his importance.
Jacob's Treatise on an Anonymous Paul
This brings us back to the text of James. Jacob begins the letter by 
asserting both his servanthood of Jesus and his geographic/ideological 
superiority stemming from his position in Jerusalem. I will come back 
to 1:2-18 when I discuss 2:1-13, and begin instead with 1:19-27 and 
2:14-26. Commentators have long recognized the antithetical nature 
of this material to Paul’s gospel of salvation by faith, and even of the 
interpretation of Abraham’s righteousness in comparison to Paul’s 
(see, e.g., Romans 4).65 The connection between these two passages 
within James itself has also been seen— there is a natural progression 
between them, somewhat marred, many have thought, by the 
intervening material.66
In essence, these two passages seem to be responding to a teaching 
(or teacher) that has misunderstood the Taw of liberty’ and not
65 Cf. p. 239, above.
66 Though cf. M. Tsuji, Glaube zwischen Vollkommenheit und 
Verweltlichung: Eine Untersuchung zur literarischen Gestalt und zur inhaltlichen 
Koharenz des Jakobusbriefes (WUNT 2.93; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1997), 
who tries to show the thematic unity of James. He does not see an attack on Paul 
as the unifying theme (cf. pp. 187-99 for his interpretation of the Pauline 
connection, which is in keeping with most of what has gone before in scholarship 
on this issue), but still, this kind of approach has merit over those who see James 
as simply a disconnected gnomic wisdom discourse.
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persevered in doing good works, or is perceived to teach people in a 
manner that Jacob fears will lead them to not so persevere. Hence the 
emphasis on the relationship between faith and works. As they stand 
above, these two passages could be construed as a response to Paul’s 
theology as expressed, for instance, in Galatians, but it seems more 
likely that Paul’s theology can be construed, in part, as a response to 
this material in James.
The example of Abraham brought up cursorily in James and in 
more detail in both Gal. 3:6-9 (but cf. the development of this 
argument 3:10-29) and Romans 4 (from which Paul also develops a 
continued argument 5:1-21) is illustrative— how could one think that 
‘you see that faith works with his works, and from works his faith was 
perfected, and the scripture which says “And Abraham believed God, 
and it was reckoned to him as righteousness and he was called ‘friend 
of God’” is fulfilled’ is a reasonable way to respond to Paul’s 
developed argumentation on this point? In fact, is not the example of 
Abraham rather difficult for Paul? Would it not make more sense to 
assume that one of the reasons Paul must spend so much time dealing 
with the example of Abraham, with a counter-intuitive assessment of 
the role of the Law in God’s plan for humanity, is that this argument 
was put to him in the first place? Otherwise, we are in a position of 
ascribing to the author of James (who most certainly cannot be 
thought of as the leader of the earliest Church in Jerusalem) either 
total ignorance of Paul’s arguments, or a damaging weakness in 
coping with sustained argumentation of the sort in which Paul 
engages. This latter possibility is unlikely, I judge, because of the way 
in which Jacob demonstrably links together many different aspects of 
his attack on Paul into a single whole. The way in which he does this 
suggests that, while different than Paul in style, Jacob was a capable 
thinker.
It is often apparently forgotten that Jacob’s two key passages on 
faith and works are surrounded by other material: 1:2-18 and 2:2-13. 
Jas. 2:2-13 is an interesting passage, as, if one thinks of 2:14-26 as 
some kind of response to Pauline theology (or activity), it seems to be 
somewhat of a non sequitur. Its injunctions against partiality on the 
grounds of the persecutory activities of ‘the rich’ and its discussion of 
the Law are hard to understand. Are these general statements, made 
because members of the churches to whom this letter was addressed 
were showing partiality and aspiring to riches, which somehow led 
them to show no mercy and/or break the Law? Or are these very
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specific statements, made concerning a very specific situation? The 
former is a possibility— Jacob may very well be skipping from one 
issue to the next with very little concern for their relationship.67
However, what if, while continuing to posit that this letter is, for the 
largest part, a response to Pauline theology and activity, we imagine 
that there may be a connection between these passages? If we were to 
do so, the flow of logic in these chapters might be something like this: 
beginning with 1:19, we find Jacob’s caricature of Paul— at this point 
a young man, a zealous convert, and, if his later letters are anything to 
go by, never the quickest to hear, slowest to speak or the slowest to 
anger.68 Jacob continues this ad hominem attack by characterizing 
Paul’s attitudes as ‘filthiness and rank growth’ (1:21), contrasting this 
attitude (and teaching?) with the meek reception of the ‘implanted 
word’— the only thing which can save his hearers’ souls. One 
wonders whether this is not an appeal to tradition and to the authority 
of those who had passed it down (i.e. the leadership of the Jerusalem 
church). This provides an obvious juncture to consider this relation 
between Paul and James from a Gadamerian point-of-view.
This moment in Jacob’s letter stands as an example o f the 
counterfeiting about which I wrote above. Far from Gadamer’s ideal 
of open questioning, which contains within it the idea of delimitation 
along the lines of the horizon of the text,69 this counterfeit suggests an 
appeal instead to the idea of tradition as determinative. This was 
discussed above in connection with my questioning of the traditional 
story explaining the ‘background’ of Philemon. In this case, although 
we are speaking of an ancient dialogue between Paul and Jacob, the 
conditions for understanding are nonetheless similar: ‘prejudices are 
necessary conditions of all instances o f genuine understanding, 
without, however, being ever sufficient fully to determine the outcome
67 This is a typical position with regard to the structure of James’ arguments, 
e.g., Penner, James and Eschatology, 214: ‘The Epistle of James is obviously not 
a unified whole in the sense that there is a logical connection between every unit 
of the letter, with one unit flowing out of the argument of the previous one.’
68 Cf. Acts 9:9-30, which outlines the speed with which Paul was able to 
minister effectively and forcibly as a Christian. Although Luke has, I judge, 
consciously positioned Paul here to reflect the martyr, Stephen, it is interesting to 
note that it is the removal of Paul from Jerusalem to Caesarea and hence to Tarsus 
that leads to a position characterized as follows: ‘The churches throughout Judea, 
Galilee and Samaria were now left in peace, building themselves up, living in the 
fear of the Lord, and filled with the consolation of the Holy Spirit’ (9:31, JB).
69 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363, see above, p. 225.
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of any instance of real understanding’.70 That Jacob is not here 
interested in real understanding is indicated by his dictatorial way of 
stating the ‘proper’ attitude of those who will be saved. He is not 
setting the tone for a conversation but rather the curtailment of a 
conversation. Like the Keeper of the Gate in The Trial, he appears to 
offer solutions and ways forward in dialogue, but this is only a 
phantasm.
Rather than accepting the paragraph division most versions place at 
this point in the letter,711 would suggest that the following material is 
tightly linked to that which precedes. The particle 8c can function as 
either a weak adversative (as in the R S V  translation ‘but’) or as a 
conjunction ( ‘and’, ‘so’, ‘now’).72 Either way, it does nothing to 
suggest that the relation between material introduced by this particle 
should be strongly disjunctive from that preceding. Instead, if we read 
it as a conjunction, we have the sense, ‘so be doers of the word, and 
not hearers on ly ...’, which suggests that the content of the ‘filthiness 
and rank growth’ Jacob speaks about in the previous verse has to do 
with the relation between faith and works about which Jacob goes on 
to speak in the following verses. It also suggests that the indefinite 
and demonstrative pronouns in the following verse may be a 
continuation of the ad hominem attack on Paul I suggested in 1:19-20. 
Far from being a general statement concerning those who habitually 
look into mirrors and promptly forget what they look like, this appears 
to be a direct attack on Paul, whom Jacob sees as having moved away 
from the faith as he received it—he is now preaching righteousness by 
faith and not works, which Jacob sees as an antinomian move which 
jeopardizes the very content of the Christian message. James 1:25 acts 
as a motivator to those being swayed by Paul’s teaching to come back 
to the ‘true way’— the perfect law, the law of liberty, promising
70 Detmer, ‘Gadamer’s Critique of the Enlightenment’, 279 (emphasis 
original). Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 283; idem, ‘The Problem of Historical 
Consciousness’, 108: ‘it is a grave misunderstanding to assume that emphasis on 
the essential factor of tradition which enters into all understanding implies an 
uncritical acceptance of tradition’.
71 Of modern translations, the discourse segmentation apparatus of the 
UBSGNTA lists only Luther’s German translation and the French Traduction 
Oecuménique de la Bible as lacking a paragraph division here (as well as the 
Greek texts of Westcott and Hort, Merk, the Textus Receptus, and Antoniadis’s 
text).
72 Cf. BDF §447.
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blessings as a result. Jacob continues his invective against Paul in 1:26 
with the injunction against one who does not ‘bridle his tongue but 
deceives his heart’, concluding that ‘this man’s religion is in vain’. 
The following verse then suggests, in contrast to one who thinks he is 
religious (but is not), that the content of pure religion is to care for the 
oppressed and under-privileged of first-century Greco-Roman society, 
widows and orphans, as well as to remain ‘unstained from the world’.
These two elements of ‘true religion’ may very well be the heart of 
the disagreement between the Jerusalem leadership and Paul. On the 
one hand, the injunction to visit orphans and widows, coupled with 
the discussion of faith and works, would again suggest that Jacob sees 
an antinomian interpretation of Paul’s teaching as threatening such 
activity among Christians. On the other hand, the second element may 
very well have to do with the way Paul’s activities among the Gentiles 
were viewed by the Jerusalem church. If we are to assume that the 
makeup of the Jerusalem church is still predominantly Jewish, and 
that Jewish Christianity at this point still saw itself as part o f the 
Jewish nation—perhaps, as I suggested above, the fulfilment of the 
true Israel— then we should have no difficulty imagining that the 
Gentile mission would have caused difficulties for those believers. 
This is, of course, nothing new. The second part of Jacob’s description 
of ‘pure religion’ would be a very unsurprising thing for Jacob to say 
in this regard— how else would a conservative Jew(ish Christian) 
view the kind of missionary activity that we know Paul undertook 
later, and may have begun even at this early date? If Gal. 2:12 is any 
indicator, even Peter had no problem with the Gentile mission and its 
implications for day-to-day life until n v a ç  à n o  ’IaKco(3ou ( ‘some 
from Jacob’) came to Antioch.
The next seeming leap in logic comes between 1:27 and 2:1— what 
does partiality have to do with pure religion, especially if we suggest 
that this is a specific ‘discussion’ of Paul, his theology and his 
activities? Of course, it is impossible to tell exactly what the 
connection is here, as the evidence even for such a tentative 
reconstruction as this is limited, but it may be possible to make some 
suggestions. In the first place, it seems that Jacob perceives some kind 
of lack in his opponent’s treatment of the disadvantaged, or it may be 
that he is responding not to the actions of his opponent, but rather the 
status that that opponent held. If it were the latter, that is, if Paul or the 
church at Antioch’s social stratum was somewhat higher than that of 
Jacob and/or the Jerusalem church as a whole, this may have been the
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source of some bitterness between the two groups and/or individuals. 
Two other passages may be adduced here as well. In Jas. 1:9-11,
Let the lowly brother boast in his exaltation, and the rich in his 
humiliation, because like the flower of the grass he will pass away. For the 
sun rises with its scorching heat and withers the grass; its flower falls, and 
its beauty perishes. So will the rich man fade away in the midst of his 
pursuit (RSV).
Jacob suggests two things: (1) the poor (6 TcnTÉivôç ‘lowly’) should 
rejoice in their exaltation, but (2) the rich (6 ttXouctloç) in their 
lowness (êv rf] Tonreivcùoei). The reason for this is that the sun will 
rise and scorch the grass (a possible reference to the dominical saying 
found in Matt. 6:19-20/Luke 12:33-34 regarding the laying up of 
treasure in heaven, but also possibly to the parable of the sower [Matt. 
13:3-23/Luke 8:5-15]) and bring the rich person to nought (outws* kclI 
6 TrXouCTLOs* eu T o iç  TTOpELGLLç airrou p.apav6f|(j£Tai). 6 TrXoucrioç 
( ‘the rich person’) in this case may be a generalized ‘any rich 
person’,73 or (but not as the only other option), this ttXouctloç may be 
an oblique reference to a more affluent and privileged community in 
Antioch.74 It could also be that this reflects a judgement on any 
Christian communities which did not function in a socialized manner, 
as Acts records the earliest community in Jerusalem to have done.
73 On the use of the article in this manner, cf. Porter, Idioms, 107-108.
74 Although we are unable to tell much about the socio-economic level of the 
members of the Antioch church vis-à-vis the Jerusalem church, there is no doubt 
that Antioch-on-the-Orontes was indeed a wealthy city. Having been the capital of 
the Seleucid kingdom, under the Romans it remained a centre of trade, culture and 
political influence (see R. Wallace and W. Williams, The Three Worlds o f Paul o f 
Tarsus [London and New York: Routledge, 1998] 167-72). In addition to this, 
among the named members of the Antiochene church in Acts 13:1 is a certain 
Mavafjv 'HpwSou t o O reTpaapxou auvrpo^os' (‘Mana-en, foster brother/close 
friend of Herod the Tetrarch’), which surely suggests a reasonably high socio­
economic level. A case for the socio-economic level for the whole church cannot 
be built on one name alone, but it does suggest that there were at least some in this 
church at a level in society which the Jerusalem church does not seem to have 
penetrated. On the history and archaeology of Antioch, cf. G. Downey, A History 
o f Antioch in Syria: From Seleucus to the Arab Conquest (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1961); F. Kolb, ‘Antiochia in der friihen Kaiserzeit’, in H. 
Cancick et al. (eds.), Geschichte—Tradition—Reflexion: Festschrift fiir Martin 
Hengel zum 70. Geburtstag (2 vols.; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1996) 2.97-118; 
and, with special reference to the Jewish community in Antioch, Bockmuehl, 
‘Antioch and James’, 157-79.
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Also important is the discussion in Jas. 2:6-7 of the actions of the 
rich against the recipients of the letter. Jacob accuses his recipients of 
dishonouring the poor, and then goes on in rhetorical questions to say 
that the rich oppress them, take them to court, and ‘blaspheme that 
honourable name which was invoked over you’, probably meaning the 
name of Jesus invoked in baptism. The question here is whether this is 
merely socio-economic oppression, or whether socio-economic 
factors were mixed with religious oppression as well. We have no way 
of knowing whether we are to think that Jacob is referring to Jewish 
or Gentile oppression, but it seems to be an inescapable conclusion 
that the two factors—religious and socio-economic— were mixed, at 
least in Jacob’s conception of the process. Now, if the group to which 
Paul belonged was, as was suggested earlier, o f a higher socio­
economic stratum than the Jerusalem church, then it would not be out 
of place to imagine that Jacob and the Jerusalem church would have 
been resistant to this group, especially if they were ‘consorting’ with 
the class that had caused hardship for both the early Jesus movement 
and the later Jerusalem church. Paul himself may very well have come 
from a reasonably high social stratum,75 and was most certainly 
among those who had persecuted the church. These factors may have 
continued to cause difficulty for the Jerusalem church— neither 
economic inequality nor persecution came to an end with the 
conversion of some wealthy people. Hence, any past involvement in 
such a class by an individual or a group, no matter what their current 
disposition, may not have encouraged unity between them and 
Jerusalem.
The discussion of the relationship between faith and works in 2:8- 
26 has already been examined above, so I will move directly on to the 
following verses: 3:1-4:10. This is a rather long passage, not often 
seen as unified in content. The first verse of ch. 3, however, sets the 
tone for the following chapter and a half: ‘Let not many of you 
become teachers, my brethren, for you know that we who teach will 
be judged with greater strictness.’ If this letter is read as combating 
the spreading personal influence of Paul and his teaching, then this 
verse may be the clearest sign that Jacob is referring to a specific 
individual. The oblique references to a ‘double-minded man’,76 ‘every
75 For recent discussion of this point, see Wallace and Williams, Three 
Worlds o f Paul, 140-43.
76 On this, see S.E. Porter, is dipsuchos (James 1,8; 4,8) a “Christian” 
Word?’, Biblica 71.4 (1990) 469-98, here 484, who argues that ‘James uses
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man’, one who is a ‘hearer of the word and not a doer’, one who 
‘thinks he is religious’ (but whose religion is in vain) and a ‘shallow 
man’ are augmented by a specific reference to teaching— and with a 
threat. Jacob’s extended use of metaphor and simile in 3:3-5 to 
demonstrate the sway that the tongue can have over a man, and the 
further metaphor of the tongue being a fire (3:5-6), which can set 
whole forests ablaze, suggest that the teacher (or teachers) against 
whom Jacob is directing his anger is someone Jacob would prefer kept 
his mouth shut. Assuming the accuracy of my reading, we have no 
way of knowing if this was because Paul was an angry young man, apt 
to say stupid things in the heat of discussion, and unwise in the 
manner in which he made his points, or because Paul was a persuasive 
speaker w hose in flu en ce  frightened Jacob and his 
compatriots—perhaps it was a little of both. If Paul’s letters are any 
indication of the way he matured and progressed in his manner of 
expression, but always maintained an edge, then we are perhaps 
justified in imagining him as an angry young zealot for his new 
cause— highly intelligent in his arguments, while being perhaps 
imprudent in the way he made them. In the light of this, 3:10-12 may 
be the one place where Jacob’s careful programme of generalized 
criticism slips into direct invective against Paul, using another ad  
hominem argument:
From the same mouth come blessing and cursing. My brethren, this ought 
not to be so. Does a spring pour forth from the same opening fresh water 
and brackish? Can a fig tree, my brethren, yield olives, or a grapevine 
figs? No more can salt water yield fresh ( r s v ) .
This seems to be another non sequitur, but in the light o f my 
reading of James here, it would seem to suggest that, no matter how 
reasonable Paul may seem to sound, the anger and ‘curses’ he is wont 
to display negate the possibility that he is also speaking truth. This is 
anything but a natural conclusion, and the following passage, from 
3:13-4:10, sounds like a rather paternalistic conclusion to the 
potentially explosive theological debate Paul engendered within the
ô'ufjvxoç in two ways, with reference to those who may be divided in their belief 
about God’s faithfulness to answer a prayer for wisdom, and to those who have 
succumbed to the wiles of the tempter and are divided in their allegiance and 
hence seen as sinners’, and then pointedly asks, ‘Is there the implication that to 
persist in divided perception of God’s ability to answer a prayer for wisdom may 
call for the need to repent?’, which would, of course, fit in well with the tenor and 
setting of this letter argued for in this chapter.
260 BROOK W .R. PEARSON
early Church. One part of this passage deserves specific mention. 
Jacob begins his attack with a discussion of wisdom:
Who is wise and understanding among you? By his good life let him show 
his works in the meekness of wisdom. But if you have bitter jealousy and 
selfish ambition in your hearts, do not boast and be false to the truth. This 
wisdom is not such as comes down from above, but is earthly, unspiritual, 
devilish, ( r s v )
The characterization of wisdom as ‘such as comes down from above’ 
(or, in this case, does not, and is ‘earthly, unspiritual, devilish’) is 
strongly reminiscent of Paul’s own later discussions of wisdom, 
especially in the Corinthian correspondence (e.g. 1 Corinthians 1-2). 
These last verses of James 3 may form another oblique personal attack 
on the person of Paul, this time suggesting that his wisdom is not 
heavenly, but ‘earthly, unspiritual, devilish’— another ad hominem 
attack that cannot be answered, for, if  Paul is to make a clever 
response to this, he has just demonstrated that he is using earthly, 
unspiritual, devilish reasoning, and is promoting selfish ambition, 
which is the cause of the disorder which is going on (and which might 
just hide other vile practices). This is a closed questioning that tries to 
mask itself as an attempt to reach the ‘sphere of the truly open’, as 
Gadamer phrases it.77 But in this case, if  Paul is to demonstrate that 
he is wise, he must first become pure, gentle, open to reason, full of 
mercy and good fruits, and be without uncertainty or insincerity. All 
of these could be very difficult for Paul to adequately demonstrate, 
especially if he was diametrically opposed to certain aspects of the 
way the Jerusalem church taught the gospel. If Paul had to accept that 
this was the content of being ‘open to reason’, then of course it would 
be very difficult to fulfil the requirements for ‘heavenly wisdom’. 
This would also have meant that Paul could neither sow nor reap the 
‘harvest of righteousness [which] is sown by those who make peace’ 
(3:18). In addition to this, it may be that the specifically ‘heavenly’ 
nature of the wisdom to which Jacob is referring might also evoke a 
further aspect of the Jerusalem version of Christianity with which Paul 
may have taken issue. One of the main planks in Goulder’s 
reconstruction of the counter-Pauline mission is that the ‘Petrine 
Christian leaders were delivering halakha as under inspiration of the 
Spirit, “words of wisdom” interpreted from the B ible... It is the 
delivery of dibre hokmah, which are not (Paul says) divine law at all,
77 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 363.
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but are mere human cleverness, taught in the Church as the Tannaim 
taught them in Judaism.’78 Goulder goes further and suggests that this 
non-Pauline group (or groups) was, at least in places, connected with 
mystical practices in keeping with Jewish mysticism, specifically 
Merkabah-related visions.79 In this light, it could very well be that, 
coupled with the argument as characterized above, Jacob is evoking a 
spiritual aspect of ‘wisdom’ with which Paul also disagreed. Although 
this is provisional upon Goulder’s reconstruction, its congruity with 
the identity of Jewish Christianity as Goulder construes it is 
suggestive.
James 4:1-10 is another part of the same discussion, but it seems to 
be slightly broader— instead of a specific argument against Paul, 
Jacob goes on to elaborate the reasons for quarrelling. It carries on the 
paternalistic tone of the more specific statements in the earlier part of 
the letter, and returns to two important issues. The comment about 
‘making the world your friend’, and the fact that this leads to making 
‘God your enemy’ (4:4), may very well be a reference to the idea of 
including Gentiles in the gospel, but from a perspective different from 
Paul’s presuppositional basis for his gospel. In this case, it would 
seem that, if  this could be taken as a reference to the inclusion of 
Gentiles in the Church, it is the moral and ethical implications of this 
which concern Jacob, not necessarily the religio-legal ones. 
Nonetheless, Jacob returns to this legal theme in 4:11-12, and asserts 
that ‘Anyone who slanders a brother, or condemns him, is speaking 
against the law and condemning the law. But if you condemn the law, 
you have stopped keeping it and become a judge over it’ (JB). This 
could have something to do with Paul’s theology, or it may simply be 
a halakhic argument to conclude the previous comments.
This last part of ch. 4, and the whole of ch. 5, while not, I judge, 
specifically directed at Paul, nonetheless speak to the tone of Jacob as 
he writes his letter. Like the letter’s address, with its ‘Jerusalem to the
78 Goulder, ‘Socfua in 1 Corinthians’, 516-34, here 523. See also idem, 
‘Vision and Knowledge’, JSNT56 (1994) 53-71, esp. 58-65.
79 Goulder, ‘John 1.1-2.12 and the Synoptics’, 212: ‘Its members not only 
gave their devotion to the Law, but also experienced visions in which they were 
taken up to the Throne of God and given angelic instructions on its interpretation’. 
Cf. idem, ‘The Visionaries of Laodicea’, 33. For further discussion of Merkabah 
and early Christianity, cf. B.W.R. Pearson and F. Harley, ‘Representations of the 
Resurrection in Jewish-Christian Literary Sources and Early Christian Art: A 
Comparison’, in Porter and Pearson (eds.), Christian-Jewish Relations, 65-87.
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diaspora’ language, the heightened evoking of dominical language 
and instructions for his audience come across as instructions from a 
sage to his students. Although the present context is not appropriate 
for a full scale discussion of the connections between James and the 
dominical tradition, it would be interesting to add to the model of a 
New Testament history by examining the way in which James, faced 
with the rate of change precipitated in the early Church, utilizes his 
brother’s way of speaking to underscore his own authority.80
The above reading of the letter of James as an oblique attack on the 
theology and possibly even person of Paul is hypothetical. It 
occasionally steps over bounds of the way in which New Testament 
scholars are apt to speculate, and offers readings which can be boiled 
down to ‘what i f  s’. In part, I offer this reading as an example of the 
very kind of reading about which I have been speaking throughout 
this thesis— a contribution to conversation. By way of concluding this 
reading, it is tempting to see Jas. 5:19-20 as a parting shot, re­
capitulating the anonymous attacks on Paul in the earlier part of the 
letter: ‘My brothers, if  one of you strays away from the truth, and 
another brings him back to it, he may be sure that anyone who can 
bring back a sinner from the wrong way that he has taken will be 
saving a soul from death and covering up a great number of sins.’ On 
the other hand, perhaps you, my patient readers, will identify with 
Jacob, desiring to bring me back to the truth. Such is the nature of 
scholarly dialogue!
RESTATING THE PREMISES
Dialectical Collection
The title of this section is intentionally vague: what is ‘dialectical 
collection’? On the one hand, this suggests the initial stage of a 
Platonic dialogue, with its (sometimes ponderous) statement of 
premises, and establishment of the subject matter. On the other, it 
suggests that there is something dialectical about the collection 
activity in which Paul participated for the benefit of the church in 
Jerusalem. It is my contention that, in response to this apparently 
questioning (but falsely thetic) ‘beginning’ of a dialogue found in
80 A good starting place for this is Hartin, James and the Q Sayings o f Jesus, 
although he does not accept or attempt to develop a large-scale reconstruction of 
the early Church’s intra-relations.
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Jacob’s letter, Paul attempts to reify the grounds for this dialogue. 
However, because of the nature of the comments made by Jacob about 
Paul’s behaviour and/or attitude— the curtailment of questioning 
through the medium of a counterfeit dialogue— Paul is forced to 
reformulate the grounds for dialectic exchange. The only way Paul 
can do this, though, is to accept the weight o f the concern Jacob 
expresses about the implications of Paul’s theology, and demonstrate 
that they are baseless, and Paul demonstrates this by way of his 
collection activity. Counter-intuitively, this is only to be accomplished 
by not accepting Jacob’s concerns, and so Paul will never require of 
his congregations involvement in the collection. In this way, Paul is 
able to productively state the axiomatic thesis o f his theological 
principle of righteousness that comes by faith and not by works, in a 
way that can not be compromised by his desire to likewise address the 
concerns of the Jerusalem church, as expressed in James.
In Chapter 1, in connection with applying Hobson’s description of 
the philosophy of Derrida to Gadamer’s philosophy, I spoke of 
‘lexemes’ and ‘micrologies’ (p. 15). Hobson’s discussion is likewise 
useful to help illuminate here (though in a limited fashion) the 
connection of varied elements in Pauline thought and activities. 
Hobson speaks of ‘syntax, a repeated form of articulation o f one 
element of Derrida’s discourse, one philosophical problem, with 
another’.81 At another point, she speaks of ‘Derrida’s circuits, the 
programmes attached to lexem es [— these] are local but also 
extensible’.82 I argue such a case here, namely that Paul’s collection 
activities are part of the syntax of his dialectical relations not only to 
Jerusalem, but likewise to each of his congregations, mediated 
through the vehicle of his theology. Too often, as Hobson argues with 
regard to the study of Derrida’s philosophy, we are tempted to reduce 
our study of Paul to the lexemes of Pauline theology that, say, the 
Reformers thought vital, or that modern scholarship has identified as 
important. Hobson calls the discussion that has formed around the 
‘lexem es’ Tike named island s’ in Derrida’s philosophy  
‘philosophemes’.83 In a similar manner, we might suggest that, in the 
study of Paul, we have a tendency to develop ‘theologemes’. Rarely 
do we attempt to identify larger patterns in Pauline thought, or at least 
in the fragments of his thought we have available in his extant letters.
81 Hobson, Jacques Derrida, 3.
82 Hobson, Jacques Derrida, 234.
83 Hobson, Jacques Derrida, 3,5.
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Like Hobson, writing while Derrida is yet alive and publishing (as 
well as speaking), we must be continuously aware of the fact that we 
do not have a complete canon of the works of Paul. Even were we not 
aware of missing letters (such as the two Corinthian letters mentioned 
in the extant Corinthian corpus, or the letter to the Laodiceans, 
mentioned in Col. 4:16), we do not know what else might be 
missing—Paul may be dead, but the ‘archaeological’ record of the life 
of Paul is incomplete. Although the comparison between Hobson’s 
study of Derrida and mine of Paul eventually breaks down, this idea 
of ‘syntactical’ patterns connecting various micrologies and lexemes 
in an often repeated fashion is one of potentially great benefit for 
Pauline theology. Hobson’s comparison of micrologies in Derrida’s 
thought to circuits of structural patterning, through which, like 
electronic signals, the syntax of his thought flow, is likewise useful 
for studying Paul. In the focus of the present chapter, Paul’s theology 
is not merely reducible to the ‘theologemes’ which form parts of its 
structure, but is also made up of the patterning of these ‘building 
blocks’ and other materials to make up an indeterminate whole. One 
such aspect of this structure, only partially reconstructable (like the 
walls of Masada, replaced to the best of the archaeologists ability, but 
with a black line clearly marking where the reconstruction begins), is 
the motivation behind and execution of the collection for Jerusalem 
that characterized the middle part of Paul’s ministry.
Paul and Jerusalem 
One of Goulder’s key points in his discussions o f the self- 
understanding of Jerusalem Christianity is that it understood itself in 
the light of its early shared-property arrangements. He also suggests 
that the later, fourth-century Jewish-Christian movement called the 
Ebionites was an expression of Jewish Christianity in the Jerusalem 
trajectory. He states:
All authorities agree that the Ebionites kept Jewish customs, circumcised 
their boys, would not use the Pauline letters as being hostile to the Law, 
read Matthew’s Gospel only, as the most Jewish, etc.: indeed they are the 
only clearly Jewish-Christian sect described by Irenaeus. Irenaeus takes us 
back two centuries from Epiphanius, and he adds the interesting comment 
that they had the same christology as Kerinthus.. .84
84 M.D. Goulder, ‘A Poor Man’s Christology’, NTS  45.3 (1999) 332-48 
(334). Thanks are due to Professor Goulder, for generously supplying me with a 
pre-publication copy of this paper.
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He also suggests that the ‘paradox of the NT’s general abhorrence of 
riches alongside evidence of a middle-class church is eased if the 
Jerusalem church thought of itself as oi tttgoxol [“the poor”], and 
actually fell into poverty as the later Ebionites claimed’.85 In addition 
to this speculation, however, there is one other important factor to 
consider. One of the defining characteristics of Paul’s career is this 
collection of monies to aid the Jerusalem church (see, e.g., Rom. 
15:25-26, 31; 1 Cor. 16:3; 2 Cor. 8-9)— one writer has even made 
mention of this second collection a criterion for deciding which letters 
of Paul are authentically Pauline.86 This is not a stable hypothesis, and 
requires a much more nuanced approach to the process of the two 
collections (about which we know) in the career of Paul. The first 
collection, mentioned in Acts 11:27-30, is reputed to be directly
85 Goulder, ‘A Poor Man’s Christology’, 334. Although the term ‘middle- 
class’ seems to have more to do with modern society than the ancient world, 
Goulder’s point is taken here in that, as W.A. Meeks {The First Urban Christians 
[New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983] 72-73) states, the early Church ‘is a 
picture in which people of several social levels are brought together. The extreme 
top and bottom of the Greco-Roman social scale are missing from the picture... 
The levels in between, however, are well represented... a Pauline congregation 
generally reflected a fair cross-section of urban society’. Justin Meggitt’s recent 
revisionist reconstruction of Paul’s social reality disagrees with this, asserting 
instead that Paul’s churches ‘shared fully in the bleak material existence that was 
the lot of the non-élite inhabitants of the Empire’ {Paul, Poverty and Survival, 
153). While I agree with the importance of being aware of the economic 
conditions of a large proportion of inhabitants of the Roman Empire (who were 
likewise the largest contingent in the early Church), I find Meggitt’s insistence 
that this was the only contingent in the early Church to be baseless and too one­
sided, often relying on a mirror-reading of Paul’s statements which takes Paul too 
literally, and apparently assumes the conclusion that Paul’s churches did not have 
any affluent members or groups. The analysis in the present chapter suggests 
instead a group of ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’, or at least those who would position 
themselves as such.
86 Kiley, Colossians as Pseudepigraphy, 46-51. This rather strange 
suggestion runs counter to the evidence Kiley himself presents with regard to the 
authenticity of Philippians (from which he supposes the author of Colossians to 
have copied), as it makes no reference to the collection. The ‘giving’ and 
‘receiving’ and the ‘gift’ mentioned in the thanksgiving in Phil. 4:14-20 do not 
count, as it is clear that these are in reference to gifts sent to Paul himself during 
his ministry, not via Paul to Jerusalem (see esp. 4:16). The lack of any such 
mention in letters (such as Philippians and Colossians) which come after this 
collection (or collections) had been taken to Jerusalem should in no way be 
surprising. See further discussion of Kiley above, in Chapter 3.
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motivated by a prophecy about coming famine, but gives us no real 
indication why relief is to be sent to Judea from Antioch, when the 
prophecy only states that ‘famine would spread over the whole 
empire’. Perhaps this underscores the differing socio-economic levels 
of the two churches suggested above, but perhaps, too, it speaks to the 
perceived need for the church at Antioch to show its loyalty to that in 
Jerusalem. That the prophet, Agabus, comes ‘down from Jerusalem’ 
with some others and has his prophecy met by a response directly 
aimed at Jerusalem (for a famine that had not yet apparently taken 
place) raises some questions as to the identity of this prophecy, and 
the careful way in which Luke has couched it in his narrative. If Paul 
is responding to and reifying Jacob’s counterfeit initiation o f a 
dialogue by undertaking the (second) collection, then it may be that 
this pattern is something he learned as a response to a similar problem 
at a much earlier phase in his career.
What, then, were the motivations for the second collection? We 
have no Agabus coming to Paul in the middle o f the night and 
foretelling doom for the Judean church and we hear of no revelation 
that commands obedience in this manner. If we can imagine that the 
situation between Paul and Jerusalem at the time of the first collection 
had not yet developed in as problematic a direction as it later would, is 
not Paul a rather strange person to have spear-headed the continuation 
of this effort? On a model of earliest Church internal politics such as 
that assumed here, namely that conflict on deep issues was a 
fundamental aspect of them, one could read Paul’s actions simply as 
an attempt to ingratiate him self with the Jerusalem church.87 
However, in the light of the charges laid against Paul in James (in my 
present reconstruction of the motivation behind the letter), this 
collection could be seen as an attempt by Paul to ‘put his money 
where his mouth was’, by demonstrating conclusively that the fears 
(or accusations) o f the Jerusalem church and its leader were
87 Even if it did not, in the end, work. Recent research (S.E. Porter, ‘Acts 
21:17-26 and Paul, the Man for All Seasons, or the Man Betrayed by his 
Friends?’, Paul o f Acts, 172-86) has suggested that it was the Jerusalem church 
which was actually responsible for instigating the events which led to the arrest of 
Paul. This would suggest that Paul’s efforts were not, in the end, acceptable to the 
Jerusalem church. Paul’s words in Acts 24:17, if historical, are nevertheless 
filtered through the conciliatory purposes of Luke. Yet, they still betray what must 
have been an incredible sense of surprise at this ungrateful response from the 
Jerusalem church.
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meaningless. If Paul were to bring a collection from his churches to 
the struggling Jerusalem church, this would demonstrate both that his 
reading of the relationship between righteousness, the Law, faith and 
works would not lead to the kind of behaviour Jacob suggests, and 
that his personal attitude to the poor (or lowly) was not such as he was 
being accused of having— and/or that the community out of which he 
had come88 did not see itself as superior to Jerusalem because of its 
higher social and/or financial status. Paul would effectively be able to 
re-formulate the premises for this dialogue in a manner which would 
allow for on-going dialogue between the two (main?) factions of the 
Church.
In response to the programme of the Tübingen School, and its 
reading of New Testament history as one of conflict between pro- 
Pauline and pro-Petrine factions, Munck goes to great lengths to show 
that there is no controversy between Paul and Jerusalem, but that
the goal that Paul keeps before his eyes on all his journeys and in all his 
apostolic activities is Jerusalem, and... up to his last journey Rome played 
no decisive part in his plans.89
He goes on to assert, on the basis of his analysis, that Paul ‘is not the 
opponent of Jerusalem and the apostate detested by the Jewish 
Christian mission’.90 Munck further defends this thesis by reference to 
Paul’s upbringing in a climate where ‘Jerusalem was probably the 
centre of the world for him’, after which, ‘as a Christian and as 
apostle the significance of Jerusalem was only increased’.91 This is 
supported by Scott, when he suggests that ‘Paul views Jerusalem as 
the center of the world’,92 and that ‘we must reckon with the very 
likely possibility that “from Jerusalem” [in Rom. 15:19b] indicates the
88 Or perhaps did come at the time. It is difficult to ascertain the identity of 
the on-going relationship between Paul and the Antioch church after his early 
days there (but cf. Hengel and Schwemer, Paul between Damascus and Antioch, 
214, where they questionably suggest that the use of the singular verb in Gal. 2:1 
[àvé(3r)v] is evidence that, between the events recorded in Galatians 2 and the time 
of writing them down, ‘he has broken with Antioch’).
89 Munck, Paul and the Salvation o f Mankind, 282.
90 Munck, Paul and the Salvation o f Mankind, 282. Cf. Lake, Earlier 
Epistles, 116, but cf. n. 3.
91 Munck, Paul and the Salvation o f Mankind, 285.
92 Scott, Paul and the Nations, 139.
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special significance of the place itself for Paul’s mission and not just 
an event that took place in Jerusalem associated with his mission’.93
There may be room for debate with Scott’s analysis. Yet, assuming 
for the moment that Scott is right, and Jerusalem somehow (perhaps 
theologically or geographically) formed the centre of Paul’s thought 
world, the ‘significance’ of the Jerusalem Christian community for 
Paul must surely be separated from the discussion of whether or not 
there was conflict between Paul and Jerusalem. The centrality of 
Jerusalem for Paul (or at least the importance of maintaining good 
relations with Jerusalem) does not in any way militate against the idea 
that Jerusalem may have been involved in conflict with Paul and his 
followers. Indeed, the reading of Paul’s collection activities argued in 
this chapter necessitates a life-long devotion to unity within the 
Church on the part o f Paul, despite the activities o f the Jerusalem 
church against him. Munck’s reading of the Gentile mission and the 
‘collection for the poor’ as self-conscious fulfilm ents o f  
eschatological signs heralding the salvation of the Jewish people 
requires dialogue concerning the exact character of the relationship 
that Paul has with the Jerusalem church.94
Hurtado’s article on the subject of the collection, while recognizing 
that relief for the poor played a secondary role in the reasons for the 
collection, still construes the relationship of Paul to the Jerusalem 
church along lines which would suggest that Paul’s purposes in 
undertaking the collection had to do with demonstrating ‘his success 
in the Gentile Mission and proving the unity of the church’.95 Among 
other things, the actions of the Judaizers in various Pauline churches 
suggest that the Jerusalem church was uncomfortable with the obvious 
success of (Paul’s) gospel among Paul’s Gentile converts. In this light, 
it seems strange that Hurtado can suggest that Paul should wish to
93 Scott, Paul and the Nations, 137. Scott appeals to R. Riesner, Die Friihzeit 
desApostels Paulus (WUNT 71; Tübingen: Mohr [Siebeck], 1994) 214.
94 Munck, Paul and the Salvation o f Mankind, 282-308, esp. 304-308. He is 
followed in this interpretation by D. Georgi, Remembering the Poor: The History 
o f the Collection for Jerusalem (trans. I. Racz; Nashville: Abingdon, 1992 [rev. 
and enlrg. from German 1965]) 47-48.
95 Hurtado, ‘The Jerusalem Collection’, 49 (emphasis added). Hurtado bases 
the former on Rom. 15:14-33 and the latter largely on 2 Cor. 9:13-15. To his 
credit, Hurtado is aware of the potential for divergence between Paul’s ‘public’ 
meaning for the collection, and the fact that, ‘in his own mind the offering meant 
additional things and the overall importance of the offering for Paul seems to have 
been enormous’ (p. 48).
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further demonstrate this success to the very people who were 
apparently attacking him as a result of it.96 Hurtado’s second 
suggestion, that this collection was a way of demonstrating unity 
between Paul’s churches and the Jerusalem church, seems more 
reasonable. In the light of the criticism we have seen in the book of 
James with regard to the issues of finance, wealth and the status that 
goes along with them, however, Paul’s reasons for the collection may 
have been more nuanced than a simple demonstration of ‘unity’.97
Paul’s Dialectical Motivation for the Collection 
One thing seldom mentioned in discussions of the collection is the 
relative hazardousness of such an activity. Even in the era of the pax  
Romana, the transportation of money (about which many people 
indeed would have had knowledge, given that Paul’s congregations 
were preparing for these collections for years) would be a potentially 
dangerous task. A further question must be asked: If (1) Paul’s 
churches are constantly beset by Judaizers from Jerusalem, (2) Paul 
himself is involved in defence of his very right to be an apostle, and 
(3) (using Goulder’s reading of the situation at Thessalonica98) Paul is
96 This kind of language with regard to Paul’s motivation for the collection is 
common: see, e.g., C.H. Talbert, ‘Money Management in Early Mediterranen 
Christianity: 2 Corinthians 8-9’, RevExp 86 (1989) 360; J. Knox, ‘Romans 15:14- 
33 and Paul’s Conception of His Apostolic Mission’, JBL 83 (1964) 1 (but cf. 
Bowers, ‘Fulfilling the Gospel’, 191, who takes issue with Knox’s 
characterization of Paul as simply trying to get finished with his chores in the east 
before striking into new territory in the west); Ascough, ‘Completion of a 
Religious Duty’, 598; K.F. Nickle, The Collection: A Study in PauTs Strategy 
(SET 48; Naperville: Allenson; London: SCM Press, 1966) 111-29; R.P. Martin, 
‘The Setting of 2 Corinthians’, TynBul 37 (1986) 4; Hall, ‘St. Paul and Famine 
Relief, 311; Perkins, ‘Taxes in the New Testament’, 192-94.
97 Hurtado follows Nickle, The Collection, 111-29, in this regard, although it 
is interesting to note that Nickle’s treatment (see esp. pp. 112-15) also allows for a 
previous or potential disunity, for which the collection may serve as a 
mollification.
98 I refer to Goulder, ‘Silas in Thessalonica’, where he argues that the 
inclusion of Silas in the missionary activities of Paul in Thessalonica was at the 
behest of the Jerusalem church, to whom Paul was trying to demonstrate himself 
to be reasonable and friendly. Goulder explains the aberrant theology of the 
Thessalonians with regard to a realized eschatology as a result of the influence of 
Silas, who, once he actually saw Paul ‘in action’ was unable to co-operate with 
him fully, and undermined his teaching with particularly non-Pauline, 
Jerusalemite doctrines. Cf. discussion of this above, p. 136 n. 115.
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even undermined by supposedly sympathetic representatives of the 
Jerusalem church, why should he then turn around and try to help this 
organization at the risk of his own personal safety?
For Paul to establish an open dialogue with Jacob and the church 
under his leadership, it was nevertheless essential that Paul maintain 
consistency in his theology. Even at or near the end of his life, Paul 
was still absolutely radical in living out his assertion that salvation, or 
righteousness, came through faith alone—his comments in Phil. 2:12 
(with regard to the Philippians’ salvation), and 3:11 (with regard to his 
own hope of resurrection) should not be down-played. They are the 
logical outworking of a belief like Paul’s that salvation is God’s gift 
alone, and that, while Paul might be ‘sure that he who began a good 
work in [the Philippians] will bring it to completion at the day of 
Jesus Christ’ (1:6), nevertheless, the proper attitude toward this is not 
confidence and triumphalism, but rather to ‘work out your own 
salvation with fear and trembling’ (2:12). For Paul, even though he 
might rubbish all of his Jewishness (3:2-10)— which could in itself be 
seen as a work—yet, when facing death, he says ‘if somehow, I may 
attain the resurrection from the dead’ (3:11). For Paul, even the 
assumption that he would attain the goal and receive the ‘prize of the 
upward call of God in Christ Jesus’ (3:14) could, I judge, be counted 
as a work. If this is a true characterization of Paul’s radical 
consistency on this matter, it would seem that the idea of good works 
would present special problems. How then can Paul re-formulate the 
premises of Jacob’s putative dialogue, and yet not compromise on this 
matter?
Munck is correct when he suggests that,
If the Tübingen School’s views about the opposition and conflict between 
Paul and the first disciples at Jerusalem are warranted, and the latter 
caused the difficulties in Corinth, this voluntary collection for his 
relentless opponents becomes quite improbable. He could in the same 
breath describe his opponents as servants of Satan and address to the 
church that they are afflicting a request for generous help for them and for 
their accomplices. If the Jerusalem church is in such want as we are told 
here, but is at the same time indefatigable in sending out apostles and 
emissaries to work against Paul in his own churches and so try to win 
those churches over to Jerusalem and the Jewish Christian doctrine, we see 
a further peculiarity—Paul collects voluntarily for Jerusalem, although the 
church there, in spite of its poverty, uses its modest means to pay the
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travelling expenses" of people who are to oppose the apostle in the 
Gentile Christian churches. Paul is therefore supposed to have collected 
money voluntarily for the benefit of the Jerusalem Judaizing mission in his 
own churches. Let anyone believe that who can.100
Although I obviously do not agree with Munck’s analysis o f this 
point, his hyperbole makes it eminently clear that there is indeed an 
inconsistency in arguments concerning conflict in the early Church 
which do not take into account the role of Paul’s collection.101 We 
have missed a crucial part of the on-going dialogue (or attempt to 
establish a dialogue) between Paul and Jacob/the Jerusalem church. 
However, the evidence is not limited to such an interpretation as 
Munck suggests. We must somehow reconcile the apparently difficult, 
dangerous (and thankless!102) task of the collection with the fact that 
Paul was not apparently on the best of terms with those for whom he 
undertook it.
99 This assumes a state of affairs with no evidential basis for reconstruction. 
What evidence we do have concerning the payment of expenses during travel for 
the Christian cause stems from the Pauline mission, and this evidence points 
toward this being a problematic issue. 1 Thessalonians 2:1-12, Paul’s defense of 
his activities among the Thessalonians, contains a very explicit statement on the 
matter: ‘For you remember our labour and toil, brothers—night and day working 
to not burden you in any way while we were preaching to you the good news of 
God’ (2:9; cf. also v. 6, which might suggest that Paul is relinquishing his rights 
to upkeep). Likewise, in the Corinthian correspondence, Paul goes to some length 
to establish his right to upkeep from those among whom he acts as God’s minister 
(see esp. 1 Cor. 9:1-18). This last context is especially telling in opposition to 
Munck’s characterization of the situation, for Paul makes it explicit in 1 Cor. 9:5- 
6 that Paul and Barnabas’s self-supporting way of ministry is different than that of 
‘the other apostles and the brothers of the Lord and Cephas [Peter]’. This would 
suggest that the Jerusalem apostles did not need to be supported from the coffers 
o f the Jerusalem church, but were supported by the local churches.
100 Munck, Paul and the Salvation o f Mankind, 290.
101 Goulder, too, pays little attention to this. Although he mentions the 
collection on occasion (‘Silas in Thessalonica’, 89-90 [thoughts which are further 
developed in ‘A Poor Man’s Christology’] and ‘ZO<&IA in 1 Corinthians’, 529, 
where he lists the collection as part of the ‘status quo’ of Paul’s ministry), there is 
nothing in his work that convincingly works out the details of how he sees the 
collection fitting into Paul’s relationship with Jerusalem.
102 See Porter, Paul o f Acts, 172-86, discussed on p. 266 n. 87, above.
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Paul’s (and by extension, his churches’) motivation in this regard, 
while not as cloying as many commentators suggest,103 is, I contend, 
motivated by a need for Paul to answer the charges brought against 
him by the theologians of the Jerusalem church.104 If the early dating 
of James is correct, and if that letter is indeed in reference to either 
Paul himself (as is argued above), or even simply to the kind of 
theology he preached or received from the Antioch community, then 
the motivation becomes crystal clear. Paul can not, according to the 
premises for discussion set out by Jacob’s letter, answer the charges 
brought against his theology of salvation by faith, not works. What 
Jacob says such theology will engender may or may not be true, but 
Paul's theology will not be enough in and o f itself to prove the case 
one way or another, for the axiomatic principle of Paul’s theology 
precludes him commanding good works from his congregations. The 
only way that Paul can finally demonstrate to his detractors that his 
theology does not lead to the kinds of problems raised in James is by 
showing that it does not do so. The very things Jacob calls ‘true 
religion’ are the kinds of things in which Paul must show his 
congregations are indeed involved. However, the most lasting 
impression would, of course, be effected by undertaking and causing 
his churches to undertake a task which would directly demonstrate to 
the Jerusalem church that neither Paul’s theology nor the churches 
which he founded were in danger of neglecting good works. This, 
then, is the explanation for Paul’s various exhortations to his
103 E.g. Perkins, ‘Taxes in the New Testament’, 193: ‘we have what appears 
to be a new venture whose orientation is social, a voluntary gift of charity by the 
Gentile churches... out of gratitude toward the church in Jerusalem’.
104 The evidence in Acts 15, regarding the involvement of various figures and 
groups from the Jerusalem church in the decision regarding the requirements to be 
put on Gentile Christians, is problematic in connection with the characterization 
of the ‘Antioch Incident’ in Galatians 2. Acts 15:1 records the arrival in Antioch 
of ‘certain individuals’ from Judea who preach a message of circumcision, while 
15:5 makes it clear that this sentiment is held by those ‘believers who belonged to 
the Pharisees’. 15:24, at the opening of Jacob’s letter to the church at Antioch, 
makes it clear that these people who were troubling the Antiochene church were 
not sent by ‘us’, presumably including Jacob. Nevertheless, even if the delegation 
of ‘some from Jacob’ in Gal. 2:12 is not to be identified with the group mentioned 
in Acts 15:1, it would seem that Jacob was not—in Paul’s opinion—above 
reproach in making things difficult for the Gentile-Jew divide within the earliest 
Church.
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congregations with regard to the collection.105 The timing of the 
original (Acts 11) collection may very well co-incide with the 
reception of this letter by the Antiochene community, but, it is the 
seond, on-going collection activity, after his possible departure from 
the apparent authority of the church in Antioch that must be 
explained. My suggestion is simply that this was the only way Paul 
could demonstrate both the consistency and correct formulation of his 
theology.
This can be briefly demonstrated by reading 2 Corinthians 8-9. 
Here, Paul’s extended discussion of the role of the Corinthians in the 
collection is frequently punctuated with language which underscores 
the necessity of the voluntary motivation and joyfulness of those 
involved in the collection. First, in 8:1-7, Paul seeks to motivate the 
Corinthians (and Titus) by comparing the efforts of the Macedonian 
churches, who, even during a time of affliction, gave generously and 
joyfully— ‘begging’ to be involved (v. 4). The most significant 
statement, however, is 8:8: T do not say this as a command, but I am 
testing your love against the earnestness of others’. The rest of ch. 8 
and ch. 9 is summed-up in this simple statement, for it is here that 
Paul makes clear why he goes on at such length to persuade (8:8-15), 
encourage (8:1-7), manipulate (9:6-15) and shame (9:1-5) the 
Corinthians into contributing. He will not command them, but he 
depends on their involvement to show others that the ‘love’ of the 
Corinthians is appropriate to their calling.
105 This may even suggest a way of explaining Paul’s often debated 
paraenetic contribution to the Hellenistic letter-form. For definitions of the letter 
form taking 3, 4 and 5 parts respectively as constituent, see J.L. White, ‘Ancient 
Greek Letters’, in D.E. Aune (éd.), Greco-Roman Literature and the New 
Testament: Selected Forms and Genres (SBLSBS 21; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 
1987) 85-105, esp. 97; J.A.D. Weima, Neglected Endings: The Significance o f the 
Pauline Letter Closings (JSNTSup 101; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1994) 11; and 
W.G. Doty, Letters in Primitive Christianity (GBS; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 
1973) 27-43. For assessment, see Pearson and Porter, ‘Genres of the New 
Testament’, 151-52. Although some would suggest that ‘paraenesis’ should be 
conflated with the ‘body’, the way Paul so consistently follows the body of his 
letters with a paraenetic section working out the implications of the theology in 
the body argues for the importance of keeping these two sections separate. In 
addition, according to my suggestion here, this division may reflect the 
faith/works divide of Paul’s theology in a formal manner, which is a matter for 
future research.
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A final historical point must be raised. It has been noticed that, 
when mentioning the collection early on, the areas included in this 
connection are Galatia (1 Cor. 16:1), and Macedonia and Achaia (2 
Cor. 9:1-5). As Hurtado states, ‘in the writings subsequent to 1 
Corinthians Paul never refers to Galatian participation’.106 Hurtado’s 
argument, following Lightfoot, is that Gal. 6:6-16 includes reference 
to the collection, and is ‘an allusive appeal to participate in the 
Jerusalem offering (6:6-10), [and] a final rejection of the “Judaizers” 
(6:11-15)’.107 Hurtado, however, is only willing to allow that we ‘are 
left...with the impression that Galatia may not have participated in the 
collection’, a position which he himself in no way wishes to be seen 
as defending, claiming that it is not verifiable.108 Paul may have lost 
the influence he had once had in Galatia, most probably to those 
whose position he attacks with such vigour in his letter to the 
Galatians. Like Hurtado, Goulder has also noted the way in which 
later Paulines seem to be limited, in the areas visited by Paul during 
his lifetime, almost exclusively to Macedonia, Achaia and Asia, but 
that later Galatian theology reflects more of the Jerusalemite line than 
anything recognizably Pauline.109
The implications of these two data are consistent with the 
interpretation of the collection offered above. On the one hand, only 
those churches directly under the influence of Paul would have needed
106 Hurtado, ‘The Jerusalem Collection’, 49.
107 Hurtado, ‘The Jerusalem Collection’, 57. Cf. J.B. Lightfoot, The Epistle o f 
St. Paul to the Galatians (London: Macmillan, 19th edn, 1896) 55, 219.
108 Hurtado, ‘The Jerusalem Collection’, 50.
109 Cf. Goulder, Tale o f Two Missions, 182-89, esp. 182, in a discussion of 
Eusebius, EH 5:23, and the controversy over the details and dating of the Holy 
Week events, ‘On the one side (fast until Saturday, feast on Easter Day) were the 
main body of churches: the bishops of Caesarea and Jerusalem in Palestine, 
Victor, Bishop of Rome...,the bishops of Pontus (North Turkey), Gaul (including 
Irenaeus, Bishop of Lyons, who saw a compromise through), Osroene (South-east 
Turkey), Corinth and “great numbers of others”. On the other side (fast till 13th 
Nisan, feast on 14th, when the Passover lamb was sacrificed, on whichever day of 
the week it fell), were the bishops of “the whole of Asia” (probably the rest of 
Turkey), led by Polycrates, Bishop of Ephesus. The interest lies partly in the areas 
which are not mentioned...where are the great dioceses of Syria and 
Egypt—Antioch, Damascus, Alexandria, and points east? They are missing; and 
if they had written among “the great numbers of others”, we may be sure that 
Eusebius would have cited them. The likely conclusion is that they were not part 
o f Christendom, as Victor and Polycrates understood it: they were heretical. 
Ebionites, as Irenaeus would have described them.’
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to contribute to the collection, as the collection was a sign from the 
Gentile Pauline churches that, not only did they follow Paul, but the 
theology of righteousness by faith did not lead to a path of no good 
works. On the other hand, the silence of Paul with regard to the 
Galatian churches, and the apparent non-Pauline nature of these 
churches in the second and third centuries argue for the success of the 
‘Judaizing’ mission in the mid-first century.
CONCLUSION
The above analysis, while tentative, is nevertheless offered as a way 
in which Gadamer’s hermeneutical model can be used to interpret 
texts—not just as a way of explaining the sense of a text, but also as a 
way to suggest lines of inquiry into human interaction. The dialectical 
relation between Jacob and Paul is difficult to construe. Our evidence 
is incomplete, tendential and stands in question in the scholarly 
tradition. This is not to be down-played. Still, the above reading both 
reflects interaction with these difficulties, and suggests a way forward. 
This provisional study could form part of a body of evidence that 
seeks to explain and interact with a much larger corpus of New  
Testament material and tradition.
From a Gadamerian point-of-view— even if my analysis of the book 
of James, the reason for Paul’s collection activity, and the general 
construal of (conflict) relations in the New Testament period are not 
accepted— this study stands as a significant development of aspects of 
his model. As the last chapter in my thesis, this signals my desire both 
to continue to develop Gadamer’s model, and likewise, to investigate 
and explore new vistas not encompassed by Gadamer’s philosophy.
c o n c l u s i o n : GADAMER, PAUL, a n d  o p e n -e n d e d
SCHOLARSHIP
This thesis has been an attempt to outline several related issues. On 
the one hand, I have tried to show how Gadamer’s philosophy is 
useful to help understand texts. At times, I have attempted to go 
beyond Gadamer, not necessarily because of shortcomings in 
Gadamer’s philosophy, but because of the pregnancy of less 
developed directions in his thought. Generally, however, the direction 
of this book has been charted by Gadamer’s fruitful and important 
reflections on understanding. Because of this, I have striven to engage 
fully with Gadamer’s hermeneutical model, and have hence treated 
Gadamer as a dialogue partner, with whom, at times, I have differed. 
Likewise, I have tried to raise the ancient writers who are my other 
dialogue partners—Paul, the book of Acts, Egyptian cultic traditions, 
Jacob the brother of Jesus—to the status of equals in this discussion. 
The theme of dialogue, so important to Gadamer’s philosophy, and 
likewise important in my utilization of his philosophical categories in 
interpreting the New Testament, has provided the thematic structure 
for each chapter.
On the other hand, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics are also 
vitally important for speaking about the interpretation of texts. I hope 
that an approach to the New Testament which moves beyond the 
‘technique’ orientation o f previous work— both overtly  
‘hermeneutical’ and otherwise— and seeks to interact with the New  
Testament in a fundamentally dialogical manner will be welcomed. 
Nonetheless, although I have at multiple junctures signalled my desire 
to emulate Gadamer’s concern to move away from a method- 
orientated approach to interpretation, the following quotation 
underlines this theme, and should be read in conjunction with the idea 
that what I have here proposed is any kind of a ‘new approach’ :
Heidegger had a good reason for eventually dropping the word, 
‘hermeneutics’. I have learned myself that it is dangerous to use this word, 
because it always invites the expectation that here is a new wonder- 
weapon: that one can learn how to interpret more reliably, more surely, 
and with deeper meaning than was ever done before.1
This is not the purpose or goal of my work in the above chapters. 
Instead, the blurring of the interpretative lines—bringing the idea of
1 Gadamer in Gadamer and Ricoeur, ‘The Conflict of Interpretations’, 302.
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Paul the interpreter and writer into the same context as examination of 
Paul the interpreted and written upon— is intended to recognize that 
the ‘interpretation of another speaker and his speech, or a writer and 
his text, is just a special aspect of the process of human life as a 
whole’.2 It is meant to fully re-instate the historical distance and 
cultural separation between us and Paul and the other first-century 
writers about whom I write, while collapsing that distance into 
precisely the distance that exists between each and every one of us in 
the fusion of horizons that is the ‘special aspect of the process of 
human life’ : communication and interpretation.
There are many aspects of Paul’s writings, life, and interactions 
with others in the first century which are left unexamined here. 
Occasionally, I have indicated areas where future analysis of Paul and 
Pauline issues could be fruitfully pursued along the lines here: 
presented. However, there are also several programmatic issues 
addressed in the above chapters which could be fruitfully applied to 
other areas of New Testament and other ancient texts. One of these is 
the approach to describing and outlining the connections and 
disjunctions between Paul and Egyptian cultic material in Chapter 4. 
Although this stands in this thesis within the orbit of Pauline studied 
its application to other religious texts and traditions in the first-century 
world might help to re-invigorate the classical ‘history-of-religions’ 
approach. The lack of a philosophically rigorous basis for the 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century approach to the study of 
ancient religion was detrimental, and had a deleterious effect on the 
study of not only the New Testament, but also, to pick two examples, 
the Judaism of the period and the Isis cult. It is high time that the 
religious complexion of the Roman world is reassessed.
Another area of obvious future expansion is in the more wide-scale 
reconstruction of the theological, ideological and political map of the 
earliest Church. The ‘dialectical mapping’ I have spoken about at 
several junctures above could, perhaps, be extended to become a full- 
fledged dialectical cartography of the New Testament. By this, I mean 
something that would approach the goals of what is often called ‘New  
Testament theology’ and ‘New Testament history’— a tracing, 
analysis and reconstruction of the relationships between ideas, 
persons, and groups in the New Testament period. Such an enterprise, 
while following some old pathways and tracks, would nonetheless
2 Gadamer in Gadamer and Ricoeur, ‘The Conflict of Interpretations’, 302.
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provide new ways of addressing these old problems, and encourage a 
synthetic openness towards not only the writers of the New Testament 
and aspects of Jewish culture thought to impinge upon them, but also 
aspects of religions and other cultures which stand in dialectical 
relationship to them.
APPENDIX A
AN INDICATIVE SURVEY OF GADAMER’S HERMENEUTICS
IN NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS, AND
CRITICISM
Works in New Testament studies typically begin with a survey of 
literature relevant to all aspects of their concerns. In the current study, 
my utilization and interaction with Gadamer’s philosophy is of a 
different identity than what has gone before in its use in this particular 
‘human science’. Because of this, I thought it appropriate to reserve 
such a survey for an appendix, rather than encumbering the main body 
of my thesis with material of limited relevance.
As I stated in the preface to this thesis, I do not position my work as 
exclusively ‘Gadamerian’. In this light, though I wish to distance my 
preceding work from previous interactions with Gadamer in New  
Testament studies, this is not because I necessarily position any of the 
following surveyed studies as ‘more’ or ‘less’ ‘Gadamerian’ than my 
own. Rather, this distance lies in the attempt of the present study to 
think philosophically with  Gadamer, rather than to compare and 
contrast his work with other alternative theories of interpretation or 
meaning, which approach typically characterizes work in New  
Testament ‘hermeneutics’. Nevertheless, the studies surveyed below 
help to demonstrate how what has transpired in the above pages can 
be positioned in the history of discussion of Gadamer in New  
Testament scholarship.
This survey is intended, as the title of this appendix states, to be 
indicative. I would gain nothing by taking account of every mention 
of Gadamer in the history of New Testament scholarship. This would 
be unwieldy, and neither productive nor instructive. Yet, the 
proceeding demonstrates that my utilization of Gadamer’s work has 
not taken place in a vacuum, even if its identity is different from the 
studies surveyed below.
GADAMER’S INITIAL RECEPTION IN NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY
We can trace Gadamer’s fortunes in New Testament hermeneutics 
and theology following a roughly chronological chain of evidence. In 
1963, Wolfhart Pannenberg published an essay in German which was
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translated in 1967 as ‘Hermeneutics and Universal History’.1 At one 
point in his essay, he characterizes Truth and Method as a valiant but 
doomed attempt on Gadamer’s part to avoid the pit-falls of Hegel’s 
concept of universal history:2 ‘It is a peculiar spectacle to see how an 
incisive and penetrating author has his hands full trying to keep his 
thoughts from going in the direction they inherently want to go. 
Gadamer’s book offers this kind of spectacle...’3 Despite this 
confidence, Pannenberg’s article is, in many ways, a thorough-going 
misunderstanding of Gadamer.4 For example, Pannenberg mis-reads 
Truth and Method in several specific ways: (1) Gadamer explicitly 
states that ‘the reader before whose eyes the great book of world 
history simply lies open does not exist. But neither does the reader 
exist who, when he has his text before him, simply reads what is 
there’,5 and that the ‘very idea of a [historical] situation [in which we 
find ourselves] means that we are not standing outside it and hence are 
unable to have any objective knowledge of it. We always find 
ourselves within a situation, and throwing light on it is a task that is 
never entirely finished. This is also true o f the hermeneutic 
situation’.6 However, Pannenberg is convinced that
In a methodical execution of an interpretation... the process of 
understanding must be reflected upon because only in that way can the 
correctness of the interpretation be tested. The comprehensive horizon of
1 Originally published as ‘Hermeneutik und Universalgeschichte’, ZTK  60 
(1963) 90-121, English translation by P.J. Achtemeier: ‘Hermeneutics and 
Universal History’, Journal for Theology and Church 4 (1967) 122-52, here cited 
from a reprint in Wachterhauser (trans. and ed.), Hermeneutics and Modern 
Philosophy, 111-46.
2 Despite Pannenberg’s assertion, Gadamer’s use of Hegel is quite critical, 
and self-consciously avoids Hegel’s idea of universal history. Cf. Truth and 
Method, 369, 370-71; see above p. 31 n. 86 and p. 32 n. 90. Where Gadamer is 
positively indebted to Hegel is in Hegel’s approach to the history of hermeneutics. 
As Gadamer states, ‘If we are to follow Hegel rather than Schleiermacher, the 
history of hermeneutics must place its emphases quite differently. Its culmination 
will no longer consist in historical understanding being liberated from all 
dogmatic bias...’ {Truth and Method, 173; cf. discussion in Grondin, Sources o f 
Hermeneutics, 90-91).
3 Pannenberg, ‘Hermeneutics and Universal History’, 134.
4 Gadamer responded to this article in 1967 in ‘On the Scope and Function
of Hermeneutical Reflection’, Philosophical Hermeneutics, 18-43.
5 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 340.
6 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 301-302.
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understanding must be formulated so that one can test whether or not it is 
capable of including both the horizon of the text and the horizon of the 
interpreter.7
This removal of the interpreter from the interpretative process is 
something that Pannenberg does not elucidate. Instead of interacting 
with Gadamer’s position, he simply asserts an untenable position of 
his own, one against which Gadamer had already spoken in Truth and 
Method % If such a reflecting-out of the interpreter as Pannenberg 
describes was possible, the hermeneutical process would be 
essentially unnecessary.
(2) Pannenberg is likewise convinced that
Gadamer’s reference to the unspoken horizon of meaning of every spoken 
word is, at first glance, convincing. The primary hermeneutical task 
consists precisely in restoring the word of a transmitted text to its original, 
if also unspoken, context of meaning, in order to understand it from within 
its original situation, the situation of its author in which he composed the 
text we now have. Nevertheless, in the first place, such a procedure can 
begin only from an exact grasp of what is stated. The implicit, unspoken 
horizon of meaning is accessible to the understanding only on the basis of 
the assertion,9 and not without it.10
This mis-reads Gadamer’s explicit statements on these concepts. What 
Gadamer actually says is:
A person who has something to say seeks and finds the words to make 
himself intelligible to the other person. This does not mean that he makes 
‘statements [Aussagen] ’. Anyone who has experienced an 
interrogation—even if only as a witness—knows what it is to make a 
statement and how little it is a statement of what one means. In a statement
7 Pannenberg, ‘Hermeneutics and Universal History’, 128.
8 Cf. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 360 (emphasis original): ‘A person who 
does not admit that he is dominated by prejudices will fail to see what manifests 
itself by their light. It is like the relation between I and Thou. A Person who 
reflects himself out of the mutuality of such a relation changes this relationship 
and detroys its moral bond. A person who reflects hinself out o f a living 
relationship to tradition destroys the true meaning o f this tradition in exactly the 
same way.‘>
9 ‘Assertion’ here translates Aussage, from which also we get 
A ussagefunktion , ‘predicative function’, which is the concept in which 
Pannanberg is interested. By this, he means objectified language, something 
which Gadamer says is the oppposite of a hermeneutically approachable text.
10 Pannenberg, ‘Hermeneutics and Universal History’, 132. Cf. Gadamer’s 
comments {Truth and Method, 395) on the idea of an ‘original’ audience.
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the horizon of meaning of what is said is concealed by methodical 
exactness; what remains is the ‘pure’ sense of the statements. That is what 
goes on the record. But meaning thus reduced to what is stated is always a 
distorted meaning.
To say what one means, on the other hand—to make oneself 
understood—means to hold what is said together with what an infinity of 
what is not said in one unified meaning and to ensure that it is understood 
in this way... Even in the most everyday speech there appears an element 
of speculative reflection, namely the intangibility of that which is still the 
purest reproduction of meaning.11
Pannenberg’s admission that this is ‘at first glance convincing’ is 
followed by the idea that Gadamer is suggesting that we must recover 
the totality of what is unsaid in order to interpret what is said.12 
However, that is not at all Gadamer’s point here. In fact, Gadamer’s 
discussion in this instance is focused on the production  of texts or 
utterances, not the interpretation of them. To be sure, Gadamer’s 
model of the interpretative process as the fusion of two horizons13 
assumes that the horizon of the text will include the totality of that 
which is unsaid in the text, but never assumes (or insists) that such 
should be recovered, if  such were even possible. At the same time, 
however, Pannenberg’s assertion that ‘such a procedure can begin 
only from an exact grasp of what is stated’, unnecessarily presupposes 
the necessity of a contingent procedure by which such an exact grasp 
is to be attained. It is as if Pannenberg were trying to stop the vicious 
hermeneutical circle he requires, which may explain his next 
statement: ‘The interpreted text is precisely the text that has been 
objectified with respect to the previously unanticipated proportions of 
its horizon of meaning.’14 The Archimedean point from which 
Pannenberg imagines he could attain such objectification is
11 Gadamer, Truth and Method, 469. Cf., however, my extended questioning 
of this element of ‘good faith’ in Gadamer’s model, above, Chapter 5.
12 Cf. L. Alonso Shokel with J. Marfa Bravo, A Manual o f Hermeneutics 
(BibSem 54; trans. L.M. Rosa; trans. ed. B.W.R. Pearson; Sheffield: Sheffield 
Academic Press, 1998) 82, for a similar misunderstanding of Gadamer’s concept 
of horizon.
13 Discussed above, p. 12.
14 Pannenberg, ‘Hermeneutics and Universal History’, 133. Cf. the more 
measured distress of C. Walhout, ‘Narrative Hermeneutics’, in R. Lundin, C. 
Walhout and A.C. Thiselton, The Promise o f Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: 
Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999) 114: ‘Gadamer’s model is...unsettling.’
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undisclosed until the last two pages of his article, where he clarifies 
the whole thrust of his argument against Gadamer. It appears that, 
from Pannenberg’s standpoint, the perspective from which one can 
obtain a ‘universal historical’ perspective is the eschatological 
understanding of Christianity:
It is precisely this understanding of history as something whose totality is 
given by the fact that its end has become accessible in a provisional and 
anticipatory way that is to be gathered today from the history of Jesus in 
its relationship to the Israelite-Jewish tradition.15
This position should not necessarily be rejected simply because it is 
theologically oriented.16 It is to be opposed because it is an attempt at 
an illicit solution for which there are no such easy answers. It ignores 
the fact that this ‘history of Jesus in its relationship to the Israelite- 
Jewish tradition’ is something which is itself a problematic subject of 
hermeneutical inquiry. The ‘eschatological character of the message 
of Jesus [that] remained hidden to...[Hegel and] the New Testament 
exegesis o f his time’17 is unrecoverable as something outside of 
human tradition, no matter what the nature of one’s theological 
position. This attempt on the part of Pannenberg to side-step the 
problems of human existence by a highly questionable appeal to the 
results o f (human) New Testament exegesis is not appropriate. 
However, because Pannenberg raises issues about Gadamer’s 
relationship to Hegelian dialectic (among other things), Gadamer 
does, as mentioned above, respond to this, while kindly leaving 
Pannenberg’s conclusions and somewhat naive theological bias out of 
his sights.18
15 Pannenberg, ‘Hermeneutics and Universal History’, 139.
16 In many ways, it reflects a theologized version of part of Jürgen 
Habermas’s, objections to Gadamer’s hermeneutics. See above, p. 11 n. 4, for 
bibliography and discussion.
17 Pannenberg, ‘Hermeneutics and Universal History’, 139-40.
18 Gadamer, ‘On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection’, 36- 
38. Cf also idem. Truth and Method, 397, where Gadamer states that a position 
such as Pannenberg outlines (although Gadamer makes no specific reference to 
Pannenberg in this context) is ‘manifestly absurd’.
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GADAMER IN NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY FROM THE ‘NEW 
HERMENEUTIC’ TO THE PRESENT
Most early theological reflection on Gadamer’s hermeneutics was 
deeply coloured by his importance for the thinkers of the so-called 
‘New Hermeneutic’, Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling, as well as by 
Gadamer’s appreciation of Rudolf Bultmann’s hermeneutical 
programme.19 This may explain why Gadamer has been so seldom 
appropriated by New Testament theologians in any systematic way in 
New Testament hermeneutics. These other thinkers often seem to be 
so much more important for New Testament theology and 
hermeneutics, as their prime area of interest was, unlike for Gadamer, 
the New Testament. One result of this was that Gadamer became 
lumped together with proponents of the New Hermeneutic, as can be 
seen in the following comment by Stuhlmacher:
In a hermeneutics of consent [the position advocated in Stuhlmacher’s 
book] we need first to recall that as early as the nineteenth century the 
attempt at an objective naturalistic view of history was defeated. Then, to 
the degree it is ontologically possible, we need to lay hold of the insight of 
the ‘new hermeneutic’—the studies of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Ernst Fuchs, 
and Gerhard Ebeling—into the lingual dimensions of historical reality. 
Third and finally, we need to consider how complex the existence of the 
world and man is for us today.20
19 Cf. the treatment by G.R. Lucas, Jr., ‘Philosophy, its History, and 
Hermeneutics’, in Hahn (ed.), LLP, 173-189, esp. 179-80, 183, 185-86, which 
misunderstands and overstates the effects of Bultmann’s theological programme 
on subsequent New Testament theology, and, more importantly, provides a false 
disjunction between ‘philosophy’s reliance on history [and] that of historical 
religions like Christianity’ (p. 186). He posits that the former is concerned with 
‘meaning’, while the latter is focused upon ‘being’, a point with which Gadamer, 
in his ‘Reply to George R. Lucas, Jr.’, in Hahn (ed.), LLP, 190-91 (190), 
disagrees: ‘[Bultmann] is certainly not alone with respect to the decisive points 
that are being worked out here, namely “being” and “meaning”’. Lucas’s desire to 
differentiate the kind of hermeneutical inquiry involved in a theological discipline 
such as New Testament theology from that in his own field (the ‘philosophy of 
the history of philosophy’ as he puts it, p. 173) surely displays exactly the 
difficulties with the relationship between ‘being’ and ‘meaning’ with which both 
Gadamer and Bultmann have grappled.
20 P. Stuhlmacher, Historical Criticism and Theological Interpretation o f  
Scripture: Towards a Hermeneutics o f Consent (trans. R.A. Harrisville; 
Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977; London: SPCK, 1979 [1975]) 84.
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This conflation of Gadamer with the New Hermeneutic, though his 
work is important for aspects o f it, is perhaps too simplistic.21 
However, on the next page, Stuhlmacher says that ‘Today, the second 
requirement of a hermeneutics of consent is that altogether and in its 
detailed use it must as far as possible be verifiable as to method’ !22 As 
I have shown throughout the above chapters, the hermeneutics of 
Truth and Method can not possibly be identified with such a 
statement. Although it may not be entirely correct to characterize 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics as ‘anti-method’, there is no doubt that his 
approach to hermeneutic reflection leaves no room for the many 
superlatives that Stuhlmacher assigns to m ethodological 
verifiability.23
To other scholars, however, it soon became clear that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics could have a very positive role to play. Dale Stover’s 
1975 article, ‘Linguisticality and Theology: Applying the 
Hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer’, is an excellent example of 
Gadamer being taken on his own merit, and not simply as a support 
for or obstacle to another theological programme.24 In the article, 
Stover summarizes Truth and Method, and compares Gadamer’s
21 However, cf. W.W. Klein, C.L. Blomberg, and R.L. Hubbard, Jr., 
Introduction to Biblical Interpretation (Dallas: Word Books, 1993), in whose 491 
pages Gadamer is mentioned only 5 times, none of which are primary references, 
except p. 50 n. 101, where he is called the ‘master theoretician’ of the New 
Hermeneutic. Cf. also R. Detweiler and V.K. Robbins, ‘From New Criticism to 
Poststructuralism: Twentieth-Century Hermeneutics’, in S.R. Prickett (ed.), 
Reading the Text: Biblical Criticism and Literary Theory (Oxford and Cambridge, 
MA: Blackwell, 1991) 225-80, who also discuss Gadamer’s influence in New 
Testament studies largely in the light of the New Hermeneutic, albeit realizing his 
independence from the movement (esp. pp. 239-40). The best treatment of the 
relationships between these figures is to be found in Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 
331-43, but see below for discussion of difficulties of Thiselton’s analysis of 
Gadamer in The Two Horizons.
22 Stuhlmacher, Historical Criticism, 85-86. He retains both of these 
difficulties in his later Vom Verstehen des Neuens Testaments: Eine Hermeneutik 
(GNT; NTDE 6; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2nd edn, 1986) esp. 214 
and 223-25.
23 See, e.g., Gadamer, Truth and Method, 277, 290, and discussion above, 
pp. 9-11.
24 D. Stover, ‘Linguisticality and Theology: Applying the Hermeneutics of 
Hans-Georg Gadamer’, SR 5 (1975-76) 34-44.
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programme with those of Pannenberg, the New Hermeneutic,25 and 
Barth.
The early eighties saw developments in New Testament criticism 
that invited the involvement of hermeneuticists and theologians. The 
advances of structuralism, coupled with the utilization of literary 
methods and a growing awareness of philosophical hermeneutics, led 
to the beginning of a boom in hermeneutical reflection in New  
Testament studies. Reflective of some of these newer trends in New  
Testament studies is the 1981 article by Mark Taylor, ‘Interpreting 
Interpretation’.26 The true nature of Gadamer’s hermeneutics is an 
unfortunate casualty of the article’s discursive style and haphazard 
attempt to provide a basis for the historical reading of New Testament 
texts. Displaying the same retrojective slippage as would Gerald 
Bruns later (see above, pp. 20-25), Taylor, following Ricoeur’s 
terminology, tries to show how Schleiermacher was a proponent of an 
‘archaeological’ approach to hermeneutics ‘in which the text is 
understood in terms of the world from which it originated [while] 
Gadamer proposes a “teleological” hermeneutics in which the text is 
interpreted in terms of the world it projects [to the interpreter]’.27 He 
goes on to suggest that ‘Gadamer’s teleological hermeneutics remains 
curiously insensitive to the historical origin of the text’,28 but a closer 
reading of Truth and Method suggests that such an interpretation of 
Gadamer is not germane (see discussion of Gadamer’s concept of 
horizons in interpretation, above, p. 12).
An exception to the developing trend of these responses to Gadamer 
in theological circles comes from slightly outside the strict rubric of 
‘New Testament studies’. T. Guarino’s 1990 ‘Revelation and 
Foundationalism: Toward Hermeneutical and O ntological 
Awareness’, has the purpose of examining ‘To what extent [one can] 
maintain the bold statements about the “eternity” of Christian 
revelation, its “finality”, its “perpetuity” and its “integrity” in the light 
of the horizons uncovered by post-modern philosophy’.29 He
25 In contrast to Stuhlmacher and others’ conflation of the two, discussed 
above.
26 M.C. Taylor, ‘Interpreting Interpretation’, JAAR Thematic Studies 48 
(1981) 44-64.
27 Taylor, ‘Interpreting Interpretation’, 48.
28 Taylor, ‘Interpreting Interpretation’, 49.
29 T. Guarino, ‘Revelation and Foundationalism: Toward Hermeneutical and 
Ontological Awareness’, Modern Theology 6.3 (1990) 231.
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iden tifies three major strands o f herm eneutic theory: 
reconstructive/objectivist (Betti, Hirsch), phenom enological 
(Gadamer, Tracy30), and radical (Caputo31), suggesting that only the 
first two options offer any possibility for a theology of revelation. He 
then suggests that ‘Roman Catholic theology has, for the most part, 
opted for the limited pluralism called for by reconstructive 
hermeneutics and has avoided the more radical plurality endorsed by 
the Gadamerian trajectory’ 32 What is significant about this article for 
the current context is not its identification of the general Catholic 
theological stance as being objectivist/reconstructive. Instead, perhaps 
because his article is primarily descriptive in nature, Guarino 
facilitates Gadamer’s hermeneutics to be displayed, and not through 
the mouths of his critics, nor in conjunction only with reaction against 
Gadamer’s ‘threat’ to objectivity. Instead, although Guarino’s 
conclusion (as cited above) is tentative and descriptive, his earlier 
discussion indicates that he finds a phenomenological approach very 
appealing, if  not as certain an approach as the reconstructive 
hermeneutic:
A sophisticated reconstructive or objectivist hermeneutics clearly provides 
one solution [to the problem being addressed in Guarino’s article]... 
[However, aside] from the theoretical issues which have already been 
raised, one may ask, on a practical plane, if reconstructive hermeneutics 
possesses the resources to handle the type of pluralism which will likely 
be essential for Christian unity? Does it possess the resources to handle the 
growth of the Christian message in other cultures and continents?
It is just such issues as ecumenism and inculturation which make the 
phenomenological hermeneutics of Gadamer and Tracy so attractive...33
Despite the theologically-oriented identity o f Guarino’s 
discussion— a concern not reflected in this present study— his 
openness to the plurality of Gadamer’s hermeneutics does seem to be 
the result of a sympathetic reading of Gadamer. This is not to say that 
some kind o f uncritical agreement with Gadamer is to be 
sought— quite the contrary. However, as mentioned above, it seems
30 D. Tracy, Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope (San 
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1987).
31 J. Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and the 
Hermeneutic Project (Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1987).
32 Guarino, ‘Revelation and Foundationalism’, 233.
33 Guarino, ‘Revelation and Foundationalism’, 231-32.
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that one of the chief weaknesses of the critical appropriation of 
Gadamer in much New Testament studies is the lack of interaction 
with Gadamer himself.34
GADAMER IN NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM
More recently, many of those concerned with method and theory of 
New Testament criticism have taken an interest, however fleeting, in 
Gadamer’s hermeneutics. Disappointingly, few have utilized his work 
as he has intended it to be used. They treat it as if  it were another 
method of interpretation, rather than a meta-critical discourse intended 
to act as a description (and corrective) of critical discourse, and an 
explicit discussion of the process o f communication and its 
interpretation.
To read Gadamer’s hermeneutics as a method of criticism is a 
failing found in Thiselton’s first major work on hermeneutics, The 
Two Horizons. At first, it seems that Thiselton does recognize that 
Gadamer insists that ‘his philosophy is purely descriptive’, and that he 
understands the import o f this for the application of Gadamer’s 
philosophical programme to interpretation of the New Testament: ‘If 
Gadamer’s claim [to be merely descriptive] is correct...categories 
drawn from his work cannot be said to lead to distortion in 
interpreting the New Testament’.35 As his treatment progresses, 
though, Thiselton seems keen to discuss, in the spirit o f Betti, how 
philosophical categories derived from Gadamer’s work can be said to 
lead to distortion in interpreting the New Testament.36 On the same 
page, he highlights the objections of Betti to Gadamer’s work, before 
moving on to a discussion of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. It seems that 
Thiselton is keen to bring Gadamer into discussion in his book not on 
his own terms, but rather (as the emphasis in his later chapters shows) 
because of his importance for the New Hermeneutic. The dismissal of 
Gadamer (who silently fades from the book around p. 356 after a long 
discussion of the New Hermeneutic) seems to have more to do with
34 Cf. S. Briggs, ‘“Buried with Christ”: The Politics of Identity and the 
Poverty of Interpretation’, in R.M. Schwartz (ed.), The Book and the Text: The 
Bible and Literary Theory (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1990) 276- 
303, a similarly sympathetic reading, but one which takes a primarily negative 
stance vis-à-vis Gadamer’s programme (see esp. 288-89).
35 Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 28.
36 Cf. my discussion of E.D. Hirsch’s similar resistance to Gadamer’s 
programme above, pp. 16-17, and Walhout, ‘Narrative Hermeneutics’, 36-37.
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the way in which Gadamer is used by the thinkers of the New  
Hermeneutic than because Thiselton has adequately assessed the 
usefulness o f Gadamer’s hermeneutics for New Testament 
interpretation. A similar sublimation can be seen in Thiselton’s 
treatment of Heidegger, who is subsumed in his picture of 
Bultmann.37 His initial treatment of Gadamer culminates in a 
confusing portrait of a philosopher who somehow tells us how  to 
interpret, rather than one who discusses the nature of interpretation.
Thiselton seems to have realized this mistake, for his sequel to The 
Two Horizons, New Horizons in H e rm e n e u tic sexplicitly recognizes 
the meta-critical nature of Gadamer’s work. His attempt to defend his 
earlier mis-treatment of Gadamer in The Two Horizons,39 however, is 
not successful.40 He supports this with an appeal to Stephen Fowl, 
whose article, discussing the relationship between Brevard Childs’s 
canonical-critical approach to biblical texts and Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical programme,41 fails to account for the unsuitability of
37 Thiselton, The Two Horizons, 28.
38 Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, ch. 9.
39 Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 313-14. After an introductory 
paragraph in which he, following Ricoeur, rightly recognizes that Gadamer’s 
hermeneutics are a ‘critique, or a meta-critique’ (emphasis original), he suggests 
that ‘It is possible, however, to draw implications and analogues from Gadamer’s 
work for biblical interpretation... ’
40 Thiselton’s recent ‘Biblical Studies and Theoretical Hermeneutics’, in J. 
Barton (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Biblical Interpretation (Cambridge 
Companions to Religion; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) 95-113 
is not an improvement, although he does seem to have changed his approach to 
Gadamer yet again. He suggests (p. 107) that against Gadamer (whom he lumps 
in with ‘postmodern approaches’), ‘Paul Ricoeur shows that it is possible to 
appreciate a wide plurality of hermeneutial approaches without subscribing to a 
pluralism of world views’, which is based on his earlier assessment (p. 104) that 
Gadamer was fundamentally motivated in his emphasis on the ‘open-endedness of 
the question and conversation’ by his ‘antipathy to propaganda...bound up with 
Gadamer’s suspicion of the Nazi regime’. Despite Thiselton’s appeal to R.R. 
Sullivan’s Political Hermeneutics: The Early Thinking o f Hans-Georg Gadamer 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1989), this is a dismissive 
and unsympathetic treatment, which misconstrues Gadamer’s programme as a foil 
for Thiselton’s treatment of Ricoeur. Although concern for the differing 
orientations of German philosophers to the Nazi regime is not unimportant, it can 
hardly be used in the manner here outlined.
41 S. Fowl, ‘The Canonical Approach of Brevard Childs’, ExpTim 96 (1985) 
173-76.
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Gadamer’s hermeneutics for this comparison. This treatment suggests 
that Thiselton continues to be influenced by the approach he took to 
Gadamer in The Two Horizons. Thiselton quotes the first o f the 
following two paragraphs from Fowl,42 where Fowl expresses his 
frustration with Gadamer’s non-method-orientation, for the purpose of 
criticizing Childs:
Gadamer talks about concepts such as ‘judgement’, ‘tact’, the ‘Sensus 
Communis', et al. as guiding principles in determining what is and is not 
justifiable in one’s pre-understanding. On a theoretical level this sounds 
very helpful. When it comes to discussing how one might exercise these 
principles in certain situations, however, Gadamer is painfully silent. This 
reflects Gadamer’s overall desire to avoid presenting a ‘method’ of 
understanding.
It would be wrong to say that Childs’ position is untenable a priori... 
Childs...need[s] to elaborate and strengthen his positions regarding his 
pre-understanding and the emphasis he places on effective-history before 
the canonical approach can receive a proper hearing.43
What is inadequate with Fowl’s reading of Gadamer is that he 
interprets the thrust of Gadamer’s programme as that o f trying to 
‘avoid presenting a “method” of understanding’, as if  this were a 
danger into which Gadamer might fall, were he to let his attention 
slip. As I have shown, this is not at all the nature of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutical programme, and Fowl’s comparison of Gadamer with 
Childs should simply serve to underline the way in which he has 
m isunderstood Gadamer’s entire purpose. For exam ple, 
‘Gadamer...works on a theoretical level; as a result, he does not have 
to justify any actual pre-understanding regarding a specific text. 
Childs, on the other hand, is quite open about the pre-understandings 
he brings to the OT’.44 That this misunderstands Gadamer’s 
discussion of pre-understanding in interpretation45 is an additional 
failure on Fowl’s part to engage with Gadamer’s programme, but the 
more serious problem with this is the fact that he can, without 
qualification, compare Gadamer with Childs as if the two had the
42 Thiselton, New Horizons in Hermeneutics, 314.
43 Fowl, ‘Canonical Approach’, 176.
44 Fow l,‘Canonical Approach’, 175.
45 See above, p. 9.
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same aims in their discussions.46 Thiselton’s most recent treatment of 
Gadamer redresses some of this imbalance,47 but his appeal to 
Sullivan’s study on the political motivation of Gadamer’s early 
work48 to ‘explain’ Gadamer’s stress on ‘the importance of dialogue 
and conversation as against the manipulative propaganda of “closed” 
assertions’, is troubling. It would seem that, for Thiselton, Gadamer 
remains a foil for discussing other thinkers.49
In contrast to Fow l’s treatment, Mark Brett’s analysis o f the 
relationship between Childs and Gadamer is well considered, and 
treats both Gadamer and Childs sympathetically. Although I do not 
wish to defend or extend Childs’s hermeneutical programme, Brett’s 
sensitive treatment of both Childs and Gadamer is instructive. As 
points of comparison, he notes ‘that in embracing the historicality of 
all biblical interpretation Childs approaches Gadamer’s view of 
truth’,50 and suggests that
A comparison with Gadamer’s philosophy provides the most charitable 
way of understanding the hermeneutics of the canonical approach... Fresh 
interpretations of the canon reflect the interpreter’s own situation in 
history rather than an ideal end of inquiry. The classical text has an 
inexhaustibility that resists any one interpretative method or any one 
understanding of it.51
He goes on to note, however, that ‘There are...some residual 
problems in this comparison’ ,52 The most important difference in this 
regard is the disjunction between Gadamer’s insistence on the need to 
examine classical texts’ truth claims in the light of modern inquiry
46 The present evidence supports the view that Fowl’s mis-treatment of 
Gadamer in his article stems from over-reliance on a view of Gadamer influenced 
especially by the epitome of Gadamer in Palmer, Hermeneutics.
47 A.C. Thiselton, ‘Communicative Action and Promise in Hermeneutics’, in 
Lundin, Walhout and Thiselton, Promise o f Hermeneutics, 134.
48 Thiselton, ‘Communicative Action’, 217; referring to Sullivan, Political 
Hermeneutics, 1-16, 165-92.
49 In this context (Thiselton, ‘Communicative Action’, 217), it is Niebhur’s 
attack on ‘the insidiousness of corporate structures of evil’, while in The Two 
Horizons, as discussed above, Gadamer is discussed primarily in connection with 
the ‘New Hermeneutic’.
50 M.G. Brett, Biblical Criticism in Crisis? The Impact o f  the Canonical 
Approach on Old Testament Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991) 145.
51 Brett, Biblical Criticism, 146.
52 Brett, Biblical Criticism, 146.
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and Childs’s apparent circumvention of such examination of the 
biblical texts ‘by claiming that the canonical approach has different 
interpretative interests’.53 As Brett puts it, ‘Gadamer...has 
consistently stressed that hermeneutics has a “productive” aspect, that 
is, the interpreter needs to consider issues beyond the perspective of 
the author if  the truth value of an author’s text is to be taken seriously. 
Childs, on the other hand, wants both to emphasize the truth value of 
canonical. . . theology and at the same time to reject [traditional] 
biblical studies’.54 It would seem that, implicit within Brett’s use of 
Gadamer to rehabilitate Childs’s canonical programme, is the 
possibility that Gadamer could be used in his own right as both a 
useful tool to critique biblical criticism, as well as a way forward in 
the study of biblical texts themselves, as I have attempted in the 
present study.
Unfortunately, with the exception of the examples discussed above, 
and the occasional reference to Gadamer as a supporter of the idea of 
‘pre-understanding’ in interpretation,55 or mentions of him in histories
53 Brett, Biblical Criticism, 147.
54 Brett, Biblical Criticism, 149 (emphasis original).
55 E.g. R.A. Horsley and M. Myers, ‘Idols, Demons, and the Hermeneutics of
Suspicion: Biblical Traditions Informing Ethics’, in D. Lull (ed.), Society o f 
Biblical Literature: 1989 Seminar Papers (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1989) 
641: ‘A final hermeneutical concern, then, is to take our own situation into 
account in a critical appropriation of the story or the tradition...(Gadamer’s 
“prejudice”). This must be taken into account as we prepare the ground for a 
hearing and application of the text in our contemporary situation’; E.V. 
McKnight, ‘A Sheep in Wolf’s Clothing: An Option in Contemporary New 
Testament Hermeneutics’, in E. Struthers Malbon and E.V. McKnight (eds.). The 
New Literary Criticism and the New Testament (JSNTSup 109; Sheffield: 
Sheffield Academic Press, 1994) 326-47, esp. 332, where he mentions Gadamer 
only to introduce the socially-oriented criticisms of Gadamer by Habermas and 
Apel; cf. idem. Meaning in Texts: The Historical Shaping o f a Narrative 
Hermeneutics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978) 4, 5, 53-60; and, from a 
different perspective, J.I. Packer, ‘Infallible Scripture and the Role of 
Hermeneutics’, in D.A. Carson and J.D. Woodbridge (eds.), Scripture and Truth 
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983) 355, where he asserts that ‘Heidegger and 
Gadamer set us adrift without chart or compass on a sea of ultimately 
uncontrolled subjectivity’. (From a theological perspective as well, cf. the more 
measured criticism of Gadamer, following Ricoeur, by W. Jeanrond, Theological 
Hermeneutics: Development and Significance [London: Macmillan, 1991 (repr. 
London: SCM Press, 1994)] 64-70.)
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of hermeneutical enquiry in books on hermeneutics 56 Gadamer has 
not been utilized in any extensive way by New Testament 
scholarship.57
56 E.g. Detweiler and Robbins, ‘From New Criticism to Poststructuralism’ ; 
W.C. Kaiser in W.C. Kaiser and M. Silva, An Introduction to Biblical 
Hermeneutics: The Search for Meaning (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994) 28-29 
(derivitave of Schneiders, ‘From Exegesis to Hermeneutics’), but especially 178- 
79, where Kaiser displays a fundamental misunderstanding of Gadamer’s concept 
of ‘horizon’; cf. M. Oeming, Biblische Hermeneutik: Eine Einfiihrung (Die 
Théologie; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1998) 91-92, and the 
chart on 176.
57 In this regard, perhaps because he actually deals with biblical texts in his 
work, Paul Ricoeur has fared better. Cf. K.J. Vanhoozer, Biblical Narrative in the 
Philosophy o f Paul Ricoeur: A Study in Hermeneutics and Theology (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990). In a recently published edited volume on 
hermeneutic reflection (Lundin [ed.], Disciplining Hermeneutics), however, there 
may be a ray of hope for the continuing appropriation of Gadamer’s hermeneutic. 
The initial section of this book, entitled ‘The Speech of God: Hermeneutics and 
the Word’, is made up of three essays, by Nicholas Wolterstorff ( ‘The Importance 
of Hermeneutics for a Christian Worldview’, 25-47), Howard Marshall (“To Find 
out What God Is Saying”: Reflections on the Authorizing of Scripture’, 49-55) 
and Merold Westphal ( ‘Post-Kantian Reflections on the Importance of 
Hermeneutics’, 57-66). The two initial essays, but especially Wolterstorff’s, 
reflect high views of ‘Scripture’ (Wolterstorff s is largely based on his Divine 
Discourse: Philosophical Reflections on the Claim that God Speaks [Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995]), while attempting to engage some of the 
language of modern hermeneutical discourse. Both fail in the latter. A stark 
contrast to these is found, however, in the essay by Westphal, who is willing to 
fully face the implications of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics (as well as 
the philosophies of Heidegger and Ricoeur): ‘some...feel the need of an 
objectivity of interpretation that will make it a zero sum game, turning the agony 
of interpretation into a contest only one can win, the one who comes up with the 
right interpretation. That is what the romantic hermeneutics of authorial intent 
was all about’ (p. 61).
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A CASE FOR THE EXISTENCE OF BAPTISM AS 
INITIATION IN THE CULT OF ISIS AND SARAPISi
BAPTISM IN THE ISIS/SARAPIS CULT
This appendix is an attempt to determine whether or not a 
reasonable case can be made for the existence of baptism in the 
initiatory practices of the Isis/Sarapis cult. This question, however, 
must be seen in two ways: (1) from the postulated standpoint of the 
actual historical states of affairs (in so far as these can be ascertained 
from available sources) of what did and did not happen within the cult 
itself, and (2) what popular perception might have been regarding the 
practices of the cult. The fact that the Isis/Sarapis cult was a mystery 
cult2 should be taken seriously, especially with regard to the function 
that mystery would have played in the minds of those not privy to its 
inner workings.3 The role of alienation as a function of detached 
observation is central to this.
1 Originally published as ‘Baptism and Initiation in the Isis and Sarapis 
Cult’, in S.E. Porter and A.R. Cross (eds.), Baptism, the New Testament and the 
Church: Historical and Contemporary Studies in Honour o f R.E.O. White 
(JSNTSup 171; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1999) 42-61, reprinted here 
with some modification, and the omission of Section 1: ‘Baptism and the 
Mysteries, Revisited’.
2 Terminology with regard to ‘mystery cults’ varies. In older sources, these 
cults are often called ‘mystery religions’, and will occasionally be called simply 
‘oriental cults’. As I use the term ‘mystery religion’, this denotes those organized 
religious groups in the Roman world which were not the ‘official’ cults (the 
Imperial cult, the Roman/Greek pantheon, etc.), and whose origins were 
somewhere in the east. Typically, one of the chief characteristics of these cults is 
an element of secrecy. For systematic study of these features, cf. W. Burkert, 
Ancient Mystery Cults (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 
1987).
3 But cf. Dunand, Le culte dTsis, 3.246-51, who raises an objection to even 
thinking of the Isis cult as a proper mystery cult until well into the Imperial age. 
Her model of the Isis cult suggests that any ‘mystery’ which would have taken 
place was largely in the minds of non-initiates, and may in fact be largely blamed 
on the strangeness of the Egyptian myths, rather than their secretive nature: Les 
cérémonies égyptiennes en l’honneur d’Osiris ne sont en rien des mystères, dans
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The major sources of information with regard to the practices and 
theology o f the H ellenistic Isis/Sarapis cult are Apuleius, 
Metamorphoses l l ,4 also known as the Tsis Book’; Plutarch, Isis and 
Osiris; Diodorus Siculus I,5 and several other classical authors, as 
well as inscriptions6 and papyri7 relating to the cult. In addition, 
although more difficult in many cases to understand, the 
archaeological evidence of individual monuments and concentrated 
areas of worship— Sarapea and Isea— scattered throughout the Roman 
Empire are fundamental to many discussions of baptism, precisely 
because of the nature of the act of immersion baptism, if practised by 
the Isis/Sarapis cult within their temple precincts, would reasonably 
seem to be something obvious from the remains o f special
la mesure où elles ne comportent ni public restreint, ni épreuves initiatiques, ni 
aboutissement, pour les fidèles, à un état privilégié; qu’elles aient eu aux yeux des 
Grecs un caractère mystérieux est assez explicable, les mythes qu’elles illustrent 
et sur-tout les rites qui les caractérisent étant sans doute pour eux à peu près 
incompréhensible’ (pp. 247-48). Later, with regard to the secret books Lucius is 
shown by Mithras, the high priest who has initiated Lucius into the Isiac faith, 
Dunand suggests that, although the books were written in hieroglyphics (hence 
their mysterious nature, accessible only to the initiate), it is highly unlikely that 
the Greek or Roman priests would have been able to read them (p. 250 n. 2). 
However, it does seem that Dunand’s scepticism is perhaps too thorough-going. 
Her assertion that the content of the Isiac mysteries was essentially what was 
visible, but re-interpreted to the initiate, is a possible interpretation of the extant 
evidence, but not the only one. Even with her model, one must wonder what these 
secret interpretations would have been. These interpretations, using Dunand’s 
model for the moment, would still be something to which we may or may not be 
privy in our extant sources.
4 For commentary and discussion, see Griffiths, Apuleius o f Madauros and 
H. Miinstermann, Apuleius.
5 For commentary on this book of Diodorus, see Burton, Diodorus Siculus.
6 Vidman, Sylloge, collects virtually all of the pertinent inscriptions in 
Greek and Latin. See also his Isis und Sarapis, for extended discussion based on 
his epigraphical research into the Isis/Sarapis cult. See also F. Mora, 
Prosopografia Isiaca (2 vols.; EPRO 113.1-2; Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1990).
7 To my knowledge, no systematic collection of the corpus of papyri 
relating to the Isis/Sarapis cult has heretofore been made, although Dunand, Le 
culte d ’Isis, makes extensive use of the papyri, and all of the Ptolemaic-era papyri 
which were published by the turn of the century have been collected by U. 
Wilcken, Urkunden der Ptolemaerzeit (altere Funde) (2 vols.; Berlin and Leipzig: 
De Gruyter, 1927, 1935-57). See ‘Excursus’, below, with regard to P.Paris 
41/UPZ1.10.
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constructions for that purpose.8 Obviously, however, there is no little 
difficulty in reconstructing ‘the’ theology and practices o f the 
Isis/Sarapis cult, specifically because of its nature as a mystery cult. 
Many things seem to have been left unrecorded, or at least are no 
longer extant, which is perhaps to be expected, given the air of 
secrecy that surrounded certain aspects of the cultic activities of all 
mystery religions (see above, n. 3).
However, there are many things which can be surmised about the 
practices of the Isis/Sarapis cult from both the known nature of many 
Greco-Roman religions (both mystery and ‘officia l’), and the 
evidence which we do have available to us. One of the most important 
texts for this kind of reconstruction is Apuleius’s Metamorphoses, 
which, although it comes from the second century C E,  is likely 
indicative of a long tradition of practice within the cult.9 This text tells
8 The works of Salditt-Trappmann (Tempel der agyptischen Gotter) and 
Wild (Water in the Cultic Worship o f Isis and Sarapis) address this question in 
specific. More general discussions which take account of the archaeology of the 
Isis/Sarapis cult include Witt, Isis in the Ancient World', Dunand, Le culte d 9Isis’, 
idem. Religion populaire en Égypte romaine', Tran tam Tinh, Sérapis debout.
9 See Meyer (éd.), Ancient Mysteries, 176-93 for English translation and 
brief discussion; and, for extended discussions, Griffiths, Apuleius o f Madauros: 
The Isis-Book, and Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, esp. ch. 12. There is, of course, 
the possibility that variation in the religion occurred between the period in which 
we are intertested (ca. first century c e )  and the second century c e , but even 
Wedderburn (Baptism and Resurrection, 162), who is not keen to see mystery- 
influence in Paul, is willing to admit that the ‘mysteries were certainly very much 
alive in the first century of our era and, even if they were not yet enjoying the 
boom which they experienced in the following two centuries, they were a spiritual 
power to be reckoned with... Nor is there any adequate reason for saying that the 
beliefs of their devotees then were greatly different from those a century later, so 
that it is not illegitimate to read back whatever we may infer from, for instance, 
Apuleius’ account of Lucius’ initiation into the mysteries of Isis [in the first 
century]’. A conservative, even reactionary, tendency towards the preservation of 
traditional practice would seem to be necessary in a secretive setting such as the 
Isis/Sarapis cult. The opportunities for innovation would have been very small, 
and any variation of traditional practices would have been obvious to the local 
group of initiates. The lack of free flow between different groups of worshippers 
would have meant that any such variation would have likely been highly 
localized. The story of Lucius himself shows both of these—he travels from 
Cenchraea to Rome, but is unaware even of the existence of some parts of the 
Isiac religion, and requires an additional two levels of initiation before becoming 
fully aware of the mysteries. It is unlikely that such hard-won knowledge could be 
freely changed by those who had attained initiation into the highest levels of the
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the story of one Lucius of Madauros, who had, on account of his 
lascivious lifestyle, been transformed into an ass. The first part of 
book 11 thus describes his entreaty to the goddess Isis to be returned 
once more to human form, and her answering description of the 
manner in which this miraculous transformation would take place. In 
short, he was to insinuate himself into a ritual Isiac procession being 
held in nearby Cenchraea, and eat a wreath of roses which a particular 
priest (who was simultaneously receiving similar instructions from the 
goddess) would be holding. The transformation takes place as 
predicted, and the grateful Lucius then devotes himself to the service 
of Isis, with which the second half of the book is taken up. Lucius 
goes through three different initiations into three different levels of 
mystery— first, he is initiated (after much pondering and waiting) into 
the first level of Isiac mystery at the Iseum at Cenchraea (11:21-25). 
Then Lucius is commanded by the goddess to go to Rome, where he 
becomes part of the Iseum located in the Campus Martius. Here, he 
becomes aware of the fact that he is not yet fully initiated— which 
comes as a surprise to him: ‘After I had examined all my religious 
doubts in the privacy of my own conscience, I consulted a priest. I 
then learned a new and disturbing thing: that I was initiated into the 
mysteries of the Goddess, but that I knew nothing of the rites of the 
mighty God, the supreme Father of the Gods, unconquerable Osiris’ 
(11:27).10 No sooner has Lucius gone through the next 
initiation— whose cost, like the first one, he bears himself, at the 
expense even of the clothes off his own back— than he ‘was once 
more molested by unexpected visionary commands; and a third time
cult, and more likely that the form and content of the cult actually went through 
very little variation after its inception by Ptolemy I. As Dunand {Le culte d ’Isis, 
248) puts it, ‘On ne peut sans doute pas plus parler de “doctrines secrètes” que de 
“mystères égyptiens”, avec cette réserve que la théologie pouvait effectivement 
rester secrète, parce que difficilement communicable, pour les fidèles égyptiens 
comme pour les fidèles grecs’. He goes on (p. 253) to suggest that ‘Il ne semble 
pas qu’on puisse déceler des changements notables dans la célébration du culte et 
des fêtes, entre l’époque hellénistique et l’époque impériale; les mêmes pratiques 
restent en vigueur et leur permanence n’a rien de surprenant: un certain nombre 
d’entre elles existaient déjà dans l’Égypte ancienne; or le rituel égyptien se 
caractérise par son immuabilité’.
10 Translation taken from Meyer, Ancient Mysteries, which is in turn from J. 
Lindsay, The Golden Ass (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962). Osiris 
is, of course, the Egyptian deity with which the new Ptolemaic god Sarapis was 
most often identified.
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[he] found [him]self yearning towards a mystery’ (11:29). This time, 
rather than postpone the matter (as he had both previous times), he 
submits himself to the priest immediately, and goes through the 
necessary period of fasting, before receiving the final mystery, in 
which he becomes a member of the college of priests (11:29-30).
There are several things about this text which have interested 
scholars concerned with baptism (and its interpretation) in the 
Isis/Sarapis cult: (1) The first initiation, at Cenchraea, is preceded by a 
ritual bathing, before the obligatory ten day period of fasting— 11:23 
describes Lucius’s preparations for his initiation, and then he tells us 
that T was led to the Baths, surrounded by a crowd of devotees. 
There, after I had taken the usual bath, Mithras [the priest leading him 
through the initiatory process] himself washed and sprinkled me with 
pure water, invoking first the pardon of all of the gods’. (2) In 11:21, 
before his first initiation, Lucius is eager to be allowed to be initiated, 
and is informed that the initiation date would only be given by the 
goddess herself, and that ‘to undertake the ministries o f the 
goddess...without her consent would be an invocation of destruction. 
For the gates of shadow as well as the bulwarks of life were under the 
goddess’s control; and the act of initiation has been compared to a 
voluntary death with a slight chance of redemption’. (3) Lucius’s 
description of the actual initiatory process, while frustratingly 
incomplete, is still somewhat helpful: T approached the confines of 
death. I trod the threshold of Proserpine;11 and borne through the 
elements I returned. At midnight I saw the Sun shining in all his glory. 
I approached the gods below and the gods above, and I stood beside 
them, and I worshipped them. Behold, I have told you my experience, 
and yet what you hear can mean nothing to you’ (11:23). (4) The 
initiate of Isis is twice (11:16 and 21) called renatus, ‘bom again’.
This material from Apuleius provides us with more than enough 
evidence to suggest that the connection between baptism, death 
(symbolic, actual, or simply the possibility thereof), and initiation into 
the cult of Isis would have existed in at least the popular mind 
(despite, or perhaps because of, the assertion that what the reader 
hears ‘can mean nothing to you’). Even if we were to suggest that no 
baptism took place during the initiation ceremony, Wagner’s
11 Persephone, with whom Isis was identified. See Witt, Isis in the Ancient 
World, 159 n. 41. The ‘threshhold of Proserpine’, then, would indicate a 
movement either to the brink of the underworld, or one in and out of the 
underworld.
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argument that ‘There is no direct connection between the bath and the 
“mystery”, so the meaning of the mystery proper must not be 
transferred to this single action preceding it’, 12 does not necessarily 
follow. While the text does not speak in detail concerning the actual 
process of initiation, the very nature of the ‘mystery’ meant that only 
the initiates of a mystery would actually have access to the ‘mystery 
proper’, and that those who remained outside this circle also remained 
ignorant of the ‘mystery proper’. If we go with Dunand’s conception 
of the process, the only elements of the ‘mystery proper’ which would 
have been inaccessible to the un-initiated would have been the ‘double 
signification, mythique et symbolique, des actions représentées’.13 
The uninitiated were able to be involved in the rituals leading up to 
the ‘mystery’ and in its aftermath—in Apuleius’s text (11:23), Lucius 
is ‘led to the Baths, surrounded by a crowd of devotees’. We are not 
told where the bath was— there is some indication that it could have 
been attached to the Isis temple itself, although this is by no means 
certain14— but regardless, this does not seem to have been a secret 
part of the mystery. We are also told of the connection between the 
initiation and death on more than one occasion by Lucius.
At this point, a brief excursion into the realm of archaeology, to 
discuss the various physical remains which may (or may not) be 
pertinent to the issue of baptism within the Isis/Sarapis cult, is in 
order. One of the more important pieces of archaeological information 
in this regard is the mosaic from the temple of Fortuna Primagenia in 
Palestrina. This mosaic is connected with Isis, and depicts a scene of 
the Nile Valley in flood. On it (centre, left) is the representation of a 
temple with what looks much like a bath or, as Witt styles it, ‘a kind 
of baptismal font’.15 In his rather more full discussion o f the 
archaeology of the fifty or so sites of centralized worship in the Isis
12 Wagner, Pauline Baptism, 101.
13 Dunand, Le culte d ’Isis, 3.249.
14 See Wild, Water in the Cultic Worship o f Isis and Osiris, ch. 7 for full 
discussion of the various facilities thought to have been used for ablutions and 
related rituals.
15 See Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, 76-79 for plates, and 163-64 for 
discussion (here 163). This bath or basin is, however, probably best identified as 
an ablution basin (see Wild, Water in the Cultic Worship o f Isis and Osiris, chap. 
7). As mentioned, however, this does not negate the possibility that such ablution 
basins, when involved in initiatory rituals such as Lucius’s, could not have been 
identified with a baptismal rite, even if this identification took place only in the 
mind of the non-initiated.
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and Osiris cult, with specific reference to the water-related facilities. 
Wild suggests that ‘they appear to have a significant function within 
the cult’.16 Wild is, however, in some disagreement with Salditt- 
Trappmann, who suggests that the ‘crypt’ of the Iseum at Gortyn on 
Crete was used for actual baptism.17 While Wild does not fully share 
Salditt-Trappmann’s extended views on Isiac baptism, he does 
support this aspect of her interpretation: ‘That individuals entered 
basins in these crypts’—here referring to the widespread existence of 
crypts in Greco-Roman Isea— ‘to undergo a ritual drowning appears 
some what... credible. Such a ritual might explain why the inflow pipes 
in the Gortyn and Pompeii crypts are located close to the ceiling’.18 
He then goes on to note that the use of this particular basin would 
have produced problems with regard to access.19 This assessment on 
the part of Wild by no means rules out the identification of this basin 
as a baptismal basin. It does not seem that Wild has actually inspected 
the evidence at Gortyn about which he speaks (although he says in his 
introduction, p. xiii, that he ‘made an inspection of some of the most 
important sites in the eastern Mediterranean area’), while Salditt- 
Trappmann’s discussion of the site seems to be based not only on 
published details of the archaeology of the sites, but also upon first­
hand investigation.20 The value of the results of Wild’s study is also 
somewhat ameliorated by the fact that he is ‘concerned to compare the 
manner in which these rituals [of initiation into the Isiac cult] were 
conducted rather than their nature and meaning’,21 even though it 
would appear that he does stray into the realm of ‘their nature and 
meaning’ in his theory that the crypts found in many Isea and Sarapea 
were ‘places in which [the Nile] flood symbolically but “really”
16 Wild, Water in the Cultic Worship o f Isis and Osiris (including numerous 
diagrammes, pictures and plates) here 1.
17 Salditt-Trappmann, Tempel der agyptischen Gotter, 54-66, and plan 2 for 
the layout of the Gortyn Iseum.
18 Wild, Water in the Cultic Worship o f Isis and Osiris, 52.
19 Wild, Water in the Cultic Worship o f Isis and Osiris, 53.
20 See Salditt-Trappmann, Tempel der agyptischen Gotter, vii. Her 
description of the site at Gortyn certainly sounds first-hand, while Wild’s 
criticism of her identification of the crypt’s acess via ‘eine Stufe’ {Water in the 
Cultic Worship o f Isis and Osiris, 53) betrays no such first-hand knowledge.
21 Wild, Water in the Cultic Worship o f Isis and Osiris, 255 n. 73 (emphasis
added).
304 BROOK W .R. PEARSON
recurred from time to time’,22 which would then ‘preserve this sacred 
water for the needs of the cult’ 23 
I will return to Wild’s theory later, but first, it seems important to 
investigate the role that a baptismal ritual might have played for the 
individual initiate into the Isiac mysteries. What was the connection 
between— or identification of—the myths of Isis and Osiris (now 
Sarapis) and the initiation process? To this question, two tentative 
answers may be offered. The first is that, as has been suggested in the 
past,24 the Isiac initiate, in baptism, identified with the god Osiris, 
whose death in the Nile was one of the central myths of the Isis cult. 
Dunn, in his discussion of this issue in relation to Rom. 6:1-11, 
summarizes the negative response to this suggestion with two points: 
(1) Isis and Osiris were closely linked, but their cults were separate, as 
‘Osiris is never mentioned in the key passages’,25 and (2) language of 
‘identification’ is missing in the key texts of the Isis cult, such as 
Apuleius.26 The first point is, it seems to me, very difficult to defend. 
While it may be true that there is some distinction made between the 
two deities in some inscriptions,27 the indivisible nature of the 
mythology surrounding these two deities would have made it entirely 
likely that aetiological myths would have been shared, even if the two 
deities were worshipped by entirely different groups. That this was 
not the case, however, is obvious from Apuleius’s account of Lucius 
in Rome, for it is in Rome that he is initiated into the mysteries of 
Osiris, at the Iseum o f the Campus Martius. Even if  the Osiris 
initiation is a further stage on from Isiac initiation, this does not 
preclude the existence of an aetiological myth being common to both, 
or both including distinct aetiological myths. Either way, the
22 Wild, Water in the Cultic Worship o f Isis and Osiris, 49.
23 Wild, Water in the Cultic Worship o f Isis and Osiris, 53.
24 See Wengst, Christologische Formeln, 40; Griffiths, Apuleius o f  
Madauros, 52, 298-99, 301, 304, 307.
25 Dunn, Romans 1-8, 310.
26 On this second point, see esp. Wedderburn, ‘Hellenistic Christian 
Traditions’, 345 and ‘The Soteriology of the Mysteries’, 57-62.
27 Dunn (Romans 1-8, 310) cites Vidman, Isis und Osiris, 15, but surely 
misunderstands Vidman’s argument. Although Vidman does rightly suggest that 
‘Der Osiriskult verbreitete sich also nicht gleichzeitig mit dem Isiskult’ (p. 15), 
Dunn has ignored the thrust of Vidman’s point here. The very fact that Vidman, 
whose earlier Sylloge is the standard treatment of inscriptions relating to Isis and 
Sarapis, mentions the occasional independence of the Sarapis cult points up that 
the usual situation saw Isis and Osiris/Sarapis spreading simultaneously.
APPENDIX B : BAPTISM IN THE ISIS/SARAPIS CULT 305
likelihood that Isis and Osiris would play prominent roles in both 
stages of initiation is unavoidable. Of course, the archaeological 
evidence of many temples dedicated to both Isis and Osiris/Sarapis 
(e.g. at Gortyn, Crete; Eretria, Greece; Priene, Asia Minor, etc.) 
makes a position such as Dunn’s clearly untenable.
Dunn’s second point, however— the question of language of 
identification— is a more important one. We lack the exact knowledge 
about the content of the mysteries of Isis and Osiris that is craved, 
specifically, the aetiological myth(s) that would explain the 
significance of the various symbols and rituals about which Apuleius 
speaks: ‘Behold, I have told you my experience, and yet what you 
hear can mean nothing to you’ (11:23). In the absence of these, 
however, we are by no means left without recourse. The admixture of 
the various mythologies o f the Greco-Roman period led to a very 
interesting situation in the discussion of any particular expression of 
religion. Two writers in particular—Diodorus of Sicily (Siculus), who 
probably published his Library o f History some time between 36 and 
30 BCE, and Plutarch, whose career covered the last half of the first 
century CE— showed a great deal of interest in the gods, religions and 
myths of Egypt and their various relationships to the Greek gods, 
religions and myths. The results o f their investigations make very 
interesting reading, and may offer several clues to the content of the 
central myths of the Isis and Osiris mysteries. As these writers make 
clear, the identification of Osiris with Dionysus seems to have 
occupied a great deal of the discussion of the religious and mythical 
role of Osiris (see below, n. 33), and we should thus expect that 
recourse to the Dionysian mysteries, especially in their later Orphic 
form, would also be a legitimate avenue of research into the 
possibility of identification between the initiate into the Isiac 
mysteries and the dying and rising Osiris.
If this latter course of research is pursued, there are two elements 
which need to be mentioned: (1) The aetiological myth of the Orphic 
mysteries has the son of Zeus—Zagreus— being lured with toys and 
eaten by the Titans, except for his heart, which, being saved by 
Athena, is swallowed by Zeus. Becoming ‘pregnant’, Zeus gives birth 
to another Zagreus— Dionysus. He then destroys the Titans and, from 
their ashes, mankind springs forth, a mixture of the divine nature of 
Zagreus (as his body, having been recently eaten by the Titans, was 
burnt along with their own flesh), and the evil nature of the Titans
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(hence Plato, Laws 701c, ‘the Titanic nature of man’).28 As Nilsson 
describes it:
The myth of the Titans’ crime against Zagreus might be taken as an 
aetiological tale intended to explain the central rite in the Dionysiac 
orgies, the tearing to pieces and devouring of the god personified in an 
animal, but with this rite, Orphicism indissolubly associates the myth of 
man’s origin from the ashes of the Titans, in which particles of the divine 
Zagreus were also present.29
C lem ent o f  A lexandria, in his E xhortation  to the 
Greeks/Protreptikos 2:15, gives a version of this tale in which (as with 
the rest of the chapter) he is keen to speak openly about the contents 
of the mysteries, els* KaTdyvcaaiv Trapa0ea0ai, ‘for the purpose of 
stirring up condemnation’, and quotes rà  dxpEia cruf±(3oXa, ‘the 
worthless symbols’ of the mystery as the knuckle-bone, the ball, the 
spinning top, apples, wheel, mirrors, and fleece— the toys with which 
the Titans had lured the child Zagreus to his fate. What Clement either 
does not know, or is not willing to describe in his ridicule, is the 
powerful ritual of the Orphic orgy, in which a live animal— often a 
bull— was slaughtered and eaten by the initiates— who then both take 
on the persona of the Titans and partake of the god himself.30 (2) In 
Egypt, the aetiological myth of the slaughter of Zagreus and (re)-birth
28 See also Diodorus Siculus 5:75:4, and I.E. Harrison, Prolegomena to the 
Study o f Greek Religion (Whitstable, England: Whitstable Litho, 1980 [1903]) 
478-571 for a full discussion of the Orphic mysteries.
29 M.P. Nilsson, A History o f Greek Religion (trans. E.J. Fiel den; Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2nd edn, 1949) 216-18, here 217. See also the discussions in W. 
Burkert, Greek Religion (trans. J. Raffan; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1985) 297-99; idem, ‘Craft Versus Sect: The Problem of Orphies and 
Pythagoreans’, in B.F. Meyer and E.P. Sanders (eds), Jewish and Christian Self- 
Definition. III. Self-Definition in the Greco-Roman World (London: SCM Press, 
1982; Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983) 1-22, 183-89; W.K.C. Guthrie, The 
Greeks and their Gods (Boston: Beacon Press, 1954) 318-21; and, for the Near 
Eastern form of the Orphic Zagreus myth, see Harrison, Prolegomena, 492-94, 
and W. Burkert, The Orientalizing Revolution: Near Eastern Influence in the 
Early Archaic Age (trans. M.E. Pinder and W. Burkert; Cambridge, MA and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1992) 94-96.
30 For the etymological identification of the participants in the orgiastic feast 
of the Orphic mysteries with the Titans, see Harrison, Prolegomena, 490-94, and 
Burkert, The Orientalizing Revolution, 94-96. Pertinent discussion of Clement’s 
use of mystery terminology in this chapter of the Protreptikos can be found in 
Riedweg, Mysterienterminologie, 152-54.
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of Dionysus was closely connected with the aetiological myth of the 
Isis and Osiris cycle— the murder, dismemberment, and scattering of 
Osiris by Typhon (himself a Titan-like figure, as can be seen in the 
story of the Typhomachy in Hesiod, Theogony 820-85). In ancient 
times, the Osiris myth was the basis for what are perhaps the first 
mysteries— the lawful succession of the pharaohs, their burial, and 
eventual union with Osiris in the afterlife.31 This ‘mystery’ eventually 
became something in which not only kings, but other Egyptians could 
partake, and, in time, spread across the known world, along with the 
worship of Isis and Sarapis.32
For our purposes here, both of these elements separately and in 
combination suggest that the Isis initiate did indeed go through a 
process of identification with the god Osiris, and that this fact would 
have been the assumption behind the entire initiation process. In the 
first place, the ancient form of the Isis-Osiris mysteries clearly has the 
kings, and later normal people, identifying with the god Osiris in the 
hope of unification with him in the afterlife (and even, possibly, in his 
resurrection). This is indisputable. We have no reason to think that the 
worship of Isis and Osiris (Sarapis), as it spread throughout the Greco- 
Roman world, changed its essential myth in any great way. The 
initiate of the first century would surely have partaken in mysteries 
akin to those practised throughout the history of the Isiac cult. This is 
where the identification of Osiris and Dionysus becomes most 
important.33 At one point in his long discussion of Isis and Osiris,
31 Cf. Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, 36-45; Meyer, The Ancient Mysteries, 
157-58.
32 See Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, 46-58 for discussion of the spread of 
the Isis cult in the Greco-Roman world, esp. pp. 56-57, 264-65 for maps of Isis- 
related finds (slightly out of date, but still impressive in their amount and 
distribution). See also Dunand, Le culte dTsis, pull-out maps at back of all three 
volumes.
33 For the identification of Osiris and Dionysus, see Plutarch, Isis and Osiris 
356B, 362B (which equates Osiris, Dionysus and Sarapis), 364E-65B (this text 
explicitly links the Orphic mystery of the slaughter of Zagreus with the 
dismemberment of Osiris, to be discussed below), 377D (‘But as for Isis, and the 
gods associated with her, all peoples own them and are familiar with them, 
although they have learned not so long ago to call some of them by the names 
which come from the Egyptians’, LCL, see also 377F); 359B and 362D also 
suggest one reason for the conflation of Orphic mysteries with the Osiris myth, in 
that the Apis bull (symbol of Sarapis), kept in a temple in Memphis, is seen to be 
the living expression of Osiris, an identification that would have been all too
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Plutarch suggests that the story of Osiris and his murder by Typhon is 
on a par with the stories o f Dionysus, Demeter, and others, ‘which 
anyone may hear freely repeated in traditional story’, but that, ‘So, 
too, are all the things which are kept always away from the ears and 
eyes of the multitude by being concealed behind mystic rites and 
ceremonies’ (360F, LCL). This would suggest that the myths which 
we know about Osiris and Isis were indeed aetiological myths for the 
Isis cult, just as the other myths Plutarch mentions were, even though 
they had a more popular form. The most striking texts are those which 
equate the central Orphic myth with the story of Osiris: Plutarch, Isis 
and Osiris 364E-365B, ‘the tales concerning the Titans and the rites 
celebrated by night [i.e. the Orphic orgies] agree with the accounts of 
the dismemberment of Osiris and his revivification and regenesis’ 
(LCL); and Diodorus Siculus 1:25:6-7, ‘[Isis] discovered the drug [or 
‘charm/spell’— the Greek is < f> d p p .a K o v 34 ]  of immortality, by means of 
which she not only raised from the dead her son Horus, who had been 
the object of plots on the part of the Titans and had been found dead 
under the water, giving him his soul, but also made him to receive of 
immortality’.35 The collocation of death, water, and resurrection in
familiar to the Orphic orgiastics; Diodorus Siculus 1:11:3-4; 1:13:5; 1:22:6-7 (this 
is another text which explicitly links the Dionysian rituals with the story of Osiris, 
here the honour of the phallus which is common to them both: ‘the Greeks too, 
receiving from Egypt the celebration of the orgies and the festivals connected 
with Dionysus...’; on this, see also Plutarch 365B-C); 1:23:1-8 (explains how 
Orpheus, who is credited with having both fundamentally altered the original 
Dionysian rites and established them in their most enduring form [hence ‘Orphic’ 
mysteries of Dionysus, cf. Harrison, Prolegomena, 454-77], actually took these 
mysteries from Egypt); 1:25:1-2 (which discusses various divine identifications, 
including Sarapis, Dionysus, Zeus, Pluto, Ammon, and Pan); and 1:25:6-7 (links 
the myths of Osiris and Zagreus). Dunand’s explanation of various of these 
identifications also bears repeating. On the basis of her theory that the Isis cult 
essentially had no mystery of its own, she suggests that aspects of various Greco- 
Roman religions were taken and grafted onto the Isis/Osiris myths, thus creating a 
new thing altogether (see Dunand, Le culte d ’Isis, 246-48).
34 LSI, s.v. (^dppaicov, 1917.
35 The connection between Osiris and his son Horus is ancient. Apparently, 
in the ancient form of the mysteries, Horus is the result of the necrophiliac union 
of Isis and Osiris, after Osiris had been killed, and thus ‘Osiris reincarnate in the 
body of a new Pharaoh’ (Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, 210). As such, this story 
as found in Diodorus would be a cognate to the (re)-birth of Dionysus from the 
heart of Zagreus—Dionysus and Zagreus are different, yet the same, and such is 
also the case for Horus and Osiris. Diodorus goes on to tell us that Horus, being
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this last passage makes an extremely strong case for the cultic 
connection of these elements, which may, in turn, help explain the 
various snippets of information we have from other sources, as 
discussed above.36
It is at this juncture that a return to Wild’s theory concerning the 
role of the Isiac crypts may be potentially fruitful. Despite the fact that 
Burkert cites Wild’s theory as though it alone will refute the notion 
that baptism took place in the Isis cult (while completely ignoring 
S alditt-T rapmann ’ s contrary notions),37 what we know of the role of 
aetiological myths in Greco-Roman mystery religions would suggest 
the opposite interpretation. Given the specific nature of the myth 
which undergirded the Isiac religion, it would seem more reasonable 
to suggest that this identification of the crypts as re-enactments of the 
Nile itself would even more strongly lend credence to the idea that 
such constructs had a role to play in the initiatory process itself, even 
one in which the initiate descends into the underworld through a re­
enactment of the death of Osiris. Rather than give difficulty to the 
idea of initiatory baptism in the Isis/Sarapis cult, Wild’s theory with 
regard to the crypts, when taken in conjunction with many of the other
made divine by his mother’s action, is actually to be identified with the Greek god 
Apollo, ‘having been instructed by his mother Isis in both medicine and 
divination, he is now a benefactor of the race of men through his oracular 
responses and his healings’ (1:25:7, LCL). That Plutarch does not make this 
similar identification is interesting, in the light of his numerous parallels to 
Siculus in other matters, and his ready willingness to show his addressee, Clea 
‘head of the inspired maidens of Delphi’ (364E), how Dionysus is the same as 
Osiris, but not so willing, apparently, to make the identification of Apollo (whose 
priest he was) with Horus, Osiris’s son. See also the Oxyrhynchus Litany 209, and 
Witt, Isis in the Ancient World, 51-53, for evidence and discussion of the way in 
which Horus came to associated with Apollo.
36 As Griffiths {Apuleius o f Madauros, 52), an Egyptologist and scholar of 
the Isiac religion, put it, ‘there is a parallel’ to the idea of identification with 
Christ ‘in the Isiac’s attitude to Osiris. In Christianity the identity was 
undoubtedly more personal, and it was concerned, unlike Isiacism, with a 
historical person. If there is a similar formulation, the spiritual content differs. 
The Isiac believer identified his death and rebirth with those of Osiris’. See also 
Harrison, Prolegomena, 474, discussing the Orphic reform of the Dionysian 
mysteries: ‘the worshippers of Dionysus believed that they were possessed by the 
god. It was but a step further to pass to the conviction that they were actually 
identified with him, actually became him. This was a conviction shared by all 
orgiastic religions...in Egypt the worshippers of Osiris after death became Osiris’.
37 Burkert, Ancient Mystery Cults, 101.
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elements presented in this appendix, offers some of its strongest 
support.
EXCURSUS: P.PARIS 47 AND BAPTISM IN THE ISIS/SARAPIS CULT38
A final note must be made regarding the relevance of P.Paris 47 
(U P Z  1.70, Sel.Pap. 1.100) for the question of baptism in the 
Isis/Sarapis cult. This text has been brought up by various scholars as 
‘evidence’ for such baptism, while vehemently denied by others, and 
ignored by still others. The controversy over this text occurs on two 
fronts: (1) the restoration, reading and translation of the text itself, and 
(2) its meaning. Depending on the way this papyrus is restored and 
translated, it may indicate not only that baptism existed in the 
Isis/Sarapis cult (at least in Egypt), but that the link between death and 
baptism that we have seen in Apuleius was also made at a much 
earlier date— and not only in the popular mind, but also between 
initiates. P .P a r is  47 is a mid-second century BCE letter from 
Apollonius, an official at the Sarapeum in Memphis, to his brother 
Ptolemaeus (see UPZ  1.66 = P. Paris 43 = S el Pap. 1.99), whom he 
addresses as ‘father’ (as he does in U PZ  1.68 = P.Paris  44; this 
probably means that Ptolemaeus was his spiritual father, as Mithras 
was to Lucius in Apuleius). This text was first published by Brunet de 
Presle in 1865,39 re-edited by Witkowski in 1906,40 and then again by 
Wilcken in 1927 41 Various others have subsequently followed these 
versions.42
38 I wish to thank my colleague Bernhard Palme of the Commission fur 
Antike Rechtsgeschichte of the Ôsterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 
and the Papyrussammlung and Papyrusmuseum of the Ôsterreichische 
Nationalbibliothek for corresponding with me concerning this papyrus. Although 
I diverge from his opinion on the interpretation of this papyrus, his thoughtful 
comments have greatly helped me shape my own opinion on the matter.
39 J.A. Letronne, W. Brunet de Presle and E. Egger (eds.), Notices et textes 
des papyrus du Musée du Louvre et de la Bibliothèque Impériale (Notices et 
extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque Impériale et autres bibliothèques 18.2; 
Paris, 1865) 314.
40 S. Witkowski, Epistulae Privatae Graecae quae in Papy ris Aetatis 
Lagidarum Servantur (Leipzig: Teubner, 2nd edn, 1911 [1906]) 88-90, no. 48.
41 Wilcken, UPZ 1.70, pp. 331-35.
42 E.g. G. Milligan, Selections from the Greek Papyri (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1907) 21-24 no. 7, following Witkowski; A. Hunt 
and B. Edgar, Select Papyri (2 vols.; LCL; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
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P.Paris 47, written in 152 BCE, is part of a small archive {P.Paris 
40-47) of letters relating to the activities o f this Ptolemaeus, a 
koltoxos* (religious recluse) of the Sarapeum in Memphis.43 In this 
particular letter, Apollonius expresses his anger at something, 
although what exactly is somewhat unclear.44 Lines 1-13 of Wilcken’s 
edition read:
1 ’ATroXXcjûVLo? IlToXepaLWL 
TCÛ TTOtTpi XClLpeiV. ’OpVU" 
o Top Éàpamv, i pf) piKpov 
TL éPTpéTTOpai, OÙK ctv [16 
5 lôes* TO TT-O-paCOTTOV pou
TTOTTOTe, O T l ^O E U S ^L  
TidvTa Kal o l  uapa ae  
6e o 1 ÔpOLùJÇ, OTL È V  
(3épXr|Kav ûpâç^ e l ç  üXt|v 
10 pEyàXriv Kal ou ôuvdpE"
0 a  àrroOavELV, k c lp  l ô ï ] ç  
o t l  péXXopEV CTLûOfjvaL,
TÔ TE (3aT T T L C w pE 0a. 
ktX...
Wilcken translates this as (beginning mid-line 2):
Ich schwore beim Sarapis: wenn ich mich (dessen) nicht ein wenig 
schâmte, so würdst Du niemals mein Angeschicht wieder sehen. Denn Du 
lügst ailes und die Gotter bei Dir gleichfalls, denn sie haben uns in einen 
groB Schlamm geworfen und worin wir sterben kônnen, und wenn Du (im 
Trâume) gesehen hast, da6 wir (daraus) gerettet werden sollen (gerade) 
dann werden wir untergetaucht.45
Press/London: Heinemann, 1932, 1934) 1.100, following Wilcken; White, Light 
from Ancient Letters, 75-76, no. 42, following Wilcken.
43 These papyri from the Sarapaeum at Memphis are actually only a small 
part of a much larger archive of approximately 100 documents, apparently found 
in a single container by Arabs in the early nineteenth century, but which were 
then split up for sale in different lots. See E.G. Kenyon, ‘The Serapaeum at 
Memphis’, in Greek Papyri in the British Museum: Catalogue, with Texts. I. 
(London: British Museum, 1893) 1-43, esp. 1-6 with regard to the entire archive. 
The archive is split between Paris, the Vatican, Leiden, and London (the British 
Museum). See also White, Light from Ancient Letters, 63-76, nos. 34^42.
44 White, Light from Ancient Letters, 75: ‘The nature of his difficulty 
is...puzzling. Though he talks about the gravity of the situation, he does not 
identify the problem. Ptolemy, of course, would have understood the 
circumstances.’
45 Wilcken, UPZ, 333.
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Reitzenstein,46 interpreting the papyrus somewhat differently than 
this, argued that the problem in this papyrus is connected with a delay 
to Apollonius’s full initiation into the mysteries (much as we have 
seen in the case of Lucius in Apuleius), which is what causes him to 
call into doubt the gods’ fidelity. In doing so, it may be that 
Apollonius provides us with very early evidence indeed that death 
could be connected to the practice o f Isiac initiatory baptism. 
Reitzenstein translates 11. 8-10 something like ‘they [Ptolemaeus’s 
gods, 11. 6-8] have cast us into a great forest’, but then sees the next 
few words as a quotation of Ptolemaeus being cast back in his face by 
the angry Apollonius, “‘and we cannot die”— and if you should see 
[i.e. in a dream, cf. 1. 30] that we are about to be saved, then we 
should be baptized’. So Reitzenstein saw the papyrus essentially as a 
complaint and argument between Apollonius and his brother/mentor, 
Ptolemaeus. He later modified his reading,47 and suggested that the 
Q L T ro Ô a v e îv  and (3 a T T T iC c 6 p .€ 0 a  mean essentially the same thing, that is: 
‘they have cast us into a great forest, and we cannot die [in baptism], 
but if you should see [in a dream] that we are about to be saved [by 
being initiated], then we will be baptized’, with the ‘and we cannot 
die’ being a complaint that his baptism had been delayed, rather than a 
quotation of Ptolemaeus by Apollonius.
Any translation of this papyrus is faced with two contentious 
readings, which form the basis o f the disagreement between 
Reitzenstein and Wilcken: (1) The accenting on the ou from 1. 
10— Witkowski (followed by W ilcken) reads ou— the relative 
pronoun— while the original edition by Brunet de Presle has the 
negative particle, où (followed by Reitzenstein). This accenting is 
further compounded by the alternatives available for the function of 
ou: Milligan48 takes it in its adverbial meaning of ‘where’, while 
Wilcken (followed by Edgar and Hunt and White) translates it in its 
pronominal sense, which they translate as ‘in which’. Neither Wilcken 
nor Reitzenstein really discusses this matter in any detail. Wilcken 
limits his comments (otherwise quite extensive) to a textual note 
indicating that Witkowski reads ou, while Brunet de Presle reads où. 
(2) The translation/understanding of (3aTmCa)|j.e0a. The first problem 
with this word is that, while it looks like a subjunctive, Wilcken takes 
it as an indicative ( |3 a T T T iC 6 |ie 0 a ) , in which he has been followed by
46 Reitzenstein, Hellenistic Mystery-Religions.
47 ‘Religionsgeschichte und Eschatologie’, ZNW  13(1912) 1-28.
48 Milligan, Selections from the Greek Papyri, 21-24, no. 7.
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Edgar and Hunt and White. The second problem is how it should then 
be translated. Milligan’s citation of Mark 10:38 as evidence for his 
translation: ‘we are immersed in trouble’, seems somewhat fanciful.49 
However, this translation is reasonably in line with Wilcken’s, ‘dann 
werden wir untergetaucht’ ( ‘then we go under’), which is followed by 
both Edgar and Hunt ( ‘then we sink outright’) and White ( ‘then we 
are immersed’).
Essentially, the translation/understanding of ou is directly related to 
one’s understanding of the relationship between and meaning of 
airoQaveiv and |3aTTTLCcop.€6a. It would seem that the translation of 
paTTTiCwp-eGa is open to interpretation— although Wilcken can see no 
way to understand it but to relate it back to 6v(3é(3Xr|rav u|iâç els* 
uXpv p,eydXr|v:
Der Begriff des ^airTiCeaQai paBt so ausgezeichnet zu dem mit 
èv(3é(3Xr|Kav [f)pets'] eiç üXtip gezeichneten Bild, daG man dies Bild nur 
zerstôren wiirde, wenn man hierin eine iibertragene Bedeutung wie 
Reitzenstein Taufe finden wollte. Sie ist in der Tat hier ganz 
ausgeschlossen.50
However, Reitzenstein, writing in a revised edition of his Hellenistic 
Mystery-Religions (published after UPZ), responds to this statement 
by suggesting that
It is my opinion that certainty cannot be gained here at all, for uXpv is not 
the word that necessarily produces this picture, LÔTjç refers to something 
that is to be done in the future,51 and (BaTTTiCopeGa and fipS? are only 
conjectural; the subjunctive is also possible. Such passages are better left 
aside. The only thing that is proved is—and for the later statements this is
49 ÔUVttCTÔE TTLELV TO TTOTppiOV Ô Èyà) TTLVCO T] TO (BdtTTTlOp.Cl O Eyd)
PctTmCopcu paTTTKjefjmi; (‘Are you able to drink the cup that I drink, or to be 
baptized with the baptism with which I am baptized?’). Milligan, with regard to 
(BcnmCwpeea in P.Paris 47, suggests that this is a ‘metaphorical usage, recalling 
strikingly the language of Mk [10:38]...’ (Selections from the Greek Papyri, 22 n. 
to 1. 13). It seems odd that Milligan would see this usage in Mark as metaphoric 
(at least in the sense that he uses in translating P.Paris 47), as the discussion in 
Mark seems to be a clear reference to religious or cultic ceremonies, but in an 
intensified sense because of their relation to Jesus’ coming Passion. This is 
discussed by Kennedy, St. Paul and the Mystery Religions, 230-32, esp. 232 n. 2.
50 Wilcken, UPZ, 334.
51 This assertion seems to rely on a view of the subjunctive which is 
essentially time-based. Although this is often the case, it is by no means certain 
that subjunctives will refer to future time. For discussion, see Porter, Verbal 
Aspect, 321-35.
314 BROOK W .R. PEARSON
important enough—that Ptolemaeus prophesies on the basis of dreams and 
declares that certain deities are speaking through him.52
At the end of the discussion, it is probably best to go with 
Reitzenstein’s suggestion that ‘certainty cannot be gained here at all’, 
but I am not convinced that ‘such passages are better left aside’, since, 
given the nature of a ‘mystery cult’, even half-heard, difficult to 
understand conversations between these ancient initiates may become 
significant in the light of other evidence. In this case, I think it is 
important to remain open to the idea that this text may be interpreted 
in the manner suggested by Reitzenstein, and is not, simply because 
most translations and editions have followed Wilcken, necessarily to 
be understood as Wilcken understood it.
When read in tandem with the other evidence we have concerning 
the Isis cult’s initiatory rituals discussed in this appendix, it is possible 
that the uncertainty with regard to the ‘trouble’ in which Apollonius 
finds himself could be resolved. In the first place, depending on the 
reading, this papyrus may establish either that baptism is associated 
with salvation, or with death, or that the consequence of prematurely 
partaking of baptism is death. Any of these solutions to the riddle of 
P.Paris  47, especially in conjunction with what we know from 
Apuleius, suggests the importance of baptism for the Isis cult, and 
probably with regard to initiatory rituals.
52 Reitzenstein, Hellenistic Mystery-Religions, 251.
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